Admiral CASSADY. That is correct. Mr. SIKES. After these deliveries were completed? Admiral CASSADY. That is correct, sir. Mr. MAHON. Would it not probably be an uncomplimentary commentary on the air arm of the Navy and the air arm of the Air Force if it should be said that your operating forces were 100 percent modern? That would indicate, despite the fact that sometimes it takes 2 or 3 years to construct a plane, that you had made no new models and had no new developments. It can never be 100 percent modern. Admiral CASSADY. That is correct. The normal plane, after about 3 years of use, more or less becomes a second-hand plane, and I agree with you that you probably never would get any time 100 percent modernization. PROCUREMENT OF RECIPROCATING ENGINE AIRCRAFT Mr. SIKES. In view of the fact that you have found the conventional type plane to be highly satisfactory for the Korean operation, are you acquiring any replacements of that type plane, or is all the money in this bill for the jet aircraft? Admiral CASSADY. Fortunately, Mr. Sikes, we have in storage 4,000 of the reciprocating type that we are now using in Korea. We estimate it will not be necessary to procure through new production any additional planes of those types. Mr. SIKES. But what if future incidents similar to the Korean situation develop and we find we have gone a little too modern in our thinking and we find it is an expensive type of operation; that the reciprocating engine is actually more satisfactory and much more economical for operations of the Korean type, then where will we be? Admiral CASSADY. We still have in production, and will continue for at least another year, the Chance-Vought F40-5N. That production line does not run out for another 12 months. In addition, we are continuing in production the Douglas AD attack type. That is in itself quite an effective fighter-bomber. In addition, we have the A-2-D Douglas, which has the new turboprop engine; so we feel that by the time our present stock of conventional reciprocating engines runs out-the World War II type planes-the A-2-D will be developed and we will have other types which will be much more effective. Mr. SIKES. Actually, I fear the ground support that has been given by the Air Forces in Korea is going to prove possibly the most expensive air support ever given. I don't minimize the importance of air support. But heretofore planes have been fueled in Japan, flown to combat, stay over the target a few minutes, and are flown back to refuel again. The conventional type engine is much more economical and because of the lack of air opposition is fully adequate to the need thus far. Mr. TABER. Is that true as far as the Navy is concerned? Mr. SIKES. I am talking about the Air Force. I know that they are doing the best they can with what they have over there, but I think that we must recognize all the facts. Mr. MAHON. The Air Force is not using the jet which has such a small amount of time over the combat area exclusively in the air operation. Mr. SIKES. That is true. They are using both types. Now as I understand it, the bill you have before us will give you planes to carry on the Korean campaign and will do very little else? Admiral CASSADY. That is correct. Mr. SIKES. It could not do much, if anything, to alleviate the aggravated shortage of first-line planes which we have been pointing to for several years in the Navy? Admiral CASSADY. That is correct, sir. SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS Mr. SIKES. Now, how many aircraft carriers were you operating prior to the Korean situation? Admiral CASSADY. We were operating seven. Mr. SIKES. How many are you operating now? Admiral CASSADY. Still seven. We will have two more. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. SIKES. You can put me on the record as stating that there is a serious deficiency in the number of aircraft carriers now operating, both from the standpoint of successful operation in Korea, and from the standpoint of our national security. I hope the services will take into consideration the size of the overall task and take more carriers out of mothballs. I do understand we have the carriers in mothballs and that they can be put speedily into operation? Admiral CASSADY. Yes. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. MAHON. If this program as proposed here in the supplemental budget is completed how many carriers will be put into operation in the active fleet? Admiral CASSADY. Nine large carriers; 10 small carriers, plus one small carrier reduced in commission for training, plus three transport carriers. (Off record discussion.) NEED FOR INDEPENDENT OPINIONS OF WITNESSES BEFORE THE COMMITTEE Mr. NORRELL. I voted for construction of the big carrier, and if the Navy thinks it should have it now, I am ready to vote for it again. I want the admiral who is in charge of determining what the Navy needs to have that responsibility, and I want the general in the Army as well as the Marine Corps to tell us what they think. This statement applies to the other services. Congress in the final analysis can decide what should be done. We should have the benefit of these expert opinions though. Mr. SHEPPARD. May I suggest, as long as we are discussing that, that in order to literally achieve what the gentleman is suggesting, with which I heartily concur, we will have to amend the National Security Act. (Off record discussion.) EXPENDITURES ESTIMATED IN 1951 Mr. ENGEL. In the entire budget of $10,000,000,000 requested, how much is for direct appropriation, not contract authorization, but cash appropriation? I would like to know just how much of that money is going to be drawn out of the Treasury in 1950, 1951, 1952, and so on. In other words I would like to get your schedule of expenditures, exact cash expenditures balanced against levy. Admiral HopwOOD. The expenditures for 1951. Mr. ENGEL. That is $10,000,000,000? Admiral HopwOOD. No. I am speaking only for the Navy. Admiral HopwOOD. The expenditure estimated for 1951, on the original basis, as amended by the House action, was 4.6 billion dollars; the supplemental appropriation now being considered will add 1.350 billion dollars to that in 1951, making an estimated 5.950 billion dollars expenditures in 1951. The remainder, or about 1.350 billion dollars of the supplemental will be expended proportionately: an estimated 70 percent in 1952, and 30 percent in 1953. EFFECT OF ADDITIONAL $950,000,000 FOR AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT Mr. SIKES. If we were to give you $950,000,000 additional for aircraft at this time what would be the effect on the request for aircraft for the next 2 or 3 succeeding years, assuming that the world condition does not become more aggravated? Admiral CASSADY. That would be less. We would require less aircraft, because after we once work up to the proper degree of modernization we would level off the requirements to about 200 or 250 planes per month. COST OF MAINTAINING A LEVEL OF 7,000 AIRCRAFT Admiral PRIDE. Yes. Say about seven-thousand-odd airplanes; under normal conditions I would think they would cost about $2,000,000,000 a year, to keep it at that level would be somewhere, say, around 2,500 airplanes a year, and the cost would be, I would think, about $2,000,000,000. Mr. ENGEL. That is for the Navy? Admiral PRIDE. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. And you are asking $2,000,000,000 for the 56 groups in the Army? Mr. SHEPPARD. What becomes of the 70? Mr. ENGEL. They proposed 56 groups. Admiral PRIDE. I think with the number of planes that we are discussing here it will come to pretty near one-third of whatever the cost is, the capital investment, which happens to be about $3,000,000,000, and it will cost pretty close to the billion dollars to keep them up. And if the investment, which happens to be the case in the Air Force is, say, about three times the Navy, it will cost them three times as much to keep them modernized. Mr. ENGEL. Of course, I was figuring on the group that we were talking about in the Navy Air Force. Admiral PRIDE. If we had the same number of planes it would be about the same ratio. Mr. ENGEL. But we were told that it would cost $2,000,000,000 a year to keep a 56-group Air Force modernized. Admiral PRIDE. With any air force, no matter whether it is Army, Navy, for modernization it is pretty near one-third the cost of the capital investment. Mr. ENGEL. I do not quite agree with that, Admiral, for the reason, that the Naval Air Force has a larger percentage of small planes with an average lower cost than the B-36 or the B-47. Admiral PRIDE. But they become obsolete, not because of what we do; but the enemy obsoletes them. Mr. MAHON. At any time they may become obsolete, after they have been operated for 3 or 4 years, you have got to replace. The bombers and the cargo planes may last a little longer, 5 or 6 years, but whether they are obsolete or not you still have to replace them. Admiral PRIDE. I think the history of the last few years will bear that out. Mr. ENGEL. But you cannot rebuild all of the planes every time you get a new type of plane; you can only build a certain number of new planes each year. Admiral CASSADY. That is right. Mr. ENGEL. If you replace one-third of them each year we would have a peacetime tax structure that would be prohibitive. When we get in war we would have a different situation. Mr. MAHON. If you should freeze all models of fighters and bomber aircraft and not make any alterations or changes, you would still have to replace them in 3 to 5 years. Mr. SHEPPARD. If you used them. AVAILABILITY OF CARRIERS AND CARRIER PLANES Mr. TABER. If you undertook to develop and bring into service 12 carriers instead of 9 would you have the carriers available to put in commission? Admiral CASSADY. Yes; we have some 15 big carriers in mothballs at the present time. Mr. TABER. Do you have the effective planes in shape so they could be put on them? Admiral CASSADY. At the present time it would be necessary to take out of mothballs some additional planes and operate some of the light planes. Mr. TABER. That is, it would be necessary to take the reciprocating engines? Admiral CASSADY. That is right. Mr. TABER. Have you any new planes on order now that you got money for that you can very materially step up the delivery in the present fiscal year? Admiral CASSADY. We estimate that it will take about 1 year—is that about right? Admiral PRIDE. In fiscal year 1950. Mr. TABER. Well, we are a little bit by 1950. Mr. SHEPPARD. You are asking about the construction of those presently considered for delivery. Mr. TABER. I was asking if construction beyond the group that is estimated for here was contemplated; and if they expected to get delivery of many of those in fiscal year 1951. (Discussion off the record.) SHIPS AND FACILITIES WITNESS REAR ADM. D. H. CLARK, CHIEF, BUREAU OF SHIPS Mr. MAHON. What is the next item, Admiral Hopwood? Admiral HopwOOD. The next item is for the Bureau of Ships, and will be presented by Admiral Clark, Chief, Bureau of Ships. GENERAL STATEMENT Mr. MAHON. We will be glad to have a statement from you, Admiral. Admiral CLARK. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: the supplemental appropriations which I am here to justify are those for "Ships and facilities" and "Construction of ships, Navy". SHIPS AND FACILITIES The total supplemental request under "Ships and facilities" is $483,748,000. This request is to provide for increased expenses due to (a) The activation of those vessels which have been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations for return to the active fleet; (b) Maintenance and operating expenses for those ships which are being restored to the active fleet; (c) Increased operating expenses for those vessels which are taking part in the Korean operation; (d) Pipeline or "stocking" requirements at advanced bases to care for the material requirements of the vessels taking part in the Korean operation; (e) Procurement of ships' components, repair parts, and electronics equipment. Miscellaneous minor support items for the foregoing major expenses. The expenses involved in this supplemental request which are explained briefly but in somewhat more detail under each of the budget activities concerned have been computed by (1) multiplying the unit activation estimates for the types of vessels concerned by the numbers of those vessels; and (2) by multiplying the estimated unit consumption requirements for repair parts, components, and so forth, by the number of vessels. (The consumption estimates for those vessels operating in the western Pacific have been increased above normal.) The summation of these two computations, when taken together with the material procurement requirements and estimates for "pipeline" requirements, accounts for all but a minor portion of the total supplemental request. |