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PROPOSED INCREASES IN PROGRAM

(1) An increase of $9,589,000 for structural repair projects.

(2) An increase of $840,000 for landing aids.

(3) An increase of $3,139,000 for shop and industrial equipment.

8. Research and development:

Senate bill, 1951..

Proposed supplemental..

Revised requirement, 1951..

$75, 005, 000

0

75, 005, 000

No increase is requested under this budget activity. Concurrently with the increase in operating strength and the supporting expansion in aircraft procurement, aircraft and equipment prototypes must be accelerated rapidly to the point of production. There is an urgent need in the combat forces for levels of performance of which our prototype equipment is capable. Further, there is an equally urgent need for improved components to support not only the experimental prototypes under development but also to increase the effectiveness of aircraft already in production.

It is estimated that $62,000,000 additional is required to supplement the aviation research and development program for this purpose but no increase is being requested under this appropriation. It is understood that funds for this program are being requested separately by the Secretary of Defense.

9. Industrial mobilization:

Senate bill, 1951

Proposed supplemental.

Revised requirement, 1951--

No increase is requested under this budget activity.

$4,065, 000

0

4, 065, 000

Although no supplemental estimate is requested under this budget activity, plans are being developed to increase mobilization tooling and to establish small pilot lines for critical components. It is understood that funds for this program are being requested separately by the Secretary of Defense.

10. Supporting equipment, matériel, and services:

Senate bill, 1951.

Proposed supplemental

Revised requirement, 1951----

PROPOSED INCREASES IN PROGRAM

$26, 757, 000

39, 322, 000

66, 079, 000

The following table presents an analysis of proposed increases by individual subactivities:

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PROPOSED INCREASES IN PROGRAM

(1) An increase of $934,800 for 300 additional employees.—Salary requirements are computed on a steady rate of accessions to bring all additional personnel on board by December 31, 1950. On this basis the average salary of additional employees will be 75 percent of the existing Bureau average salary of $4,154, or $3,116. (Three hundred employees at $3,116 equals $934,800 additional salary requirement.)

(2) An increase of $550,760 for overtime cost of civilian employees. It is estimated that 281,000 overtime hours will be required at $1.96 per hour for a total cost of $550,760. The estimated number of overtime hours is based on an average of approximately 700 of the Bureau's civilian staff working a 6-day week in lieu of the normal 5-day week.

(3) An increase of $222,440 for related departmental expense.-The increase for related departmental expense is required as follows:

Required to equip offices for 300 employees__

A 37 percent increase in general expenses corresponding to increased personnel__.

$53, 000

62, 000

Increased communications toll charges arising from greater volume of urgent business_.

17, 440

Increased travel requirements.

90, 000

Total__

222, 440

Admiral PRIDE. The other items, other than the procurement of aircraft, will be flight operations, Regular Navy and Reserve, and we would ask for an increase over the 1951 bill of $36,425,000.

In aircraft overhaul, which is the function of the increased operation, we would ask for an increase of $32,884,000.

For station operations, Regular Navy and Reserve, we would ask for an increase of $25,171,000.

For alteration and replacement of facilities, we would ask for an increase of $13,568,000.

In going down my table, which you have there, I would like to invite attention to the fact that research and development and industrial mobilization have nothing in there, and inevitably there will have to be something.

Supporting equipment, matériel and services, an increase of $39,322,000.

Departmental administration, an increase of $1,708,000.

Mr. MAHON. I note that you have there a total increase of $149,078,000.

In your justifications extending from page 1 through page 18, which we have placed in the record, you have broken down for the use of the committee these proposed increases?

Admiral PRIDE. Yes.

ALTERATION AND REPLACEMENT OF FACILITIES

Mr. MAHON. This alteration and replacement of facilities, generally speaking, embraces what?

Admiral PRIDE. The resurfacing of runways, the repair and replacing of power facilities and this is in the Far East and Pacific areasand rehabilitation of structural facilities. There is an increase in there of $840,000 for landing aids.

Mr. MAHON. Where would those landing aids be used?
Admiral PRIDE. At all the fields in the Pacific.

Mr. MAHON. The forward area?

Admiral PRIDE. Yes-modern lighting and aids to landing.

We need about $3,000,000 for additional tooling in overhaul and repair facilities.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

DEFICIENCY IN NUMBER OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I think we have had some very informative and valuable statements from the Secretary of the Navy and from Admiral Sherman.

I noted that both of them directed considerable emphasis, and this has further been brought out in subsequent testimony, to the shortage of aircraft.

The Secretary of the Navy said:

In the aircraft procurement program this estimate contemplates replacing aircraft lost in operations in Korea as well as estimates of losses using these time attrition rates in all other areas, but does not provide modernization for the naval and Marine Corps Reserve aircraft, which I consider to be a serious deficiency. Then Admiral Sherman said:

The supplemental amount of $2,648,029,000 which has been recommended to the Congress provides for most (not all) of what is necessary to the Navy during the fiscal year 1951 for these increments.

We know that cuts in naval operating strength have had a very serious effect. I would like to have a clear picture of just what our naval aircraft situation now is. I would like to ask you gentlemen how many operating aircraft we actually have in the Navy now. Admiral CASSADY. We were authorized 6,233, and we are almost at that figure. This will bring us up by 1,102 to 7,335.

For

Mr. SIKES. How many of those are modern aircraft? Admiral CASSADY. A very small percentage of them, sir. example, we would have had under this appropriation bill, with no supplemental, a deficiency of 990 combat aircraft to take care of merely our combatant forces.

Mr. SIKES. Prior to the Korean incident?

Admiral CASSADY. Prior to the Korean incident. Since that time we have increased our forces by three carrier air groups, seven patrol squadrons, and three antisubmarine squadrons. That would require an additional total of 668 aircraft.

Mr. SIKES. Are those additional aircraft needs?

Admiral CASSADY. That many additional.

Mr. SIKES. You are asking that they be modern aircraft?

Admiral CASSADY. They must be first-line, modern aircraft.

Mr. SIKES. And you do not have them now?

Admiral CASSADY. We do not have them to equip those existing squadrons.

Mr. SIKES. That is for the present situation in Korea?

Admiral CASSADY. That is for the present situation in Korea plus the general augmentation of Naval forces.

Mr. SIKES. How much would those aircraft cost?

Admiral CASSADY. Would you want me to add up the total deficiency and give you the cost on that, or break it down?

Mr. SIKES. The total.

Admiral CASSADY. In addition to that, we have had another unexpected deficiency due to the attrition of aircraft from our forces committed in Korea.

(Further discussion off the record.)

We estimate it would take 1,300 first-line planes to adequately equip the Organized Reserve. You add those deficiencies and it gives a total deficiency of 2,832. The first supplemental provides 1,067 planes. Subtracting that from your total deficiency leaves a remaining deficiency of 1,765 planes, which we estimate will cost practically $1,300,000,000.

Admiral Pride and I feel that for practical reasons it would be best if we did not at this time procure a total of 1,765 planes. We feel that about 1,300 additional planes will be sufficient at this time tomodernize completely our combat units and also to modernize approximately one-half of our Organized Reserve.

Mr. SIKES. And that would cost in addition to what is in the bill? Admiral CASSADY. Additional, $950,000,000.

Mr. SIKES. Then in your belief the money that is contained in the request now before us actually would not provide for sufficient aircraft for present security and in addition permit the operation of the Korean campaign as it should be carried on?

Admiral CASSADY. It does not, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Would it permit the operation of the Korean campaign in a satisfactory way if you ignored the matter of security in other areas?

Admiral CASSADY. That would be accepting a calculated risk, in my opinion. I think the considerations are such that I would not be justified in recommending that we do any such thing.

Mr. SHEPPARD. You would merely be increasing the existing risk, would you not?

Admiral CASSADY. That is correct.

Mr. ENGEL. Could you produce these additional planes with present facilities?

Admiral CASSADY. I would rather that Admiral Pride answer that. Mr. ENGEL. And within what time?

Mr. TABER. The ones estimated here, within what time?

Admiral PRIDE. Those would be in fiscal year 1952.

Mr. TABER. What part?

Admiral PRIDE. Spread over the year, and some of them would go on into the following year.

Mr. SIKES. We do not think the Korean situation will last that long, so will you interpret that answer in view of your previous answer to me about the need for these planes for the Korean incident?

Admiral PRIDE. I would like to withdraw that answer. I have some figures here on that. We can get a certain number of them this year, in the fiscal year 1951. Contracts have already been let for aircraft included in the original 1951 program, and the aircraft contractors are now expanding production in order to accelerate delivery schedules. We have not included funds for åircraft which cannot be delivered within the same period of time planned in the original 1951 estimate.

Mr. TABER. How many does that make for 1951 delivery and how many for 1952?

Admiral PRIDE. I do not have my delivery schedule with me. I wonder if I could send that up later. I could give you the precise schedule.

Mr. TABER. I want the figures for 1952, 1953, and, if it goes beyond that, we ought to have that. If we are to embark upon a further program, we ought to have the delivery dates of those items presented to us so that we would know what we are talking about. Admiral PRIDE. Yes.

(Information requested will be supplied the committee.)

Mr. SIKES. What you are telling us in part is there will be increased attrition of present operating aircraft as the result of the Korean campaign, and you are going to have a greater need for additional planes to replace and to modernize the operating air fleet than you would have had ordinarily; is that true?

Admiral CASSADY. That is correct.

As you will remember, Mr. Sikes, for the last several years we have never been able to procure enough aircraft to fully modernize our approved operating forces, nor have we ever been able to provide first-line aircraft to the Organized Reserve.

Mr. SIKES. Under this bill will you be able to provide first-line aircraft to the Organized Reserve?

Admiral CASSADY. No.

Mr. SIKES. Under the additional $950,000,000?

Admiral CASSADY. We will, sir.

Mr. SIKES. You will be able to provide first-line aircraft to all the active reserves?

Admiral CASSADY. For all that part which has an early mobilization combat commitment.

Mr. SIKES. Now, taking into consideration the Korean situation and requirements, what will be the percentage of modern aircraft under the bill as it is now before us? Just give me an estimate.

Admiral CASSADY. For the forces actually committed to Korea, I would say we would probably have 75 percent of first-line aircraft. Mr. MAHON. I presume you probably do not want 100-percent first-line aircraft in Korea because you are preferring to use the reciprocating engines as well as the jets, believing that is the most efficient and effective over-all operation?

Admiral CASSADY. That is correct, sir. (Discussion off the record.)

PERCENTAGE OF MODERNIZATION

Mr. SIKES. Let me go one or two steps further. If you get the additional $950,000,000, at the time of the delivery of those planes, what will be your percentage of modern planes in your operating air fleet?

Admiral CASSADY. 100 percent.

Mr. SIKES. For the $950,000,000?

Admiral CASSADY. With the additional $950,000,000, minus a deficiency of 465 planes, or about 90 percent.

Mr. SIKES. Which is really about as high a percentage as you would want?

Admiral CASSADY. At the present time, I feel that we would always have a use for a certain number of second-line planes, and we would never probably require complete 100 percent.

Mr. SIKES. But unless you continue a procurement program, then your percentage of obsolescent planes would again be increased?

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