of $1,000. An increase of $9,000 is required for additional telephone service, except local calls.

Military occupational classification project:

REAR ADM. A. M. PRIDE, CHIEF, BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS VICE ADM. J. H. CASSADY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (AIR)

CAPT. J. E. DODSON, FISCAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS CAPT. W. A. SCHOECH, DIRECTOR, PLANS COORDINATION DIVISION, BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS

E. J. LEWIS, DEPUTY FISCAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS Admiral HopWOOD. The next item, sir, is "Construction of aircraft." Rear Admiral Pride, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and Vice Admiral Cassady, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, will testify, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Will you submit us a summary statement as to the supplemental aircraft program of the Navy, Admiral Cassady? Admiral CASSADY. I have a statement, if you would like for me to hit the high lights on it, sir.

GENERAL STATEMENT

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, Naval aviation has programed for expansion in this supplemental appropriation from 6,233 operating aircraft provided in the 1951 program to 7,335 operating aircraft. This expansion as related to the 1949, 1950, and 1951 forces is indicated below in tabular form:

In addition to the above increases in combat units and operating aircraft, an increase of 4,433 officers and 30,964 enlisted men is planned. This increase provides 13,805 officers and 96,250 enlisted in comparison to our 1951 program of 9,372 officers and 65,286 enlisted men. The pilot training rate is planned to be increased to an output of 1,550 per annum from the present rate of 1,050 per annum. In order to implement the expanded program, substantial increases in aircraft procurement are required. Data submitted in support of the

original 1951 budget indicated that with forces asked for, the Navy would still have a deficiency of first line combat aircraft in Regular Navy combatant forces alone. Since the above data was furnished Congress, five important factors have been introduced;

First, we have committed our naval forces in the Far East and aircraft attrition will increase materially.

Second, we are increasing our operating forces and we must buy modern aircraft for these new groups and squadrons if they are to have real combat value in modern war.

Third, the imminent possibility of war has placed immediate importance on thorough modernization of all combat forces instead of a "calculated risk" degree of readiness.

Fourth, units of the Naval Air Reserve have been recalled to active duty and additional units will likely be called in the near future.

Fifth, the increased possibility of war makes it imperative that aircraft production capacity be built up to a sound mobilization base. (In 1941 the Navy was receiving new aircraft at the rate of 300 per month in contrast to a much lower delivery rate which would have resulted from the original 1951 budget. The Munitions Board studies show that mobilization production would fall far short of Joint Chiefs of Staff requirements for a major war. Although all-out mobilization is not under consideration at present, certainly the situation today demands steps toward mobilization at least to a point in aircraft production well above the current delivery rate. The supplemental revised budget being presented here provides for the procurement of 1,067 additional aircraft at an estimated cost of $620,000,000. It has been computed that the Navy has a remaining deficiency of 1,765 aircraft. This would permit complete modernization of Regular Navy units and partial modernization of the Naval Air Reserve. Certain practical aspects such as present limitation of the productive capacity of the aircraft industry and the limited capacity of some of our Reserve flying fields indicate that the complete provision for the total deficiency is not in order at this time. Instead the Navy views that we have a practical deficiency capable of being cared for at this time of approximately 1,300 planes. If these were procured, the essential Regular Navy units and those Reserve units where facilities. would permit, could be properly equipped. It is emphasized again that the presently planned procurement of 1,067 aircraft contained in this supplemental appropriation will not permit the assignment of any first line aircraft to our Naval Air Reserve program.

Thirteen units of organized Naval Air Reserve plus some augmenting personnel have been called for mobilization. The vacancies in the organized Reserve caused by this mobilization will be filled as soon as possible and the organized Naval Air Reserve will be continued at its present personnel and aircraft strength. From those units called for mobilization it is currently planned that they will form the nucleus of two of our three additional carrier air groups, two patrol squadrons and one antisubmarine warfare squadron. As a result of the success of our Naval Air Reserve program in recent years it is anticipated that these units will reach "ready-for-combat" status in an amazingly short period of time.

The budgetary responsibility for these plans rests with the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Rear Admiral Pride. He and his assist

ants are therefore ready to explain the supplementary appropriation in detail.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you, Admiral Cassady. We will now hear from Admiral Pride.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. A. M. PRIDE

Admiral PRIDE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, last February when I presented for your consideration the 1951 naval aviation budget estimates I explained that we were programming our operations at a greatly reduced level. During 1950 we disbanded large numbers of our combatant units, in order to conserve funds, but developments since then have made essential the reactivation of a number of these combatant units at the earliest possible date, We accordingly are now withdrawing carriers and aircraft from mothball storage and are reforming as rapidly as possible three of the five carrier air groups which were disbanded during the past year.

In arriving at the reactivations necessary, we based our decisions entirely on forces needed immediately and did not provide for implementing the recommendation of the Congressional Aviation Policy Board concerning the initial strength required to mount promptly an effective, continuing and successful air offensive against a major enemy. According to Congressional Aviation Policy Board findings, the combined air strength necessary for this purpose is the Air Force 70-group program of 20,541 aircraft and the Navy program of 14,500 aircraft, or a total of 35,041 aircraft. Our present estimates provide for our achieving one-half the carrier air group strength contemplated in the 14,500 aircraft program, with associated forces roughly in balance with this one-half level of carrier air group strength.

A comparison of our augmented 1951 program with the original program for that year, and also the program you approved for 1950, is presented in the following table:

As this table indicates, we are increasing our forces only to minimum levels immediately necessary and are planning to remain substantially below our actual strength in 1950 prior to the reduction in force.

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS

Aggregate increases of $795,347,000 are requested to support the augmentation in program. These increases reflect peacetime operating factors and peacetime training levels for all forces other than the 434 aircraft now scheduled for combat operations in the Far East. The distribution of these increases by appropriations is summarized in the following table:

The total of $1,326,519,000 required for the initial 1951 program was approved by your committee and by the House itself last May but a reduction of $4,000,000 was recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. In computing our supplemental requirements we have assumed that the entire initial estimate will be approved as requested. If the $4,000,000 is not restored, our supplemental estimate should be increased by a corresponding amount.

REGULAR NAVY FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND AIRCRAFT OVERHAUL

The augmentation of flight operations involves an increase of 1,102 operating aircraft for the Regular Navy and Marine Corps and an increase of 433,000 flying hours. These increases have been priced at actual costs for the airplane models involved, adjusted for overtime premium to the extent that work is being accomplished on an overtime basis. In all, we are requesting $36,425,000 additional for flight operations and $32,884,000 additional for aircraft overhaul.

Our overhaul estimate is closely allied to the operating program and to aircraft procurement. It reflects the increased numbers of aircraft which must be made available to operating units to support the augmented strength, less the number of additional aircraft to be delivered under the accelerated aircraft procurement program. Our operating units will require a total 2,100 additional aircraft and we expect to be able to provide 348 of these from accelerated new production deliveries, leaving a balance of 1,752 to be provided by the overhaul and modification programs. Of this number, approximately 75 percent are available in ready-for-issue storage, but require depreservation and modification before they can be assigned to the active forces. The remaining 25 percent must be provided from aircraft that require complete overhaul.

REGULAR NAVY SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

The aviation shore establishment is being expanded to base the additional operating units that we are reactivating. We plan to establish new bases in the Far East, reactivate a base in Okinawa that we closed last year, and to reopen additional bases in the continental United States for this purpose, at a total cost of $7,400,000.

To minimize costs, most of our operations will be conducted from established bases but additional funds must be provided to finance the increased workload at these bases. We are requesting $10,298,000 for increased costs at existing bases in the Pacific area and $1,816,000 for increased costs at existing bases in the Atlantic area, a total of $12,114,000.

The final element in our station operations estimate is $5,657,000 for necessary overhead support of the overhaul programs. The increased overhaul programs for aircraft and engines require increased overhead support amounting to approximately 20 percent of the direct overhaul costs involved.

These adjustments in the aviation shore establishment will suffice insofar as military dispersion and general station capacity are concerned but they will not correct serious deficiencies in operational facilities at the stations involved. The length, strength, and width of runways and parking areas, the fuel storage facilities, and the industrial shops have not been improved in conjunction with advances in aircraft performance. Substantially no funds at all have been available for this purpose since World War II and, as a result, the capabilities of the shore establishment have been so far outdistanced by modern aircraft performance that operations are becoming unnecessarily hazardous, particularly in view of the transition from reciprocating to jet models of aircraft. This situation requires a large-scale aircraft facilities improvement program to be undertaken without further delay. Funds for this purpose are essential to the other programs covered in our present estimate, and it is for this reason I am reviewing these problems with you now, but the public works funds necessary are to be separately requested. Accordingly the two aviation estimates here being presented contain no provision for these essential major public works improvements.

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

Aircraft procurement represented the largest area of deficiency in our original estimate and is the largest item in our supplemental estimate. We are requesting a total of $620,410,000 for the procurement of 1,067 additional aircraft and their related ordnance. All of these aircraft are first-line combat models for assignment to combat units of the fleet which otherwise would be compelled to operate second-line aircraft for an extended period of time. These additional. aircraft are required to support the reactivated units and to replace first-line aircraft being lost through increased attrition incident to combat operations in Korea.

So that there may be no misunderstanding as to our aircraft position, I should like to emphasize that we are not budgeting for existing deficiencies in aircraft procurement and we are not budgeting for any first-line requirements for the Naval Air Reserve. Our present request is based entirely on changes in program factors and does not meet all of our first-line requirements. To meet our total Regular Navy deficiency, and to equip our Naval Air Reserve with first-line combat models, would require an additional 1,765 aircraft beyond. those provided by the combined original and supplemental request. of $1,346,242,000.