Mr. MAHON. We will resume our hearings. SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM, 1948-51 Mr. TABER. I am interested in the total gross figures of the 1948 program, the 1949 program, the 1950 program, and the 1951 program. Those figures are not confidential? Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. Mr. TABER. Then I ask you for the figures in connection with the shipbuilding program for 1948. They show a total of $403,642,000; is that correct? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. TABER. And for 1949 a program of $246,771,000? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. TABER. For 1950 it was $150,621,000. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. TABER. And the figures submitted in the 1951 budget were $46,876,000? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. TABER. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) ADAPTABILITY OF NAVAL PLANES OPERATING IN FAR EAST Mr. TABER. Now, I would like to ask you this: Are the planes you have on the carriers that are out in the Far East of a type and character that would be chosen for the kind of warfare that they are required to engage in, or do we have a type that would be better for combat with other planes rather than a ground follow-up proposition and bombing? Admiral SHERMAN. I would like to state that the aircraft now being operated from the carriers in the western Pacific are, in my judgment, well adapted for their present employment. (Discussion off the record.) DIVISION OF KOREA AND CHINA AT THE THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL Mr. ENGEL. There was testimony here yesterday, or the day before, concerning the reason why Russia got the north half of Korea and we got the south half of Korea, south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The testimony was to the effect that an agreement was finally worked out whereby Russia took the surrender of the Japanese Army north of the thirty-eighth parallel and we took the surrender south. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. Now, before World War II Manchuria was being developed by Japan. Japan practically controlled Manchuria. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes; they had one of their most important armies in there. Mr. ENGEL. A big army in there. Do you have any idea how many men they had in there? Admiral SHERMAN. I did know the figures once. If I were to give them to you I would only be guessing. Mr. ENGEL. Give your best guess. Admiral SHERMAN. About 750,000 men. Mr. ENGEL. They had control of the industrial plants and the country as a whole. It was a Japanese development over a period of many years. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. And the entire Manchuria was north of the thirtyeighth parallel? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. What we got was South Korea; is that about right— south of the thirty-eighth parallel? Admiral SHERMAN. I would put it more definitely than that. We got such part of Korea as was south of the Liao-tung Peninsula. Mr. ENGEL. That is still farther south of the thirty-eighth parallel? Admiral SHERMAN. May I show you that on the map, off the record? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. ENGEL. The thirty-eighth parallel was the boundary? Mr. ENGEL. That put all of the Japanese Army and all of Manchurian production in the Russian zone? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. And put it under the control of the Russians—at least they took control of it. Admiral SHERMAN. In that particular part of the world, yes. Mr. ENGEL. And the Russians took the surrender of that part of the Japanese Army in that area? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. And took their arms and ammunition? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. Their supplies, bases, and otherwise-planes and everything? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. What part, if you know, of that army was south of the thirty-eighth parallel? Were there any in South Korea at all? Admiral SHERMAN. As of September 1945 there were considerable Japanese forces south of the thrity-eighth parallel, but in what proportion I have never known. Mr. ENGEL. The biggest share of the army was north? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. And still farther north was the Siberian-Manchurian border? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. And on the Siberian side was the Russian Army and south of the border was the Japanese Army? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. Waiting for a possible invasion? Mr. ENGEL. Do the 750,000 men that you spoke about include service troops or combat troops, or both? Admiral SHERMAN. That is an over-all estimate of a figure that I have not thought about since 1945. Mr. ENGEL. Could you check it? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. Was it not a foregone conclusion that whichever side, the Communist or Nationalist China took, the surrender of the larger part of that army would win the Japanese war? Would not that have been pretty obvious with all the supplies in there? Admiral SHERMAN. In my judgment, that would have been obvious to anyone who at that time could have foreseen the present situation. Mr. ENGEL. Hindsight is always better than foresight. That is always true. When that army was surrendered, that was the determining factor as to which side would win the Chinese war, the Nationalists or the Communists-assuming that the Russians would support the Communists. Admiral SHERMAN. I do not think so, because this is Korea Mr. ENGEL. I am not talking about Korea; I am talking about Manchuria and the surrender of the Japanese arms in Manchuria, which were turned over to the Russians. Admiral SHERMAN. I do not think it follows that that would control the outcome of the struggle for power in China proper. Mr. ENGEL. Were not those arms and supplies turned over to the Communists over there? Admiral SHERMAN. Those supplies were taken by Russia. I have no knowledge of what became of them after that. On the other hand, the arms surrendered by the Japanese in China fell into the hands of the Chinese, and I believe that the situation as of late 1945 was that the Government of the Republic of China, the Chinese Nationalist Government, with the Japanese arms they took over, plus what we gave to them during the war and in the early years after the war, if they had retained them, would have been sufficient equipment to have maintained control of China. Mr. ENGEL. Wait a minute. Do you mean the Russians turned over the arms of the Japanese who surrendered to them to the Nationalist Government of China? Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. What I mean is that in south China, central China, and in north China, the weapons of the Japanese and the surrender of the Japanese troops were taken by China. Mr. ENGEL. Yes, but how many did they have in there? The bulk of the army was at the Russian border at Siberia. Admiral SHERMAN. At the end of the war I think not. At the end of the war there had been a very considerable deployment in the south. Mr. ENGEL. I remember when I was in China they were trying to fly troops up in there. Admiral SHERMAN. Remember, sir, there was another factor, which was that we landed an amphibious corps, including two marine divisions, with supporting elements, in north China, and those units in effect formed a barrier between the Russians and the rest of China as long as they were there. Mr. ENGEL. Yes, but you just said that Russia took over the surrender of these 750,000 men in Manchuria north of the thirty-eighth parallel and all the arms and ammunition. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. I recall very distinctly hearing testimony before this committee of pitched battles up alongside the Siberian-Manchurian frontier during the war with men being killed. One report was that there were 3,000 casualties. Admiral SHERMAN. I think that some of that took place before World War II. Mr. ENGEL. And they had these troops up there to defend themselves against Russia, and they kept them there, I think, until the end of the war-until they surrendered. Admiral SHERMAN. There was local fighting along that border prior to World War II, which did not spread away from the local area. Mr. ENGEL. And during World War II before Russia entered the war, and these two armies faced each other along the Siberian front, the Siberian-Manchurian front, they were tremendous armies. I have heard some estimates of as high as 1,000,000 men, supplies and everything. I do not know how accurate that is. Admiral SHERMAN. That figure may be better than mine. Mr. ENGEL. When the Thirty-eighth parallel was set that turned over to Russia all the manufacturing establishments and all the plants and everything north of that parallel. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. And with it, the surrender of that part of the Japanese Army which was practically confronting the Russians on the Siberian front, including all the supplies needed in there; is that not true? Admiral SHERMAN. That is my understanding. But my knowledge of this is from what I learned at the time that I was in the Pacific Fleet in 1945. I am really not the best witness on the subject. Mr. ENGEL. You do know, however, that the thirty-eighth parallel line being set turned over not only the northern part of Korea but the entire of Manchuria and the best part of China to Russia, because when they took the surrender of the Japanese Army, they took that part of China. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. FUNDS IMPOUNDED 1946-50 Mr. ENGEL. Now, I would like an itemized statement regarding the funds that this committee appropriated that were frozen in the Treasury for the years 1946-50. Admiral HopwWOOD. I can give you that. (The information requested is as follows:) Department of the Navy―Amounts withheld by Bureau of Budget and Office, Secretary of Defense, 1946 through 1950 1 Mr. ENGEL. I would like to know the attrition rate of the different types of planes. Admiral HOPWOOD. Admiral Pride will have that information for you. Mr. ENGEL. Also, the amount of that $190,000,000 research and development and industrial mobilization money that the Navy has applied for. Did you apply for it? Admiral HopWOOD. I have the details in that connection. If you care to, we can cover that at the end when I give my final statement. Mr. ENGEL. Very well. Mr. MAHON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) EFFECT ON MILITARY SITUATION OF STRONGER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC Mr. ENGEL. The Admiral testified about certain equipment. I believe if we had obtained this Japanese equipment in Manchuria Russia might not have started any trouble. Is that your testimony? Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall, my testimony was that if we had a stronger fleet out there and the divisions in Japan had been up to full strength and the air groups had been up to full strength, the difficulty would not have been as great and we would have been able to do more in case of an attack on Korea. We would have been able to have slowed the thing down more and probably stabilized it sooner. Mr. ENGEL. There probably would have been no attack. On the other hand, when the statement was made that we would not defend Korea and there was testimony to that effect the other day-would not that in itself have been an invitation for them to come in? Admiral SHERMAN. I did not know that we had ever made any such public statement, sir. Mr. ENGEL. There was some testimony before this committee to that effect. Mr. MAHON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. ENGEL. Admiral, in the first place, if we did not have the troops that you spoke about, number one, and if added to that statement was the impression that we could not defend Korea, that would account for the fact that Russia seemed very much surprised that we did defend Korea: Does not an easy, vacillating policy in itself invite offensive action, to take a chance to step in? Admiral SHERMAN. I believe that is the history of such matters. (Off record discussion.) BASIS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR FUNDS Mr. MAHON. I would not believe that Congress should appropriate a lot of money, $10,500,000,000 or any other sum, based on the assumption that if world war III comes that it will be fought in a place like Korea. In other words, it would seem to me that if we should base our defensive planning on any such assumption the battle in Korea to me would be just wasting time and money and energy. I would like to have your comment on that, Admiral Sherman. Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, the history of so-called limited wars is that they tend to be unlimited, primarily because one contestant finds that it is not achieving its objective in the limited area, and therefore strikes elsewhere where it can be more effective. Then the other contestant, resorts to the same process and what started out to be a limited war then becomes an unlimited war, with the primary theater in an area which has been influenced by global considerations. And certainly if we should find ourselves fighting for the existence of the United States we would choose an area that is more favorable |