under modernization-speeding up overhauls of important ships, and so forth. All of that costs money and increased expenditures, so that the program that is being presented is as a third increment to produce the naval forces agreed to for 1952, except where already we have gone above those levels in particular categories. THIRD INCREMENT RULES The criteria, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were used in preparation of third increment estimates, and which differ markedly from those in effect from September 1949 until now, are as follows: (a) Levels of supply for naval forces Far East (and those earmarked for deployment to the Far East) will be increased to war levels. (b) Procurement and production essential to fill pipelines, to provide continuing logistic support for the Korean campaign and to provide replacement of all supply items and critical materials withdrawn from mobilization reserves will be included. (c) In computing production and procurement requirements, it will be assumed that the consumption rate of materials for all forces other than those assigned to the Far East will be the peacetime usage rate. (d) For all forces committed to the Korean operation, maintenance and operation and procurement will be based on war usage rates for a period of 1 year. (e) The shore establishment will be brought into a condition where it can adequately support the forces listed in this enclosure. With respect to maintenance and operation, reactivation of deactivated shore establishments, plants, etc., will be held to the absolute minimum consistent with the accomplishment of the work in hand. Deferred maintenance of establishments and facilities will be provided for only to the extent necessary to insure their efficient and safe operation. (f) With regard to levels of supply and methods of supply support for those forces, battle damage spares and other insurance items will be provided at forward area repair facilities within their capability to install and service. Other supply support will be furnished to the maximum possible extent by mobile logistic support vessels. I would like to expand that point. Because of the complex international situation we intend, wherever possible, to avoid the creation of shore bases in the Far East and to rely on auxiliaries so that we can redeploy quickly if we have to. (g) Items which reactivated ships require to enable them to operate with the fleet will be procured and installed. (h) Training of replacements and reliefs for Far East forces, crews of reactivated ships and personnel of reactivated units will be accelerated in order to bring their combat readiness to acceptable levels. Other training will continue at peacetime rates. Except for those ships and units urgently needed to meet the Korean situation, we plan to reach the increased strength provided for in these estimates by a process of orderly phasing throughout the remainder of fiscal year 1951. The new operating force levels and manning levels provided for in this estimate are set forth in table 1 attached. Because of the classified nature of this information, I request that these tables be kept off the record. PERSONNEL On June 30, 1950, naval personnel strength was 44,641 officers and 330,841 enlisted men, a total of 375,482. The planned requirement for June 30, 1951, is 67,514 officers and 512,291 enlisted men, a total of 579,805 persons. An increase of 204,323 is needed. To obtain this increase 53,000 reservists have been called to active duty. An additional 35,000 reservists will be called. The remaining requirement will be met by recruit input at the rate of 15,500 per month. Naval ships will be manned at 85 percent of war complement, except that the amphibious force in the Pacific will be maintained at 100 percent of war strength. An over-all average of 1.2 pilots per seat will be provided; but groups and squadrons in the forward area will be maintained at 1.5 pilots per seat, and deployed patrol squadrons in the Pacific will be provided with two crews per plane. SHIPBUILDING Table 2 attached summarizes prior years shipbuilding programs and shows in detail how we propose to utilize the $185,000,000 new obligating authority included in this supplemental estimate. In brief, we shall convert 200,000 tons of ships, and we shall initiate the construction of 50,000 tons under the authorization in H. R. 7764 now pending before the Congress. AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT This supplemental estimate includes $620,410,000 for the procurement of 1,067 aircraft of various types, which are required to replace combat losses, to provide aircraft for the additional groups and squadrons being activated in accordance with table 1 of this statement, and to provide for normal peacetime attrition resulting from operations of the larger Naval Air Establishment. These funds will not, however, provide for a satisfactory degree of modernization of either the Regular or the Reserve components of the Naval and Marine Corps Aviation. To achieve the desired degree of modernization of our Regular and Reserve components will require the procurement of 1,310 additional aircraft at a cost of $950,000,000, over and above the amounts included in this supplemental estimate. These latter requirements are being coordinated between the Navy and the Air Force at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Since the preparation of this statement a conference on that subject has been held and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, who represented the Air Force in that conference, has agreed that we should go ahead with this additional procurement. I hope the supplemental estimates will be before the committee without delay. (Discussion off the record.) PUBLIC WORKS This supplemental estimate includes no funds for public works. Requirements stemming directly from the Korean situation, plus the necessity adequate to support the larger Naval Establishment envisioned in the supplemental estimates, will require public-works funds in the amount of about $175,000,000 for the following principal purposes : (a) Improvement and expansion of airfields and facilities, which are largely related to the wider introduction of jet aircraft. (b) Provision of additional jet fuel storage. (d) Research and development facilities in support of the fleet. (e) Improvement of training, supply, and medical centers in support of the fleet. (f) Repairs to facilities upon which maintenance has been delayed. In the event the committee desires to be informed of the prospective employment of the forces referred to in this statement, I shall be glad to give such information off the record. Mr. MAHON. I think it would be well to have that at this time before the questioning period. Admiral SHERMAN. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) After off record discussion.) REASON FOR SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST Mr. MAHON. Admiral Sherman, I have unbounded faith in your ability, and I want to commend you and the Naval Establishment for doing the best that can be done under the circumstances with what you have at this time. The general public I think believes, and I rather imagine that many Members of Congress believe that when you come up to Congress as representing the Department of Defense, requesting 10.5 billion dollars, that this sum is to be hurled into the Korean area. To my mind that is a misconception. I would like to have you comment on that. Admiral SHERMAN. In my opinion the greater part of the 10.5 billion dollars is for the purpose of increasing the security of the United States in a critical world situation, which has been highlighted and clarified by events in Korea. A relatively small part is for handling the situation in the Far East. Insofar as the Navy is concerned, of the 2.6 billion dollars that is in this bill, only about $1,000,000,000 will be spent on that local operation. The rest will be spent in improving the readiness of the Navy to do its part in connection with our over-all national security, not only in this year but in subsequent years. A similar situation exists in the other two services, I know, although I cannot give their financial proportions as well as I can my own. I believe it is very important that everyone realize that this program represents what the men who have the military responsibility for the security of the country consider is necessary, including our additional charges in connection with this particular situation. Mr. MAHON. Could it be said that if we wanted to throw everything we had into the Korean situation and not replace the vacuum that would be left by the deployment of these forces in the Korean area, that the Korean conflict might be ended successfully without additional appropriations on a large scale? I realize that would mean many vacuums would be left, which would be unthinkable, but I am just trying to get the point discussed which I think is well taken. Admiral SHERMAN. In the Navy, for example, if we concentrated all of the naval capability from other areas, we could do the job in Korea with a considerably smaller sum of money than is in this appropriation, but in so doing we would invite disaster to our homeland. And that, I know, is true of all the other services. I might expand on that: The minute that we obviously weaken ourselves in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean the part that western Europe plays in the security of the United States would disappear rapidly. SUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS REQUESTED Mr. MAHON. On page 4 of your statement, Admiral, you say: The supplemental amount of 2.6 million dollars which has been recommended to the Congress provides most (not all) of what is necessary to the Navy during fiscal 1951 for these increments. I am not in favor of going before the House with a half-baked measure to meet the present situation, and if the Navy at this moment requires additional funds I should like to see those funds provided. Will you amplify that? You will recall the conversation we had when you and the Secretary of Defense both were here day before yesterday? Admiral SHERMAN. As was indicated then by the Secretary of Defense, and as was stated by the Secretary of Defense to the Senate Appropriations Committee and very clearly to the Senate Appropriations Committee yesterday by the Secretary of the Navy, this refers to the two fields of aircraft procurement and public works primarily associated with the aircraft forces. Mr. MAHON. And the other items could wait as brief time as necessary for additional presentation? Admiral SHERMAN. I feel that they are more urgent, particularly aircraft procurement is more urgent, than might appear. The Air Force program and the total naval air program should be coordinated and presented to the aircraft industry as a whole. If the Navy program does not come forward quickly we will have to place orders in a market which is pretty well absorbed by the Air Force programs. Mr. MAHON. Would these planes, which you contemplate will be required in addition to the present budget, be used principally by the Reserves? Admiral SHERMAN. If we do not need any further regular expansion these airplanes would result in that part of the Naval Air Reserve and the Marine Air Reserve involved in D-day commitments being equipped with jet aircraft. At the present time we have an unfortunate situation wherein the Air National Guard is pretty well equipped with jets and our Naval Air Reserve is mostly flying World War II models. That is somewhat unsatisfactory. Now may I make a comment off the record? Mr. MAHON. Off the record. (Off record discussion.) Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary Matthews and Admiral Sherman, I think I can speak for the committee in saying that whenever we have clearance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President to the budget of any additional request, we will consider it immediately. If there are going to be additional requests for funds in the near future it seems to me they should all be embodied in this one supplemental. NEED FOR MODERN PLANE PRODUCTION Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, may I say this: I was very much interested in the admiral's statement regarding the building up of the productive capacity of our industry in plane production, because it takes a long time to build the planes after you get started. However, if you have to build up the production capacity first it doubles the time required to produce planes. I think it is one of the most important things. At the beginning of World War II, back as far as 1939, that was the primary objective we had, of building up the productive capacity of the planes. I do hope that the planes being built for the Navy will be the most modern, and not obsolete such as those we did build before World War II. Admiral SHERMAN. I believe we have very excellent models ready to go in production, and our new carrier jet fighters, for example, are getting a very excellent service test at the moment. Mr. MAHON. Admiral Hopwood, will you have the heads of the various services, who can talk specifically about aircraft, specifically about ship construction, specifically about shore installations, and the various other programs, during the hearing? Admiral HopwOOD. Yes, sir. They are scheduled during the day's hearing. Mr. MAHON. In view of that circumstance I do not believe I have any further questions. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. MAHON. Mr. Sheppard? NAVAL OPERATIONS IN KOREA Mr. SHEPPARD. I want to choose my comments rather carefully today, in order that I will not transgress upon the conscience of others. Insofar as your activities presently pertain in the Korean conflict, just what type of aviation operations, to wit, plane warfare, are you conducting as you would typify that operation in the phraseology of the military? Admiral SHERMAN. We are conducting attacks in indirect support of the troops by attacking areas away from the front lines, burning out airplanes, fuel dumps, bridges, refineries, tanks, trains, and so forth. Within the past 2 days we have been giving close support to the ground troops, and we have also been giving, as at the time the cavalry division went in, air cover, fighter cover to those operations. Mr. SHEPPARD. In other words, then, you have been called upon in this operation to utilize the availability of the Navy's combat power, not only in the functions of sea operations as literally applied in its terminology but to the protection of advancement of land operations as well? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. SHEPPARD. Well, if one can believe what one hears through the public avenues of communication, I will say that the Navy has apparently vindicated itself and should not be classified in the so-called Paul Jones category as of today. I would like to compliment you gentlemen accordingly. There are some in the Congress, of course, 69887-50-pt. 2- -8 |