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The metals used in manufacturing present quite a different picture.

In only one, molybdenum, is the U.S. entirely self-sufficient, although we are nearly so in copper. Imports of the other industrial metals are increasing rapidly, and several of them, notably chromium, antimony, cobalt, manganese, mercury, and tin are not abundant in North America but must be imported from other continents. Because the increase in demand

for industrial metals is greater in industrializing countries than in the U.S. and because geological constraints on exploitation are much more severe for this group than for the others, the real costs of copper, lead, zinc and the other metals are rising.

On the other hand, the possibility of recycling is by far the greatest in this group of nonrenewable resources, the possibility of substitution by more abundant metals, or by nonmetallic products, is considerable, and the per capita demand for the industrial metals has almost leveled out in the past full decade. As population growth in the U.S. slows, the total increase in demand on the industrial metals will be much lower than on the other mineral resources.

Of all the mineral commodities listed in Table I, two stand out as major problems: petroleum and natural gas. North American reserves are inadequate, per capita consumption is growing, imports are expanding rapidly, and world prices are increasing. The potential impact on the national economy of much higher fuel costs and a larger drain on the dollar to finance imports is just beginning to be recognized.

Metals which present recognizable problems include antimony, chromium, cobalt, manganese, and uranium. Two nonmetallic, non-fuel, mineral resources of concern are fluorspar and helium.

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Natural gas

Depletion forecasts for the problem resources

In the next 10 years, we could easily consume an amount of natural gas equal to all that already produced in the United States, some 400 trillion cubic feet. Proved gas reserves at the end of 1972 were only 271 trillion cubic feet. 1972 was the fifth consecutive year in which proved reserves declined in the conterminous states (lower 48).

Reserves decline when the rate of additions to reserves or finding rate (F/t) is less than the production rate (P/t). If the F/P ratio is greater than 1.0, reserves are increasing; if it is less than 1.0, reserves are decreasing. The trend of the F/P ratio is a rather sensitive barometer of the future. In the Permian Basin natural-gas area of west Texas and southeast Nex Mexico, the F/P ratio declined from a high of 2.9 in 1966 to 0.2 in 1970. Nationwide, the F/P ratio dropped from 2.28 in 1956 to 0.40 in 1969.

Another tool for evaluating the supply picture is the ratio of proved reserves (R) at the end of any particular year to production during that year (P). Although the R/P ratio should never be interpreted as the number of years remaining until "we run out of" a resource, the trend of the ratio on a regional, national, or continental scale provides a clear indication of what is happening to reserves. In the lower 48 states, the R/P ratio for natural gas decreased from 26.9 in 1950 to 11.9 in 1970. In the South Louisiana area, which accounts for well over a third of total U.S. natural gas production, the ratio declined even more precipitously, from 28.2 in 1956 to 10.8 in 1970.

In Canada, proved gas reserves at the end of 1970 were about 20 percent of the U.S. total, and about 20 percent of the Canadian reserves

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were dedicated to the U.S. market. Although the F/P ratio in Canada is still above one, it dropped from 14.6 in 1956 to 1.8 in 1970, while the R/P ratio was declining from 90 to 30.

Another significant barometer is the trend of drilling activity.

The number of wells drilled for oil and gas in the United States started to decline in 1956 and has dropped 40 percent in a period of 10 years. Although published potential reserve figures for the U.S. and Canada range up to a combined total of almost 2300 trillion cubic feet or about 90 times current production-consumption rates in the two countries, the New York Department of Public Service spoke for many when it said in a 1971 report that little weight should be given such estimates. All indicators point to rapid depletion of domestic natural-gas reserves. The best hope for sustaining production rates at somewhere near present levels lies in offshore discoveries, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico. The next best hope is that large gas supplies will be developed in the Canadian and Alaskan arctic and that it will be economically and politically feasible to transport these supplies to the United States. The prospect for significant additions from deep reservoirs and from nuclear stimulation of tight reservoirs seems limited by cost in the first instance and political resistance in the second. By the year 2000, domestic natural gas probably will provide only 5 percent or less of the U.S. energy demand.

That this forecast is not incompatible with some made within industry is suggested by recent major commitments to importations of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and to development of synthetic pipeline gas from coal.

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World supplies of natural gas are not as widely distributed as those of petroleum. The Soviet Union holds by far the greatest reserves. World production should increase at least until the year 2000, and there should be no physical shortage of LNG available for purchase and import until after that time. Whether or not the U.S. does import large quantities of LNG will hinge not on the rapid depletion of domestic reserves, which is certain, but on the comparative cost and security advantage of producing synthetic gas from U.S. coal.

Petroleum

Estimates of ultimately recoverable petroleum in the United States range rather widely (Table II). When the total already produced and proven is subtracted from each estimate, the resulting range is almost 9 times, from the lowest to the highest! This spread, which suggests that earth scientists have not advanced very far in their ability to forecast discovery, is a serious matter, since national strategy based on the highest estimate could conceivably be quite different from strategy based on the lowest estimate.

If a high estimate is accepted, the nation might be justified in seeking to subsidize domestic discovery as an alternative to foreign imports, or at least as a safeguard against interdiction of foreign supply. If a low estimate is accepted, the appropriate strategy might be to subsidize the rapid development of a domestic synthetic-fuels industry, as well as the maintenance of a strategic economic reserve of petroleum equal to 180 days or more of the current import rate.

The higher estimates of Table II are those reached by the geologicanalogy method, with or without optimistic projections of the ultimate