As to the trade of the United States with Manchuria, it is not separately shown in the general statements of the commerce with China. The Department of Commerce and Labor, through its Bureau of Statistics, however, compiled some figures which show that the imports of New-Chwang, the principal port through which Manchurian commerce passed, amounted in 1902 to about 18,000,000 haikwan taels, against 17,000,000 in 1901 and 8,000,000 in 1900. The value of the haikwan tael in 1902 was 63 cents, so that the value of the imports of Manchuria, stated in dollars, would be, in 1902, about $11,000,000. The table which follows shows the total value of foreign merchandise of all kinds imported into New-Chwang in each year from 1896 to 1902: The table which follows shows the value of imports into Japan during each year from 1881 to 1903, and the percentage supplied by the United States and the United Kingdom. It will be noted that in the twenty-two years covered by these figures the volume of Japanese imports has been multiplied by ten, and that the total value has shown a tendency to double about every seven years. *Average value of haikwan tael reported by Chinese government: 1896, 81 cents; 1898, 70 cents; 1901, 72 cents; 1902, 63 cents. Compiled from official reports of the Japanese government. CHAPTER XXX The Beginning and Causes of a Great War Many Causes of the Rupture between Russia, the Great Empire of the East, and Japan, the Island Kingdom-A Long Period of Negotiations-War Hangs in the Balance-Statements Issued by Contending Parties. Τ HE fundamental causes which for half a century had been leading up to the outbreak of 1904 were the natural antagonisms between the national ambitions of both Russia and England. Far seeing English statesmen have realized that the supremacy of that country is dependent upon the superiority of her navy, made necessary by her insular position. As a logical result of Russia's policy of continental expansion, eventually her interests will come into conflict with England's desire for continued supremacy of the high seas. English thinkers have been keenly alive to the gravity of this situation, and British diplomatic intrigue for at least two generations of statesmanship has been guided toward the prevention of Russia's naval growth, which once started, her immense natural resources obviously threaten England's ascendency on the sea. British diplomacy so far has been pre-eminently successful, to the deep chagrin of the Czar's ministers. With the exception of Russia's sea-ports on the Baltic, which, for a great part of the year are practically closed by the rigors of semi-arctic climate conditions, her only other undis puted deep water port was Vladivostok on the Japan Sea which suffers from similar climatic disadvantages. The chief object of Russia's occupation of Manchuria was for the purpose of establishing at Port Arthur a harbor open to the sea the entire year. Antagonism to this happened to unite the interests of Great Britain and Japan. Therefore, England's traditional policy made her the natural ally of Japan in this struggle. The struggle, which began actively with the naval battle on Monday, January 9, 1904, off Port Arthur, on the coast of China, had been brewing for many years, and may be ascribed largely to the greed of both Japan and Russia to become the owners and possessors of the small country, which has been known, on account of its solitary existence and its aloofness from other nations, as the "Hermit Kingdom." Better known as Korea, it is a peninsula, extending down between the Yellow Sea and the Japan Sea, and only a few hours' sail from the Island Kingdom. There was another cause for this war, which must not be overlooked, and which is to be found in the feeling of revenge on the part of Japan for the loss of the fruit of her victory over China in 1895. Through diplomatic manipulations, Russia gained possession of Port Arthur, and the territory which Japan had actually taken by force from China, and which rightly belonged to her, but, with the aid of other European countries, Russia succeeded in getting the full control of Port Arthur, and later becoming supreme in Manchuria, practically annexed that entire territory to the Russian domain. Hence Japan had been preparing to avenge herself upon the powerful nation. Russia, as it has appeared, agreed to vacate Manchuria the 8th of October, 1903, but failed to do so. On the other hand she steadily encroached upon Japan's interests in Korea. The Mikado demanded, on the part of Japan, that the Czar should carry out his pledge and recognize Korea as a Japanese sphere of influence. All offers of compromise were spurned, and Japan strengthened her position by an alliance made with Great Britain in 1902. The latter country saw that it was to her interest to have an ally in the far East to oppose the progress of Russia towards acquiring supreme influence in the Eastern Hemisphere. Finally, Japan declared that she was ready to fight for her rights, even unaided. Both sides in the struggle issued statements defining and describing their respective positions, and the causes which led to a break in the peace negotiations between the two countries, and leaving it finally to the arbitrament of the sword. We give here both statements. RUSSIA'S STATEMENT By an official communication the Russian account of the negotiations which led to the rupture, was as follows: "Last year the Tokio Cabinet, under the pretext of establishing the balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of the Pacific, submitted to the imperial government a proposal for a revision of the existing treaties with Korea. "Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexieff was charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in co-operation with the Russian Minister at Tokio, who was entrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese government. Although the exchange of views with the Tokio Cabinet on this subject were of a friendly character, Japanese social circles and the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a warlike ferment among the Japanese and to drive the government into an armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof, the Tokio Cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the negotiations, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make the country ready for war. "All these circumstances could not, of course, disturb Russia's equanimity, but they induced her also to take military and naval measures. Nevertheless, to preserve peace in the far East, Russia, so far as her incontestable rights and interests |