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charge of the amendment, admitted that the point of order was good, and the Chair sustained it. 83 Cong. Rec. 8567. The amendment was then offered in the Senate, where the Presiding Officer also sustained a point of order that it was legislation in an appropriation bill.S 83 Cong. Rec. 9189.

The provision was thereafter included by the conference committee as a proviso to Section 402 of H. J. Res. 679 (which later became Pub. Res. No. 122). See 83 Cong. Rec. 9512, 9677. It was passed by the Senate without much debate. In the House, the debate disclosed that the amendment had the same purpose and effect as the provision inserted in the various appropriation bills for the preceding years. Representative Woodrum, in presenting the amendment to the House, described it as follows (83 Cong. Rec. 9677):

we are providing a further inhibition for 1 year against payment of the reenlistment allowances in the military and naval services.

& Senator Byrnes, who had offered the amendment on behalf of the Appropriations Committee, then engaged in the following colloquy with Senator Walsh (83 Cong. Rec. 9189-9190):

Mr. BYRNES.. I will say to the Senator from Massachusetts, in the light of the ruling of the Chair, that before the Congress adjourns I shall certainly make an effort to do something to bring about a change, so that there will not be dissatisfaction among the various services. If the bounties were all restored, millions of dollars would be involved.

Mr. WALSH, Is not the situation that under existing law there is now an authorization of funds to be paid to those who reenlist in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Public Health Service? Is not that the situation ?

Mr. BYRNEs. There is authority to pay the bounty. It has not been paid for 6 years.

Mr. Walsu. No funds are available.
Mr. BYRNES. No funds are available.

Mr. WALSH. The House Bill did seek to provide funds for reenlistment bounties in the Army. Of course, it would be highly discriminatory to have reenlistment bounties paid to those who reenlist in the Army, and none paid to those who reenlist in the other branches of the military service.

Mr. BYRNEs. It would certainly be discriminatory, and cause great dissatisfaction among the services.

Mr. WALSH. Is the bill now in such shape that no funds are provided for reenlistment bounties for any branch of the military service ?

Mr. BYRNES. That is correct.

Mr. WALSH. Wbat the Senator sought to do was to have Congress declare as its policy that it did not intend in the future to pay such reenlistment bounties, so as to prevent possible claims; is not that true?

Mr. BYRNES. Mr. President, the sole position of the Committee is that no funds being provided, we should not leave open the opportunity for numbers of persons to file claims in the Court of Claims in behalf of men who reenlist, with the result that a year from now, or 2 years from now, some men would receive the reenlistment bounty or some part of it, after the attorneys received their fees.

Mr. Walsh. I think I understand.

• The debate in the Senate was as follows (83 Cong. Rec. 9512) :

Mr. WALSH. Mr. President, I understand that the bill as it passed the House contained a provision for the use of funds from this appropriation for reenlistments in the Army, and no provisions were made for the use of any of the appropriation for the payment of reenlistments in the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard. Mr. ADAMS. That is correct.

Mr. WALSH. The purpose of the amendment is to eliminate the provision for payment in case of reenlistments in the Army because it is discriminatory against the other services and civil forces, which formerly received reenlistment pay and allowances.

Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, and it is to open the way for statutory clearing of the whole situation.

253153-404-46

“No reenlistment allowances have been paid for the past 5 fiscal years in any of the services, and in the absence of permanent law stopping it, the inhibition has been shuttled about in economy bills and appropriation bills at one time or another. We have not paid them for 5 years, and the latter part of this amendment now before the House is a Senate amendment which discontinues for another year the payment of the reenlistment allowances." The opponents of the amendment, while questioning its wisdom, were in general agreement with its sponsors concerning its purpose and effect. 83 Cong. Rec. 9678-9679. The amendment was then adopted by the House. 83 Cong. Rec. 9679.

We are of opinion that Congress intended in Section 402 to suspend the enlistment allowance authorized by Section 9 during the fiscal year ending on the 30th of June 1939. The legislative history, summarized above, discloses that Congress intended the legislation concerning the allowance during the fiscal years 1938 and 1939 as a continuation of the suspension enacted in each of the four preceding years. The adoption in the act of May 28, 1937, of different terminology might in other circumstances indicate an intent to change the object of the legislation. Compare Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 337; Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 190; Pirie v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, 448. But the drawing of such an inference is a workable rule of construction, not an infallible guide to legislative intent, and cannot overcome more persuasive evidence where, as here, it exists. Compare Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41, 48.

The respondent contends that the words of Section 402 are plain and unambiguous and that other aids to construction may not be utilized. It is sufficient answer to deny that such words when used in an appropriation bill are words of art or have a settled meaning. See United States v. Perry, 50 Fed. 743, 748 (C. C. A. 8th). The very legislative materials which respondent would exclude refute his assumption. It would be anomalous to close our minds to persuasive evidence of intention on the ground that reasonable men could not differ as to the meaning of the words. Legislative materials may be without probative value, or contradictory, or ambiguous, it is true, and in such cases will not be permitted to control the customary meaning of words or overcome rules of syntax or construction found by experience to be workable; they can scarcely be deemed to be incompetent or irrelevant. See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, supra, at 48. The meaning to be ascribed to an Act of Congress can only be derived from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction.” These lead to the conclusion that the judgment of the court below must be reversed.

. Compare Luce, Legislative Problems (1935), pp. 421 et seq.,

432.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS, Mr. Justice STONE, and Mr. Justice ROBERTS dissented, being “of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed on the views expressed by the Court of Claims."

6 "Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived .. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386.

INDEX DIGEST

ACCEPTANCE OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

See Contracts XXXV.
ACTUAL VALUE.

See Taxes VII, VIII.
ADDITIONAL OVERHEAD.

See Contracts XI.
AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT.

See Contracts XXXVIII.
AGENCY UNDISCLOSED.

See Contracts XXXIX.
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT.

See Taxes I, II, III.
ALLOWANCES UNDER SPECIAL ACT.

See Pay And Allowances II, III.
APPRAISEMENTS.

See Indian Claims XIX.
APPROVAL BY ANOTHER.

See Contracts XXXVII.
ATOKA AGREEMENT.

See Indian Claims XVIII, XXV, XXXI.
BAD DEBT.

See Taxes XXXII, XXXV.
BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See Contracts VII, VIII.
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE.

See Taxes XI, XII.
CAPITAL STOCK TAX.

See Taxes V, VI, VII, VIII.
CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PERIOD.

See Taxes XXV, XXVI.
CHANGE ORDER.

See Contracts XXII.
CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, U. S. A.

See Contracts XVII.
CHOCTAW WARRANTS.

See Indian Claims XXXV.
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE.

1. Where plaintiff, a civil service employee, was notified

that on account of reduction in force he would be dis-
charged on October 14, 1931, at which date his pay
ceased, and where the instant suit was commenced by
the petition Aled January 2, 1940, it is held that
plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Middleman, 306.

697

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