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We humbly ask that you kindly protect the rights of citizens and property owners in this Great Country of ours by protecting and safe-guarding our constitutional rights and freedoms in the defeat of this proposed legislation. We respectfully thank you. Sincerely,

OMAR CALZARETTA, Chairman.

CONNECTICUT ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE BOARDS, INC.,
Hartford, Conn., June 28, 1966.

Senator SAM ERVIN,

Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: This letter is written to you to place in the hearing record the views of the Connecticut Association of Real Estate Boards, Inc. with respect to Title IV of S. 3296.

Our Association is made up of 32 local boards with a total membership of 3600 real estate brokers and salesmen. We are affiliated with the National Association of Real Estate Boards. Our membership contains most of the leading real estate brokers and salesmen in the State of Connecticut.

Our Board of Directors adopted the following Statement of Policy on April 23, 1964:

"Realtors in Connecticut recognize that the problem of integration is one of the most serious and pressing problems facing the nation today. Any permanent or lasting progress in the elimination of prejudice and in attaining the broader objective of social acceptance will come only through a better climate of understanding and tolerance on the part of all citizens of the state and nation. "Qualifications for membership in Real Estate Boards should be based upon proven integrity, professional competence, reputation and other membership requirements of the individual boards. There should be no restrictions on

membership in any Board based on race, creed or color."

The rapport between our Association and the Civil Rights Commission in Connecticut is excellent. It is our hope that no Federal legislation will be enacted which will stir up controversy and ill-feeling where none now exists or which will supersede our State law which is working well and accomplishing the desired result.

We would suggest to this Committee that Title IV of S 3296 be revised so that, where States have already acted in this field, the Federal law would not apply. In Connecticut, we have legislation in this field which is carefully drawn to protect the rights of both the complainant and the accused (Secs. 53-35, 53-35a, 53-36, 53-36a, 53–36b, 53–36c and 53-36d of the 1965 Supp. to the General Statutes of Connecticut), a copy of which laws is annexed to this statement. Under our law there must be a preliminary determination of "reasonable cause” before the public agency (Civil Rights Commission) brings a court action on behalf of a complainant. There is provision for a speedy trial and for a bond to protect the respondent in the event of a judgment in his favor.

Our law against discrimination in associations of professional or licensed persons is not directed solely against real estate brokers and salesmen; it applies to all licensed trades, professions or occupations.

We are working out our own problems in this field in Connecticut, in a spirit of good-will and cooperation.

We are opposed to Title IV of S. 3296.

We are opposed to this legislation for several reasons.

First, we believe that the individual who has acquired a piece of property, often after many years of hard work and saving, has the right to decide for himself to whom he will sell it. We do not believe that the government can or should deprive him of that right. We do not regard this as a property right; we regard it as a personal right.

We are not lawyers and we do not propose to argue constitutional points with this committee. However, we would suggest that there is enough doubt as to the constitutionality of this legislation so that Congress should await a decision of the United States Supreme Court in the expected appeal of the recent California case (Mulkey v. Reitman, Calif. Supreme Court, 5/10/66) on Proposition 14 before considering S. 3296 or any similar legislation.

Second, We believe that any law of this kind should make an exception for the owner-occupied rooming house or two-family house. The reasons for this

are obvious. It is one thing to say to a person, if you are going to sell your property, you must make it freely available to all who can afford to buy it; it is a far different thing to say that you must permit to live in your home persons who are distasteful to you. Our Connecticut statute on this subject (Sec. 53–55, 1965 Supp. to General Statutes of Conn.) makes such an exception. The proposed law, without such an exception, could bring about more harm than good.

Third, We believe that Sec. 403 (e) of S. 3296 is a denial of the freedom of contract which is guaranteed by the Constitution. A multiple listing service is a voluntary association of real estate brokers or salesmen which makes available to a person who lists his property with one broker or salesman the services of all who have chosen to associate themselves for this particular purpose. While we in Connecticut believe that membership in trade associations and in multiple listing services should, for the good of the participants themselves, be open to all who can meet qualifications of integrity, fair dealing and professional standing, we do not believe that the individual should be forced by law to associate himself with anyone and, therefore, we oppose Sec. 403 (e) of this Bill.

Fourth, We believe that the enforcement provisions of this Bill are one-sided and unjust. They seem to be drafted on the assumption that every complainant is right and every person complained against is wrong.

They provide for the appointment of an attorney for the plaintiff, at public expense and without setting out any criteria for such appointment.

They provide for a temporary injunction, which may tie property up for many months, without any provision for either a prompt trial or a bond to protect the defendant in the event that the complaint is ultimately dismissed. They provide for damages for "humiliation and mental pain and suffering" without limit. They give to the prevailing plaintiff a "reasonable attorney's fee", but there is no provision for paying a reasonable attorney's fee to the defendant in the event that he prevails.

We urge most strongly that if such a bill is to become law it first be revised so that it protects the defendant as well as the complainant.

Respectfully submitted.

F. JEROME SILVERSTEIN, President.

Sec. 53-35. Discrimination in public accommodations, rental housing and sale of building lots. (a) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full and equal accommodations in every place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; and any denial of such accommodation by reason of race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry of the applicant therefor shall be a violation of the provisions of this section. Any discrimination, segregation or separation, on account of race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry shall be a violation of this section. A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement within the meaning of this section means any establishment, which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public including, but not limited to, public housing projects and all other forms of publicly assisted housing, and further including any housing accommodation or building lot, on which it is intended that a housing accommodation will be constructed, offered for sale or rent, provided the provisions of this section shall not apply (1) to the rental of a housing accommodation in a building which contains housing accommodations for not more than two families living independently of each other, if the owner or members of his family reside in one of such housing accommodations, or (2) to the rental of a room or rooms in a housing accommodation, if such rental is by the occupant of the housing accommodation, or by the owner of the housing accommodation and he or members of his family reside in such housing accommodation. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not less than twenty-five nor more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both. (b) This section shall not apply to proceedings pending before the civil rights commission or in any court on October 1, 1963. (1959, P.A. 113; 1961, P.A. 472: 1963, P.A. 594: February, 1965, P.A. 141.)

Sec. 53-35a. Discrimination in associations of professional or other licensed persons. Any association, board or other organization the principal purpose of which is the furtherance of the professional or occupational interests of its members, whose profession, trade or occupation requires a state license, which

refuses to accept a person as a member of such association, board or organization because of his race, creed or color shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars. (February, 1965, P.A. 433, S. 1.)

Sec. 53-36. Complaint to civil rights commission. Commission may issue complaint. In addition to the penalties provided for violation of sections 53-34 and 53-35 and section 53-35a, any person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of *** any such section may, by himself or his attorney, make, sign and file with the civil rights commission a complaint in writing under oath which shall state the circumstances of such violation and the particulars thereof and shall contain such other information as may be required by the commission. In addition, the commission, whenever it has reason to believe that section 53-35 or section 53-53a has been or is being violated, may issue a complaint. The commission may thereupon proceed upon such complaint in the same manner and with the same powers as provided in chapter 563 in the case of unfair employment practices, and the provisions of said chapter as to the powers, duties and rights of the commission, the complainant, the court, the attorney general and the respondent shall apply to any proceeding under the provisions of this section. (1959, P.A. 111; February, 1965, P.A. 433, S. 2.)

Sec. 53-36a. Complaint for injunction. Bond. In any complaint filed under the provisions of section 53-36 wherein a violation of section 53-35 in the sale or rental of housing accommodations has been alleged and after a determination of reasonable cause by a commissioner in the manner provided for in section 31-127, any three commissioners of the commission on civil rights may file a petition in equity in the circuit court in the circuit in which the unlawful practice which is the subject of the complaint occurred or in the circuit in which the respondent resides, seeking appropriate injunctive relief against such respondent, including orders or decrees restraining and enjoining him from selling or renting to anyone other than the complainant or otherwise making unavailable to the complainant any housing accommodations with respect to which the complaint is made, pending the final determination of proceedings on said complaint. No temporary or permanent injunctive relief, order or decree shall be granted except after hearing, notice of which shall be given to the respondent not less than three, nor more than five, days prior thereto in such manner as the court, or any judge of the court when such court is not actually in session, may direct. The court, or any judge of the court when such court is not actually in session, shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining orders as it or he deems proper. No injunctive relief, order or decree and no temporary relief or restraining order shall issue in any case until the commission gives bond in an amount to be determined by the court or judge, in favor of the respondent, for which it is empowered to pledge the full faith and credit of the state. By the terms of such bond the respondent shall be entitled to all damages suffered by him in case the commission fails to prosecute to effect the action in which the relief, order or decree was granted. (February, 1965, P.A. 543, S. 1.) Effective July 1, 1965.

Sec. 53-36b. Notice. Hearing. Judgment. Appeal. (a) In any case wherein the commission files a petition in equity in the circuit court as provided in section 53-36a such court shall assume exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising out of the complaint, any provision of section 53-36 to the contrary notwithstanding. This shall not bar the commission from continuing its investigation nor its conciliation efforts. The commission shall incorporate in and make a part of its petition in equity its complaint against the respondent and its prayers for relief. Notice of such complaint shall be given to the respondent simultaneously with notice of hearing on the injunctive relief, order or decree sought and in the same manner as is provided therefor in section 53-36a. Upon service on the respondent of such notice, the respondent shall not sell or rent the housing accommodations which are the subject of the complaint to anyone other than the complainant until the court or judge has decided the application for temporary injunctive relief, and the notice shall so provide. The court or judge shall at the same hearing hear arguments both on the temporary or permanent injunctive relief, order or decree sought and on the merits of the complaint unless within two days before the date set for hearing the respondent shall have filed with the court and served by mail upon the commission a request for postponement of the hearing on the merits. If any temporary relief or restraining order is granted, the court or judge shall grant or deny the permanent injunctive relief, order or decree sought in the petition and enter judgment on the merits of the complaint within seven days after completion of the hearing.

Appeals direct to the supreme court shall lie from such judgment and from the granting of any injunctive relief, order or decree. Upon issuance of a permanent injunction the case shall be returned to the commission for such further action as is authorized by chapter 563.

(b) Upon entry of judgment in favor of the respondent as provided in subsection (a), the court or judge shall simultaneously enter an order dissolving any injunctive relief, order or decree or temporary relief or restraining order theretofore issued against the respondent in the matter. (February, 1965, P.A. 543, S. 2, 3.) Effective July 1, 1965.

Sec. 53-36c. Attorney general to be counsel for commission. The case in support of the complaint herein shall be presented at the hearing by the attorney general, who shall be counsel for the commission. (February, 1965, P.A. 543, S. 4.) Effective July 1, 1965.

Sec. 53-36d. Appeals. In any appeal to the supreme court under the provisions of sections 63-36a to 63-36d, inclusive, the chief justice or any judge of the supreme court, on written application, after oral hearing, may order a party who has filed a notice of intent to appeal either to appeal or withdraw such notice of appeal and may make such orders as will expedite said appeal, may by further order specify some different and more expeditious manner by which the record on appeal may be prepared and submitted and may permit for the purposes of the appeal the use of typewritten copies of some or all papers necessary or appropriate therefor in order to enforce due diligence and dispatch of such appeal and may further order in appropriate situations the later filing of printed copies for permanent record purposes. (February, 1965, P.A. 543, S. 5.) Effective July 1, 1965.

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR,
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Raleigh, N.C., August 2, 1966.

Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,
Member of Congress,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: As secretary-treasurer of the North Carolina District Solicitor's Association, I have the duty to advise you that our association on the 23rd of July, 1966, in a conference held in Morehead City, North Carolina, unanimously passed a resolution opposing the passage by Congress of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1966.

The resolution further provided that the North Carolina Congressional Delegation be advised of this action. We will certainly appreciate your consideration of our views in this matter.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM G. RANSDELL, Jr., Secretary-treasurer, District Solicitor's Association.

STATEMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF CITIZENS ASSOCIATIONS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The City Planning and Zoning Committee of the Federation of Citizens Associations of the District of Columbia considered the legislation proposed in S. 3296 at its meeting on May 5, 1966 and adopted by unanimous vote a Resolution opposing the housing section (Title IV) of this bill.

This action was coordinated with the Federation's Law and Legislation Committee and presented as a recommendation of both committees to the Federation at its regular meeting on May 12, 1966 where it was approved with only one dissenting vote. The Federation represents approximately 20,000 residents of the District of Columbia and coordinates activities of its 36 member bodies, each of which sends three delegates to Federation meetings.

The Resolution is as follows:

Whereas a new Civil Rights bill has been proposed by the Administration and introduced in the Congress as S. 3296; and

Whereas this bill contains provisions for the control by the Federal Government of the sale of private housing in the name of anti-discrimination; and

Whereas the right of the individual citizen to own his own home and to dispose of it as he sees fit is one of the fundamental rights of our democracy and the

65-506--66-pt. 2- 45

proposed legislation would seriously impair this right; Now, therefore, the Federation of Citizens Associations of the District of Columbia hereby

Resolves, That it opposes that part of the proposed civil rights legislation S. 3296 which would force an individual home owner to sell or rent his property against his desires; and

Further, That it calls on the Congress to reject this legislation; and

Finally, That copies of this Resolution be sent to the President, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General of the United States, the leaders of the Senate and the House, the chairmen of the committees considering this legislation, and the D.C. Commissioners.

The Federation's opposition to title IV of this bill is based on several factors, as follows:

1. It believes that sections of the bill are unconstitutional;

2. It considers the philosophy that the bill seeks to implement a further intrusion by government into personal freedom;

3. It considers the enforcement provisions vicious and one-sided;

4. It is deeply concerned that actions taken under the bill to claim discrimination whether by individuals or the Attorney General will embitter and antagonize large groups of citizens and by such antagonisms deepen the rift between racial groups, thereby making it impossible to achieve the social objective of racial groups living in harmony; and

5. It is also concerned, even though we would hope that any bill passed by the Congress would be obeyed by the citizenry, that many people, including very possibly a large majority of home owners, would attempt to evade the law by various strategems and that this would have an adverse effect on the proper regard for law and order (witness the 18th amendment).

Further, the Federation would point out that there are many sound reasons— leaving aside discrimination for color, race, or religion-why an owner would refuse to rent or sell his property to another individual. These would include such considerations as doubtful financial responsibility, careless guardianship, excessive number of tenants, and potential nuisance to the neighborhood.

It should also be pointed out that under this bill and in cases where the real reason for refusal to sell or rent is not discrimination, the party who is refused the sale or rental could still go to court and-with little financial cost to himself-claim discrimination and cause the owner distress, humiliation, and mental pain and suffering in addition to loss of time and money in defending himself against the alleged discrimination.

For these reasons and as stated in the Resolution heretofore quoted, the Federation of Citizens Associations of the District of Columbia respectfully requests the Congress of the United States to reject Title IV of S. 3296.

JOHN R. IMMER,

President. GEORGE W. BRADY.

Chairman, City Planning and Zoning Committee.

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FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS,
Orlando, Fla., June 7, 1966.

Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: With 10,400 members, we are the nation's 4th largest state association of Realtors.

On behalf of the Florida Association of Realtors, we respectfully urge you, as a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to oppose Title IV of this legislation-legislation, so un-American and so viciously contrary to the liberty and freedom of all men and women of this great land of ours.

We are against the injection of the element of legal compulsion, of the police power, in the relations of a home owner or any other residential property owner and the one who seeks to buy or rent his property.

The proposed law to compel the home owner to enter into a contract against his will, with a person not of his choice, would destroy our American heritage of freedom of contract-the right of any citizen to choose, for whatever reason, to

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