Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: On behalf of myself, Senator Margaret Chase Smith, and Representatives Frances P. Bolton, Martha W. Griffiths, Catherine May, Julia Butler Hansen, and Patsy T. Mink, I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter we have jointly addressed to the President of the United States urging his support for an amendment we are proposing to the Administration's proposed civil rights legislation which is now under consideration by your committee. As the letter explains in greater detail, we have been very disappointed that the language in sections 101 and 201 of the Administration bill fails to accomplish the objective stated by the President, "to establish unavoidable requirements for nondiscriminatory jury selection," specifically with regard to sex discrimination. Although section 201, for example, as presently worded would prohibit the total exclusion of women from jury service in three States, it would not affect the variety of sex distinctions in jury service now permitted by the laws of 25 other States. In common with the President's Commission on the Status of Women and many other individuals and organizations, we believe there should be a single standard for service on juries, applicable equally to men and women. The amendment we have proposed, the text of which is contained in our letter to the President, would accomplish this objective. It has the formal support, among others, of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women and the Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia. We respectfully solicit your consideration and support of this amendment. FLORENCE P. DWYER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE PRESIDENT, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your State of the Union Message on January 12, 1966, promised to "propose legislation to establish unavoidable requirements for nondiscriminatory jury selection in Federal and State courts." As Members of Congress, we welcomed your message, and on February 25, 1966, we asked you, and the Attorney General, to include provisions in your sponsored bill to "preclude, in both State and Federal courts, any discrimination in jury service on the basis of sex, as well as other irrelevant factors such as race, color, political or religious affiliation, or economic or social status." We strongly believe that the arbitrary discrimination in the jury system on the basis of sex is wholly unjustified and must be eliminated. However, we regret to note that because of inappropriate language the Civil Rights bill which you sent to the Congress on April 28 will fail to accomplish your goal and ours: "to establish unavoidable requirements for nondiscriminatory jury selection." We therefore respectfully request, and urge, that you support the amendment which we here propose to rectify the unduly limited language now in the bill. Discrimination in the selection of a jury undermines the very foundation of a democracy in the administration of justice, whether such discrimination is based on race, economic or social class, political or religious affiliation, or sex. Where such discrimination occurs, as your message of April 28 to Congress so clearly says: "It is not only the excluded group that suffers. Courts are denied the justice that flows from impartial juries selected from a cross section of the community." Women constitute a cross section of one-half of the adult community. The jury system will not be representative, or nondiscriminatory, unless and until no distinction is made between men and women with respect to jury service. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1957 made women eligible to serve on all Federal juries, the procedures still being used in many of the Federal district courts continue to undermine the statutory purpose. The situation is much worse in State courts. Only 22 States have laws that put men and women on an equal footing with regard to jury service. The other 28 States and the District of Columbia make various distinctions on the basis of sex alone which result in distorted and unrepresentative juries, as follows: A. Three States-Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina-totally exclude women from juries. B. Twenty-fivé States and the District of Columbia provide different treatment for men and women with regard to jury service, as follows: 1. Three States-Florida, Louisiana and New Hampshire-permit women to serve on juries only if they first register with the clerk of the court. These States have no similar law with respect to men. (In addition, a jury in a condemnation case in Florida must be composed only of men). 2. Fourteen jurisdictions excuse women from jury service solely because of their sex, namely, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland (in 4 of 23 counties), Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. 3. Eight States exempt women (but not men) if they have family and child care responsibilities. These are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. 4. Two States allow women to serve on juries only where courthouse facilities permit: Rhode Island and Nebraska. 5. Two States specifically exempt women from jury service in cases involving certain crimes: Massachusetts and Nebraska. In the light of these facts, let us look at the specific language of section 201 of your proposed bill. It provides: "No person or class of persons shall be denied the right to serve on grand and petit juries in any State court on account of race, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." This language would clearly change the laws in Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina which totally exclude women from jury service. However, it would not invalidate the laws of the other 25 jurisdictions which make sex distinctions in jury service. In these 25 jurisdictions women have a "right to serve" on the jury, and section 201 merely forbids a denial of "the right to serve." The sex distinctions now drawn in these 25 jurisdictions result in great evil. They are used in many locations to discourage women from serving on a jury. Frequently, women ask to be excused because they are disturbed by gratuitous suggestions about the inconvenience of jury service, the uncertainty of time required, the unwholesomeness of the surroundings, or the distasteful facts to be heard in some cases. These sex distinctions undermine women's sense of civic responsibility. They introduce totally unwarranted distortions in the selection of a jury so that it fails to be a cross section of the community. The recent Federal court decision (White v. Crook, Feb. 7, 1966), holding the Alabama law unconstitutional did not help very much, because the court's decision allowed the State until June 1, 1967, to set up a new system which could include such factors as "whether service is to be compulsory or voluntary and the availability of physical facilities." If Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina, which now exclude women, follow the example of the 25 other jurisdictions, allowing women to serve, but not on the same basis as men, the Civil Rights bill will have very little practical effect on eliminating sex discrimination in the selection of State juries. Unless the Civil Rights bill tackles the problem of sex distinction in jury service, rather than merely the denial of the "right to serve", the bill will not "establish unavoidable requirements for nondiscriminatory jury selection" as promised in your State of the Union Message of January 12. Although further litigation might bring further progress in ending discrimination between men and women in jury service (for example, whether the absence of physical facilities in a court house causes a denial to women of the right to serve on juries on account of sex), litigation is a long and costly process, of uncertain outcome, and the results will vary from State to State. We believe that there should be but one law relating to jury service, applicable equally to both men and women; not one law for men and another law for women. We believe that no one should be excused from jury service solely on the basis of sex. We believe that jury service by women should not depend on whether a State or county has installed physical facilities for women jurors in court houses. We believe jury service should not depend on whether women register specially to serve, or otherwise ask to be allowed to serve. We believe that making women eligible for jury service on the same basis as men will not drag the mother away from her home-making and child-care duties. The existence of such responsibilities, which is a proper functional basis for excuse from jury duty, should be a reason available to any citizen, not just women. We agree with the position of the President's Commission on the Status of Women which urged: "attention to assuring equal jury service without distinction as to sex. Women and men alike should assume their responsibilities for making juries representative of the communities in which they live." can Women, 1963, pp. 46-47). We agree with the 1963 report of the Commission's Committee on Civil and Political Rights which stated (pp. 12–14): (Ameri "The Committee believes there is urgent need for State legislative reform with respect to jury service eligibility, exemption, and excuse in order to achieve equal jury service in the States. The removal of sex distinctions in State laws respecting jury service would not mean that women having the care of small children would be forced out of the home; it would mean only that eligibility for an exemption and excuse from jury service would be the same for either sex." To help achieve our common goal of establishing "unavoidable requirements for nondiscriminatory jury selection in Federal and State courts", we shall recommend, and hope you will support, amending the language of section 201 to read as follows: "It shall be unlawful to make any distinction on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status, in the qualifications for service, and in the selection of any person to serve, on grand or petit juries in any State court." We suggest that a similar change should be made in the language of that part of section 101 of the bill that would amend 18 U.S.C. 1862. The changes we recommend will bring this aspect of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966 into accord with the policy against sex distinctions which is already in section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-352), and section 3 of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (Public Law 88-38). Respectfully yours, PATSY T. MINK. JULIA BUTLER HANSEN. FRANCES P. BOLTON. MARTHA W. GRIFFITHS. |