that that line of cases dealt only with tax power, not with power under the commerce clause.

So I think that the short answer to your question-I am not giving you the long one-the short answer is that the reach of the commerce clause is a very broad reach indeed. That does not mean that the Congress in its wisdom should regulate all of the things that it can regulate under the commerce claus.e But where Congress exercises that judgment the court is going to be very reluctant to overturn the legislation which Congress found justified. And I think the same thing would be true with respect to the 14th amendment. In other words, I think that if Congress felt that a conspiracy of the type that I described did in fact exist, and that this was a major obstacle to securing rights which the 14th amendment sought itself to secure on an equal basis, if Congress made that judgment, I think the court would be very reluctant to overturn that judgment, whether he did it under the commerce clause or whether he did it under the 14th amendment.

Senator DIRKSEN. Just as a passing observation, it has been years and years since I have examined the Mann Act, but it seems to me that the seductee must cross the State line.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. Yes. I was using it because the purpose of the Mann Act, I think, was scarcely the regulation of the

interstate commerce.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is right.

But putting this in its simplest frame, early this year I was invited. to address a Methodist university, a Presbyterian university, and a Catholic university. And I relived some of my old student days. And as they took me around I would see these signs, "Student room for rent." Now, it was quite common, for instance, to see this kind of a squib in the paper: "Catholic family residing two blocks from the university has two nice, large rooms for rent to students in a quiet neighborhood, students who are of the same faith." And right away the preference has been spread. So I come along, and this is for me. I do not tell them who I am. I look like a student.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. I think you are a student, Senator. Senator DIRKSEN. So I see a room, and I say, "This is going to be most delightful."

And they say to me, "You are a member of the Catholic faith?" "No, I am a hard-shelled Mississippi Baptist."

Now, there is an act of discrimination-or is it not? Does the commerce clause cover it? There is no intimidation; there is no conspiracy. There is no linkup with any other interest that I can see. It is just a plain case of a very charming family wanting to have students who share an identical faith, simply because it added materially to the religious atmosphere of the home.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. As I said, Senator, if you will look at this as a series of isolated, infrequent individual cases, you will be hard put to understand why the commerce clause or why the 14th amendment would have its impact on it. I do not happen to think that, whatever that individual case is, that that is the nature of the beast that we are dealing with.

Now, I think that in attempting to deal with the problem, just as in the public accommodations situation, in attempting to deal with the

problem of very widespread discrimination, most of which has been against Negroes, some of which has been against Jews, some of which has been against Catholics, I think much less so today, that I think that Congress in dealing with that, in attempting to deal with it effectively, could cover the situation that you have described. There is nothing unconstitutional in covering that if that is an essential or important way of dealing with the larger problem. If what you had in this country were isolated instances of preference of the kind that you are describing, and if that is all that you had, I would doubt that Congress could make a rational judgment under either the 14th amendment or the commerce clause that this problem should be regulated. But where it determines that it should be regulated, we are somewhat like back in the Filburn case, where you thought of the problem of your agricultural price supports and your agricultural legislation as a problem which was only dealing with one small field of weed that one man was growing for consumption on his own premises, you would say, how on earth could Congress do that? But that was not the nature of the problem. But in the regulation of the problem dealing with the problem as a whole Congress felt that it had to reach everything that could be covered by this. The cumulative effect of that in a sense was the problem itself, not the cumulative effect of growing crops. And I think in this area it is exactly the same situation, that you have got a major problem of dealing with certain minority groups, particularly Negroes. And to reach that problem there should be a broad reach to the legislation.

Now, the House determined to exempt in this very small units. And I think they intended to exempt the kind of situation that you are talking about. I think that is a reasonable judgment for Congress to make, if it wants to make those exemptions, on the ground that the cumulative amount of housing available is that this is a very small part of it, and that therefore in terms of either the commerce clause or the 14th amendment Congress could exempt those kinds of things. But I think-after all, we had exactly the same situation really in public accommodations, because of the sweep of this, you picked up very small restaurants, and very small lunch counters. But Congress felt, I think, in that instance that if the problem was going to be dealt with at all it was best to deal with it on a wide basis across the board. And I do not think there is any constitutional problem in doing it.

Senator DIRKSEN. Do you think there is an analogy here with the accommodations title of the 1964 act?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. Oh, yes, I think there is an analogy there, because I think under the 1964 act places of public accommodations that were very small indeed, that had very little impact on Congress, were nonetheless covered in with places that had a much bigger impact on Congress. And I take it that your little boardinghouse example is of the same sort really, that it is a very small part of the housing picture, but if you make that the typical housing picture, this isolated situation of a Catholic family that prefers to have two Catholic students, if you think that is the problem we are dealing with-I do not think you do think that is the problem we are dealing with-but if that is the total problem we are dealing with, that, I think, would be a different situation. But I do not think that is the problem.

Senator DIRKSEN. But this family has no identity with the problem. that you constantly refer to. Here they buy a lot, they build a house, they raise a family. They send their children to school. The children graduate. They marry. They have got a fairly good-sized house. So they want to rent a few rooms to students. They would like to have students of their own faith. Now, it could be that on Saturday afternoon or Sunday they might want to invite them to Sunday dinner, and you might reason that some of the food on the table traveled in interstate commerce, or if they serve a cocktail, it came from a distillery somewhere outside the State. But that seems to me so remote and so tenuous that I do not know how you can sustain that, frankly.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. Well, Senator, I do not think this is any more difficult than Mr. Filburn's wheat to sustain. The point is that in dealing with the problem, that does deny people rights guaranteed under the 14th amendment effectively, and does make that less effective than it should be in dealing with the problem that does importantly affect interstate commerce. Once you cross that bridge, once you have said yes, housing is important in interstate commerce, and the existence of widespread racial discrimination does block interstate commerce to a certain degree, and to an important degree, then the Congress has the power to regulate it. And it seems to me then how far it goes, whether it covers this family or not, is a legislative judgment for Congress to make as to what is effective in dealing with that problem. And if you want to make a legislative judgment here that it need not cover the situation that you are describing, that is all right. But I think the Congress felt that it was important to cover even that situation, that the Court would be very relucant to overturn that application.

We have a great many examples of purely intrastate commerce, purely intrastate commerce which has an effect on interstate commerce, and thus permits Congress to regulate it. I would call your attention to the application of the minimum wage laws, for example, where the interstate contacts could be totally unimportant, where you can deliver five loaves of bread a week in interstate commerce, if that could be regulated.

I call your attention to the regulation of coloring margarine produced and sold within the State, but it affects interstate commerce in important ways.

So that if all you are dealing with is what the scope of it should be, I would say that the scope can be whatever Congress determines is wise and necessary to deal with the problem itself. And if you want to draw the line short of your boardinghouse, your individual families, do what the House did. They said they are exempting owner-occupied four-room houses, I mean with no more than four apartments in them. I think they did so not because they could not constitutionally cover those houses, but because they made a determination that that was a very small part of a much bigger problem, and those exemptions would still allow Congress to deal effectively with the problem.

But that is a legislative judgment, Senator, not a constitutional one. Senator DIRKSEN. You would still render that opinion if you lived in a small town, a school town 100 miles, 200 miles from any city that had anything proximating a ghetto?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. Yes, absolutely. I do not know what the local pressure would be on me, if you are suggesting that as a lawyer in that town.

Senator DIRKSEN. I must make one comment about these so-called real estate lobby or pressure deals to which we referred. I had such a pressure group once. It consisted of three people. It consisted of three people. Strangely enough, instead of being against the bill, they were for it when they came up. And nobody has come to see me yet in opposition to the bill.

Now, you still do not believe that we are violating the due process clause, as Dr. Petro of New York University laid out, in what I thought was a rather scholarly presentation?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. It had a lot of rhetoric in it, not much else.

Senator ERVIN. I thought it had a lot of logic and a lot of punch; it also had lovely rhetoric, I agree.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. You will notice that he always referred to this as a "home" rather than a "house"?

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes. Well, that showed the right bringing up. You remember there was a very popular book authored by a lady from New York, entitled "A House Is Not a Home."

Attorney General KATZENBACH. That makes my point.

Senator DIRKSEN. So I think that Petro put the emphasis where it should be.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. I think I would have a home, Senator, even if I had no place to live.

Senator DIRKSEN. That clock is running out on me, and I must ask you a residual question. What changes would you make in the bill that will be up for action in the House under the so-called discharge procedure?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. What changes would I make in this title, or elsewhere?

Senator DIRKSEN. You can take the whole bill if you like, or take it by title.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. I think as far as this title is concerned I would clarify the point that we have discussed. I think there may be a couple of other minor clarifications which might be desirable because the administrative provisions of this does not completely gibe with the others, and it might be that there would be some small language changes there, although not of substantive importance. While, as I have stated, I would prefer to see the bill with a broader coverage which the administration introduced, judging from the action of the committee on this, and from other conversations that I have had, I would not at this point believe that the House was disposed to reinstate broader provisions. If I thought that they were, I would urge them to do so. My guess would be that the amendments that I have suggested are the amendments which will be offered there. Of course, there may be a lot of other individual amendments.

Senator DIRKSEN. If you have the bill, the House bill-
Attorney General KATZENBACH. Yes, I do.

Senator DIRKSEN. Let me ask you to look at page 64. That is subsection (b) of 403: "Nothing in this section shall apply to an owner

with respect to the sale, lease, or rental by him of a portion of a building." What about an entire building, or the sale of a house? It says, "by him of a portion of the building which contains living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families,” and so forth. You get a clear idea that he is referring to duplexes, apartments, and small houses, but not individual homes. And that is obscure language there.

Attorney GENERAL KATZENBACH. Yes. I think that is a point that might be clarified as well. And again I have no question about the intention of the House committee with respect to that. And I think I would interpret that section as applying to a boardinghouse as well, because they intend it to cover one- and two-family dwelling there. And I would take it to apply to the rental of that portion as well, Senator. But I certainly think the language is capable of clarification in that respect, if there is any disposition. But you can leave the answer to Senator Javits on the other. I would quite frankly interpret this provision to cover Mrs. Murphy's boardinghouse as well as Mrs. Murphy's small apartment house.

Senator JAVITS. If the Senator would yield, it would still be subject to three transactions qualification.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. Oh, yes.

Senator JAVITS. And the seller of the four-family house probably would not have had any more than that one transaction here. Attorney General KATZENBACH. Owner occupied as well.

Senator DIRKSEN. To use that word "transaction" with respect to these problems, there is no definition of "transaction." Now, who is going to determine what a transaction is?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. There are a lot of words used in statutes that are not defined, Senator. I would think in the context of this statute a transaction was pretty clear when it was used there, and I think it means the sale and rental of that property. It does not define it, but it does say, it is pointed out to me, transactions involving the sale or rental or lease of any dwelling or any interest therein. And I think that transaction is pretty clear in that context.

Senator DIRKSEN. If I hired a carpenter to build a good-sized sign, and a sign painter to paint it, saying that this property is for sale, and put it on the property; that is, with respect to the property involved, is that a transaction?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. I would not think that was a transaction involving the sale. But it would be the second the house was sold.

Senator DIRKSEN. Well, it is very loosely drawn. There are a number of interpretations here.

Attorney General KATZENBACH. If there is need for clarification, I am sure that it can be. I conceive of interpretations of that, whether a month-to-month lease renewed to the same person as a separate transaction could conceivably raise a problem. But I would think that the intent is pretty clear on what they are attempting to cover here. And I would think it is not too badly drafted.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Attorney General, you were kind to come back. And I am sorry if I inconvenienced you some days ago. But the fact of the matter is that I was ill, and just could not be here.