a judgment of the General Court of Maryland, directed the mandate for execution to issue to the General Court.1 Where a judgment over which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, is brought before it for revision by a writ of error, it will not, upon a motion to dismiss the writ of error, examine whether the record contains any bill of exceptions, or any statement of facts upon which a question of law could arise for review. § 402. Where the court below instructed the jury to give damages for the hire of a steamboat, from a certain time to a day which, it appears from the record, was posterior to the institution of the suit, the judgment should be reversed.3 § 403. The laws of Louisiana authorizing a summary judgment upon mere motion against the security in an appeal bond, without the intervention of a jury, such a judgment may be rendered in the District Court of Louisiana under the Act of Congress of 1824.* § 404. Where there is a substantial defect in the appeal, or writ of error, the objection may be taken at any time before the judgment, on the ground of a want of jurisdiction.5 § 405. The mandate of the Supreme Court to the circuit court must be its guide in executing the judgment or decree on which it issued. The mandate is the judgment of the Supreme Court transmitted to the circuit court; and where the direction contained in it is precise and unambiguous, it is the duty of the circuit court to carry it into execution, Clark v. Harwood, 3 Dallas, 342; 1 Cond. 157. 2 Minor et ux. v. Tillotson, 1 Howard, 287. 3 Bradley v. The Steam-packet Co., 9 Peters, 107. 4 Hiriart v. Ballon, 9 Peters, 156. 5 The Heirs of Wilson v. The Life and Fire Insurance Co. of New York, 12 Peters, 140. and not to look elsewhere for authority to change its meaning. But when the circuit courts are referred to testimony to ascertain the amount to be decreed, and are authorized to take more evidence on the point, it may sometimes happen that there will be some uncertainty and ambiguity in the mandate; and in such a case the court below have, unquestionably, the right to resort to the opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered at the time of the decree, in order to assist them in expounding it.' The mandate of the Supreme Court is to be interpreted according to its subject-matter, and is in no manner to work injustice. The meaning of the mandate may be ascertained from the instrument itself, but the reasons which induced the court to make it, are to be found in the evidence contained in the original record. The proceedings in the original suit are always before the court, so far as to determine any new points between the parties. A judgment of the Court of Errors of New York had been brought before the Supreme Court of the United States, and reversed, on the ground that the defendant being Consul-General of Saxony, could not be sued in the Supreme Court. When the mandate of the Supreme Court was filed in the Court of Errors of New York, that court declared, that the person named was exempt from being sued in a state court; but added, that the fact of his character did not appear upon the record of the proceedings of the court below (the Supreme Court of New York), and that its own power did not extend to the reversal of any judgment of that court, for an error of fact not apparent upon the face of the record; and for these reasons ordered the writ of error to the court below to be quashed. This judgment being brought before the Supreme Court of the United States by a writ of error was affirmed.^ 1 West et als. v. Brashear, 14 Peters, 51. 3 Mitchell et als. v. The United States, 15 Peters, 52, citing Ex parte Sibbald, 12 Peters, 493, and The Santa Maria, 10 Wheaton, 431. Davis v. Packard et als. 8 Peters, 312. § 406. Where the original judgment is reversed, the reversal of a dependent judgment on a forthcoming bond follows, as a matter of course. But a difficulty may arise in connecting with the original reversed judgment that which is asserted to be dependent upon it. A certiorari upon a suggestion of diminution would not answer the purpose, as the proceedings in the original suit form no part of those in the subsequent suit, the only foundations of which are the bond and notice. Nor would it be regular to receive as evidence of the dependency of the latter upon the former judgment, the certificate of the clerk of the circuit court. The court thought it best to direct a special writ to be framed, applicable to cases of this nature, to be directed to the clerk of the court in which the judgments were rendered, to certify under the seal of the court the execution recited in the bond on which the second judgment was rendered.1 1 Bartit v. Petit & Bayard, 7 Cranch, 288; 2 Cond. 494. CHAPTER VII. PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN EQUITY AND And § 407. THE Act of March 3, 1803, eh. 93, § 2, having provided the process of appeal for the removal of equity and admiralty cases from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court, such cases cannot be removed by writ of error.1 whether the distinction between proceedings at law and proceedings in equity exists or not in the courts of a state, if the relief sought in the circuit court of the United States is a relief mainly appropriate to a chancery jurisdiction, the case must be carried to the Supreme Court by appeal, and not by writ of error.2 § 408. As the Act of 1803, however, makes appeals in equity and admiralty "subject to the same rules, regulations, and restrictions, as are prescribed by law in cases of writs of error," by the Act of 1789, the time within which the appeal may be taken, in what instances it is to operate as a supersedeas, the citation to the adverse party, the security to be given by the appellant for prosecuting his suit, and the restrictions upon the appellate court as to reversals in certain enumerated cases, are to be the same as are provided by the latter statute for writs of error;3 except that where the appeal is prayed in open court at the same term when the decree The San Pedro, 2 Wheaton, 132. 2 M'Collum v. Eager, 2 Howard, 61. appealed from is made, a citation is not necessary. But if the appeal is prayed after the court has risen, the appellant must proceed in the same manner as in a writ of error.2 § 409. The time within which an appeal may be taken being fixed, by the 22d section of the Judiciary Act, at the period of five years from the time of rendering or passing the decree, a second appeal, within that time, may be taken, where the first appeal has been dismissed for informality.3 If the appeal is taken and the bond given within ten days from the date of the decree, it will operate as a supersedeas; and if the final decree does not take effect until a day subsequent to its date, in consequence of the subsequent action of the court with regard to it, the ten days will begin to run when that subsequent action is finally terminated. Thus, where a final decree was rendered on the 10th of May, 1843, and on the 26th of the same month the defendants filed a petition to have the decree opened for certain purposes, and the court took cognizance of the petition, and on the 9th of June refused it, and thereupon the defendants took an appeal from this refusal as well as from the final decree, and gave bond on the 15th of June, and the appeal was then allowed by the court, it was held, that the appeal operated as a supersedeas or stay of execution on the decree, being within ten days from the day when the decree, which had been suspended, took effect.* § 410. With regard to the parties by whom an appeal is to be taken, the rule is, that where there are various parties, all of them who are affected by a joint decree should be joined in the appeal from that decree; and if any of them refuse or decline upon notice and process (in the nature of a Ibid. Reiley v. Lamar, 2 Cranch, 349; Brockett v. Brockett, 2 Howard, 238. 2 Yeaton v. Lenox, 7 Peters, 220. 3 Yeaton v. Lenox, 8 Peters, 123. Brockett v. Brockett, 2 Howard, 238. |