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first of these two publications; which (says Dr. Priestley in his letter to the Author of it) has been submitted to the perusal of persons of great learning and worth, who, I am informed, think highly of it, and have recommended the publication, not only as excellent in itself, but as very proper to follow that of Dr. Price; who was thought by them to have been too tender of me, in our amicable discussion, and to have made fome imprudent conceflions. Your work, it is thought, will supply the deficiency in his.'

Though Mr. Palmer does not, in this publication, particularly discuss the question concerning the materiality or immateriality of the soul; one of his principal arguments, in favour of human liberty, or agency, is founded on the immateriality of that substance. If the fentient principe in man be of a man terial nature, it must, as we have observed in the former stages of this dispute, be subject to the laws of matter or mechanism; and be necessarily determined by the motives or external causes operating upon it: but, on the other hand, if the soul of man be immaterial, or a substance perfectly distinct from matter; it may be said that the same necessity may not take place. The foul, thus conftituted, may be conceived endowed with a self-determining power, imparted to it by the Creator. Motives, or external causes, will indeed have weight or influence over it; but that influence will not be a mechanical, and may not be a neceffitating influence. Motives may occasionally induce, but cannot compel to action, a spiritual substance, which is a selfmover, or which has a power imparted to it of beginning motion :--a power, which, the Author observes, as it exists in the Supreme Being, may by him be communicated to created beings; as all other powers may, which do not imply selfexistence or independency.

Accordingly, as Dr. Priestley has inferred, that if man be wholly a material, he must be a mechanical being; so the Author, on the other hand, draws an opposite conclusion from the contrary supposition ; and further concludes, that if man be frei, or poffeffied of the power of moral agency (as he endcavours to prove in the course of this work), there must be fonething in the constitution of his nature, to which this power belongs, that is intirely distinct from matter, and not subject to its laws; or that the spirit in man is properly immaterial.' In short, the tenour of this part of his argument consists in Mewing that the neceffity, which musi attend the operation of physical causes, is not applicable to, nor can take place with respect to, a suba ftance of a totally different nature from matter.But to represent this argument in another light - or rather perhaps only in other words:

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The Neceffarians, in their arguments drawn from the confideration of cause and effect, suppose, or rather take for granted, a fimilarity in the nature of matter and spirit; and accordingly apply the same general maxims to effects mechanically produced, and to effects depending upon the will and choice of a human mind: whereas the Author, as an advocate for human liberty, does not admit what is thus assumed by the Neceffarians. The advocate for liberty allows indeed that every effect must have a caure; and that every cause must be adequate to the eff.&t: he admits too that bodies must produce the same effects precisely on other bodies, under the same precise circumstances : but the mind, according to his hypothesis, not being subjected to the laws of matter, though liable to be influenced by it, and porn fesling a felf-moving or determining power, may will or determine differently, on different occasions, even though the circumftances are the same. Or, nearly in the words of the Author, the mind not being under the controul of matter, a variety of volition or determination, in the same situation or circumstances, may be admitted as possible, at least, without any contradiction, or even seeming difficulty.

In reply to this last observation, Dr. Priestley, in the second of these publications, obferves that the contradiction is not at all the less glaring, or the difficulty in any degree diminished, by ascribing immateriality to the mind. It does indeed fol: low,' says he, that the mind, being immaterial, is not subject to the laws of matter ; but it does not therefore follow, that it is subject to no laws at all, and consequently has a self-determining power, independent of all laws, or rule of its determinations. In fact, there is the very same reason to conclude that the mind is subject to laws as the body.'-He instances in certain affections and passions of the mind. Thus, perception invariably follows the presentation of a proper object: the judgment follows, as certainly, the perceived agreement or diragreement of two ideas. These affections belong to the mind as much as the will; they are invariably determined by a view of the objects presented to them,, and have nothing of selfdetermination belonging to them. The decisions of the will as invariably follow the motives, which are its objeEts; and it would be strange if the will could be ascribed to some other substance, intirely different from that in which perception and judgment inhere whether that substance be material or immaterial.

It is impossible for us to follow Mr. Palmer through the various questions into which this dispute has been branched out by Dr. Priestley and his answerer We shall however take particular notice of that part of his work, in which he treats of the moral influence of the doctrine of necessity, and confiders

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how far the general conduct of men will be influenced by the belief of that doctrine. To these considerations we shall subjoin the substance of Dr. Priestley's reply. We choose this subject, both because we particularly attended to it, when we gave an account of Dr. Priestley's original work; — [See M. Rev. vol. Iviii. May 1778, page 361.] and likewise because, if Dr. P. has succeeded in his new illustration of it, he has cleared up what has always appeared to us one of the most difficult parts of his do&trine, as applied to the conduct of men believing in it.

Mr. Palmer asks, what can possibly have a stronger tendency towards the rendering men indifferent with respect to their conduct, and preventing all human endeavours, than for a man to believe that he has no power over his actions; so that (to use Dr. Priestley's own words) ' no action or event could possibly be otherwise than it has been, is, or is to be? This would be the case, Dr. Priestley has before owned, if their own actions and determinations were not necesary links in this chain of causes and events, and if their good or bad success did not, in the ftricteft sense of the word, depend upon themselves.'

According to Mr. Palmer, the confideration of the actions and determinations of men being neceffary links in this chain of causes and events,' is the very thing that constitutes the difficulty, instead of removing it. If all human actions and determinations are necessary, what is there,' he asks, that, in any proper sense, can be said to depend upon a man's self? What, on this plan of human nature, are all endeavours or efforts which a man can exert, but impressions, or the consequences of impressions, made upon him, in which he has not the leaft concern as an efficient or agent?- To look upon every action and event as necessary, and that nothing could be otherwise than it is, is a much better salvo for all the follies and errors of men, than any other which they have been able to find out. therefore, are to succeed beiter, or be happier, in any part of their existence, than others, their superior prosperity and happiness will be infallibly secured to them: and though there is a certain disposition of mind and course of action, which are inseparably connected with their success and happiness, as means to bring about these events; yet the means, as well as the end, are alike necessary; and having no power to make either the one or the other at all different from what they are, or are to be ; their lot, through the whole of their being, is by them ablolutely unalterable.'

Mr. Palmer then alludes to the case of the farmer, adduced by Dr. Priestley, as a popular illustration of his doctrine ; and which, on that account, we transcribed into the page of our Review above referred to. In this case, Mr. Palmes says, that

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the Doctor seems to take the principle of necesity for ganted, and then reasons upon it, as if it were really true. To make it a case in point, it must be supposed, not only that “ vegetation is subject to the establithed laws of nature;" but likewise, that the farmer believes, that he himself is, in the whole of his conduct, subject to the like physical neceffity; and that, if he is to reap, he shall also find himself under a necessary, compulsive, inAuence to low. Whether this is a common opinion among that plain sort of men,' says Mr. Palmer, let the Doctor himfelf, on impartial reflection, determine. But, till that is first proved, no inference, favourable to the doctrine of neceflity, can be drawn from the pains they take, in making use of the means appointed for rendering the earth fruitful.'— The fact, he doubts not, is, that they do consider themselves as having it in their power to neglect or use the means: and, did they believe the contrary, he apprehends, that their belief would be attended with want of exertion, and neglect of their concerns.

In his answer to these objections and observations of Mr. Palmer, Dr. Priestley does not defend himself against the whole of the doctrine here imputed to him.- I am confident,' says he (treating only of what makes a man's actions his own, and depending on himself), that, in what you say on this subject, you deceive yourself by the use of words, or you could not draw the consequences that you do, from what you suppose to be my doctrine on this subject. He then proceeds:

• Strictly and philosophically speaking, my success in any thing I wish to accomplish, depends upon myself, if my own exertions and actions are necessary links in that chain of events, by which alone it can be brought about. And, certainly, if I do know this, and the object or end be desirable to me, this desire (if it be of sufficient strength) cannot but produce the exertion that is necessary to gain my end. This reasoning appears to me extremely easy, and perfectly conclusive; and yet, though I have repeated it several times, and have placed it in a variety of lights, you do not seem to have considered it. I shall, there. fore, give another instance, and add some farther illustrations.'

This other instance, in which the Author substitutes himself in the room of the farmer, seems to us calculated to obviate the objection above made by Mr. Palmer to the former illastration; and in which he urges, that farmers do not, in general, know, or believe in, the doctrine of neceflity : whereas no one can doubt of Dr. Priestley's believing in his own doctrine,

• Can I,' says he, have a fufficiently strong wish to answer your book, and not of course read it, mark proper extracts from it, arrange them, write my remarks upon them, then transcribe them for the press, and put them into the hands of a bookseller or printer, &c. when I know, that if all this be not done, the book will never be answered ? Surely, my firm belief that all these things are necessarily connected, muft convince me of the neceffity of setting about the work, if I wish to do it at all; and my wish to have it done, is here to be supposed, as having arisen from a variety of previous circumstances.

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If, therefore, I shall certainly find myself disposed to act just as I now do, believing my actions to be necessary, your obje&tion to my doctrine, on this account, cannot have a sufficient foundation. You say, that if the thing must be, it must be; if your book is to be answered by me, it will be answered by me ; and that I may, therefore, make myself easy about it, and do nothing. I answer, that fo I should, either if I had no desire to have it done, which happens not to be the case, or if I thought that no exertions of mine were necessary to gain my end, which is not the case neither. On this consideration depends the capital distinction that I make between the doctrines of philofophical necefsity, and Calvinistic predestination.

Dr. Priestley then proceeds to Thew, that the doctrine of philosophical necessity supposes a necessary connection between our endeavours and our success ; ' so that if only the desire of success, the first link in this chain, be sufficiently (trong, all the reft will follow of course, and the end will be certainly accomplished.'- Whereas, according to the Calvinists, the desire and the end, have no necessary connection. In the work of conversion or regeneration, for instance, they say, that · God is the fole agent, and men altogether passive;'--that, without his immediate agency, to which nothing on the part of man can contribute, let a man exert himself ever so much, in the use of all polible means; yet all bis volitions, and all his actions, would be only finful, and deserving of the wrath and curse of God to all eternity:

Notwithstanding these explanations, and allowing the justice and propriety of these distinctions, between the doctrine of philofophical necessity and that of Calvinistic predestination; itill, we apprehend, the capital difficulty will appear to many not to be removed by them. We mean that contained in the passage which we have marked with Italics, in the paragraph preceding the last. Notwithstanding all that is here said, this stumblingblock ftill seems to rear its head, and this question still recurs; -If the thing Must be, it must be'; and therefore, how can í prevent it, or why foould I exert myself?-Or, in other words, does it depend on me to prevent or produce an event, which cannot possibly be otherwise than it is. to be?' If, in the plan of providence (may an indolent man say), I am the destined agent, whose exertions are necessary to a certain end; the defire of success,' and other links in the chain of causes, will necessarily impel me to those exertions; and I will patiently await their Rev. Jan, 1780.

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