one present wished to introduce some friend on the list of subscribers, he pretended to cast up the sums already subscribed, said the loan was full, huddled up his papers, got into a chair, and returned home, reserving to himself, by this manoeuvre, a large share in the loan." "1 A few years later, similar practices were exposed Lotteries. in another form. Lotteries were then a favourite source of revenue; and it appeared from the lists of subscribers in 1769 and 1770, that shares had been allotted to several members of Parliament. On the 23rd of April, 1771, Mr. Seymour moved for the list of persons who had subscribed to the lotteries of that year, alleging that it appeared from the lists of 1769, that twenty thousand tickets had been disposed of to members of Parliament, which sold at a premium of nearly 21. each. His motion was refused.2 On the 25th April, Mr. Cornwall moved to prohibit any member from receiving more than twenty tickets. He stated that he was "certainly informed," that fifty members of Parliament had each subscribed for five hundred tickets, which would realise a profit of 1000l., and secure the minister fifty votes. His motion also was rejected.3 North's Again, in 1781, the very circumstances of Lord Bute's Lord flagitious loan, were repeated under Lord North. A loan, 1781. loan of 12,000,000l. was then contracted, to defray the cost of the disastrous American war, of which lottery tickets formed a part. Its terms were so favourable to the subscribers, that suddenly the scrip, or omnium, rose nearly 11 per cent. The minister was assailed 1 Cited in Walpole's Mem., iii. 100, n. 2 Parl. Hist., xvii. 174. ham Corr., iv. 148, n.; Parl. Hist., 4 Sir P. J. Clerke, on the 8th 3 Walp. Mem., iv. 320; Chat- March, said it had risen from 9 to with injurious reproaches, and his conduct was repeatedly denounced in Parliament as wilfully corrupt. These charges were not made by obscure men: but by Lord Rockingham, Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, Mr. Byng, Sir G. Savile, and other eminent members of opposition. It was computed by Mr. Fox, that a profit of 900,000l. would be derived from the loan; and by others, that half the loan was subscribed for by members of the House of Commons. Lord Rockingham said, "the loan was made merely for the purpose of corrupting the Parliament, to support a wicked, impolitic, and ruinous war." Mr. Fox declared, again and again, that a large sum had been placed in the “hands of the minister to be granted as douceurs to members of that House, as a means of procuring and continuing a majority in the House of Commons, upon every occasion, and to give strength and support to a bad administration." 1 The worst feature of this form of corruption, was its excessive and extravagant cost to the country. If members of Parliament were to be bribed at all,bank-notes, judiciously distributed, were far cheaper than improvident loans. Lord Bute had purchased a majority, on the preliminaries of peace, with thirty or forty thousand pounds. Lord North's experiment laid a burthen upon the people, of nearly a million. It was bad enough that the representatives of the people should 11 in the Alley that day. Lord North said it had only risen to 9, and had fallen again to 7. Lord Rockingham estimated it at 10 per cent. Debates in the Commons, 7th, 8th, 12th, and 14th March, and in the Lords, 21st March, 1781; Parl. Hist., xxi. 1334—1386; Rockingham Mem., ii. 437; Lord J. Russell's Life of Fox, i. 235–241. Wraxall's Mem., ii. 360—375. Among the subscribers to this loan were seven members for 70,000%. ; others for 50,000l.; and one for 100,000l.; but the greater number being holders of scrip only, did not appear in the list.-Wraxall Mem., ii. 367. be corrupted; and to pay so high a price for their corruption was a cruel aggravation of the wrong. North's nuance of Pitt. In 1782, Lord North, in raising another loan, did Lord not venture to repeat these scandals: but disappointed loan, 1782. his friends by a new system of close subscriptions. This arrangement did not escape animadversion: but it was the germ of the modern form of contracts, by sealed tenders.1 Mr. Pitt had himself condemned the former Discontisystem of jobbing loans and lotteries; and when he the system commenced his own financial operations, as first minister by Mr. of the crown, in 1784, he took effectual means to discontinue it. That the evil had not been exaggerated, may be inferred from the views of that sagacious statesman, as expounded by his biographer and friend Dr. Tomline. Mr. Pitt "having, while in opposition, objected to the practice of his predecessors in distributing beneficial shares of loans and lottery tickets, under the market price, among their private friends, and the parliamentary supporters of the government, adopted a new plan of contracting for loans and lotteries by means of scaled proposals from different persons, which were opened in the presence of each other; and while this competition ensured to the public the best terms which could be obtained under existing circumstances, it cut off a very improper source of showing favour to individuals, and increasing ministerial influence." The lowest tenders were accepted, and Mr. Pitt was able to assure the House of Commons that not a shilling had been reserved for distribution to his friends.3 One other form of parliamentary corruption yet Contracremains to be noticed. Lucrative contracts for the 1 Parl. Hist., xxii. 1056; Wrax all's Mem., 320. 2 Life of Pitt, iii. 533. 3 Lord Stanhope's Life of Pitt, i. 219. tors. public service, necessarily increased by the American war, were found a convenient mode of enriching political supporters. A contract to supply rum or beef for the navy, was as great a prize for a member, as a share in a loan or lottery. This species of reward was particularly acceptable to the commercial members of the House. Nor were its attractions confined to the members who enjoyed the contracts. Constituents being allowed to participate in their profits, were zealous in supporting government candidates. Here was another source of influence, for which again the people paid too dearly. Heavy as their burthens were becoming, they were increased by the costly and improvident contracts, which this system of parliamentary jobbing encouraged. The cost of bribery in this form, was even greater and more indefinite than that of loans and lotteries. In the latter case, there were some limits to the premium on scrip, which was public and patent to all the world: but who could estimate the profits of a contract loosely and ignorantly, not to say corruptly-entered into, and executed without adequate securities for its proper fulfilment? These evils were notorious; and efforts were not wanting to correct them. In 1779, Sir Philip Jennings Clerke obtained leave to bring in a bill to disqualify contractors from sitting in Parliament, except where they obtained contracts at a public bidding: but, on the 11th of March, the commitment of the bill was negatived. Again, in February 1780, Sir Philip renewed his motion, and succeeded in passing his bill through the Commons, without opposition but it was rejected by the Lords on the second reading. In 1781 it was brought forward a third time, but was then lost in the House of Commons.3 1 Parl. Hist., xx. 123–129. 2 Ibid., xxi. 414. 3 Ibid., 1390. Meanwhile, Lord North's administration was falling: the opposition were pledged to diminish the influence of the crown, and to further the cause of economic reform; and in 1782, Sir Philip Clerke was able to bring in his bill, and carry the second reading. In committee, Mr. Fox struck out the exception in favour of contracts obtained at a public bidding, and extended the measure to existing as well as future contracts. Immediately afterwards, the Rockingham ministry coming into office, adopted a measure so consonant with their own policy; and, under such auspices, it was at length passed.2 It was another legislative condemnation of corrupt influences in Parliament. condemned In weighing the evidence of parliamentary corrup- Abuses tion, which is accessible to us, allowance must be made by Parliafor the hostility of many of the witnesses. Charges ment. were made against the government of the day, by its bitterest opponents; and may have been exaggerated by the hard colouring of party. But they were made by men of high character and political eminence; and so generally was their truth acknowledged, that every abuse complained of, was ultimately condemned by Parliament. Were all the measures for restraining corruption and undue influence groundless? Were the evils sought to be corrected imaginary? The historian can desire no better evidence of contemporary evils than the judgment of successive Parliaments,— 1 Parl. Hist., xxii. 1214, 1335, 1356. Debates, 19th March; 15th and 17th April; 1st and 27th May, 1782. 2 The bill contained an exception in favour of persons subscribing to a public loan. It was said, however, that the loan was a more dangerous engine of influence than contracts, and ultimately the exception was omitted, "it being ge nerally understood that a separate > |