referred to by the Board. The Court, in the Taylor case, voided a regulation of the Civil Service Commission which provided for the placing of a preference eligible in an annual leave status during the 30-day notice period. In doing so the Court said:

The Act says that "no permanent or indefinite preference eligible shall be discharged ・・・ and the person whose discharge is sought shall have at least 30 days' advance written notice." This means, we think, that he shall have 30 days' notice in advance of his discharge, which means in advance of his being separated from the payroll. The regulation of the Civil Service Commission quoted above would deprive the preference eligible of this right. It would permit his separation from the payroll co instante. This is in conflict with the Act and is, therefore, invalid.

We are of the opinion that plaintiff is entitled to recover his salary for this 30 days.

Section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act is recognized as conferring upon a preference eligible a right to 30 days' advance notice of an adverse action. Incident thereto is the right to remain in an active duty status. In the Taylor case and the related cases which followed it, namely, Kenny v. United States, supra, and Armand v. United States, 136 C. Cls. 339, decided July 12, 1956, the Court recognized the right to an active duty status as continuing merely for the period of required notice-30 days. A basis is not apparent for considering that right as extending beyond the required notice period, until the removal of the employee from the rolls, notwithstanding that, in the exercise of administrative discretion, advance notice for more than 30 days is given or, after reaching an adverse decision, the date of removal from the rolls is postponed to enable the employee to avail himself of grievance procedures.

In the absence of a judicial decision recognizing the right of a preference eligible to remain in an active duty status beyond the period of notice required by section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act, we concur in the position of your Office that Mr. Cash is entitled to a lump-sum payment only for the leave charged to him during the 30-day advance notice period.

[B-134332]

Leases-Rent Limitation Exemptions-General Services Administration-Statutory Construction

The certification authorized to be made by the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy under 40 U. S. C. 278b to exempt leases for national emergency purposes from the rent limitations in 40 U. S. C. 278a may not be regarded as inconsistent with the right to acquire space in buildings by lease vested in the Administrator of General Services by the subsequently adopted Reorganization Plan No. 18 of 1950 so as to be construed as a function of the Administrator of General Services.

To the Administrator, General Services Administration, December 30, 1957:

Reference is made to your letter of November 4, 1957, requesting advice as to whether the General Services Administration is con

sidered to have the authority to make the certification provided for in section 278b, Title 40, United States Code, in connection with the acquisition of space by lease for Government agencies by GSA, where it is desired to except the transaction from the limitations imposed by section 278a, Title 40, United States Code.

Section 322 of the act of June 30, 1932, 47 Stat. 412, as modified by section 15 of Title II of the act of March 3, 1933, 47 Stat. 1517 (40 U. S. C. § 278a), popularly referred to as the Economy Act, provides that no appropriation shall be obligated or expended for the rent of any building or part of a building to be occupied for Government purposes at a rental in excess of the per annum rate of 15 per centum of the fair market value of the rented premises nor for alterations, improvements, and repairs of the rented premises in excess of 25 per centum of the amount of the rent for the first year of the rental term, or for the rental term if less than one year, with certain exceptions.

The act of April 28, 1942, c. 249, 56 Stat. 247, as amended by section 205 (a) of Title II of the act of July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 501 (40 U. S. C. § 278b), provides that the above limitations of the Economy Act "shall not apply during war or a national emergency declared by Congress or by the President to such leases or renewals of existing leases of privately or publicly owned property as are certified by the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Navy, or by such person or persons as he may designate, as covering premises for military, naval, or civilian purposes necessary for the prosecution of the war or vital in the national emergency."

Section 1 of Reorganization Plan No. 18 of 1950, effective July 1, 1950, 64 Stat. 1270, transferred to the Administrator of General Services all functions with respect to acquiring space in buildings by lease and assigning general purpose space for the use of Federal agencies. It specifically excludes space located in buildings in foreign countries, at military posts, arsenals, navy yards and similar defense installations, space occupied by the Post Office Department, and space in hospitals, laboratories, factories and other special purpose buildings.

You state that there have been instances both before and since the effective date of Reorganization Plan No. 18 where GSA had transferred to it, or has entered into, leases for the housing of activities especially exempted from the Economy Act by section 278b, upon the certification of the Secretary of the Army or Navy, illustrative of which is the recent request made by the Federal Civil Defense Administration for acquisition of space in which to stockpile medical supplies in case of disaster. Also, you state:

It is the view of this agency that the authority to make the certification provided in 40 U. S. C. 278b, in acquiring space in justifiable cases similar to

the one mentioned above, is a "function with respect to acquiring space by lease" and accordingly must be considered to have been transferred to this agency by Reorganization Plan No. 18.

It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special or specific statute will be considered as not intended to affect the special or specific provisions of the earlier statute unless the intention to effect the repeal is clearly manifested or unavoidably implied by the irreconsilability of the continued operation of both, or unless there is something in the general law or in the course of legislation upon its subject matter that makes it manifest that the legislative body contemplated and intended a repeal. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 564. It is also a general principle of interpretation that where a statute directs a thing to be done in a particular manner, or by certain persons, it will ordinarily be held to imply that such thing shall not be done in any other manner, or by other persons. 50 Am. Jur. 239, Statutes, Sec. 244.

The transfer to the Administrator of General Services by section 1 of Reorganization Plan No. 18 of 1950 of "All functions with respect to acquiring space in buildings by lease" is not necessarily inconsistent with the retention of the right and duty vested in the Secretaries of the Army and Navy under section 278b to determine whether the facts in a particular case are such as to warrant the issuance of a certificate exempting the lease transaction from the limitations imposed by section 322 of the Economy Act. The function of issuing such a certificate bears some relation to the lease subsequently entered into, but we do not regard it as "a function with respect to acquiring space in buildings by lease," any more than is the function of determining that space is required, which still is to be exercised by several agencies. Hence and inasmuch as the determination to be made is that the premises are for purposes "necessary for the war or vital in the national emergency," " which appears still to be within the province of the military departments, we perceive no basis for concluding that section 1 of the Plan modified by implication the provisions of section 278b in the manner contended. Moreover, section 9 (a) (1) of the Reorganization Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 203, 5 U. S. C. 133z-7 (a) (1), pursuant to which Reorganization Plan No. 18 of 1950 was submitted, provided that any statute enacted before the effective date of a reorganization plan "shall, except to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, or made inapplicable by or under authority of law or by the abolition of a function, have the same effect as if such reorganization had not been made."

It is therefore our conclusion that the General Services Administration is without authority to make the certification provided for in section 278b.

[B-134452]

Military Personnel-Coast Guard-Disability Retirement— Savings Provisions-Effect of Retirements Under Career Compensation Act of 1949 for Benefits Under Title 10 U. S. Code

The savings proviso in section 402 (f) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, 37 U. S. C. 272 (f), which permits certain members of the uniformed services who are required to be retired for physical disability to be retired under the laws relating to voluntary and involuntary retirement, does not entitle members retired for physical disability to any right to retired pay authorized for voluntary or involuntary nondisability retirement.

Although the proviso in subsection 402 (f) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, which permitted certain members of the uniformed services who were required to be retired for physical disability to be retired under the laws relating to voluntary and involuntary retirement, has not been restated in Title 10 of the U. S. Code which reenacted into positive law the disability retirement provision of section 402 of the 1949 act, it continues to be applicable to a Coast Guard enlisted member who was placed on the temporary disability retired list prior to August 10, 1956-date of the enactment of Title 10 of the U. S. Code-and who may now desire to be retired under the twenty-year voluntary retirement law rather than to be retired under the permanent disability retirement law. A Coast Guard enlisted member who is on the temporary disability retired list pursuant to action taken under section 402 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, prior to its repeal and subsequent reenactment in Title 10, Chapter 61, of the U. S. Code, must have his permanent disability retirement effected under the former provisions in section 402; however, the savings provision in 10 U. S. C. 1401, which permits members to receive the highest retired pay under any law, although not applicable while the member is on the temporary disability retired list, would apply when his permanent retirement for disability is effected. A Coast Guard enlisted member who is on the temporary disability retired list pursuant to action taken under section 402 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949 and who reenlists in the Coast Guard upon a determination by the Secretary of the Treasury of physical fitness for duty may thereafter be permitted to retire under the Coast Guard twenty-year retirement law, 14 U. S. C. 355. Under 10 U. S. C. 1401, which contains a table setting out the methods for computing retired pay for physical disability and length of service retirements, and a savings clause entitling members of the uniformed service to have retired pay computed on the formula most favorable to them, members retired under any section referred to in 10 U. S. C. 1401 are entitled to the highest retired pay computed under any provision of law.

To the Secretary of the Treasury, December 30, 1957:

Further reference is made to letter of November 15, 1957, from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, requesting our decision on certain questions relating to the basis for computing retired pay in the case of Howard N. Howell (105-077) BML-1, United States Coast Guard. The questions, as set out in a memorandum enclosed with the letter of November 15, 1957, are as follows:

1. Was Howard N. HOWELL, BML-1, USCG, entitled to the payment of the additional 10 per centum of his basic pay provided for by 14 U. S. C. 357 (c) for good conduct, after he was placed on the temporary disability retired list pursuant to the provisions of section 402 (f), Career Compensation Act of 1949, 37 U. S. C. 272 (f), (1952 Ed.)?

2. Was the said HOWELL entitled to the payment of the additional 10 per centum of his basic pay provided for by 14 U. S. C. 357 (c) on and after August 10, 1956, the effective date of Chapters 61 and 71 of title 10, United States Code? 3. Will the said HOWELL be entitled to payment of the additional 10 per centum of his basic pay provided for by 14 U. S. C. 357 (c) in the event he is permanently retired in the future for physical disability pursuant to 10 U. S. C.

1201 (1952 Ed., IV Supp.) and his retired pay is computed under 10 U. S. C. 1401 (1952 Ed., IV Supp.)?

4. In lieu of effecting his permanent retirement for physical disability, could the said HOWELL at this time be restored to active duty and then be permitted to retire under the Coast Guard 20-year retirement law, 14 U. S. C. 355?

It appears that Mr. Howell was placed on the temporary disability retired list on March 1, 1953, under the provisions of subsection 402 (f) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 820 (37 U. S. C. 272 (f)). At that time his disability was rated at 10 percent and he had completed a total of 23 years of active service for disability retired pay computation purposes under the provisions of subsection 402 (d) of the Career Compensation Act. Since his placement on the temporary disability retired list he has been paid retired pay equivalent to 572 percent (22 percent times his years of active service) of the monthly basic pay of an enlisted member in pay grade E-6.

On March 1, 1953, Mr. Howell could have been allowed to retire under the provisions of 14 U. S. C. 355, which authorize the Commandant of the Coast Guard to permit enlisted members of the Coast Guard to retire voluntarily after 20 years of active service. Due to budgetary limitations existing at that time, however, he was not afforded an opportunity to retire under those provisions. Had he been permitted to so retire voluntarily he would have received, under the provisions of 14 U. S. C. 423 and 357 (c), the retired pay which he has been receiving plus an additional 10 percent of his basic pay, his average marks in conduct during his entire Coast Guard service having been not less than 972 percent.

A Physical Evaluation Board held on July 19, 1957, has determined that Mr. Howell's disability is now permanent and is rated at 20 percent. This board has recommended that he be placed on the permanent disability retired list and the Physical Review Council has concurred in such determination and recommendation. On February 28, 1958, Mr. Howell will have been on the temporary disability retired list for five years.

Subsections 402 (a) through 402 (e) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, 37 U. S. C. 272 (a)-272 (e), authorized the retirement for physical disability of members of the uniformed services under certain specified conditions and provided for the computation of the retired pay of members so retired. One of the conditions generally required for such retirement was a disability of not less than 30 percent. Under such provisions, however, those members whose disability might not be permanent were not permanently retired but were placed upon a temporary disability retired list for a period of not to exceed five years. While on such list the members were required to be examined periodically and their further disposition depended upon the outcome of such examinations. Generally a finding of permanent disability of 30 percent or more, and that the member either had a