APPENDIX EXHIBIT A TITLE 10-ATOMIC ENERGY CHAPTER I-ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION PART 6-SECURITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATING TO LABOR-MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD PROCEEDINGS. CONTRACT NEGOTIATION AND ADMINISTRATION 6.30 Clearance of certain local union representatives. 6.31 Clearance of conciliators and arbitrators. 6.32 Security indoctrination of non-employee representatives. 6.40 Final responsibility of the Commission in security matters. AUTHORITY: 8 6.1 to 6.40 issued under 60 Stat. 755; 42 U. S. C. 1801 to 1819. GENERAL $6.1 Purpose. The purpose of this part is to set forth AEC security policies and practices in the area of labor-management relations. $6.2 Basis and scope. The specific policies contained in this part are worked out within the framework of AEC's general objectives for labor-management relations in the atomic energy program, namely; (a) Wholehearted acceptance by contractors and by labor and its representatives of the moral responsibility inherent in participation in the atomic energy program; (b) Development of procedures to assure (1) that all participants in the program are loyal to the United States including those whose participation involves the exercise of negotiating and disciplinary authority over bargaining units, and (2) that determination of unit, jurisdiction, and similar questions will not breach security; (c) Continuity of production at vital AEC installations; (d) Consistent with the Commission's responsibility under the law, the least possible governmental interference with the efficient management expected from the AEC contractors; (e) Minimum interference with the traditional rights and privileges of American labor. SECURITY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD PROCEEDINGS $6.10 Policy. It is the policy of the Commission that NLRB cases falling within the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act at the various atomic energy installations should be conducted in normal fashion wherever possible, on the basis of open hearings, unclassified records and published decisions. This policy does not preclude adoption of special arrangements which may be required for reasons of program security at any stage of the proceedings in particular areas. § 6.11 Consent elections. In accordance with the recommendation of the President's Commission on Labor Relations in the Atomic Energy Installations, it is the policy of the Commission to encourge every effort by management and labor at atomic energy installations to determine bargaining units and representatives by agreement and consent elections in preference to contested proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board. § 6.12 Trial examiners. By agreement with the National Labor Relations Board, a panel of cleared NLRB trial examiners is maintained to facilitate resolution of questions as to the materiality of classified information in NLRB hearings, and to facilitate preparation of an unclassified record. The assignment cf individual trial examiners to atomic energy cases remains a matter within the discretion of the National Labor Relations Board. $ 6.13 Clearance of counsel. It is recognized that clearance of counsel for the parties is sometimes desirable for proper preparation of a case even though the record is to be unclassified. Clearance of counsel makes possible their par ticipation in any closed discussions needed preparatory to making an unclassified record. Each party is responsible for requesting clearance of its counsel well in advance so that clearance requirements will not delay the proceeding. The -clearance of temporary special counsel will be terminated on completion of the proceeding. § 6.14 AEC's role in proceedings. If controversies within the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act arise which cannot be adjusted by mutual agreement, and contested proceedings before NLRB result, each party to such proceedings will present his own position and the evidence in support thereof with due regard for existing security rules. AEC will be continuously informed of the progress of such proceedings and will act as may appear desirable (a) to assure the protection of classified information; (b) to assure that material and relevant information is not withheld from the record on grounds of security if such information can be supplied in unclassified form; and (c) to assist in determining appropriate action where a decision may turn on data which can be expressed only in classified form. LOYALTY OF PARTICIPANTS § 6.20 Policy. Loyalty to the United States is a paramount factor applicable to all participants in the atomic energy program including those whose partici pation (although not requiring access to restricted data) involves the exercise of administrative, negotiating and disciplinary authority over bargaining units composed of employees engaged on classified work. Individuals involved in questions of loyalty will be given full opportunity to explore the questions with the Commission. The Commission will take such further steps as may be appropriate in the circumstances. CONTRACT NEGOTIATION AND ADMINISTRATION § 6.30 Clearance of certain local union representatives. It is recognized that security clearance of certain union representatives may be necessary to assure opportunity for effective representation of employees in collective bargaining relationships with AEC contractors. Accordingly, AEC managers may al thorize investigation for "Q" clearance of union officials whose functions as representatives of employees may reasonably be expected to require access to restricted data (1) under NLRB and other procedures according to applicable law (LMRA, 1947); (2) to effectively perform their representation functions in the resolution of grievances and in other collective bargaining relationships with contractors; (3) to effectuate the recommendation of the President's Commission on Labor Relations in the Atomic Energy Installations in respect to integration of the union into the plant organization "as a two-way channel of communication and a medium of understanding between management and workers". (a) In the pre-contract stage of union-management relations, the require ments of the Labor Management Relations Act normally will be the applicable criteria for determining which bargaining representatives, if any, will need access to classified material in the exercise of their functions as employee representatives: (b) After a bargaining relationship has been established between the contractor and the representatives of its employees, the nature of this relationship and the procedures followed in it normally will be the controlling criteria for determination of the access to be granted to particular persons in carrying out their functions as employee representatives. For example, many contract grievance procedures designate by title certain union and management officials who are to have definite roles in the resolution of grievances under the procedure. Investigation for "Q" clearance will normally be in order for such officials, both company and union, employee and non-employee. In addition, persons not so designated may be investigated for clearance where the company and the union advise the AEC manager that their established relationships contemplate access for such persons. $6.31 Clearance of conciliators and arbitrators. Conciliators and arbitrators who are regularly assigned to atomic energy cases may be processed for “Q” clearance at the discretion of the local AEC manager, either on the manager's initiative or at the request of a contractor. $6.32 Security indoctrination of non-employee representatives. All collective bargaining representatives, company and union, who are to have access to restricted data, will be given appropriate security indoctrination. § 6.40 Final responsibility of the Commission in security matters. On all matters of security at all government-owned, privately operated atomic energyinstallations, the Atomic Energy Commission retains absolute and final authority, and neither the security rules nor their administration are matters for collective bargaining between management and labor. Insofar as AEC security regulations affect the collective bargaining process, the security policies and regulations will be made known to both parties. To the fullest extent feasible the Commission will consult with representatives of Management and labor in formulating security rules and regulations that affect the collective bargaining process. Dated at Washington, D. C., this 17th day of September 1951. DEAR CHAIRMAN HERZOG: This letter is in connection with labor relations in the atomic energy program which have been discussed in earlier exchanges of letters between the National Labor Relations Board on one hand and the Secre tary of War and the Atomic Energy Commission on the other. You will recall that originally Secretary of War Patterson requested that you withhold action in any case involving the Manhattan Engineer District. Later you were informed that the War Department believed it possible, consistent with the requirements of national security, to work out procedures under which National Labor Relations Board cases involving the project at Oak Ridge might be handled. Secretary Patterson asked, however, that that Board refrain from affirmative action in cases affecting other units of the atomic energy project and this request has been continued by the Commission. Later, a special exception to this request was made with respect to certain employees of the Zia Co. at Los Alamos. From the experience with your representatives at the Commission's Oak Ridge project, it appears that safeguards for protecting the national security can be devised in most cases involving National Labor Relations Board proceedings. On the other hand, while the experience at Oak Ridge was satisfactory from this point of view, it may be that many new problems will arise at other Commission installations where novel conditions and new unions may be involved. Under the circumstances, the Commission has decided to withdraw the request that your Board refrain from affirmative action in cases involving other atomic energy projects. While the Commission now fully approves the principle of Board proceedings at atomic energy projects in cases falling within the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act, for the present the Commission requests that National Labor Relations Board representatives clear each case as it arises with local Atomic Energy Commission representatives, in order that security considerations may be carefully reviewed. It is our judgment that under this arrangement it should be possible to process many, if not all, of the hearings and elections which have been postponed at the request of the Manhattan Engineer District and the Atomic Energy Commission. Consistent with the national policy as stated in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, it is the settled policy of the Atomic Energy Commission that the atomic energy facilities be operated in a manner best calculated to assure that those who participate in the program are loyal to the United States, including those who, though not employees of contrac tors, exercise administrative, negotiating, and disciplinary authority over such employees of contractors as are members of union bargaining units. The Commission greatly appreciates the helpful cooperation your Board has extended in the past and trusts that the further request herein can be accepted as a basis for continued cooperation in the future. The Commission will, in turn, reappraise the situation from time to time in the hope that conditions will eventually allow the same freedom of procedures that exists in other industries. Sincerely yours, UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, CHARLES E. WILSON, ITEM 2 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, President, General Electric Co., New York 22, N. Y. DEAR MR. WILSON: You have previously been advised of the policy of the Manhattan Engineer District, as continued by the Atomic Energy Commission, to request the postponement of public hearings and elections under the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act in respect to the atomic energy facilities at Richland, Wash. On the basis of a full examination of present conditions the Commission has concluded that proceedings under the Labor Management Relations Act may be conducted at this facility, provided safeguards in respect to security of informa tion which have been developed elsewhere are applied. A copy of a letter advising the National Labor Relations Board to this effect is enclosed. The Atomic Energy Commission will expect, of course, that any labor organization which may be recognized will have met such Atomic Energy Commission security requirements as will assure the loyalty to the United States of those persons who exercise administrative, negotiating, or disciplinary authority over bargaining units of atomic energy workers. The nature of these security require ments is well established as a result of the experience at Oak Ridge during the past 2 years. The Commission's manager of operations at Richland will be glad to discuss them with you in detail and assist in working out any specific problems that may arise. In this connection, attention is invited to the Commission's January 16, 1948, labor report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. This report defined certain objectives in respect to management-labor relations within the atomic energy program which the Commission would like to see all participants strive to attain. These objectives are (a) Wholehearted acceptance by contractors and by labor and its repre sentatives of the moral responsibility inherent in participation in the atomic energy program; (b) Development of procedures to assure (1) that all participants in the program are loyal to the United States, including those whose participation involves the exercise of administrative, negotiating, and disciplinary authority over bargaining units, and (2) that determination of unit, jurisdiction. and similar questions will not breach security; (c) Continuity of production at vital AEC installations; (d) Consistent with the Commission's responsibility under the law, the least possible governmental interference with the efficient management expected from the AEC contractors; (e) Minimum governmental interference with the traditional rights and privileges of American labor. DEAR MR. HARRELL: You have previously been advised of the policy of the Manhattan Engineer District as continued by the Atomic Energy Commission to request the postponement of public hearings and elections under the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor-Management Relations Act in respect to the Argonne National Laboratory at Chicago, Ill. On the basis of a full examination of present conditions the Commission has concluded that proceedings under the Labor-Management Relations Act may be conducted at this facility, provided safeguards in respect to security of information which have been developed elsewhere are applied. A copy of a letter advising the National Labor Relations Board to this effect is enclosed. The Atomic Energy Commission will expect, of course, that any labor organization which may be recognized will have met Atomic Energy Commission security requirements calculated to assure the loyalty to the United States of those who though not employees of contractors exercise administrative, negotiating or disciplinary authority over such employees of contractors as are members of union bargaining units of atomic energy workers. The nature of these security requirements is well established as a result of the experience at Oak Ridge during the past 2 years. The Commission's manager of operations at Chicago will be glad to discuss them with you in detail and to assist in working out any specific problems that may arise. Your representatives have advised that a number of labor organizations have been active in organizational activities at Argonne. It is noted that the offices of one of the organizations involved, the United Public Workers of America, CIO, have failed to comply with the section of the Labor-Management Relations Act which provides for filing of affidavits that they are not members of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party. In addition, information is available concerning alleged Communist affiliation or association of certain officers of this union. It appears that some of these officers are in a position where they exercise administrative, negotiating or disciplinary authority over the local of this union that has been active among employees at Argonne. The failure to file nonCommunist affidavits and the information concerning alleged Communist affiliation of certain officers of the United Public Workers when taken together present a very serious question as to whether representation of atomic energy workers at Argonne by a union in which such officers occupy important positions would be consistent with that full and unqualified adherence and loyalty to the interests of the United States that the security of the Nation and the policy of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 require. The Commission's policy, as you know, is that questions relating to a contractor's labor policy should be resolved and handled directly by the contractor. However, in view of the above circumstances and of the obligation of the Commission in matters pertaining to national security, the Atomic Energy Commission directs the University of Chicago to continue to refrain from recognition of the United Public Workers of America, CIO, at Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, Ill. Attention is invited to the Commission's January 16, 1948, labor report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. This report defined certain objectives in respect to management-labor relations within the atomic energy program which 93039-52-pt. 2- -3 |