mant. This is more likely to be a problem for the legislator who has no committee jurisdiction over the agency concerned. It is suggested that a public question-procedure would be helpful when a legislator does not get satisfaction on what he thinks is a meritorious issue. If he could, by filing an appropriate question with the Clerk of the House or Secretary of the Senate, have it printed in the Congressional Record under a suitable heading, with the requirement that the Department to which it is directed be required to reply publicly within a reasonable time, the legislator would have a means of airing the merits of his arguments and of exposing the weakness of the administrative decision. This disclosure would stimulate fairness in the exercise of administrative discretion.

Legislative-administrative relationships

It is obvious that many ethical problems turn on the relations of legislators with administrators. Stemming from this hypothesis a number of proposals have been made to put those relations on a sounder basis. The chief of them is Senator Kefauver's proposal that a weekly or biweekly period be established in the Senate to question a selected department head. It has such merit and is so carefully worked out that the subcommittee believes it deserves the most serious consideration (S. Res. 190).

If there is fear of encroaching upon the legislative time of the Senate, the principle could be tested on a more informal basis in a presession conference meeting on the Senate floor in advance of the regular session of the Senate under a special rule and with the chairman of the appropriate legislative committee presiding. The great advantage of the question-period principle is that it brings the administrator face to face with all Senators (who choose to be present) not merely with the appropriate committee, and that Senators in addition to those on the committee have a chance to ask formal questions and to obtain serious answers. The absence of this broader contact tends to exaggerate the influence of special interests and special viewpoints which is at the root of many ethical problems. This same idea was worked out for the House of Representatives in a resolution introduced in the Seventy-ninth Congress (H. R. 31).

The gulf between the legislative and administrative worlds is great enough so that the problem of bridging it with mutual understanding is as baffling as it is appealing. One suggestion has already been mentioned frequent informal meetings of administrators with committees of the Congress to keep them currently in touch with problems and progress, and to establish an understanding and mutual confidence that would make it possible to handle crises and conflicts rationally when they arise. A second suggestion is that an interchange of personnel would be helpful; Congressmen should employ civil servants as assistants and on committee staffs. And the administration should in turn bring Members of the Congress into the executive branch, even at the cost of their dropping out of the legislative body for a time.

Compensation

Among the suggestions for relieving the heavy financial pressure on legislators are the following ideas: (1) higher salaries; (2) a rent allowance like a quarters allowance to help meet the expense of the double-residence problem; (3) substantial pensions, or perhaps &

kind of terminal compensation to encourage ex-Members of the Congress to go back to their home place rather than to remain in Washington to make a living as lobbyists. It may be noted that there was some objection in the testimony to the tax-free expense allowance, on the ground that it is a subterfuge, but not to a corresponding upward salary adjustment. Amendments to the 1951 tax bill adopted by the Senate will, if enacted into law, remove this exemption beginning in 1953.

Other proposals regarding Congress

Among the additional suggestions regarding Congress, the following may be noted: (1) Former Members of Congress working as lobyists should be denied the privilege of the floor. (2) The employment of relatives as members of congressional staffs, paid at public expense, should be forbidden by law. (It is a generally accepted rule of good personnel policy, widely followed in the executive branch, that an executive does not employ his relatives; they may work for the same company, but not for him.) (3) A code of legislative behavior going beyond the requirements of the law and of the rules should be formulated as a recognized guide for members and for the public. Senators Benton and Douglas and Representative Bennett (Florida) have drafted such codes.

Mention should also be made of the very comprehensive and valuable hearings on the Organization and Operation of Congress conducted in June 1951 by the Senate Committee on Executive Expenditures under the chairmanship of Senator McClelland. The testimony furnishes much helpful information on problems presented more briefly to this subcommittee. Following are the main fields covered by the McClelland committee: committee structure and operation, staffing of Congress, work load on Congress, oversight of administration, strengthening fiscal controls, registration of lobbyists, compensation and retirement of members, composition and tenure of Congress, congressional ethics and immunity, party Government in Congress, congressional procedures, administration of Congress, public relations of Congress.

9. PROPOSALS REGARDING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Proposals regarding changes in administrative policy or organie structure in the executive branch fall into four categories which will be reviewed briefly: (1) improved management, emphasizing particularly personnel management; (2) administrative regulation; (3) protective practices; (4) decentralization.

Improved management

A strong belief in the importance of good management to secure high standards of conduct in administration was back of a number of proposals to the subcommittee. Several wtinesses, long familiar with the Federal service from both executive and legislative points of view, argued that executive departments urgently need competent career men and departmental managers immediately under the Secretary to give greater attention and emphasis to matters of internal management than the Secretary is able to give. The Secretary is necessarily very much occupied with matters of broad policy, and without neglecting them he finds it difficult to follow up in all the steps that are

necessary to make sure that he has a tight, well-designed, and welldisciplined organization. With a general manager of the career type, a new Secretary would gain control of his department much earlier, and he could always be in a stronger position to deal with the special interests which confront him in the several bureaus of the department. It was argued that the appointment in 1950 of Administrative Assistant Secretaries in a number of departments was a step in the right direction, but that it has not gone far enough. If this development can be carried further, the responsible heads of departments will be in a better position to detect and correct any tendencies toward arrogance, abuse of discretion, misinterpretation of statutes, negligence in administration, or improper conduct. The general line of action recommended by the Hoover Commission to improve departmental management is one that the subcommittee can approve in principle, and it urges that the program be carried to completion. Steps that are needed to improve the efficiency of departmental administration will also help control improper practices.

The creation of managerial positions at the departmental level to be filled by career men was recommended also as a needed additional rung in the career ladder which would make it possible to attract better men and retain them in the Federal service. At present there are few career posts above the bureau level, and the promotion of career men to positions of political responsibility puts them into a situation for which they are hardly prepared, and which makes their future somewhat uncertain.

Other proposals in the field of personnel policy are: (1) better salaries in the higher brackets; (2) the protection of judicial procedures for Federal employees accused on loyalty charges; (3) simplified dismissal procedures for all employees (protection is needed against the stigma of disloyalty which is a severe extra-legal penalty, not against dismissal); (4) continued delegation to the departments of large responsi bilities for recruiting, training, and developing civil servants according to standards fixed by the Civil Service Commission and subject to its supervision and audit; (5) greater diligence in discovering and reward ing outstanding performance and dedicated service among civil servants; (6) more systematic and intensive professional training particularly for officials and employees who will serve in posts abroad. The nature and number of these suggestions emphasize the widely held view that high standards of conduct for the Federal Government are dependent upon maintaining a high quality of personnel in the

service.

Administrative regulation

A subtle malady which is apparently institutional rather than personal in its incidence is the tendency of the independent regulatory commissions not to die, but to fade away; with advancing age they tend to become the servants rather than the governors of the industries which they regulate, and attain a sort of dignified stability far from the objectives which they originally sought.

Proposals for dealing with this phenomenon vary greatly. They include: (1) separation of the responsibility for dynamic regulatory action from the function of finally hearing and deciding individual

cases; (2) vesting the responsibility for the regulatory initiative, i. e. the selection and preparation of actions and the initiation of policy proposals, in appropriate executive departments; (3) making the residual commissions with their more limited adjudicative functions highly independent in status; (4) adopting the more limited plan of reorganization recommended by the Hoover Commission, consisting chiefly of concentrating responsibility for administrative direction of the commission's work in the chairman; (5) an expanded judicial review of the decisions of regulatory commissions; (6) the creation of an administrative court of appeals to review cases from all regulatory agencies; and (7) the abandonment of the principle of maintaining independent regulatory agencies with a single clientele.

Although the apparent inability of the Government to establish independent regulatory agencies which maintain their original direction and momentum has its ethical aspect, the subcommittee believes that defects in organic structure are at the root of it. Probably a radical remedy (in the medical sense) is required. The necessary diagnosis and prescription should be made by another committee.

Protective practices

Applications of the disclosure principle to protect administrative agencies from excessive pressure was suggested in the form of: (1) a docket on each case (mentioned above) showing all contacts made regarding the case, whether made through channels or unofficially; and (2) a register maintained by each agency showing complete information about all attorneys and lobbyists dealing with it. The register would also show all fees received-"finder fees," split fees, and kick-backs-and both income and expenditures of lobbyists. (3) A third use of disclosure was suggested in the form of automatic renegotiation of contracts in every instance in which a contracting officer entered the employ of the contractor. If this were to be a routine procedure, it would serve as an audit to disclose, and also correct impropriety. It should tend to prevent undue generosity. Decentralization

A variety of witnesses suggested decentralization as a remedy for latent tendencies toward impropriety and abuse of power which may be inherent in the vast powers of big Government. It was suggested that operating responsibilities and authority to handle a large number of individual cases can be delegated to regional and field organizations if policies are determined and basic programs are approved at headquarters, followed also by inspection, audit, and careful check on progress through objective reporting.

This remedy, usually advanced as an avenue to efficiency, has an appeal also as a way of relieving the great pressures for favorable action that concentrate in Washington. Decentralization would, of course, shift many of those pressures to the field service. It may be, however, that with the Washington staff concentrating on broad policy and the field organization concentrating on applying that policy to individual cases, both departmental and field personnel would be in a better position to meet undue pressures. Administrative decentralization should be encouraged and carefully watched.

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10. PROPOSALS REGARDING POLITICS

A campaign commission

A number of the constructive measures proposed to bring about an improvement in the ethical standards of American public life have to do with the quality of public discussion during elections and at other times, which is at the heart of democratic, representative government. Genuine concern over low standards of discussion was reflected in proposals that a campaign tribunal be established to report fully and currently on the campaign receipts and expenditures of candidates, committees, and parties, and also to act as a referee during campaigns by pointing out "low blows."

Such a regulatory body might be helpful; but a substantial improvement in the quality of public discussion must depend upon skillful and diligent leadership in presenting the facts and in arguing rationally from them. Progress depends also upon critical listeners who ask for evidence, are skeptical about unsupported assertions, and realize that name calling, "smears," appeals to bigotry, and emotionalism generally are prima facie evidence that the speaker has frequently nothing more substantial with which to support his position.

Representative government of the democratic variety is founded on the presumption that most men will seek and speak the truth, and that those who falsify or mislead will be discovered and defeated in the course of debate. It is admitted that the generality of men can be fooled, but not that they can be continuously deceived. No one likes to be deceived by men whom he trusts, and the penalty for bad faith is loss of faith-and support.

The present period is, in one sense, a test of faith in the capacity of mankind for self-government. Distress over intemperate, reckless, and irresponsible statements or over emotionalism and appeals to prejudice should not become an anxiety complex. The tendency to exploit fear and prejudice is not new in politics. The corrective for an emotional appeal to the worst in men is both an appeal to deeper emotional values, and a skillful and persistent challenge to man's highest powers of reason and judgment. Sensing this fact, witnesses have urged that men should have more faith in each other. Public discussion is in itself both a crucial test and an evidence of that faith. This is a time for men who believe in the power of truth and reason to stand to their guns and keep firing.

Revision of Corrupt Practices Acts

The consensus is that the Corrupt Practices Acts which regulate election financing are inadequate and ineffective. As to changes, there is agreement only on one point, the need for full publicity regarding both contributions and expenditures by all participants in the campaign. There is some feeling that campaigning has become so expensive that existing limits on contributions and expenditures are impossibly low, and that they are tolerable only because they are incomplete and easily avoided by indirection. There is no doubt of the importance, from an ethical point of view, of putting election finances on a straightforward basis.

General public support

both

The basic problem, which puts candidates for election in an almost impossible situation, is the lack of general public support, personal and financial. The fact that campaign contributions are