cost involved in a work stoppage. The strike threat, and the occasional strike itself, is the force depended upon to facilitate arriving at satisfactory settlements. Agreeemnt normally is reached without a work stoppage because neither side wants to incure the cost of such stoppage and makes reasonable adjustments to avoid it.

Thus the strike threat and the actual strike itself are instruments of bargaining. When a strike occurs it is usually because the union representatives are still dissatisfied with what they regard as the employer's last offer. The employer's terms may indeed be unfair or inadequate; that is left for the parties to decide. The union takes the action which signalizes the strike; but the employer may have taken the position which equally determined that there shall be a strike. When there is a strike, we say, colloquially, that negotiations have broken off. In time negotiations have to be resumed. The time lost, the inconveniences to the public, and the loss of income have supported the view that a strike indicates a failure of collective bargaining to work out satisfactorily or to provide for the relative satisfaction of the parties. Since the threat of a strike would not be very formidable without its occasional use, strikes will ever remain an ingredient of collective bargaining, and each side will probably continue to blame the other for their occurrence. A strike thus comes to be regarded as a failure of collective bargaining, while one of the most widely accepted tests of successful collective bargaining is the length of the period during which no strikes or lockouts have occurred.

Still, reliance on collective bargaining means dependence on the possibility, even the imminence, of a strike in every collective-bargaining session. The calculation of the cost of a strike to the parties facilitates a meeting of minds without actual resort to the strike and thus performs a vital collective-bargaining function. But strikes do eventuate when the parties are willing to risk them under particular circumstances. The policy of collective bargaining then means the policy of permitting the parties "to wait it out," or as we sometimes say, "to fight it out," after negotiations across the conference table have ceased. There has been some discussion as to whether this is the best policy with respect to disputes jeopardizing the national health and safety, where the parties may be able to hold out longer than the public or the Government; but if the policy of "waiting it out" when the parties disagree and decide to resort to economic power is not the policy we are pursuing in the generality of cases, then collective bargaining is not the national policy.

Strikes must thus be regarded as a concomitant of collective bargaining and of the growth of unionism. Unorganized workers do not strike; at least such strikes are quite exceptional and they are rarely recorded in the statistics of strikes. The policy of encouraging collective bargaining has lessened the necessity of strikes for the right to organize; but when this policy results in organizing both sides to fight for what they regard as their rights or their vital interests, failure to iron out differences and to come to agreement will result in additional strikes, since neither side has the ultimate power to coerce the other. The threat of a strike, which must be exercised when necessary if it is to remain a threat, is the drive which gives continuous meaning and substance to collective bargaining. Labor unions have no doubt that the strike threat, and its occasional exercise, is what makes collective bargaining effective. In collective bargaining the parties

present their demands and their position, discuss them, make counter proposals or suggest modifications, trade one for another, modify or hold firm, as the case may be, and, if possible, settle their differences and come to an agreement. In all this bargaining and attempt to persuade the other side, the union's strength is in its control of the labor force in the craft or plant or industry. Its arguments are given greater weight by the consideration of the alternative cost to the employer if the men should cease work collectively. Generally the employer would want to avoid a strike; but he might risk it if he has made all the concessions he feels he can make or if the demands are of a nature which he feels would jeopardize his economic position or his status or essential prerogatives. The union negotiators may be fortified by a "strike vote," but the decision to quit work collectively is not easily made, because the strike may be long and costly to the members. However, as is well known, strikes do occur when an impasse is reached. Unions feel justified in holding that to accept an unfair or unsatisfactory offer or to give first thought to the protection of the employer or even of the public by avoiding the direct and indirect effects of a work stoppage is really to abandon collective bargaining for a policy which gives the employer the only effective power to determine the terms and conditions of employment.

In all bargaining there are bid and asked prices, offers and counteroffers. If terms are not agreed to, there is no sale. In collective bargaining "no sale" means "no work" after the old agreement has expired. Every year agreements without resort to strikes are made in all but a very small proportion of the negotiations. Moreover, a strike merely delays the sale or the coming to agreement. It facilitates the lowering of bid and asked prices until a sale is made or an agreement is consummated. There are abundant opportunities for compromise and give-and-take in the numerous provisions of a labor agreement. In support of positions taken, the parties point to economic conditions and use economic arguments; they argue about traditional relations and practices, current trends, standards or practices in the same or related industries. But the final refusal of one side or the other to yield on a matter which the other side also regards as vital to its interest will result in a collective refusal to work on the part of the employees or in a refusal by the employer to permit them to work on the terms which the union insists upon. There is then a work stoppage or a strike or lock-out, depending upon the way the impasse is viewed. This consequence of failure to compromise or to make a settlement is regarded by many as industrial warfare. Yet it is only carrying the logic of collective bargaining to its conclusion. The parties expect and do return to the bargaining table, sometimes, but not always, after the intercession of some mediating agency. If uninterrupted production were the only desideratum, we would not be pursuing the course of collective bargaining with its inherent risk of work stoppages. Every settlement and every collective bargaining agreement is a resultant of both reason and potential economic force, for all reasoning by the parties is under the possibility, if not the threat, of the strike or lock-out. At the same time bargaining means conferring, making appeals to fact and to reason, to logic, to comparative conditions, to bable consequences, etc.; and these carry weight regardless of the ntial force on either side. While the parties might view facts and ments differently, ascribe different weights and meaning to them

and consider them in different perspective, they can never ignore them for force alone if they are engaged in collective bargaining. Such facts as "pattern bargaining" and understandable and rational interrelationships of wages in different industries and occupations after decades of collective bargaining suggest that reason and economic pressure are by no means necessarily in opposition.

When an agreement or settlement is made, without a work stoppage or after a work stoppage, we have a contract which specifies the terms and conditions of work for a year or more. Frequently the parties are satisfied that the best bargain under all the circumstances has been made. Sometimes the agreement is regarded as a treaty of peace, or even, when discontent still smolders, a truce for a brief period. Still, both parties have finally given their assent to the terms of employment; and the enterprise is conducted under the terms of the contract and with the consultation and coooperation which the contract calls for.

A labor agreement, jointly determined and jointly administered, is the final product of collective bargaining. The specific terms are agreed upon after consultation, bargaining, compromise, and mutual adjustment to the diverse needs of employers and employees-all arrived at in an atmosphere charged with a knowledge of the cost of disagreement and on the basis of common interest in the successful conduct of the business.

The union contract is the distinguishing mark of union conditions. Some contracts are long and some are short; but they all lay down conditions jointly agreed upon and which the employees may regard as their rights under the contract. The prior bargaining has been not only about wages and methods of wage payment but also about other matters of work assignment, personnel administration, working rules, seniority rights, the handling of lay-offs, the services and benefits provided, etc. Satisfactory provisions of the old contract are continued and new matters may be taken up. The complete contract embodies the standards and principles upon which it is agreed that work will be conducted in the plant. The obligation of the employer to abide by these terms is enforced by shop stewards and union representatives, by formal and informal machinery for handling complaints and grievances. If the machinery for enforcing the agreement is written into it and a method of final determination of grievances under it is provided, work stoppages during the life of the agreement are violations of the intent and purpose of the collective agreement. On-the-job pressures, such as slow-downs, quickies, disruptive union meetings during working time, are diseases of collective bargaining, not of its nature.

The subjects appropriate for collective bargaining are nowhere clearly and definitely delineated, defined, or delimited. Recent experience is that anything indirectly or even remotely affecting the employment and prospects of the worker can be made the subject of collective bargaining. No employer can feel assured that a matter which formerly was within his complete discretion will not be considered within the realm of collective bargaining at a later time. number of strikes each year are caused by employers' resistance to these pioneering efforts of different unions. The different industries represent different degrees of adjustment to union demands for social security provisions, shift differentials, the control of hiring or lay-offs,

standards of work and production, penalties for work not provided, etc. Nor is there any particular resting period after any of these matters have been included in a collective-bargaining agreement. Changing conditions and the desire for improvement do not provide the climate or conditions for a resting place.

This is not to say that the development of standards and joint control satisfactory to both parties is not possible or that this can be done only at higher total cost or at the expense of the consumer. Many industries which agree to union contracts covering all these matters show continuous increases in man-hour efficiency. Many would testify that satisfying the workers on the questions which they raise through their representatives contributes to the over-all result of increasing efficiency.

While every agreement is only a resting point and is frequently found to be unsatisfactory after a year, an agreement for the duration does mean, however, that the diverse interests of workers and managers in a common enterprise have been worked out by them on the basis of give and take and within tolerable reach of their needs and aspirations. If collective bargaining has an element of force or even of warfare at its foundation, it is also the instrument of attaining & measure of self-government in industry as distinguished from the alternatives of employer dictation or the fixing of all these terms by some outside authoritarian agency. The final result of successful collective bargaining is thus the joint determination of rights and benefits in a common enterprise.

Collective bargaining and the procedures and institutions it develops is thus a means of contracting for the sale of labor on terms of relative equality with the buyer, a form of industrial self-government, and a method of joint handling of problems of interest to both workers and management. There is no practical alternative which can create such values when the operation is successful.

In practice, collective bargaining has not always brought the best results inherent in the process. The criticism has arisen not merely from the high cost of strikes to third parties and to the general publicthe cost to the direct participants being regarded as their own affairbut also from practices and procedures which may be questioned as not being conducive either to peaceful settlements or fair dealing. The amendments to the Wagner Act embodied in the Taft-Hartley Act contain several limitations on laissez-faire in collective bargaining. With reference to the strike weapon, the Taft-Hartley Act forbids its use in certain types of cases, limits its use in others, and provides procedures in all cases to permit a time interval for coming to agreement without the necessity of resorting to strikes. However, these limitations are only peripheral; and under the Taft-Hartley Act, as under the Wagner Act, there are abundant opportunities for disagreement as there are numerous instances of both successful and unsuccessful collective bargaining.

CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATIONS' FINDINGS ON THE CONDITIONS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE

The most extensive studies of the industrial relations of companies which have maintained long periods of industrial peace under collective bargaining is being made by the National Planning Association, an independent research organization located in Washington, D. C. As a result of a suggestion made by Clinton S. Golden of its labor committee that

instead of looking into the causes of conflict * * * we ought to try to discover how much peace there is and what makes peace—

a committee on the causes of industrial peace under collective bargaining began work on a series of case studies of 15 companies, 8 of which have been completed to date, and an additional report on collective bargaining in atomic energy plants. The companies studied were selected from a large list of companies which had been nominated as representing companies in diversified competitive industries where industrial peace had been maintained for a long time and where the bargaining by the parties had developed what might be called a constructive relationship. The investigations were conducted by independent and objective scholars and by men with rich experience in collective bargaining and industrial relations.

The projects that have been published have included representative firms in the pulp and paper industry (in the West, Midwest and East), the glass industry, the chemical industry, the clothing industry, the steel industry, and the airplane industry. Differences also exist in the size and form of the companies, the degree of mechanization or investment per worker, the size of communities in which the plants are located, outlets for the consumption of goods produced, working conditions, types of workers, and forms and levels of collective bargaining. But despite these differences, collective bargaining in these various plants was found to be characterized by more or less similar conditions, attitudes, procedures, and peaceful and mutually satisfactory results.

In these studies collective bargaining is shown to be a process of accommodation of the object of unions and the objectives of management. Their differences, growing out of different objectives and needs, are settled by argument, facts, discussion, compromise, and agreement. At the same time the parties have recognized their common objectives as well; and they have pursued these in a variety of forms of joint action.

EXTERNAL FACTORS IN INDUSTRIAL PEACE

The external causes which have aided in maintaining peaceful relationships in these companies are bound up with general economic, social and political conditions over which neither party in a partic

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