page 1107, of the report which gives the reason for omission of 50 U.S.C. 901. The Senate Report 2484 on H.R. 7049 dated July 9, 1956, contains similar explanations.

With respect to section 49 (a) of the act of August 10, 1956, 70A Stat. 640, 32 U.S.C. 49 (a), which provides in pertinent part that laws effective after March 31, 1955, that were inconsistent with that act shall be considered as superseding it to the extent of the inconsistency, it has been held that statutes enacted at the same session of Congress should receive the construction, if possible, which will give effect to each. See Moss v. United States, 29 App. D.C. 188; United States v. Burnett, 65 F. 2d 195. Also, where Congress amends one portion of a law, leaving another untouched, the assumption is that the two were designed to function as parts of an integrated whole and the courts should give each as full play as possible. Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404. The text of Public Law 676, 84th Congress, 70 Stat. 517, 50 U.S.C. 1016, standing alone is not inconsistent with the provisions in the Revised Code pertaining to reserve personnel and, therefore, the terms "active duty" and "active service" appearing therein should, subsequent to August 10, 1956, be regarded as including fulltime training duty. Cf. 37 Comp. Gen. 264–265. The restriction contained in section 265b (2) is not regarded as being in conflict with or inconsistent with that view.

Accordingly, in answer to the first question, under the provisions of the act of July 9, 1956, Public Law 676, 84th Congress, 70 Stat. 517, and the act of August 10, 1956, Public Law 1028, 84th Congress, 70A Stat. 1, 10 U.S.C. 101, a member of the reserve component of the Armed Forces may, with respect to active duty for training performed on or after August 10, 1956, 50 U.S.C. 1016, count periods of active duty for full-time training as part of the continuous active duty necessary to determine eligibility for lump-sum readjustment pay, and, since "active service" means service on active duty (see 10 U.S.C. 101 (24) 70A Stat. 5), he may include such service for use as a multiplier.

Generally, laws are not considered as applying to past transactions in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intent that they were intended to so operate. 50 American Jurisprudence, Statutes, sections 476, 478; 5 Comp. Gen. 381; 21 Comp. Gen. 870. There is no indication in the act of August 10, 1956, or its legislative history that the Congress intended that the definition of active duty in section. 101 (22) or active service in section 101 (24) should apply to training duty performed prior to August 10, 1956. On the contrary it appears that to apply that definition to training duty performed prior to August 10, 1956, would be inconsistent with the provisions of section 49 (f) of the 1956 act, 70A Stat. 640, 32 U.S.C. 49 (f), when considered

in conjunction with the provisions of 10 U.S. Code 1402 (a). The latter provision authorizes increases in retired and retainer pay on account of active service performed after retirement or transfer to the Fleet Reserve, whereas section 49 (f) provides that enactment of the act of August 10, 1956, does not increase pay, active, retired, or retainer. In 38 Comp. Gen. 251, we held that the definition of active duty contained in 10 U.S. Code 101 (22) as including training duty does not apply to training duty performed prior to August 10, 1956, in computing the special pay of certain medical and dental officers. The provisions of section 49 (f) require that conclusion. A similar conclusion is required with respect to the readjustment payment authorized by the act of July 9, 1956.

Accordingly, question 2 is answered by saying that active duty for training performed prior to August 10, 1956, may not be considered as active duty in determining eligibility for or the amount of the readjustment payment, but that such training duty performed after August 9, 1956, may be considered as active duty for those purposes. To the extent above indicated, 36 Comp. Gen. 129 is modified.

[B-140593]

Military Personnel-Navy Officers-Voluntary Retirement Under Public Law 86-155-Annuity Elections for Dependents-Changes and Revocations

The purpose of section 3 of the act of August 11, 1959, Public Law 86-155, concerning the effect of survivorship annuity option election changes or revocations by officers of the Regular Navy or Marine Corps who are voluntarily retired under the 1959 act, was not to permit elections after retirement but was merely to change the five-year limitation period in 10 U.S.C. 1431 (c); therefore, Navy officers who are retired pursuant to the act of August 11, 1959, may not after retirement change their survivorship annuity option elections.

A Navy officer who is retired for physical disability, although he might otherwise be eligible for voluntary retirement under the act of August 11, 1959, Public Law 86-155, may not be regarded as having been voluntarily retired under the 1959 act to come within the purview of section 3 of the 1959 act to change or revoke a survivorship annuity option election without regard to the time limitations in 10 U.S.C. 1431.

To the Secretary of the Navy, September 25, 1959:

Reference is made to letter of August 25, 1959, from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personnel and Reserve Forces), requesting a decision on certain questions which have arisen within the Department of the Navy with respect to section 3 of the act of August 11, 1959, Public Law 86-155, 10 U.S.C. 1431. The request has been assigned Department of Defense Military Pay and Allowance Committee No. SS-N-449.

The said section 3 reads as follows:

Notwithstanding section 1431 of title 10, United States Code, a change of an election made under that section by an officer who is retired under this Act is

effective if made at such a time that it would have been effective had he been retired on the date prescribed by Section 6376, 6377, or 6379 of Title 10, U.S. Code, as appropriate, and a revocation of an election made under that section by an officer retired under this Act is effective if made before his retirement.

Title 10, U.S. Code, section 1431 (b) permits members of the Armed Forces, in general, to elect survivors' annuities for eligible dependents to be paid for by deductions from the retired pay of such members. Section 1431 (c) of that title provides:

(c) An election made under subsection (b) may be changed or revoked by the elector before his retirement or before he becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay. * * * the change or revocation is not effective if he is retired or becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay within five years after the date of the change or revocation. If he revokes the election, he may not change or withdraw the revocation.

The first question is stated as follows:

May an officer retired under the Act of August 11, 1959, make a change in his election with respect to the Contingency Option Act subsequent to retirement if within such time that it would have been effective had he been retired on the date prescribed by Section 6376, 6377, or 6379 of Title 10, U.S. Code, as appropriate?

H.R. 8068, 85th Congress, a predecessor bill to H.R. 4413, 86th Congress, which became Public Law 86-155, provided (in section. 13) that a change or revocation of an election made under 10 U.S.C. 1431 "is effective if made before the officer retires and within one year following the date of approval of this Act." The provisions. of section 3 of the 1959 act should be read in conjunction with the provisions of 10 U.S. Code 1431 (c) and 1436, which, respectively, permit a change in elections only if the change is made more than five years before retirement and prescribe the date as of which computation of the reduction in retired pay required to pay for the annuity elected shall be made. There is not apparent any legislative intent to change the requirement that the change in election be effected on or before the date of retirement; rather it appears that it was the intent merely to change the five-year period of limitation. That view is supported by that part of the hearings relating to the provisions of section 3, as follows:

Captain WILLIAMS. This may be best illustrated by an example. That is an officer who is being considered for continuation in his 29th year and who is not continued would normally have completed 30 years and may well have filed a modification of an election in his 25th year of service.

Mr. BLANDFORD. With respect to the Contingency Option Act?

Captain WILLIAMS. With respect to the Contingency Option Act. Going out on the 29th year under the present law, then that modification would not have been effective. This will provide that if he made it in due time, under the time that he expected to be retired, it would be effective on retirement under this act, sir.

Mr. BLANDFORD. I might mention, Mr. Chairman, that this is also written in such a manner that if that period of election is reduced from 5 to 3 years, it would cover that. That is why we don't have any number of years of service here. [Italics supplied.]

See page 321 of the Hearings of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 4413.

If the Congress had intended to permit a change in election after retirement, some provision would necessarily have been made for recomputation of the amount of the reduction in retired pay required to pay for the annuity, since 10 U.S. Code 1436 requires that computation be made as of the date when the service member becomes entitled to retired pay, and a change in election would require a recomputation of the member's payment on the cost of the annuity. Also, it is reasonable to assume that, if Congress intended to permit changes in elections after retirement, it would have considered some relaxation of the restriction in 10 U.S. Code 1435 that only the spouse or child of the member on the date of his retirement is an eligible beneficiary.

Accordingly, an officer retired under the act of August 11, 1959, may not make a change in his election with respect to the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act subsequent to retirement. The first question is answered in the negative.

The second question is as follows:

Are the provisions of Section 3 applicable to a change or revocation of an election with respect to the Contingency Option Act made by an officer who retired either voluntarily or by reason of physical disability after having been considered but not recommended for continuation on the active list:

a. If he meets the requirements set forth in subsection 2(d) and 2(e); b. If it is determined by the board that his performance would not warrant retention on the active list under any circumstances?

Section 2(e) of Public Law 86-155, 10 U.S.C. 1431(e), reads as follows:

An officer who has the qualifications specified in subsection (d) and who has been considered but not recommended for continuation on the active list pursuant to section 1 of this Act shall be considered for the purpose of subsection (d) as being retired under this Act if the officer retires voluntarily prior to the date specified for his retirement under this Act. [Italics supplied.]

In our decision of August 18, 1959, 39 Comp. Gen. 108, we held that a disability retirement is not a voluntary retirement within the meaning of section 2(e), and in the answer to question 5 we stated that, "If an officer is retired for disability under the statutory provisions authorizing retirement for disability, he is not retired under the act of August 11, 1959 ***."

Since section 3 of the act by its own terms is applicable only to "an officer who is retired under this act," the provisions of section 3 are not applicable to a change or revocation of an election with respect to the Contingency Option Act made by an officer retired by reason of physical disability, notwithstanding he might otherwise have been retired under the provisions of the act of August 11, 1959.

The phrase "for the purpose of subsection (d)" appears to have been used in section 2(e) of the act for the sole purpose of saving

to officers voluntarily retired under another statute the lump-sum payment of $2,000 granted officers retired under the act of August 11, 1959, and for no other purpose. Had the Congress intended that voluntary retirements by officers otherwise having "the qualifications specified in subsection (d) and who have been considered but not recommended for continuation on the active list" are to be considered as retirements under the act of August 11, 1959, such result could have been achieved by merely omitting the phrase in question.

Parts a and b of the second question are answered in the negative.

[B-134973]

Payments in Lieu of Taxes-Occupancy for Governmental Purposes-Tax Exemption

Although the use of real property, which was subject to State and local taxes when transferred from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to other Federal agencies, for governmental purposes is not sufficient in itself to bring the property within the tax exemption provisions in section 704 (b) of the act of August 12, 1955, 40 U.S.C. 524 (b), such governmental use must be considered with the specific uses described in section 704(b) (1), (2) and (3) of the act; hence, only if office buildings and facilities for governmental purposes are used or held primarily for the rendition of service to or on behalf of the local public may the property be considered tax exempt under section 704(b)(3) of the act. When one of three Federal agencies, which jointly occupy a former Reconstruction Finance Corporation property consisting of of 23.3 acres of land and two buildings, uses 69 percent of the total square footage of the property including 16.7 acres of land and one building, for a purpose which is considered to be for the benefit of the local public within the meaning of the tax exemption provisions in subsections 704(b) (3) and (4) of the act of August 12, 1955, 40 U.S.C. 524(b) (3) and (4), even though a preponderance of the building space is used by the other agencies for governmental purposes which do not render the property tax exempt, the property must be considered as a whole and, therefore, tax exempt so that payments in lieu of taxes may not be made.

To Ray Slavin, Department of the Army, September 28, 1959:

By second endorsement dated June 19, 1959, the Chief of Engineers referred to us your letter of May 13, 1959, submitting additional information regarding your prior request for advance decision as to whether you may certify for payment under act of August 12, 1955, Public Law 388, 84th Congress, 69 Stat. 721, 40 U.S.C. 524 (b), as amended, 40 U.S.C. 521-524, a voucher for $12,341.41 in favor of Multnomah County, Oregon. The voucher covers payments in lieu of taxes for the periods January 1, 1955, through June 30, 1958, on certain real property described as Tax Lot 8, Section 24, Township 1, North, Range 3 East of the W.M. By letter of August 28, 1958, B-134973, in response to your earlier request for advance decision, we concluded that it was not possible to determine conclusively from the information furnished by you at that time whether the property was dedicated to local public purposes (as distinguished from general public purposes) within the meaning of section 704 (b) (3) of Public