SEC. 6. The Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1951, is amended by striking out, in the paragraph designed "Folding documents" under the heading "Contingent expenses of the Senate" the words "$1 per thousand" and inserting in lieu thereof "$2 per thousand." The provisions of sections 2 and 3 shall not apply to employees whose compensation is paid from the appropriation contained in such paragraph.

SEC. 7. The aggregate amount of the basic compensation authorized to be paid for administrative and clerical assistance and messenger service in the offices of Senators shall be at the following annual rates:

(a) $68,760 in the case of each Senator from a State that has a population of ten million or more inhabitants;

(b) $66,660 in the case of each Senator from a State that has a population of five million or more but less than ten million inhabitants;

(c) $57,960 in the case of each Senator from a State that has a population of three million or more but less than five million inhabitants; and

(d) $55,440 in the case of each Senator from a State that has a population of less than three million inhabitants.

SEC. 8. The second proviso in the paragraph relating to the authority of Senators to rearrange the basic salaries of employees in their respective offices, which appears under the heading "Clerical assistance to Senators" in the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1947 (60 Stat. 390; U. S. C., title 2, sec. 60f), is amended to read as follows: "Provided further, That no salary shall be fixed under this paragraph at a basic rate of less than $480 per annum nor more than $7,740 per annum, except that the salary of one employee, other than the administrative assistant, in the office of each Senator may be fixed at a basic rate of not more than $9,660 per annum and the salary of the administrative assistant to each Senator may be fixed at a basic rate of not more than $10,860 per annum".

SEC. 9. The provisions of this Act shall take effect on the first day of the second month that begins after the date of its enactment.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not have any questions. I am in agreement with the objective of your bill. I never know, without looking at the chart, what salaries my staff are drawing, and I see no objection to it. I can understand how it came about, granting an increase at one time and another, and adding a percentage to the established salary at that time, but I think I agree with you that the time has come when we should create a new base, at least.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Do you have any questions, Senator McCarthy?
Senator MCCARTHY. Just this one question:

Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, in considering this pay raise for all Federal employees of 7 or 10 percent, whatever they are working on now, whether they are also considering increasing the salaries of the committee and Senate staff employees?

Senator FLANDERS. That I do not know.

Senator MCCARTHY. Would you want to express yourself as to what you think about it? Would you care to comment on it?

Senator FLANDERS. I would not care to give an offhand judgment on that. I surmise that all of them have increased grocer's bills and increased bills for clothing, and I surmise that they will feel that an increase in salary is justified, but I am not going to give any opinion as to whether and how much, because I have not made it a matter of study.

Senator MCCARTHY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Senator Dworshak, did you have a question?

85166-51- -7

Senator DwORSHAK. Yes. Why do you have a multiple of 60 regarding that increase?

Senator FLANDERS. You see, the percentages come out in fractions of a cent. Now, if you have multiples of 60 on a monthly or semimonthly payment, it comes out in even quarters, instead of a fraction of a percent, and that is very much handier for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Flanders.

Senator FLANDERS. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Meader, will you come forward, if you please, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MEADER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have have you with us, Congressman, and you may proceed in your own way.

Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a prepared statement. I do wish that I had had time to get my thoughts a little better in line than I have, but I will just proceed and then answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you may revise the transcript, if you desire. Mr. MEADER. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, before it is published.

Mr. MEADER. I would like to start out by commending this committee for giving consideration to the topics that are listed on the schedule which was sent to me by the chairman. I have long felt that the one important improvement in Government needed today more than any other is the strengthening of the Congress. I think the constitutional responsibilities placed upon the Congress to determine policies are not being discharged under modern times in the effective way that they ought to be. I have the general feeling that Congress has failed to keep step with the development of our national economy, which today is a far more complicated and intricate affair than it was 50 or 75 years ago.

I wanted to comment briefly on the procedural rules which were mentioned in the topics listed on this schedule for yesterday, the one under No. 5, entitled "Code of Fair Play for Investigating Committees."

In the Eighty-first Congress there were a number of such bills introduced. I testified before the Rules Committee in the Eighty-first Congress with particular reference to a proposal by Senator Lucas, to establish a set of rules for committee procedure.

Senator MCCARTHY. I think it might be a good idea, in view of the length of time Congressman Meader himself has spent on the staffs of various committees, and as chief of staff, I believe, of several, if he should give us that background, because I believe that it would lend more weight to your testimony, Congressman.

Mr. MEADER. Thank you, Senator. I will be glad to state that briefly. I became employed as assistant counsel to the Truman committee on July 1, 1943. I remained with that committee for approximately 4 years; became chief counsel of the committee under Senator

Mead on the 1st of October 1945, and remained as chief counsel to the committee until approximately July of 1947. Then I remained as consulting counsel until the end of the Eightieth Congress, at the time the Senate War Investigating Committee's official existence expired.

I may perhaps mention that I have always been a Republican, and I regard it as a tribute to Senator Mead's statesmanship that, knowing I was a Republican, he being a Democrat, he employed me nevertheless as chief counsel for the Senate War Investigating Committee. I served under Senators Truman, Mead, and Kilgore for a brief time as chairman, and under Senator Brewster.

In March of 1950 I was retained by the Fulbright committee, the subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee of the Senate, as chief counsel, and I served from March until the middle of August, when I resigned and engaged in a campaign for Congress.

My comments on the procedural rules are summarized in an article that I wrote for the Michigan Law Review in April of 1949, which sets forth my views on the proposal offered by Senator Lucas at that time to establish a code of procedural rules for congressional committees. In general, I opposed the establishment of any fixed, rigid rules for a committee, primarily because I believed that it might be possible for recalcitrant witnesses to employ the rules against the committee itself, and perhaps thus hamper the work of the committee. I do not think that there is any point in discussing those in detail. I have them all here, and I would like to leave them with the committee. Senator MCCARTHY. May I suggest that they be inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that article may be placed in the record. (The document referred to is as follows:)

[Reprinted from the Michigan Law Review, vol. 47, No. 6, April 1949]

LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION

(By George Meader, former chief counsel, Senate War Investigating Committee; member Michigan bar; member District of Columbia bar, Washington, D. C.)

I. USEFULNESS OF THE INVESTIGATORY FUNCTION

Increasingly, Federal laws embodying far-reaching national policies are being couched in broad and general terms. The effect of this type of legislation is to place wide discretionary powers in administrative officials and to throw upon the courts an immense burden of interpretation in applying general principles to specific factual situations. There have been sentational instances of hasty passage of corrective legislation made necessary by court decisions interpreting a poorly worded law in a way Congress did not intend, such as the portal-toportal and overtime-on-overtime' decisions. Meanwhile, the practicing lawyer is at a loss to advise his clients of the effect of such legislation upon their lives and businesses until the attitude of the administrative officials and the courts becomes known. Even then, there is no assurance that such attitudes will remain fixed.

The administrative tribunal exercising legislative, administrative, and judicial functions in derogation of our doctrine of separation of governmental powers has evolved and flourished in the last few decades largely because Congress has been unable to do more than to state a broad policy in general terms and create a commission to carry it out.

1 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (328 U. S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187 (1946)). 2 Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron (334 U. S. 446, 68 S. Ct. 1186 (1948)).

This situation has developed because our national economy has grown rapidly in size, organization, and complexity while Congress has remained static. Until Congress equips itself with a sizable and competent staff, it will not be able to write its legislation in clear and specific terms and recall to itself the legislative power it has lost in the last few decades.

The foregoing should not be construed to mean that quasi-legislative powers should not be vested in administrative agencies. The question is one of degree. For example, the decision of the Federal Trade Commission relating to the basing point pricing system in the cement industry, recently upheld by the Supreme Court, involves a basic national economic policy of an order that should be determined by the elected representatives of the people, rather than by an appointive commission acting under a broad delegation of authority.

Congress must be strengthened if the balance of separate governmental powers is to be restored. That strengthening may best be brought about by the development and effective use of the congressional investigative function.

August 7, 1944, President (then Senator) Truman, in announcing on the floor of the United States Senate his resignation as chairman of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, said:

"In my opinion, the power of investigation is one of the most important powers of the Congress. The manner in which that power is exercised will largely determine the position and prestige of the Congress in the future. An informed Congress is a wise Congress; an uninformed Congress surely will forfeit a large portion of the respect and confidence of the people.

"The days when Webster, Clay, and Calhoun personally could familiarize themselves with all the major matters with respect to which they were called upon to legislate are gone forever. No Senator or Representative, no matter how able or diligent, can himself hope to master all the facts necessary to legislate wisely.

"The accomplishments of the Truman committee-and I am referring now to the other members of the committee and its staff, rather than to myself— present an example of the results that can be obtained by making a factual investigation with a good staff. Similar accomplishments can be made by other special committees, as well as the standing committees of the Congress, and I particularly urge upon the Senate that it be liberal in providing ample funds for the prosecution of proper investigations. The cost of a good investigation is negligible when compared with the results which can be obtained."*

No reference to the investigative power of Congress can be found in the Constitution, yet its existence is well established. Before our Nation was born, the English Parliament and the colonial legislatures exercised investigative powers. The power of Congress to "send for persons and papers" is said to be a necessary adjunct to legislative power, since it enables Congress to inform and enlighten itself before enacting laws.

The basis for implying the existence of the investigative power of Congress furnishes the guide to its proper exercise as well as the direction of its development into a more useful instrument of a democratic system of government. În our modern, complex national economy, with its intricate and multitudinous interrelationsships, regulations and controls can no longer be adopted by simple, broad generalities but must be based upon thorough knowledge of the detailed facts, the conflicting special interests and the general public interest. The effects of proposed legislative action may thus be intelligently calculated, wise policies decided upon, and enactments stated in clear and unambiguous terms.

II. SPECIAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES

T

Although the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, did not abolish special congressional investigating committees by its terms, the Eightieth Congress did not create new special committees and the Senate drastically reduced the powers of an outstanding special committee, the Special Senate Committee Investigating

3 Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute (333 U. S. 683, 68 S. Ct. 793 (1948)). 490 Congressional Record 6747 (August 7, 1944).

5 Landis, Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harvard Law Review 153 at 159 (1946).

McGrain v. Dougherty (273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319 (1927)). 760 Stat. L. 812 (1946).

the National Defense Program (the former Truman committee). The Senate of the Eighty-first Congress has allowed another special committee to expire, the Special Committee to Study the Problems of Small Business. The theory of the Legislative Reorganization Act was that standing legislative committees should do the investigative work of the Congress. Senate committees were given the subpena power to that end. However, it is not alone the power of a committee but the ability and energy of its chairman and its members in exercising that power which determine the extent and vigor of congressional investigating activity.

The history of congressional investigations shows that, for reasons unnecessary to discuss here, standing legislative committees have not demonstrated great interest in conducting penetrating investigations. The practical effect, therefore, of stifling the creation of special investigating committees is to weaken, not to strengthen and expand, the investigative function of the Congress.

III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION

A further limitation of the investigative function of Congress is contained in proposals now before Congress to establish procedural rules for congressional committees designed to prevent abuses to witnesses and others in committee hearings and reports.

On January 5, 1949, Senator Lucas, majority leader of the Senate, introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 210 to establish certain procedural rules for congressional committees. This resolution is identical with Senate Concurrent Resolution 44, introduced by Senator Lucas on February 25, 1948."

Companion resolutions to Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 were introduced in the House of Representatives on January 3, 1949, by Representative McCormack, majority leader of the House of Representatives," and on February 2, 1949, by Representative Sabath, chairman of the Rules Committee of the House of Representatives.13

Similar resolutions and bills have been introduced by Representatives Holifield" and Buchanan.15

For present purposes, it is sufficient to discuss the rules contained in Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, which is set forth in full in the appendix to this article.

IV. PROCEDURAL RULES FOR COMMITTEES

The gist of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 is to give certain "rights" to any individual considering himself defamed by evidence presented to congressional committees, to give certain "rights" to witnesses, and to impose certain limitations upon committees, their members and employees.

Any person who believes that evidence given in a public hearing of a committee defames him or otherwise adversely affects his reputation may: (1) file a sworn statement for the record; (2) testify personally in his own behalf; (3) require the committee to produce up to four witnesses in his behalf; (4) examine such witnesses, either personally or by counsel; (5) require the committee to procure the appearance of adverse witnesses; and (6) cross-examine adverse witnesses, personally or by counsel, but for not more than 1 hour as to each such witness.

Persons granted these rights may file a petition with the committee, whereupon it is mandatory for the committee, within 10 days, to fix a time and place for a hearing to be held within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Witnesses before committees, in either public or executive hearings, are given the right to be accompanied by counsel and to have a copy of the transcript of their testimony.

A committee is prohibited from: (1) receiving evidence not relevant to the subject of the hearing; (2) publishing reports except after majority

See S. Rept. 1400 on S. 2177, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1-5 (May 31, 1946); S. 2177, 79th Cong., 2d sess., sec. 126 (1946).

60 Stat. L. 812, ch. 753. sec. 134 (a) (1946).

10 S. Con. Res. 2, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 95 Congressional Record 51 (January 5, 1949). See appendix, infra, p. 785, for text.

11 S. Con. Res. 44, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 94 Congressional Record 1675 (February 25, 1948).

12 H. Con. Res. 3, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (January 3, 1949).

13 H. Con. Res. 24, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (February 2, 1949).

14 H. Con. Res. 4, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (January 3, 1949); H. R. 74, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (January 3, 1949); H. R. 191. 81st Cong., 1st sess. (January 3, 1949).

15 H. R. 824, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (January 5, 1949).