The Foreign Relations (Affairs) Committees should exercise a dual role. First, they must perform the functions of legislative committees by examining and reporting to the Senate and to the House bills and resolutions referred to them. Secondly, because of the nature of foreign affairs these committees should exercise a secondary or an indirect responsibility for matters which are within the primary responsibility of other committees." Thus the Foreign Affairs Committees shoud have a secondary responsibility for matters pertaining to the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, even though the primary responsibility may rest with the Banking and Currency Committee as was the case with the Bretton Woods legislation. But on many other matters the Foreign Affairs Committees will have an indirect interest in matters which are within the primary or secondary responsibility of other committees, because of the foreign aspects or repercussions of these matters. One example is export control legislation.* To some extent each subject-matter committee has an indirect or a collateral interest in matters which are within the action jurisdiction of other committees. Thus there is a Finance Committee interest in the level of appropriations, an Agricultural Committee interest in monetary-fiscal and wage policies. But, as I have shown above, this indirect interest is more significant, organizationally, in the foreign affairs area than in the domestic. This pervasive reach of foreign affairs into matters properly within the jurisdiction of many committees of the Congress requires (1) that the Foreign Affairs Committees establish and maintain a special relation with the leadership organization in each House (Policy Committees, Steering Committee, Rules Committee in the House as well as the top leadership positions); and (2) that they maintain close and continuous two-way relationships with subject-matter committees and with the Appropriations and Expenditures Committees. It is interesting to compare the position of the Foreign Affairs Committees vis-à-vis the subject-matter committees with that of the State Department vis-à-vis other agencies of the executive branch. It is clear that the Government-wide leadership position of the State Department, on behalf of the President, is far more encompassing than the Government-wide leadership position of the Foreign Affairs Committees, on behalf of the top congressional leadership. To a degree this is as it should be because in each House of Congress, it is the whole assembly and not the leadership which has authority. Any Member can take an interest in any piece of legislation. But, as a matter of efficiency and thoroughness in the performance of its tasks, the Congress would stand to gain by recognizing this dual role of the Foreign Affairs Committees and by developing further various types of intercommittee arrangements. In many instances, the position of the Foreign Affairs Committees, in case of differences with other committees, would be reported to the leadership for further action. On the House side, where the limitations on floor debate are so severe, it is especially important that thorough consideration be given to the foreign relations aspects of all legislation before it is debated on the floor. However, because of inherent differences between congressional organization and executive branch organization, it frequently will be advisable to assign primary responsibility for certain items of legislation to the Foreign Affairs Committees, although for the same subject matter primary responsibility within the executive branch may properly be assigned to agencies other than the State Department. Examples of this are international commodity agreements and foreign-aid legislation. 2. THE REALINEMENT OF THE JURISDICTION AND ROLES OF PARTICULAR COMMITTEES One of the purposes of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was to streamline and to simplify the congressional committee structure. As already stated, no simplification can prevent a certain measure of overlapping or at least cross relations and the consequent need for further development of the methods of intercommittee cooperation-such as joint committee or subcom It is necessary for one committee to have primary responsibility for reporting a bill and sponsoring it before the House or Senate. However, part of a bill that is referred to one committee for such action may be clearly within the jurisdiction of another committee. This second committee may be given a secondary responsibility. Indirect responsibility refers to a collateral interest on the part of a committee in matters which are the direct responsibility (primary or secondary) of other committees. The following bills referred to various committees during the 82d Congress are among the many with foreign affairs aspects: S. 13 (gold exports) Banking and Currency: S-7. 12, and 535 (international civil aviation) Interstate and Foreign Commerce; S. 981 (Tariff Com.) Finance; S. 946 (Minerals) Armed Services. mittee hearings, the designation of one or more members of one committee to sit with another committee for a particular purpose, concurrent or consecutive referrals, and special or select committees with members drawn from several standing committees. Omnibus legislation such as the Defense Production Act of 1950 extends the intercommittee nature of modern legislation. However, it appears quite likely that the existing committee structure can be firmed up by some alterations and clarifications of existing committee duties. Special reasons may exist from time to time for referring bills to a committee other than that which has primary or secondary jurisdictional claim-such as the workload of one committee or the variance between the policies of the leadership and the committee chairman. Still it is important to have a sound basis for the regular or standard jurisdiction of committees in order to enable them to develop competence in the subject matter and to exercise the function of congressional surveillance of the executive branch. The present structure is not clear at several important points, and, in addition, a number of anomalous references have become more or less standard practice. In the realinements that will be suggested the following considerations will be borne in mind: (1) The conception of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Appropriations Committee discussed in section 1 above. (2) The desirability of assigning subject-matter committee jurisdictions on the basis of a functional-field grouping standard. (3) The desirability of maintaining generally a close correspondence between the jurisdictions of congressional committees and the agencies of the executive branch. The following table stipulates the general outline of the committee realinements which I suggest for further consideration. Suggested committee structure (tentative)* Agriculture and Forestry-- Generally the same primary jurisdiction as at present. Appropriations and Expendi- Add to the present Appropriations Commit tures- Armed Services_ Banking, Currency, and Finance (to have an international subcommittee). tees the expenditure-review and accounting functions of the present Expenditures Committees. See text for general concept and relation to other committees. Same as present except that economic mobilization should be the primary responsibility of other committees. Consider adding veterans affairs. Consolidation of present Banking and Currency and Finance (Ways and Means) committees. Selective price-controls to become a secondary responsibility of Industry and Commerce and Agriculture Committees. Tariffs and customs to become primary responsibility of Foreign Affairs Committee. Housing to become primary responsibility of Social Affairs Committee. Post Office and Civil Service___ Abolish. Post Office to Interior and Insular District of Columbia___ Committee on Social Affairs--- Affairs. Civil Service to Government Organization and Administration Management Committee. No change. Public health, welfare, housing, education, labor, immigration. In assigning the bill for the unification of the armed services to the Armed Services Committee rather than the Expenditures Committee, Senator Vandenberg stated: "Decisions frequently are difficult under the Legislative Reorganization Act because of the conflicting interpretation that can be placed on the language of the act." C. R. 80-1, p. 1413. Same for both Houses of Congress. In practice it may be advisable to partition some of these committees in the House of Representatives because of the larger membership, or, alternatively, to consolidate some of them on the Senate side. Suggested committee structure (tentative)-Continued Government Organization and The present Expenditures Committees minus Administrative Management (perhaps joint). Foreign Affairs House Administration_____ have an international sub- the expenditures-review and accounting functions. Civil Service added. See Appropriations and Expenditures Committee above. See text for general concept and relations to other committees. See text for general concept and relation to other committees. No change. (to An extension of the present Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committees. Welfare and health functions on House side to go to Social Affairs Committee. Added functions: Substantive aspects of antitrust and business regulation, patents, and trade-marks (primary). Fisheries on House side. See Armed Services, Banking, Currency, and Finance, and Judiciary. Transportation and Tele-Communications (international subcommittee). Judiciary Merchant Marine and Fisheries (House only). Interior and Insular Affairs____ Aviation, railroads, highways, shipping, tele communications. Secondary jurisdiction for antitrust; patents, Terminate. See Industry and Commerce and Primary jurisdiction over public domain, water As has been inferred above, the foreign affairs committees will need to continue to assume primary and direct responsibility for legislative matters which are preponderantly international such as overseas programs. In my opinion, this should include the civil government side of occupied area programs, now split between the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committees. However, many matters of direct intergovernmental concern such as exchange rates and some foreign trade controls would be handled by the Banking and Currency, the Industry and Commerce, the Transportation and Telecommunications, and the Agriculture Committees. Each of these committees should have an international subcommittee to develop the international implications of their activities in collaboration with the Foreign Affairs Committees. Also these committees and several others will handle many matters of indirect international consequence. Less formal liaison with the Foreign Affairs Committees should be adequate in such instances. The proposed Governmental Organization and Administrative Management Committee would represent an extension of the present functions of the Expenditures Committees other than expenditure review and accounting. Its investigations would be confined to this domain and not be virtually limitless as theoretically possible at present. Each subject-matter committee would be concerned with organization and management within its field; but the governmental organization committees would have a concern for all such questions which were Government-wide in scope or significance-for example, agency organization at the level of what may be termed "governmental structures or system." Another example would be the general and more fundamental impact of international organization upon the United States constitutional system, leaving more routine relations between the United States and international organizations to the Foreign Affairs Committees. Its relations with these other committees would be close and cooperative. This would represent an extension of the present jurisdiction of the Senate Expenditures Committee." 7 For further discussion see my book (pp. 283, 289, 308). For suggestion that there be a Joint Committee on the Machinery of Government, se proposal of William Y. Elliott in Suggestions for Strengthening Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 47-49. REPORTS AND ARTICLES OPERATION OF LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1946 (By George B. Galloway, Senior Specialist in American Government, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress) One of the responsibilities of the Committees on Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the Senate and House of Representatives is to "evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the Government." In the exercise of part of this responsibility the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments held hearings during February 1948, on the operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Three years have now passed since those hearings were held and, altogether, Congress has had 4 years experience with the workings of this law. It is timely, therefore, to undertake a fresh review of the operation of the so-called La Follette-Monroney Act in terms of its own objectives, and to consider whether or not, in the light of this experience, the act needs to be amended and strengthened. OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT As conceived and formulated by the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, and as enacted by the Seventy-ninth Congress with some significant omissions, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 had the following objectives: 1. To streamline and simplify congressional committee structure. 2. To eliminate the use of special or select committees. 3. To clarify committee duties and reduce jurisdictional disputes. 4. To regularize and publicize committee procedures. 5. To improve congressional staff aids. 6. To reduce the workload on Congress. 7. To strengthen legislative oversight of administration. 8. To reinforce the power of the purse. 9. To regulate lobbying. 10. To increase the compensation of Members of Congress and provide them retirement pay. COMMITTEE STRUCTURE Modernization of the standing committee system was the first objective of the act and the keystone in the arch of congressional reform. By dropping minor, inactive committees and by merging those with related functions, the total number of standing committees was reduced by the act from 33 to 15 in the Senate and from 48 to 19 in the House of Representatives. This reform has now survived 4 years and two Congresses-one controlled by the Republicans and one controlled by the Democrats-without change or successful challenge. Senators Holland and Wherry offered a resolution (S. Res. 58) on February 7, 1949, to create a standing Senate Committee on Small Business which was favorably reported by the Committee on Rules and Administration on June 29, 1949. But after extended debate the Senate, by a 2-to-1 vote, decided to create a select committee to investigate small-business problems. Thus the reorganized standing committee system seems to have won congressional acceptance for the time being. Under the old system the standing committees of the House ranged in size from 2 to 42 members and averaged 19 members each. Under the act, 15 out of the 19 House committees had 25 or 27 members each in the Eighty-first Congress and the average size was 25 members. Rules, with 12 members, and Un-American Activities, with 9 members, remain unchanged in size. Appropriations now has 50 members, compared with 42 before, and Armed Services has 35, compared with a combined membership of 61 on the old Military and Naval Affairs Committees. Before the act the standing committees of the Senate ranged in size from 3 to 25 members and averaged 15 members each. Under the act all the Senate standing committees have 13 members, except Appropriations which has 21, as compared with 25 before. Before the act, every Senator was entitled to serve on three major committees and two minor committees. Some had up to 10 committee assignments each. Thre was conflict in committee meetings, duplications in committee jurisdiction, and inefficient distribution of the legislative work load among committees. Under the act, no Senator may serve on more than two standing committees, except that majority party Senators may also serve on the District of Columbia and Expenditures committees. With minor exceptions, each House Member now serves on only one standing committee instead of from three to five, as many members did in the past. The rule limiting minority Senators to two committees each has had the effect, with a change in party control of the Senate, of requiring minority Senators to resign from one of their three former committees in cases where they had served on the District of Columbia and Expenditures committees in addition to two national committees. The result was to deprive these second-class committees during the Eighty-first Congress of the continued service of experienced members like Senators Aiken and Ferguson who, being limited to two committees, felt that they owed it to their constituents to elect to serve on two national committees. To meet this situation, Senator Taft introduced a resolution (S. Res. 24) on January 10, 1949, proposing to increase the membership of 8 Senate committees from 13 to 15 members each; to permit 8 minority Senators to serve on three standing committees each; and to permit majority Senators to have a third committee assignment upon any one of five specified minor committees. Senate Resolution 24 was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration which took no action upon it. In its behalf Senator Taft argued that (a) in many cases a committee of 13 members is too small to handle its work load, and (b) new Senators are deprived of important committee assignments under the twocommittee-assignment rule because older Senators fill up the limited number of seats on the more attractive committees and leave only the second-class committees open for the freshman Senators. Opponents argued that to differentiate between the size of the standing committees of the Senate would be to create a system of major and minor committees; that the proposed change would break down the two-committee-assignment rule and increase the work load and responsibilities of Senators in unrelated legislative fields; and increase absenteeism in the Senate. Many of the old standing committees of Congress were minor, inactive committees "ornamental barnacles on the ship of state" in Alvin Fuller's phrasehang-overs of lively legislative issues long since settled. Under the new scheme all the standing committees in both Houses are major committees, assigned important duties; although some Members still refer to the District of Columbia and Expenditure Committees as "second-class," an inappropriate appellation to apply to the Expenditure Committees which were rejuvenated by the act and given weighty responsibilities in the machinery of government field. It is often said and perhaps widely believed that the reduction from 81 to 34 in the number of standing committees of Congress affected by the act has been offset by the creation of a rash of subcommittees. The fact is, as the records show, that the number of standing subcommittees has not changed since 1945. In that year Congress had 131 standing subcommittees: 34 in the Senate and 97 in the House. In 1950 there were 131 standing subcommittees: 66 in the Senate and 65 in the House. During the Eighty-first Congress six House committees and four Senate committees had no standing subcommittees at all. Special subcommittees are set up from time to time in both Houses to handle individual bills, but their number fluctuates from week to week, making comparisons misleading. The tendency has been, since the act, for standing subcommittees to replace special subcommittees for individual bills, affording committeemen and their staffs an opportunity to become specialists in correlated fields of legislation. Some Congressmen are critical of subcommittees, believing that the entire membership of a committee should handle matters referred to it. Others believe that subdivisions are necessary for the preliminary study of complex matters and are an inescapable feature of the heavy duties now imposed upon the consolidated committees of Congress. The advantages that flow from the division of labor and specialization of function will probably lead most congressional committees to continue to subdivide their work, and to rely on consideration at the full committee stage for coordination and the over-all view. In the form in which it passed the Senate, the act prohibited special committees. Although this provision was stricken in the House, the spirit of the act clearly frowns on the creation of special committees. The La FolletteMonroney committee had recommended that the practice of creating special investigating committees be abandoned on the ground that they lack legislative authority and that the jurisdiction of the new standing committees would be so |