This has always been a problem in the case of the national budget. When presented with an appropriation bill affecting a single Government department, containing items objectionable to the President, he has been faced with an unfortunate choice either to sign the bill, thereby approving of items which he considers unjustified, or disapprove the bill in its entirety, thereby depriving the department concerned of funds essential for its continued operation. The opposition to this legislation may be voiced that it centers too great power in the President. Any step to enlarge Executive authority is certain to be viewed, and very properly, with some skepticism. Generally speaking, it is the position of many Members, including my own, that curtailment rather than enlargement of Executive powers is desirable. Particularly in the field of appropriations, the Congress has historically been reluctant to yield any part of its control over governmental operations. When we are faced, however, with the grim fact that we had, before the tax increase due to the national emergency, an operating deficit for 2 years in a row, fiscal 1949 and 1950, greater than the entire cost of running the Federal Government 17 years ago. Perhaps we should reappraise our attitude. Right at this critical moment, it seems to me, the most constructive service we could render would be to adopt every reasonable suggestion advanced to cut down the cost of running the Government. Let us take a look at the way this plan would operate if the President were given the power of single-item veto. It may be argued that he might disapprove a particular appropriation because he felt it was not enough and that the Congress had cut a budget estimate too much. Thus, it may be said, the passage of such a measure as I have proposed might lead to increased rather than reduced expenditures. The answer to this argument is that such action by the President would always run the risk of resulting in a complete denial of any funds for such a project, unless his veto were overridden, in which case, of course, the figure as originally fixed by Congress would be retained. As a practical matter, it seems to me the only result which could flow from the single-item veto would be a downward revision of congressional appropriations. It is true, of course, that the President might strike out some pet project of an individual Member and that action would stand, unless revised by a two-thirds vote. But that is a chance I am prepared to take. I believe, that, by and large, the people of this country would prefer to run the hazard that some particular Federal project might be curtailed if they were reassured by the prospect of achievement of a substantial over-all reduction in spending. I am completely satisfied that the net result of permitting the single-item veto would be bound to be substantial and constructive economy in Government. Conceding the desirability of such a change, we are still faced with a determination as to the method of effecting this legislative improvement. There is a substantial body of opinion, perhaps a majority, which holds that this can only be done by constitutional amendment. The first sentence of article I, section 7, reads: "Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. * By stress on the word "it," which appears at several places in the quoted sentence, the argument is advanced that the sentence is free from ambiguity, so that there is no occasion for construction. It is said that it would be too deliberate a departure from the literal and ordinary meaning of words to extend the latitude necessary to interpret this sentence as permitting item vetoes. Eminent text writers have supported this view. They may be right. The courts may eventually sustain that position, but I venture to assert that there is a powerful argument which can be advanced on the other side. At the least, it seems to me there is sufficient doubt that we would be thoroughly justified in passing legislation to bring about this much-needed reform, leaving to the judicial branch, the appropriate forum, the eventual determination regarding constitutionality. The Constitution is not a mere compilation of legalistic rules. It is the pattern of a philosophy of government. It sets forth general principles rather than detailed procedure. It was designed to create a government of laws as distinguished from a government of men. It sought to accomplish this by dividing the powers of government among three independent and coordinate branches, each one of which should be a check on the other. The Constitution simply creates these three branches and draws the line between them. We can only maintain our form of government if each independent branch recognizes the rights and duties of the others and protects them as diligently as it protects its own. Webster defines the world "bill" as follows: "A form or draft of a law presented to a legislature but not yet enacted, or before it is enacted; a proposed or projected law." The term "bill," as used in the Constitution, does not have any technical meaning and apparently had none when the Constitution was adopted. It is simply a vehicle for carrying proposed law through the legislative bodies. There is no constitutional requirement that it shall be in any particular form. It is simply a device by which the Legislature may express its will. Neither usage nor constitutional limitation requires us to attach any restrictive meaning to the word "bill" which will prevent the fulfillment of the real intent of the framers in providing for an Executive veto. We must, as in all constitutional construction, look to substance and not to mere form. In State v. Platt, a South Carolina case reported in 2 S. C. 150, there is an illuminating discussion of the meaning of the term "bill." There the court says: "In a technical sense, the term 'bill' is applicable properly to the enactment as a whole. Although the technical use of words should prevail where not inconsistent with the clear intent of the instrument, yet when such intent requires that words should be used in the larger sense it is competent so to regard them. If we should hold that the Constitution regards the enactment as a whole, in an exclusive sense, we would be led to the inevitable conclusion that, to become a law, all the substantial parts of the measure must have together passed through all the requisite stages. The consequence of this would be that alteration in a substantial part during such progress would be fatal to the whole bill. "Forced upon the opposite construction that every substantial part of a bill is to be regarded as a bill in the sense of the Constitution, we find nothing in our way but the technical import of the term 'bill.' It is not easy to perceive why, if any detached part of a statute is a law within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States forbidding States passing laws .impairing the obligation of contracts, any part of a bill is not a bill under a clause intended to secure deliberation in the passage of legislative enactments. Such a conclusion is inevitable if regard is had to the fixed principles governing constitutional construction. The objects had in view by a constitution in government are habitually substantial; matters of form are usually left to the legislative body as subject to change with the progress of ideas and events. The great objects in view in framing a constitution are the division and distribution of the powers of government, the establishment of limits and boundaries beyond which they shall not be exercised, and the creation of an efficient responsibility, tending to restrain and furnish the means to correct neglect or abuse of public authority. Clauses having for their object the creation of responsibility in the exercise of political functions are, to a large extent, intended to act upon the motive, either by way of creating inducement for right action or removing the temptation or opportunity to such abusive exercises. This is in part accomplished by fixing the responsibility for all political action in some definite person, or body of persons, by securing deliberation in the performance of public acts, and by ascertaining modes of authentication and action in important cases vitally affecting the welfare of the state. It is obvious that, in construing clauses of this class, substance rather than form is to be considered. The object to be secured is to be sought for not alone in the formal expressions of the Constitution, nor yet in the technical character of the means employed to serve its ends, but in the nature of the subject intended to be acted upon through such means. In a word, the language of the Constitution in such cases is to be construed in the largest sense fairly attributable to it, and that will best subserve the objects it has in view." All that article I, section 7, means is that all legislation which has passed the Congress must be presented to and approved by the President before it becomes law. The intent of the Constitution is that, barring an overriding of a veto, legislation shall be a result of the meeting of the minds of the Congress and the Executive the former affirmatively creating the legislation and the President exercising his right to affirm or reverse congressional action. It is my conclusion, therefore, that the method of achieving this result lies largely in the discretion of Congress. It seems reasonably clear that a provision could be inserted in each appropriation bill stating that for the purpose of the Executive veto, each separate and distinct item appropriating money shall be considered a separate enactment of Congress within the meaning of the Constitution. In conclusion, I am confident that the adoption of either of these two bills granting the President the power to veto separate items in any appropriation bills would permit the legislative and executive branches of our Government to work more harmoniously toward the goal of a balanced budget. With the impact of the huge sums for defense and mobilization yet to be completely felt by our economy, we can only estimate how great the inflationary pressures will be. Certainly, they are proving difficult enough to control at the present time. But the most constructive action to prevent further inroads into the value of our dollar which could be taken is to balance the national budget. The power of veto would be one more powerful weapon which the Congress could give the President to enable him to achieve this urgent and necessary end. We must not delay while the country sinks deeper into the endless morass of red ink and financial instability. The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is a former Representative, Congreesman Lea, of California. Will you come forward, sir? STATEMENT OF HON. CLARENCE F. LEA, FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement? Mr. LEA. I have. The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to read it, or do you wish to have it made part of the record, and comment upon it? Your pleasure, whichever way you want to proceed. Mr. LEA. Well, I do not want to impose on the committee's time. The CHAIRMAN. Not at all. We have been conducting these hearings so as to give everybody a full opportunity to express themselves fully. Mr. LEA. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before your committee with respect to the proposed amendment of the Constitution to provide for a 4-year term for Members of the House of Representatives. Ünder the original Constitution, Members of the House of Representatives were the only officials of the Federal Government who were to be selected by the direct vote of the people. The reason advanced for the 2-year term of Representatives as provided in the Constitution was that the 2-year election would reflect popular sentiment at these frequent intervals and therefore operate to make the Representative responsive to the popular will. At that time, the area of the country was limited; its population was less than one-fortieth of what it is now. Means for interstate contact and communications were meager. The legislative problems of the Federal Government were few as compared with the present day. The original House was composed of 65 Members, who represented small populations. Today the average congressional district includes over 340,000 people. Congress deals with a multitude of problems, many of which are complex, and many of them directly affect the welfare and future of more than 150,000,000 people and, indirectly, many in other lands. I think we must recognize that the duties of Members of the House of Representatives, as well as Members of the Senate, carry about as much responsibility, demands of duty, and opportunity to be of 85166-51-24 service as any political positions in this world. No man has abilities beyond the demands of his duties in service as a Member of the Congress of the United States. We cannot claim that any man is great because he is elected to the Congress of the United States. But, measured from the standpoint of his duties and responsibilities and the opportunity to serve his country, he occupies a position of preeminent importance. A Member of Congress may not be great, but there is no doubt from the standpoint of responsibility that he occupies a great position. The challenge is such that any man of worthy qualities will respond to that challenge when he fully appreciates his status. Out of 150,000,000 people, 531 men are placed in this Capitol to guard the Nation's affairs. Time, experience, and industry are necessary for the Member of Congress to carry those duties. I once heard Champ Clark say that there is no other job in the world like that of being a Member of Congress; that there was but one place to learn the job, and that was in Congress. There is an element of reality in the Champ Clark state ment. I do not deprecate the new Member of Congress or his ability to serve, but the qualities that make him a good Congressman during the first 2 years make him a better one in the next 2 years. Some years ago, I looked up the record of the length of congressional service in the House, and I found that for a good many years about 70 percent of the Members served for only about 52 years, and the remaining 30 percent of the Members had materially longer terms. From the standpoint of usefulness, it is apparent that the length of the Member's term and the length of his service and his experience as a legislator are part of a Member's qualifications to serve. I believe that a change to the 4-year term is desirable, not particularly for the benefit of the Member, though his experience better qualifies him for the job. The country gets the benefit of his experience by a longer term. At the present time, elections for him come every 2 years. Under the laws of many States, in order to retain their seats, Members of the House must be active candidates, including the primary and general elections, for periods ranging in the various States from 3 to 9 or more months. Men who have the energy to come to Congress usually are ambitious men. They have the same desire to succeed, as Members of Congress, as men in other activities of life, and to a large extent political success is measured by the result of the next election. Defeat carries more stigma as failure in politics than it should. Anyway, Members are naturally and necessarily so embroiled in the political protection of their own course of action that a 2-year term unnecessarily detracts from their ability to work more effectively for the country. The 2-year term emphasizes the political phase of membership and minimizes the importance of service. The 2-year term of office may well be appropriate for officers of local and comparatively minor importance. The frequent elections required for all Congressmen do not comport with the needs of the country from the standpoint of time, duty, and service that the Congressman should have the opportunity to give. In proportion to its duties, Congress is an extremely limited group in numbers. It deals with problems of greatest import. It is respon sible for all Federal legislation. It is vital that Members of Congress be given a term of office that affords a reasonable opportunity to give to the country their best possible service. In fact, the problem of whether we should have a 2- or a 4-year term for Members of the House is not a question of the convenience or welfare of the individual Member. The primary concern is to have a term of service that will bring the best results to the Nation. I believe that the 2-year term does substantially militate against the quality of service that Members are able to give. A term of 4 years, with half the membership elected every 2 years, should substantially contribute to the efficiency and stability of our Government. This arrangement would retain that frequency of public expression and its influence now afforded under the present 2-year system. The alternating plan of selection applicable to the Senate has been approved by 162 years of experience. The 4-year term for Members of the House, with practically onehalf its membership elected every 2 years, should give greater vitality and stability to our political structure and its operation. It is certainly true that the widespread election of approximately 218 Members of the House every 2 years would afford a very definite measure of public opinion from every State and all sections of the country. Now, Mr. Chairman, I have some comments upon the procedure that is necessary to carry this plan into effect, but to save the committee's time I will waive the reading of that part. The CHAIRMAN. Does the remainder of your prepared statement deal with that? Mr. LEA. Yes, the procedure necessary to readjust to the proposed changes that will be required. The CHAIRMAN. It may all be printed in the record, at the conclusion of your remarks. Do you have any other comments in addition? Mr. LEA. No. I think that what I have stated in this statement covers my views fundamentally. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hoey? (Discussion off the record.) The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman. (The portion of Mr. Lea's statement not read is as follows:) STATEMENT OF HON. CLARENCE F. LEA, FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS The proposed amendment involves a consideration of the procedure by which Members of Congress are to be classified and the time of their election and service. Under the Constitution, States are not required to elect Representatives to Congress. They have the right to do so if they desire. They unfailingly do exercise that privilege. The Constitution prescribes the means of determining the number of Representatives to which each State is entitled, and the length of their service. It leaves to the States the right to fix the boundaries of the congressional districts, and to elect Representatives who are selected from the districts as defined by the State legislature, or in the manner which the Congress may otherwise prescribe. Senate Joint Resolution 75 proposes the classification of Representatives by lot after their election to determine the length of service of each of the two classes, the first class so selected to serve for 2 years after the effective date of reapportionment, and the second class thereafter to serve 4 years. |