in), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

"ARTICLE

"SECTION 1. The Congress may by law permit the President to disapprove any item or items of any general appropriation bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate and have been presented to him for his approval, in the same manner and subject to the same limitations as he may, under section 7 of article I of this Constitution, disapprove as a whole any bill which shall have been presented to him.

"SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress."

[H. R. 492, 82d Cong., 1st sess.]

A BILL To amend an Act approved August 26, 1842 (U. S. C., title 1, ch. 2, sec. 25), relating to appropriation Acts

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Act approved August 26, 1842, relating to appropriation Acts (5 Stat. 537; U. S. C., title 1, ch. 2, sec. 25) be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:

"The style and title of all Acts making appropriations for the support of Government shall be as follows: An Act making appropriations (here insert the object) for the year ending June 30 (here insert the calendar year).

"For the purpose of the Executive veto each separate and distinct item appropriating money shall be considered a bill within the meaning of article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the United States and each such separate and distinct item shall be subject to veto in accordance with the conditions and limitations provided in said article I, section 7."

Mr. KEATING. The essential difference between them is that one provides by legislative fiat that each item shall be considered a separate bill for the purpose of the Executive veto, whereas the other proceeds on the theory that a constitutional amendment to achieve this objective is necessary.

Presidents Grant, Hayes, Taft, and Roosevelt, and perhaps other Presidents, have requested Congress to empower them to disapprove particular items in appropriations bills without being forced to veto the entire measure and run the risk of depriving a Government department of the power to function by withholding funds completely. At least 39 of our States permit their governors to veto separate items and in some cases simply to reduce an item.

The CHAIRMAN. How many States?

Mr. KEATING. Thirty-nine. When I first introduced this bill in the preceding Congress we then had the omnibus approach to appropriation bills. One can see that the desirability for such a provision is greater where that is the approach, because if there are half a dozen items in a big bill like that of which the President disapproves, then he again is faced with denying not only one department but all departments the funds to operate, in order to disapprove of those items. The CHAIRMAN. Then, do you favor the one-package bill, the omnibus bill?

Mr. KEATING. I am not on the Appropriations Committee. As a matter of theory, I have approved it. But, I did observe the great difficulties in operating it in the last Congress. When it was first

suggested, I thought it was a fine thing, and I still think it is fundamentally sound.

However, Mr. Chairman, in our little talk just ahead of this hearing, you gave me a new idea which I had not heard mentioned before that of changing the fiscal year, possibly to October 1.

The great difficulty, as you know, that we encountered before was getting this omnibus bill through and keeping people on the floor during its consideration. We encountered great difficulty in the House. I forget how long that bill was up there, but it was well over a month, perhaps 2 months.

(The omnibus bill was reported to the House on March 21, 1950, and passed by the House on May 10. It was reported to the Senate on July 8 and passed by the Senate on August 4. It was in conference August 8 to 28. It was approved by the President September 6.)

The CHAIRMAN. You had to pass a number of continuing resolutions in order to get the bill through on the 1st of October. I believe it was later than the 1st of October, was it not?

Mr. KEATING. I have forgotten. I think it was through the House before, but perhaps not. I think that most of the members-I am not sure of this yes; I am sure of it, because they voted for it-most of the members of the Appropriations Committee in the House feel that it did not work out and the idea should be abandoned.

While I speak with some hesitation because I am not too close to the difficulties of it, I still think in theory it is a good idea and if it were readopted, then what I have said here would be doubly true. But I still feel that the item veto is desirable even in individual appropriation bills when we are taking them up in the same manner we are now. The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question about how it would operate. Say that the President vetoed a particular item. Would that come back for a vote in Congress, and could a two-thirds majority override the veto?

Mr. KEATING. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Like any other legislation?

Mr. KEATING. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, he would certify that that particular item was disapproved and then the bill would be returned with the disapproved item.

Mr. KEATING. That is right. Now, in my statement, and I do not need to elaborate on it, there is something which, if you thought well of the idea, you might want to go into deeply. That is this, that there is a difference of opinion as to whether under the Constitution a bill with an item veto could be passed or whether it would require a constitutional amendment. As I pointed out in my statement, I feel that probably it would be constitutional to pass such a bill and that a constitutional amendment is not necessary.

The point involved is that those who advocate that a constitutional amendment is necessary put stress on the word "it" in the first sentence of article I, section 7, which tells about every bill having to be signed by the President before it becomes law. It says that if he approves, he is to sign it. They argue that "it" means the whole bill. I go into a discussion in my statement of the contentions and why I, as a lawyer, feel that it is not necessary to adopt a constitutional amendment. If the committee, however, felt otherwise, I would then urge that you

recommend getting started the rather cumbersome process of a constitutional amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question: Assuming that under the Constitution the President could be granted power by act of Congress to veto items in an appropriation bill, would not, for the same reason, Congress have granted to the President the power to veto titles to legislative bills or particular paragraphs of legislative bills or particular provisions in the legislative bills that he did not agree with?

I am just thinking about it. It seems to me that, if we could constitutionally grant the power to the President to veto an item in an appropriation bill, by the same judicial reasoning we could grant him the power to veto titles of bills, legislative bills which he did not approve of, or any provision in legislative bills he did not approve. I do not know where we can draw the line.

Mr. KEATING. I think by appropriate wording in the bill, we could do exactly that.

The CHAIRMAN. The point I am making is that, if we could do it in Congress, if the appropriations items were specifically mentioned, then it would be so limited to those appropriations items. But, once you enter that field of granting that power and authority to the President, which we all feel he does not have now, at least without an act of Congress or an amendment to the Constitution, would not the effort and the argument then be made to grant him power to veto an item not only in the appropriation bill, but that the President should also have the power to veto a separate title or separate paragraph or separate provision in a legislative bill that he does not agree to?

Mr. KEATING. Well, I think such an argument might be made, as you point out; but the power to veto a single item in an appropriation bill would only be granted by the legislative branch.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true, but what I am saying is, would not pressure be exerted on us all the time to go a step further and make it applicable to legislative bills?

Mr. KEATING. We might have the pressure on us. But I do not believe that we would be inclined to yield to that pressure beyond appropriation bills. I am going to assume that we are all sincerely worried about the financial picture and are trying to devise methods of achieving real economy.

Now, the obvious reason why this suggestion is not too popular always with members of the legislative branch is that they have been known at times to get together or agree to support various items in bills; and to give the President the power to strike out one of those items is something that they want to think about pretty carefully before they do it.

The CHAIRMAN. As a lawyer, do you believe that, if Congress now has the power under the Constitution to delegate to the President the power to veto over an appropriation item, Congress likewise has the power to delegate to the President under the Constitution as it is now, the power to veto a legislative provision?

Mr. KEATING. I would think that Congress has such power, if you get beyond the point of saying that the word "it" in that provision means more than the whole bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KEATING. If "it" means the whole billThe CHAIRMAN. You could not say "it" means an appropriation bill and does not mean a legislative item.

Mr. KEATING. No; I do not think we could. I think you have correctly stated that and it does not shock me at all. I know how we often put whole titles in bills. When we dislike a particular title, we are forced to vote for the whole bill because we believe that there is more good than bad in it. Or it might be vice versa, that there may be one very good title in what we think a bad bill, and we would vote against the whole bill. We are constantly faced with that problem. It does not shock me at all if the Legislature gave the President the power to use his surgeon's knife and take out a title and say, "This bill is good, but that title I do not think is good and I am not going to approve of it." Then, if we want to pass it over his veto, we have the power to do so; but that does not give me much.

pause.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say this to you: My questions to you do not necessarily indicate my point of view. But we are going to be confronted with all of these things later, so I am trying to analyze them

now.

Mr. KEATING. Yes; I realize that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not expressing any opinion about the power of the President to veto items in an appropriation bill. But I am developing this thought because it does seem to me, at the moment at least, that the proper way to do it would be by constitutional amendment, because it would seem to me that with the Constitution framed as it is now, we could not do it by act of Congress. I may be wrong. Mr. KEATING. I concede that it is by no means clear and I would land on the other side of the controversy; but I do not feel strongly enough about it to be at all definite.

I have discussed that in my statement, and I would urge that, if it is the conclusion of the committee that it should be done by constitutional amendment, the wheels should start turning to get that underway, if possible.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity of presenting this issue because I feel it is an extremely important one. It may be a little unusual for a Republican Congressman to be suggesting that our present Chief Executive have more power. But I think that if we are going to yell economy all the time, then we have got to give to the Chief Executive, to the executive branch of the Government, every tool that it needs. If we are going to criticize him for spending too much money, then we should give him all the tools he could possibly use to cut down on Government spending. That is perhaps a political addendum that I should have kept away from. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Congressman. Senator Hoey, do you have any comment or questions?

Senator HOEY. Congressman, I have the idea that the legislative branch would be rather loath to give the President that power which this bill contemplates. For one thing, and I believe you have stated it, there are so many instances where an appropriation item has been supported because of another appropriation, and so forth. Now, if the President is going to have the right to strike out the one he does not want and take the others, then I think that the legislative body

is surrendering a great deal of its privileges and a good deal of its rights. I can see a great many instances and a great many matters where the legislative branch would not want to surrender those rights and have it all supervised by him so that he can pick out what he wanted. Those remarks apply particularly to appropriation bills.

The same thing, although perhaps a little further, would apply to legislative bills. I recall the Taft-Hartley bill. There were some sections of that bill that the President was no friend of and he would have disposed of them if he had the power to veto separately. However, he had to veto the whole measure or none; and, of course, he did veto it, and we passed it over the veto.

At any rate, I doubt very seriously whether the legislative body would want to surrender certain of its rights and have the executive branch of the Government supervise its bills. I do not believe it would look favorably upon giving him the power to so supervise and, with respect to items of appropriations, to eliminate what he did not want and take what he did want.

Mr. KEATING. You appreciate, Senator, that this is limited to appropriations.

Senator HOEY. Yes, but the chairman did point out the possibility of having it applied to legislative bills generally.

Mr. KEATING. That is right.

Senator HOEY. I do not believe that the legislative body would be very quick to make that change.

Mr. KEATING. I realize that they would not be quick, and I am not speaking of a popular issue with the legislature. I think it is up to us to do it. I do not think that we can with full sincerity urge economy in Government unless we back it up by doing some of the things that may be distasteful to us. That is my feeling. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Keating. Your prepared statement will be printed in the record.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Keating is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH B. KEATING, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of the Eighty-second Congress I reintroduced two bills, H. J. Res. 24 and H. R. 492, designed to promote economy and assist in achieving a sounder fiscal policy. These measures give to the President the power to veto individual items in any appropriation bill. The essential difference between them is that one provides by legislative fiat that each item shall be considered a separate bill for the purpose of the Executive veto, whereas the other proceeds on the theory that a constitutional amendment to achieve this objective is necessary.

Presidents Grant, Hayes, Taft, and Roosevelt, and perhaps other Presidents, have requested Congress to empower them to disapprove particular items in appropriation bills without being forced to veto the entire measure and run the risk of depriving a Government department of the power to function by withholding funds completely. At least 39 of our States permit their governors to veto separate items and in some cases simply to reduce an item.

When I first advanced the legislative suggestion of permitting the President to veto individual items in an appropriation bill, it was in connection with the omnibus approach to providing funds with which to run the Government. I concede that the importance of the item veto is much greater in such a case, but this legislation still seems desirable to me if we continue to use the present system of separate departmental funds bills. In many of these, the President may feel that items should be stricken. Particularly with regard to bills dealing with public works, I feel this approach would be extremely salutary.