ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF CONGRESS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 1951 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in room 357, Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators McClellan (chairman), Humphrey, Underwood, Moody, Schoeppel, Dworshak. Also present: Walter L. Reynolds, chief clerk, and George B. Galloway, consultant. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Our first witness this morning is Senator Morse. I believe he sent word that he could not be present until later. Is Representative Celler here? (No response.) The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. Carter W. Atkins. STATEMENT OF CARTER W. ATKINS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CONNECTICUT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE COUNCIL Mr. ATKINS. Senator, I have a statement which I should like to present to you. It is condensed, and it will not take long. The CHAIRMAN. If you have a prepared statement, would you prefer to read it or would you prefer to place it in the record and just discuss the high lights of it? Mr. ATKINS. Senator, I should like to read it if I may. The CHAIRMAN. You are perfectly free to do so. Mr. ATKINS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Carter W. Atkins, and I am executive director of the Connecticut Public Expenditure Council, with offices at 21 Lewis Street, Hartford. The council is "an organization for better government in the interests of Connecticut taxpayers," and, as such, we have a great deal of interest in strengthening Federal fiscal controls. In fact, both the assistant director and the research director of the council spent many years in Washington before joining our organization serving the staffs of the United States Bureau of the Budget and the two Appropriations Committees of the Congress. My own interest in this subject goes back to student days at the time when this country first experienced a billion-dollar budget. More recently I had the experience of participating extensively in the hearings which led to the adoption of the Legislative Reorganization Act; so I feel appreciative of the opportunity to speak on the subject matter of strengthened fiscal controls for the Federal Government. There are six items on the agenda which was submitted to me in advance of this hearing, and I shall try to discuss each in turn within the briefest possible time. First, however, let me say that I consider this problem of fiscal controls one of the most important and perhaps the thorniest one of all confronting the Congress. Probably more time and attention has been given to this problem with less observable results than in any other single phase of public administration. There are no quick panaceas or simple solutions waiting for us to adopt. Or, at least, no one has yet advanced an easy technique which is readily apparent to all acquainted with matters of public finance. Some of the devices which seemed most fruitful of possibility for success, in their actual operation, proved to be poorly adapted to the ends they sought to achieve. One of these, the legislative budget, is the first item on the agenda for consideration today. 1. THE LEGISLATIVE BUDGET The legislative budget has as its major objective the providing of an upper limit for Federal expenditures which would be within the confines of available receipts. It was hoped that a congressional determination of the broad outlines of the spending program early in the session would lead to an orderly appropriation process and the ultimate adoption of a balanced budget for the succeeding fiscal year. I was one of those who supported the trial of this idea and watched its development with much interest. I need not refer to all the details. of what happened when the Congress endeavored to make this procedure a reality. With an unwieldy joint committee of over 100 members, without permanent paid staff, and with little real hope for its success, the Eightieth Congress did succeed in recommending a legislative budget in both the first and second sessions. It never finally adopted the budget for the first session, and there is little evidence to indicate that any serious effort was made to follow the one adopted in the second session. Apparently, with this experience in mind, the Eighty-first Congress simply placed a moratorium on the use of the legislative budget, and the Eighty-second Congress has followed suit. My own recommendation is that we forget about reviving the legislative budget and concentrate our energies in the direction proposed by your committee chairman in Senate 913, which provides for a Joint Committee on the Budget. Last month my colleague from Massachusetts, Mr. Norman MacDonald, appeared, for himself and in my behalf, in favor of this measure, and that testimony appears in the printed record of those hearings. I will not repeat what was said then, but I will state that control of Federal finances will only be achieved by constant and continuous attention to the problem by the most competent professional and technical staff obtainable working under conditions which favor their retention in oflice regardless of which party is in power. We need a joint committee to control Federal spending as much as we need the present highly regarded Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. And we need a staff qualified to do the job the committee is organized to perform. A few weeks of frantic effort in the early days of the Congress and a half-hearted declaration of congressional intent as expressed in a resolution adopting the legis lative budget are no substitute for good, hard, continuous work by an interested committee backed by highly able staff work. I do not, therefore, recommend that the legislative budget be resuscitated, but rather suggest that this is one sleeping dog that be allowed to rest in peace, and permanently. 2. CONSOLIDATION OF APPROPRIATION BILLS One of the really noble experiments of the present day was the one experience that Congress had with a consolidated appropriation act, an endeavor which produced a considerable measure of economy to the joy, or dismay, depending on the point of view, of many good citizens. For years this has been a dream of most thoughtful students of public finance. It has had the strongest kind of backing on a bipartisan basis from such distinguished Members of the Senate as Senators Byrd, Bridges, and several others. Last year the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee announced that a consolidated act would be prepared, and it was, but this year the same committee voted to abandon the new system in favor of the old method of individual bills for single or groups of departments. If it is ever to succeed, it will be essential to prepare and adopt the strongest kind of legislation requiring its utilization and taking away from the House Committee on Appropriations its present authority to initiate regular individual appropriation acts. I state this as a fact and without any desire of indicating that the House committee has ever abused its present privilege. But, unless the legislation is so drawn that only a consolidated bill will be presented for adoption, it is academic, to say the least, to discuss the feasibility or desirability of such a technique of fiscal control. I think I have said sufficient to indicate that I favor and urge the permanent use of the consolidated appropriation act, particularly if we are to utilize performance budgeting for Federal departments and agencies, since this latter device assumes a uniformity of accounting classification and, eventually, a reduction in the total of appropriation titles. If we are to have consolidated appropriation bills, however, I reiterate that it is a matter that cannot be left to congressional committee action, but rather one that should be spelled out definitely in the law. 3. THE ITEM VETO The item veto is a device that has been adopted in some States and municipalities which gives the chief executive the right to disallow portions of appropriation acts without vetoing the whole appropriation. It has long been suggested that the President be given a like power over appropriations of the Congress. As it is now, the President must veto a whole appropriation in order to indicate his disapproval of some portion of the particular act. What has resulted is that the President does not do this, but at the time of signing the act he issues a statement condemning the portion he objects to most. The case for an item veto becomes much stronger if there is only one consolidated appropriation act, which is the case in some States and municipalities. If the Congress decides to pass a consolidated appropriation act for the Federal Government, then the good case which exists for an item veto is stronger than ever. With Federal budgets now in astronomical figures and little prospect of substantial reduction for years to come, the Chief Executive should have the right to disapprove those items with which he is not in accord. The point can be made, and I think should be seriously considered, that there should be limitations on the right of exercising the item veto. Those items which are submitted to the Congress in the regular budget and approved by the Congress should not be then subject to veto. However, new items inserted by the Congress might substantially change the program of the Chief Executive. Often the Congress in considering the budget submitted has increased the amount to be made available for a certain purpose. I believe items of this nature should be subject to veto. Those who are familiar with the workings of Federal departments know that on occasion agency heads will attempt to get Congress to increase the President's budget for their departments. Realizing that the Congress has the right and, in some cases, the duty to increase appropriations if the need exists, nonetheless, any unjustified increases could be eliminated if the President had the right to disapprove increases made in these particular appropriations by the Congress. 4. RECORD VOTES ON APPROPRIATION BILLS I should like to turn next to the proposal for record votes on appropriation bills, which is the fourth item on the committee's agenda. Actually, this proposal should extend not only to the appropriation measure as it actually passes but also to each and every amendment offered to the bill as reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Once the amendments have cleared all legislative hurdles, the final vote on an appropriation bill is largely a formality. I think the members of this committee are better able to judge than I the efficacy of this supposed fiscal control. Will the voters of your State be impressed or unimpressed with your voting record on spending bills? I frankly do not know, and I find it difficult to conclude whether it would influence the members to vote in favor of economy. If it would, by all means let's have it. If it would not, I hardly see that it would serve any lasting and useful purpose other than to record votes on appropriation measures for posterity. As a result, I am forced to leave this matter entirely to your own good and able judgment. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Atkins, do you mind an interruption? Mr. ATKINS. Not at all, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I was just wondering how many different roll calls would be required if such a procedure were adopted compelling a record vote on all the amendments to an appropriation bill. You know, the committee reports out many amendments and most of those are accepted and adopted by unanimous consent on the floor. If we had to have a roll call vote on every little amendment, we would certainly consume a tremendous amount of time. It might be well to require such a vote on all amendments offered from the floor, but if we were compelled to vote on every amendment or change made by the committee, we would have a tremendous number of roll-call votes. I can assure you of that. I was thinking about the practical aspects. Mr. ATKINS. I can appreciate that fully, Senator. The point I make here is simply this, that, of course, record votes are essential on certain things and highly desirable on many, but they are time-consuming, and unless you do have the time and unless the time taken for these record votes is justified and beneficial, then my point is that you have to weigh the one against the other and reach a decision on how far you should go. The CHAIRMAN. I would say this. Yesterday we had one record vote that pretty well determined the sentiment of the Senate. It would appear to have been a waste of time to call the roll on some succeeding amendments, because the Senate virtually expressed itself in unmistakable terms as to its general feeling of economy and trying to reduce appropriations. I am not quite certain. I do not think there is much objection on the part of the members to being recorded. While it is good in theory, I rather think it would prove a considerable waste of time in most instances. If only about a dozen hold up their hands, you will get a record vote. If one-fifth of those present on the last roll call indicate that a record vote is desired, they get it. So you can get a record vote in the Senate almost any time. Mr. ATKINS. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Proceed. Mr. ATKINS. As you observed, I was leaving that to your decision, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. ATKINS. I will continue with my statement. 5. CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY A proposal for a congressional commission to bring about economy and efficiency is a natural outgrowth of the fine work done by the Hoover Commission, and, under ordinary circumstances, I would favor the appointment of such a body. However, the intent of the Legislative Reorganization Act was to make the standing committees of the Congress responsible for supervising the areas of administration under their jurisdiction and for the two committees on expenditures to ride herd on Government spending throughout the year. In addition, the Byrd Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Spending is still in operation and, with the limited means at its disposal, has been extremely effective in calling attention to a great many wasteful practices in the Federal departments and agencies. There already exists in the General Accounting Office the authority to inform the Congress regularly of wasteful and illegal expenditures of funds, and the Bureau of the Budget, through its administrative management and estimates staffs, is constantly working for economy and efficiency in the Federal Government. Similar staffs exist in a great many departments and agencies. Perhaps what is most immediately desirable is some manner of coordinating these diverse efforts without destroying the essential and initial purposes for which each was established. I wonder perhaps if the adoption of Senate bill 913, with the amendments which Mr. MacDonald and I proposed recently, would not in large measure relieve the necessity for such a commission. 85166-51—16 |