When we review a request for authority to undertake an operations research study, we review it from the standpoint of should it or should it not be done. We don't review it from the standpoint that it is going to cost $100,000 or $50,000 or $1 million.

Mr. SANDWEG. Then it is not contract by contract? It is more case by case?

General ELY. It is case by case; yes, sir.

Mr. COURTNEY. To pass very quickly to another subject-not_another subject, but this is one that is presumably completed. It is supposed to have been completed March 31, 1961-no, I beg your pardon, March 31, 1963.

And the same question is with respect to this contract. It is called a feasibility study: C.E.I.R., Inc.-formerly General Analysis Corp.-Los Angeles Research Center, 11753 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif.

Now the contract date-the contract cost is $1,419,868, partially funded.

Subject matter [reads]:

Services to conduct a study for a period of 60 months beginning April 1, 1958, and ending March 31, 1963.

The primary objective is the development of a war game specifically designed to aid the study, analysis, development, and synthesis of combat systems of particular interest to the Signal Corps. Such systems include communications systems, electronic warfare systems, battle area surveillance systems, and automatic data processing systems.

In addition to the general purpose war game there shall be developed a variety of modifications of the game especially suitable for particular applications of the game.

The game shall be comprehensive in that it will take full account of the various interactions of signal systems with combat elements. It shall be capable of measuring the contribution of signal systems to combat effectiveness.

The game shall be mechanized, using suitable computing and analog equipment so that it can be played rapidly.

The rules shall use terms familiar to military personnel and shall be sufficiently clear and simple that the game can be played with little or no special training. The contract is approximately 60 percent complete. No recommendations are submitted to date.

Now, the subcommittee would be interested in knowing the competence of this organization in the highly specialized field of combat. Who are the personnel who are devising this very simple game to be played by-it is specified it is to be a "clear and simple game," by the terms of the contract.

Who are they, and what is this all for?

Colonel DENNISON. We have some gentlemen here from the Signal Corps who I believe can respond to this part.

Mr. Wayne, or whoever, can respond.

Colonel PENCE. I am Col. Harvey Pence, from the Signal Corps. I am not familiar with this particular type of contract because I didn't know it was in the group until this morning.

I will find out and give you a full report on that.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, the committee-I think the bells have rung. Now the committee will stand in recess until Thursday morning. We will have to have you gentlemen back here with competent people who can answer the questions.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thursday morning?

Mr. HÉBERT. Thursday morning, because we have a full committee meeting tomorrow.

Mr. SANDWEG. NO.

Mr. HÉBERT. We don't have a full committee meeting?

Mr. SANDWEG. No full committee meeting this week.

Mr. HÉBERT. Tomorrow morning, then.

We hate to inconvenience you, but you certainly inconvenienced us in your appearance without giving us answers to problems that were known, maybe not you individuals personally, but certainly to your Department for 3 months.

Mr. COURTNEY. Mr. Chairman, for the interest of the committeeI don't want to place anyone under any embarrassment, but your letter of March 16, 1961, was directed to the Secretary of the Army-and I would like to place it in the record now so it will be clear.

Mr. HÉBERT. Read it into the record.

Mr. COURTNEY (reading):

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with the provisions of H.R. 78, 87th Congress, the subcommittee desires to be informed concerning those contracts let by the Department of the Army during the period January 1, 1957, to date, in the realm of basic research, management surveys, feasibility studies, and all other "effort type" contracts, wherein the ultimate objective was something other than a product or a piece of hardware.

Your reply, which should be prepared in order to reach the subcommittee no later than April 7, 1961, will include the identity of the contract, the cost of the contract, the subject matter, results of the undertaking, and such other data as would be necessary for an understanding thereof.

Your prompt attention to this request will be appreciated.

Mr. GAVIN. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. COURTNEY. March 16, 1961.

Mr. HÉBERT. The gentleman there?

Colonel HOLMAN. I am Colonel Holman.

Mr. Chairman, I can speak with authority on this subject. On the 23d of March we received in the Contracts Division, DČSLOG, a request for certain information regarding certain types of contracts which this subcommittee desired to have by April 7.

The Army responded immediately, in an effort to get this information worldwide, and we made some submissions to this committee, on two different dates.

As I recall, we did not meet the deadline of April 7, but we did have the information here by April 10.

This represented a great deal of work from all of our procuring agencies. I was the action officer in this case, and the case was coordinated throughout the Pentagon with the appropriate people.

I also attended a meeting some weeks ago when this subject came up regarding the hearings now in hand, and at that time, in talking with Mr. Sandweg, it was our impression-or I should say it was my impression that they were concerned with the types of contracts which were not particularly related to these "think" or effort type contracts. At the time we were working on this paper, two types of terms were used: "think" and then "effort" type contracts.

In any event, we are referring to the submissions we made back in April.

My point is, sir, that during the discussions with Mr. Sandweg later, it did not occur to me that this was related to this particular

document. I was advised only yesterday morning that certain contracts were specifically specified to be discussed.

As far as I know, that was the first time that there was a relationship drawn between the two cases.

Mr. GAVIN. Who advised you?

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Sandweg.

Mr. SANDWEG. I think an explanation is due here, too. We had two separate approaches to this problem, that actually was coordinated. One was on contracting out, and the other was "efforts" type contracts. At the time of the original request, the indications were that there would be hearings on both.

It was on Friday that we decided to combine them, and on Friday we notified the Army of the specific items that we would inquire into, that were brought up this morning.

There had been an understanding, I thought, that all of the “effort” type contracts that had been supplied to us in answer to our request would be subject to inquiry, if necessary.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, naturally, if we asked for answers on a contract, it was to be presumed that they are going to be subject to inquiry. We just don't want to read the text, and then get confused by this conglomeration of words we hear.

We want to reduce it-like the man that is getting paid $1 million for the war games-where you put it in simple words that Congressmen can understand.

Mr. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question here? I will ask it of the colonel.

Is there any way possible that someone can be prepared to answer the type questions that have been asked thus far on these particular contracts by tomorrow morning?

Colonel HOLMAN. I would like to answer that question this wayif I may, sir?

There were some 1,000 to 1,500 contracts reported, worldwide, by our procuring agencies. We recognized at that time that questions might be raised, or could be raised about any one of this total.

It is my opinion, sir, that tomorrow morning is too early a date for the Army to respond in authoritative fashion on any one particular contract.

Mr. NORBLAD. Your commanding officer at this arsenal, up in New York State, would certainly let you know right from a telephone call. Colonel HOLMAN. Sir, on any given contract the Army would, if the committee desires, Í am sure, attempt to obtain the individual responsible, by the fastest transportation possible to get the responsible individual here.

I am simply saying, sir, that on any given contract, given a reasonable period of time, the Army would attempt to respond.

Mr. KITCHIN. How many of these are in this particular group that you are asking now?

Colonel DENNISON. Twenty-three.

Mr. KITCHIN. So by tomorrow, it will not be possible to have witnesses here who can testify to all of the details with reference to these 23 contracts?

Colonel HOLMAN. Sir-if I might make this suggestion, sir?

using the weapon, and have made a very good study of the relative capabilities.

But every one of these involves an interview and a lot of time.

In other words, to make these studies, I would assume that the Atlantic Research Corp. people are going to have to visit some of our field commands that are working with the weapon, that have had experience in comparable weapons.

I would expect that they will have to go to Watervliet and they will have to go to a number of places. I would expect that they are going to have to bring in scientists that know metallurgy and know ballistics.

So for any given study, almost any study I could think of, there is within the Army the people who could be pulled together to make a very fine study. But you are going to take them away from something that we would in many cases feel is more important. And in the end we lose, by diverting them to this one mission for the time that it would take to carry it out.

Mr. HÉBERT. You couldn't utilize Reserve officers called to active duty for their tours instead of assigning them to come up and sit with congressional committees and report back what they hear?

General ELY. If we could find the Reserve officers with the right capabilities, I am sure we would.

Mr. HÉBERT. Don't you know the capabilities of the Reserve officers? General ELY. I am sure we have a good reading on it.

But I doubt that we have the knowledge and detail of Reserve officers and their training in mortars, their knowledge of metallurgy, and their knowledge of ballistics, that we could pull together, and say, "Give us a study on this."

I would be surprised if we could.

Mr. NORBLAD. Well, if it is a case of manpower shortage as far as Ordnance is concerned, wouldn't it be interesting if you had been here a few weeks ago when we were listening to the testimony about the closure of Benicia and Mount Ranier, where we have a surplus of some 2,000 or 3,000 technical men in the ordnance field who are being thrown on the open market and out of jobs.

Mr. HÉBERT. Raritan, also.

Mr. NORBLAD. Raritan, also.

General BIGELOW. I might respond further.

The people that will be affected by the closeout of Benicia Arsenal, and the others that are in that same category—

Mr. NORBLAD. There are two or three more.

There is one at Lake Erie, I have forgotten the name of it, and one at Toledo, too.

General BIGELOW. Rossford.

Mr. NORBLAD. Yes, that is what I mean.

General BIGELOW. They are not the people that can do this engineering type of job. They are supply people, storekeepers, maintenance technicians, rebuild shopmen, and that sort of thing. They are not the engineers that we would expect to produce on some rather basic studies like this.

Mr. KITCHIN. May I ask this one question?

I understand that nobody here is available to answer the question as to what this particular research corporation is, and that is how

many personnel, what percentage of engineers, capacity, and so forth, that are within that group of personnel.

Is this a professional interview group, or do they do the engineering studies themselves?

General ELY. I don't know Atlantic Research Corp. But I would assume that they have a mixture of physicists and chemists and metallurgists inhouse, who can interpret what they can get from interviews and from analysis of papers and other information that they can get. In other words, they are not just interview people, no.

And it is a good research corporation.

Mr. KITCHIN. I am not doubting the reliability of the research organization. I just wanted to find out what their particular function was in this case.

General BIGELOW. Well, in one of these contracts-and I can't refer specifically to which one-they actually get out and do some laboratory type work. They do some firing. They instrument the range. Mr. NORBLAD. Aren't you people doing that constantly in your Army Field Forces?

General BIGELOW. I didn't hear you.

Mr. NORBLAD. Aren't you people doing that constantly, in your Army Field Forces?

General BIGELOW. We are certainly doing it at Aberdeen. We are doing it to the extent that, as I understand it, we do not have room for this project up there.

Mr. KITCHIN. Where are they doing their firing in their experimentation?

General BIGELOW. I wasn't thinking of room in the sense of geography. I was thinking of room in terms of people to put on this particular job, because of other very high priority projects.

Mr. KITCHIN. But you do know where they are doing their actual firing or

General BIGELOW. They did some of their firing at A. P. Hill. And they may have done it all there.

Mr. SANDWEG. Could I interrupt for a moment, please?

General Bigelow, this apparently is one of the types of contracts that had to be approved by the Chief of the R. & D. Section of the Army?

General BIGELOW. I will have to reserve answering that question, because I don't know.

It is my understanding that the project was approved, the overall project, for the development of these mortars.

But the individual contracts in support of them can be approved by the commanding officer of Watervliet Arsenal.

Mr. SANDWEG. The Secretary testified, though, that these are reviewed contract by contract.

Perhaps that can be explained.

General ELY. This depends on time.

The Secretary was referring to our current policy. And we have been progressively, over the last 2 years, endeavoring to tighten up on the administration and control of this.

At the present time, the laboratory chief at Watervliet could not do this without coming in through Ordnance, to the Chief of Research and Development.