The principle which determines this classification underlies the doctrine that the states can not, under any guise, impose direct burdens upon interstate commerce for this is but to hold that the states are not permitted directly to regulate or restrain that which from its nature should be under the control of the one authority and be free from restriction save as it is governed in the manner that the national legislature constitutionally ordains

Thus, the states can not tax interstate commerce, either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce or the privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts as such derived from it (State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall., 232; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S., 489; Philadelphia & Southern Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S., 640; McCall v. California, 136 U. S., 104; Brennan v. Titusville, 156 U. S., 289; Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S., 217; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S., 1; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S., 56; Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U. S., 298; Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S., 389); or upon persons or property in transit in interstate commerce (Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35; State Freight Tax Case, supra, p. 281; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S., 517; Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S., 1; Pacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S., 504).

They have no power to prohibit interstate trade in legitimate articles of commerce (Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., supra; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S., 100; Vance v. Vandercock Co. (No. 1), 170 U. S., 438; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S., 1; Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S., 229; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S., 70); or to discriminate against the products of other states (Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall., 418; Welton v. Missouri supra; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S., 465; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S., 434; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S., 446; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S., 313; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S., 78; Darnall v. Memphis, 208 U. S., 113); or to exclude from the limits of the state corporations or others engaged in interstate commerce or to fetter by conditions their right to carry it on (Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S., 47; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, supra; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, supra; International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S., 91; Bucks Stove Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S., 205); or to prescribe the rates to be charged for transportation from one state to another, or to subject the operations of carriers in the course of such transportation to requirements that are unreasonable or pass beyond the bounds of suitable local protection (Wabash, etc., Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S., 557, 577; Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S., 204; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S., 27; Hanley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 187 U. S., 617; R. R. Commission of Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U. S., 101; Texas & N. O. R. R. Co. v. Sabine Trans. Co., 227 U. S., 111; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S., 485, 488; Cleveland, etc., Railway Co v. Illinois, 177 U. S., 514; Houston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S., 321; McNeil v. Southern Railway Co., 202 U. S., 543; Mississippi R. R. Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 203 U. S., 335; Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S., 328; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 217 U. S., 136; Herndon v. C., R. I. & Pac. R. R. Co., 218 U. S., 135; Yazoo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Greenwood Grocery Co., 227 U. S., 1).

But within these limitations there necessarily remains to the states, until congress acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of power appropriate to their territorial jurisdiction althought interstate commerce may be affected. It extends to those matters of a local nature as to which it is impossible to derive from the constitutional grant an intention that they should go uncontrolled pending federal intervention. Thus, there are cer tain subjects having the most obvious and direct relation to interstate commerce, which nevertheless, with the acquiescence of congress, have been controlled by state legislation from the foundation of the government because of the necessity that they should not remain unregulated and that

their regulation should be adapted to varying local exigencies; hence, the absence of regulation by congress in such matters has not imported that there should be no restriction, but rather that the states should continue to supply the needed rules until congress should decide to supersede them. Further, it is competent for a state to govern its internal commerce, to provide local improvements, to create and regulate local facilities, to adopt protective measures of a reasonable character in the interest of the health, safety, morals, and welfare of its people, although interstate commerce may incidentally or indirectly be involved. Our system of government is a practical adjustment by which the national authority as conferred by the constitution is maintained in its full scope without unnecessary loss of local efficiency. Where the subject is peculiarly one of local concern, and from its nature belongs to the class with which the state appropriately deals in making reasonable provision for local needs, it can not be regarded as left to the unrestrained will of individuals because congress has not acted, although it may have such a relation to interstate commerce as to be within the reach of the federal power. In such case, congress must be the judge of the necessity of federal action. Its paramount authority always enables it to intervene at its discretion for the complete and effective government of that which has been committed to its care, and, for this purpose and to this extent, in response to a conviction of national need, to displace local laws by substituting laws of its own. The successful working of our constitutional system has thus been made possible.

The leading illustrations may be noted. Immediately upon the adoption of the Constitution, Congress recognized the propriety of local action with respect to pilotage, in view of the local necessities of navigation. (Act of Aug. 7, 1789, c. 9, s. 4; I Stat. 53, 54; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra.) It was 60 years before provision for federal license of pilots was made (act of Aug. 30, 1852, c. 106; 10 Stat. 61), and even then port pilots were not included. (Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall., 450, 459.) And while Congress has full power over the subject and to a certain extent has prescribed rules, it is still in a large measure subject to the regulation of the States. (Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S., 187.)

A state is entitled to protect its coast, to improve its harbors, bays, and streams, and to construct dams and bridges across navigable rivers within its limits unless there is conflict with some act of Congress. Plainly in the case of dams and bridges interference with the accustomed right of navigation may result. But this exercise of the important power to provide local improvements has not been regarded as constituting such a direct burden upon intercourse or interchange of traffic as to be repugnant to the Federal authority in its dormant state. (Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet., 245; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 713; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S., 459; County of Mobile v. Kimball, supra; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S., 678; Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S., 205; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S., 543, 547; Willammette v. Hatch, 125 U. S., 1; Lake Shore & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 165, U. S., 365; Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S., 410; Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S., 473.) Thus, in Gilman v. Phil. adelphia, supra, the complainants were the owners of a valuable wharf and dock property in the Schuylkill River and sought to prevent the construction of a bridge which had been authorized by the Legislature of Pennsyl vania to connect East and West Philadelphia. It appeared that the bridge would prevent the passage of vessels having masts which had formerly navigated the river up to the complainants' wharf, and would largely reduce the income from the property. The court affirmed the dismissal of the bill upon the ground that in the absence of legislation by Congress the State was acting within its authority. "The States have always exercised this power," said the court (id., p. 729), "and from the nature and objects of the two systems of government they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in all cases, to the paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the States shall be exerted within the sphere of the commercial power which belongs to the Nation." Again, in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago,

supra, the question related to the power of the city of Chicago, acting under the authority of the State, to regulate the closing of draws in the bridges over the Chicago River.

The court said:

The Chicago River and its branches must be deemed navigable waters of the United States, over which Congress under its commercial power may exercise control to the extent necessary to protect, preserve, and improve their free navigation. But the States have full power to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, including in that general designation whatever will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, and prosperity of their people. This power embraces the construction of roads, canals, and bridges, and the establishment of ferries, and it can generally be exercised more wisely by the States than by a distant authority When its (the State's) power is exercised so as to unnecessarily obstruct the navigation of a river or its branches, Congress may interfere and remove the obstruction. But until Congress acts on the subject the power of the State over bridges across its navigable streams is plenary. (Id., p. 683.)

While the State may not impose a duty of tonnage (Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall., 31; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall., 212; Cannon v. New Orleans, 12 Wall., 527), it may regulate wharfage charges and exact tolls for the use of artificial facilities provided under its authority. The subject is one under state control, where congress has not acted, although the payment is required of those engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. (Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S., 80; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S., 559; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691; Huse v. Glover. supra; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S., 444; Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U. S., 288, 295.) In Transportation Co. V. Parkersburg, supra, the court had before it an ordinance of that city prescribing rates of wharfage on vessel's discharging or receiving freight at public landings belonging to the city. A transportation company having steamers plying between Pittsburgh and Cincinnati complained that the wharfage charges was exorbitant. The court held that the reasonableness of the charge, it being simply one for wharfage, was to be determined by the State law. "The regulation of wharves belongs prima facie and in the first instance to the States, and would only be assumed by Congress when its exercise by the States is incompatible with interstate commerce." (Id., p. 703.) Again, in Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, supra, where the owners of steamboats engaged in interstate commerce on the Mississippi River com plained of wharfage rates at New Orleans as unreasonable and excessive, and in effect "a direct duty or burden upon commerce," the court, overruling the contention, held that the case was "clearly within the principles of the former decisions of this court, which affirm the right of a State in the absence of regulation by Congress to establish, manage, and carry on works and improvements of a local character, though necessarily more or less affecting interstate and foreign commerce." (Id., p. 447.)

Quarantine regulations are essential measures of protection which the States are free to adopt when they do not come into conflict with Federal action. In view of the need of conforming such measures to local conditions, Congress from the beginning has been content to leave the matter for the most part, notwithstanding its vast importance, to the States and has repeatedly acquiesced in the enforcement of State laws. (Act of Feb. 25. 1799, c. XII, 1 Stat., 619, R. S., 4797; act of Apr. 29, 1878, c. 66, 20 Stat., 37; act of Feb. 15, 1893, c. 114, 27 Stat., 449.) Such laws undoubtedly operate upon interstate and foreign commerce. They could not be effective otherwise. They can not of course, be made the cover for discriminations and arbitrary enactments having no reasonable relation to health (Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S., 465, 472, 473); but the power of the State to take steps to prevent the introduction or spread of disease, although interstate and foreign commerce are involved (subject to the paramount authority of Congress if it decides to assume control), is beyond question. (Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S., 455; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S., 613; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S., 1; Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198; Compagnie Francaise, etc., v. Board of Health, 186 U. S., 180; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S., 138; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S., 251) In Compagnie

Francaise, etc., v. Board of Health, supra, the court had before it the quarantine law of Louisiana, which, among other things, provided the state board of health might "in its discretion, prohibit the introduction into any infected portions of the State persons acclimated or unacclimated, or persons said to be immune, when, in its judgment, the introduction of such persons would add to or increase the prevalence of the disease." The supreme court of the State, interpreting the statute, held that it empowered the board to exclude healthy persons from a locality infested with a contagion or infectious disease, whether they came from without or within the State. It was objected that this provision was too broad, and that the former decisions of the court were based upon the right of the States to exclude diseased persons and things which were not legitimate subjects of commerce. The court sustained the law, saying, with respect to this argument:

But it must be at once observed that this erroneously states the doctrine as concluded by the decisions of this court previously referred to, since the proposition ignores the fact that those cases expressly and unequivocally hold that the health and quarantine laws of the several States are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, although they affect foreign and domestic commerce. as in many cases they necessarily must do in order to be efficacious, because until Congress has acted under the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution such State health and quarantine laws producing such effect on legitimate interstate commerce are not in conflict with the Constitution.

True is it that, in some of the cases relied on in the argument, it was held that a State law absolutely prohibiting the introduction, under all circumstances. of objects actually affected with disease, was valid because such objects were not legitimate commerce. But this implies no limitation on the power to regulate by health laws the subjects of legitimate commerce. In other words, the power exists until Congress has acted, to incidentally regulate by health and quarantine laws even although interstate and foreign commerce is affected, and the power to ab. solutely prohibit additionally obtains where the thing prohibited is not commerce. and hence rot embraced in either interstate or foreign commerce. (Id., p. 391.)

State inspection laws and statutes designed to safeguard the inhabit ants of a State from fraud and imposition are valid when reasonable in their requirements and not in conflict with Federal rules, although they may affect interstate commerce in their relation to articles prepared for export or by including incidentally those brought into the State and held for sale in the original imported packages. (Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, p. 203; Turner v. Maryland, 102 U. S., 38; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S., 461; Patapasco Guana Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S., 345, 357, 358; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S.. 501.) And for the protection of its game and the preservation of a valuable food supply, the State may penalize the possession of game during the closed season whether obtained within the State or brought from abroad. (Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S., 31.)

Interstate carriers, in the absence of Federal statute providing a dif ferent rule, are answerable according to the law of the State for nonfeasance or misfeasance within its limits. (Chicago, Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S., 133, 137; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S., 477, 491; Martin v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R. Co., 203 U. S., 284, 294; Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227, U. S., 601, 613.) Until the enactment by congress of the act of April 22, 1908 (c. 149, 35 Stat., 65), the laws of the states determined the liability of interstate carriers by railroad for injuries received by their employes while engaged in interstate commerce, and this was because Congress, although empowered to regulate the subject, had not acted thereon. In some States the so-called fellow-servant rule obtained; in others, it had been abrogated; and it remained for Congress, in this respect and in other matters specified in the statute, to establish a uniform rule. (Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co, supra; Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S., 59, 66, 67.) So, where congress has not intervened state statutes providing damages for wrongful death may be enforced not only against land carriers but also against the owners of vessels engaged in interstate commerce where the wrong occurs within the jurisdiction of the State. (Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S., 99, 103. See American Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall., 522; The Hamilton, 207 U. S., 398.)

And, until Congress legislated on the matter, liability for loss of property on interstate as well as intrastate shipments was subject to State regulation. Some states allowed an exemption by contract from all or a part of

the common-law liability; others allowed no exemption. These differences in the applicable laws created inequalities with respect to interstate transportation, but each State exercised the power inherent in its territorial jurisdiction, and the remedy for the resulting diversity lay with Congress, which was free to substitute its own regulations; and this was done in the recent amendment of section 20 of the act to regulate commerce. (Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat., 584; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S., 491, 500.) It is within the competency of a State to create and en force liens upon vessels for supplies furnished under contracts not maritime in their nature, and it is no valid objection that the State law may obstruct the prosecution of a voyage of an interstate character. (The Winnebago, 205 U. S., 354.) It may also create liens for damages to property on land occasioned by negligence of vessels. (Johnson v. Chicago, etc., Elevator Co., 119 U. S., 388; Martin v. West, 222 U. S., 191.) Cars employed in interstate commerce may be seized by attachment under State law in order to compel the payment of debts. (Davis v. C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 217 U. S., 157.) And the legislation of the States safeguarding life and property and promoting comfort and convenience within its jurisdiction may extend incidentally to the operations of the carrier in the conduct of interstate business, provided it does not subject that business to unreasonable demands and is not opposed to Federal legislation. (Smith v. Alabama 124 U. S., 465; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S., 299; N. Y., N. H. & H. R R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S., 628; L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S., 285; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S., 612; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S., 262.) It has also been held that the State has the power to forbid the consolidation of State railroad corporations with competing lines, although both may be interstate carriers and the prohibition may have a far-reaching effect upon interstate commerce. (Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U. S.., 646, 677; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S., 677, 701, 702. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S., 317, 348, 382.)

Again, it is manifest that when the legislation of the State is limited to internal commerce to such degree that it does not include even incidentally the subjects of interstate commerce, it is not rendered invalid because it may affect the latter commerce indirectly. In the intimacy of commercial relations, much that is done in the superintendence of local matters may have an indirect bearing upon interstate commerce. The development of local resources and the extension of local facilities may have a very important effect upon communities less favored and to an appreciable degree alter the course of trade. The freedom of local trade may stimulate interstate commerce, while restrictive measures within the police power of the State enacted exclusively with respect to internal business, as distinguished from interstate traffic, may in their reflex or indirect influence diminish the latter and reduce the volume of articles transported into or out of the State. It was an objection of this sort that was urged and overruled in Kidd v. Pearson (128 U. S., 1) to the law of Iowa prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor within the State, save for limited purposes. (See also Geer v Connecticut, 161 U. S., 519, 534; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S., 343; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S., 238, 245; Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, supra.) When, however, the State in dealing with its internal commerce undertakes to regulate instrumentalities which are also used in interstate commerce, its action is necessarily subject to the exercise by Congress of its authority to control such instrumentalities so far as may be necessary for the purpose of enabling it to discharge its constitutional function. (Southern Railway Co. v. United States, supra; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra.)

is:

Within the State power, then, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall,

That immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the ter ritory of a State, not surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the