trade" must necessarily apply is the part declaring null, as against public policy, any contract or agreement to take and receive tickets "redeemable only in goods," and declaring that all "such" tickets shall be redeemable in current money. Whether the clause that "all such tickets shall be redeemable in United States currency" is an enforceable provision of the law is foreign to this discussion and to the determination of the question here at issue. It is enough to know that it is one of the declared objects of the act, indicated by the title, and set forth in the body of the law. We are constrained to hold, therefore, that the act is obnoxious to the constitutional mandate that every law enacted should embrace but one object, and that must be expressed in its title. (Moon v. Police Jury, 32 La. Ann., 1015; State v. Harrison, 11 La. Ann., 722.)

It is true the courts (our own included) and the text writers have long since settled that, where a part of a statute is constitutional and a part unconstitutional, it is permissible to separate the good from the bad, the "chaff from the wheat," the constitutional from the unconstitutional, and uphold and enforce the valid portion, if complete in itself, independent of that which is rejected and capable of being executed, while declaring void the invalid portion. And if this were an act whose title expressed only one object, while the body of the act set forth two objects-where the act is merely broader than its titleit would be incumbent on the court to restrict its declaration of the nullity of the law to that object of the act, that part of the law, not indicated in the title. "But," says Judge Cooley in his work on constitutional limitations (page 180 [star page 148]), "if the title to the act actually indicates, and the act itself actually embraces two distinct objects when the constitution says it should embrace but one, the whole act must be treated as void from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing between the two, and holding the act void as to one and valid as to the other." This doctrine was expressly sustained in Moon v. Police Jury, 32 La. Ann., 1015, and State v. Harrison, 11 La. Ann., 722.

Another objection urged against the constitutionality of the act under consideration is that its title limits the operation of the law to "merchants or corporations," by naming only such, while the body of the act broadens it so as to embrace "any person, corporation, or firm," and declares amenable to the penalties of the act "any person or officers of any corporation or firm." There can be no doubt that the title of the act governs in this respect, and the law, on this ground, is unconstitutional as to all persons not embraced within the designation of "merchants or corporations." (State v. Judge, 44 La. Ann., 90; 10 South., 400.) The title of an act defines its scope. It can contain no valid provision beyond the range of the object there stated. (Suth. St. Const., sec. 102.)

Another objection urged is that the title of the act forbids the issuance only of tickets, while the body of the law makes unlawful the issuance of tickets or checks. There is little or no force in this contention. Tickets may well cover and include checks. They mean, as here used, the same thing. A check is a ticket in the sense of the

statute.

Another objection is that the second section of the act makes the issuance of tickets in violation of the act a misdemeanor, and prescribes penalties therefor, while the title of the act is altogether silent as to

the penal character of the law. The contention is that, to read the title of the act, one would not assume it to be a criminal statute, since the title gives no indication that a new crime was being created. There is cited, with some force and appositeness, in support of this State v. Baum, 33 La. Ann., 981. We prefer, however, to rest our conclusion as to the unconstitutionality of the statute on other grounds. And we also reserve opinion on other questions raised by the defense in the case-other objections hurled at the constitutionality of the act. For the reasons assigned it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be affirmed.

In the opinion in the case of State v. Atkins et al Judge Blanchard said:

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The case is identical in its facts and law with that of State . Ferguson just decided; and, for the reasons set forth in the opinion handed down in that case, the judgment herein is affirmed.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE- "LABOR LAW" PREVAILING RATE OF WAGES-People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 59 Northeastern Reporter, page 716.-This was an application by the people on the relation of William J. Rodgers for mandamus to Bird S. Coler, as comptroller of the city of New York. As a result of a hearing in the special term of the supreme court of the State of New York an order was issued denying the relator's motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the comptroller to deliver to him a warrant on the chamberlain of the city of New York for the payment of $2,863, the amount earned by the relator under a contract with the city for regulating and grading 135th street from Amsterdam avenue to the Boulevard. On an appeal to the appellate division, first department of the supreme court, a decision was rendered reversing the decision of the special term and granting relator's motion for the writ of mandamus. An appeal was then taken to the court of appeals of the State which rendered its decision February 26, 1901, and the decision of the appellate division of the supreme court was affirmed by a divided court, Chief Justice Parker and Judge Haight dissenting.

The facts in the case were stated by Justice O'Brien, who delivered the opinion of the court of appeals, as follows:

The papers upon which the relator made the application show that on the 5th day of February, 1900, he made and entered into a contract with the city for regulating and grading that part of the street above described. The contract provided that, in order to prevent disputes and litigation, the chief engineer of highways should in all cases determine the amount and quantity of the several kinds of work which were to be paid for under the contract, and all questions in relation to his work and the construction thereof; and that his estimate and decision should be final and conclusive upon the contractor, and a condition precedent to his right to receive any money under the contract. It is alleged that the relator proceeded to perform and carry out this

contract, and prior to the application had performed the same according to his promise, and to the satisfaction of the commissioner; that subsequently the chief engineer in charge of the work and the commissioner of highways made their certificate in writing that there was earned under the contract, in accordance with the terms thereof by the relator, and then payable to him, the sum of $2,863. This certiticate was filed in the office of the comptroller, who thereupon drew his warrant on the chamberlain for that sum, but refused to deliver the same to the relator, or to make the payment under the contract. The refusal of the comptroller is based entirely upon the fact alleged that the relator, in the performance of the contract, violated certain provisions of the labor law (chap. 415, laws 1897, as amended by chaps. 192, 567, laws 1899). The following are, in substance, the provisions of this statute so far as they have any relation to the present case:

(1) The wages to be paid for a legal day's work, as hereinbefore defined, to all classes of such laborers, workmen, or mechanics upon all such public work, or upon any material to be used upon or in connection therewith, shall not be less than the prevailing rate for a day's work in the same trade or occupation in the locality within the State where such public work on, about, or in connection with which such labor is performed, in its final or completed form, is to be situated, erected, or used. Each said contract hereafter made shall contain a stipulation that each such laborer, workman, or mechanic employed by such contractor, subcontractor, or other person on, about, or upon such public work shall receive such wages herein provided for.

(2) Each contract for public work hereafter made shall contain a provision that the same shall be void and of no effect unless the person or corporation making or performing the same shall comply with the provisions of this act, and no such person or corporation shall be entitled to receive any sum, nor shall any officer, agent, or employee of the State or of a municipal corporation pay the same or authorize its payment from the funds under his charge or control to any such person or corporation, for work done upon any contract which, in its form or manner or performance, violates the provisions of this section. (3) Any officer, agent, or employee of this State, or of a municipal corporation therein, having a duty to act in the premises, who violates, evades, or knowingly permits the violation or evasion of any of the provisions of this act shall be guilty of malfeasance in office, and shall be suspended or removed by the authority having the power to appoint or remove such officer, agent, or employee, otherwise by the governor. Any citizens of this State may maintain proceedings for the suspension or removal of such officer, agent, or employee, or may maintain an action for the purpose of securing the cancellation or avoidance of any contract which, by its terms or manner of performance, violates this act, or for the purpose of preventing any officer, agent, or employee of such municipal corporation from paying or authorizing the payment of any public money for work done thereupon.

The contract was framed in compliance with these provisions of the law, and contains the following stipulation: "The wages to be paid for a legal day's work, as hereinbefore defined, to all classes of such laborers, workmen, or mechanics upon all such public work, or upon any material to be used upon or in connection therewith, shall not be less than the prevailing rate for a day's work in the same trade or occupation in the locality within the State where such public work on, about,

or in connection with which labor is performed in its final or completed form, is to be situated, erected, or used. It is further agreed that each such laborer, workman, or mechanic employed by such contractor, subcontractor, or other person in, about, or upon such public work shall receive the wages hereinafter set forth. It is further agreed that this contract shall be void and of no effect unless the person or corporation making or performing the same shall comply with the provisions of the labor law.* The contract is to be void and of no effect unless the rate of wages specified in section three of said labor law is paid; and where laborers are employed preference is to be given to citizens of the State of New York, as provided in section thirteen thereof."

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*

The contractor paid to the persons employed by him in execution of the contract wages fixed as to amount by mutual agreement, and it is conceded that he paid all that was demanded of him, or that he agreed to pay. But since it was conceded that the contractor did not in all cases pay the prevailing rate, the court at special term held that the contract and the law were violated, and that the relator was not entitled to the writ. The appellate division, by a divided court, reversed the order and granted the relator's application, and from this order the corporation has appealed to this court.

The opinion delivered by Justice O'Brien is long and exhaustive, and in concluding it he sums up the points thereof as follows:

In the brief time that we have been able to devote to an examination of this case, it would not be practicable to consider all the special features of the law and to determine the parts that are good and those that are objectionable. It will be sufficient for all purposes of this case to say that in so far as the statute is invoked to shield the city from the obligation to pay the relator the money due to him it is not a valid defense, for the reason that some of its most material provisions are in conflict with the constitution: (1) Because in its actual operation it permits and requires the expenditure of the money of the city, or that of the local property owner, for other than city purposes. (2) Because it invades rights of liberty and property in that it denies to the city and the contractor the right to agree with their employees upon the measure of their compensation, and compels them in all cases to pay an arbitrary and uniform rate which is expressed in vague language, difficult to define or ascertain, and subject to constant change from artificial causes. (3) Because it virtually confiscates all property rights of the contractor under his contract for breach of his engagement to obey the statute, and it attempts to make acts and omissions penal which in themselves are innocent and harmless. It, in effect, imposes a penalty upon the exercise by the city or by the contractor of the right to agree with their employees upon the terms and conditions of the employment.

We have already seen that it is no answer to the relator's claim to be paid what is justly due to him to say that he has consented in the contract that it should be forfeited to the city in the event of a violation of the labor law. The question does not originate in any agreement voluntarily made, but arises out of the statute, and the validity or invalidity of that enactment is the fundamental question. Neither the city nor the contractor had any interest in these stipulations.

They are in the contract only by force of the mandate of the statute, and, unless the legislature had power to frame the contract in that respect, their presence is of no consequence. The city could not maintain any action for damages for violation of these stipulations by the contractor for the plain reason that it was impossible for it to sustain any damages under the circumstances. Those provisions are a part of the contract in form only, since they lack the one most essential element of every contract, namely, the consent of the parties. The obligations and legal effect of a promise or engagement imported into a contract by force of a statute, as in this case, whereby the contracting parties agree to obey or execute some law, depend entirely upon the validity of the law. Every person is bound to obey the law, irrespective of any express agreement on his part to that effect; but he does not incur any liability or penalty for breach of an agreement to obey a void law. Such a promise or agreement can not survive the statute upon which it is founded, but must fall with it, since it can have no independent existence arising from the consent of the parties or the meeting of minds. No one would claim that the terms of the contract precluded the relator from the recovery of what is due to him for the work but for the law which is behind it.

The effect of this statute was to make the city a trustee or instrument for the enforcement of the law in the interests of the persons for whose benefit it was enacted, and thus the powers and functions of the municipality are employed for purposes foreign to those for which they were created and exist under the constitution.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-LABORERS' LIENS-PRIOR MORTGAGES-Fitch et al. v. Applegate et al., 64 Pacific Reporter, page 147.This action was brought by John I. Fitch and others under the act of the State of Washington, of March 6, 1897 (chap. 43, acts of 1897), to foreclose eight laborers' liens upon a sawmill and the land on which it stood. Applegate and wife, defendants, were the owners of the land described in the complaint, and one Caesar and his wife were the assignees of certain mortgages upon the land so described, which mortgages were recorded prior to the time of the commencement of the work for which the liens were filed. Caesar and wife were brought in as defendants for the purpose of settling their rights. Section 1 of the act above referred to reads as follows:

Every person performing labor for any person, company, or corporation in the operation of any railway, canal, or transportation company, or any water, mining, or manufacturing company, or sawmill, lumber, or timber company, shall have a prior lien on the franchise, earnings, and on all the real and personal property of said person, company, or corporation, which is used in the operation of its business, to the extent of the moneys due him from such person, company, or corporation operating said franchise or business, for labor performed within six months next preceding the filing of his claim therefor, as hereinafter provided; and no mortgage, deed of trust, or conveyance shall defeat or take precedence over said lien.