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essential attributes, the right not only to contract, but also to terminate contracts. In the case at bar the contract between plaintiff in error and Gibbons was not for any definite period of time, but Gibbons was employed by the day at so much per hour. In view of what has been said, it can not be doubted that the plaintiff in error, Charles Gillespie, had a right to terminate his contract, if he had one, with Reuben Gibbons, subject to civil liability for any termination which should be unwarranted. One citizen can not be compelled to give employment to another
citizen, nor can anyone be compelled to be employed against his will. The act of 1893, now under consideration, deprives the employer of the right to terminate his contract with his employee.) The right to terminate such contract is guaranteed by the organic law of the State. ' The legislature is forbidden to deprive the employer or employee of the exercise of that right. The legislature has no authority to pronounce the performance of an innocent act criminal when the public health, safety, comfort, or welfare is not interfered with. The --statute in question says that if a man exercises his constitutionallight to terminate a contract with his employee, he shall, without a hearing, be punished as for the commission of a crime.
Here the employment, as has already been stated, was by the day; and at the end of each day there was no obligation on the part of Gillespie to furnish another day's work and no obligation on the part of Gibbons to labor for Gillespie. At the time of the alleged offense there was in fact no contract of employment, but at that time Gillespie said, in substance, to Gibbons: “I am not employing union men, and if you belong to the union you can look elsewhere for employment.” This was not a crime on the part of the plaintiff in error, Gillespie. His sole offense consisted in refusing to give employment to a man who belonged to a union labor organization. In other words, he merely exercised his constitutional right of terminating a contract or refusing to make a contract.) Liberty includes not only the right to -labor, but to refuse to labor, and consequently the right to contract to labor or for labor and to terminate such contracts and to refuse to make such contracts. The legislature can not prevent persons who are sui juris from laboring or from making such contracts as they may see fit to make relative to their own lawful labor, nor has it any power by penal laws to prevent any person, with or without cause, from refusing to employ another or to terminate a contract with him, subject only to the liability to respond in a civil action for an unwarranted refusal to do that which has been agreed upon. Hence we are of the opinion that this act contravenes those provisions of the State and Federal constitutions which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
In addition to what has already been said, we regard this act as unconstitutional as being in violation of section 22 of article 4 of the State constitution, as above quoted. The act certainly does grant to that class of laborers who belong to union labor organizations a special privilege. The employer, if he discharges a union man from his employment, is liable to be punished as having committed a crime. But he is not subject to punishment if he should discharge from his employment a nonunion laboring man. An unwarrantable distinction is thus drawn between workingmen who belong to union labor organizations and workingmen who do not belong to such organizations.
That is to say, the statute does not relate to persons and things as a class, or to all workingmen, but only to those who belong to a lawful labor organization; that is to say, a labor union. “Where a statute does this--where it does not relate to persons or things as a class, but to particular persons or things of a class—it is a special, as distinguished from a general law.” (State v. Tolle, 71 Mo., 615; Same v. Herrmann, 75 Mo., 310.)
For the reasons above stated we are of the opinion that the statute in question is unconstitutional and void, and that the court below erred in not quashing the information and discharging the plaintiff in error. Accordingly, the judgment of the county court of Vermilion County is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court, with directions to dismiss the prosecution.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-EXAMINATION, LICENSING, ETC., OF BARBERS— Ec parte Lucas, 61 Southwestern Reporter, page 218.This was a proceeding by habeas corpus to test the legality of the imprisonment of the petitioner, Lucas, by the marshal of Jackson County, Mo., under an information filed in the criminal court of said county by the prosecuting attorney, charging him with practicing the occupation of barber without having procured a certificate of authority so to do from the State board of examiners for barbers, as he should have done under the provisions of chapter 78, Rev. St. 1899, being "An act to establish a board of examiners and to regulate the occupation of a barber, in this State, and to prevent the spreading of contagious disease," approved May 5, 1899 (acts 1899, p. 44). Pending a trial in the criminal court the petitioner applied to one of the judges of the supreme court of the State for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the law under which he had been arrested was unconstitutional, and a hearing upon said petition was had before the court in banc, which rendered its decision February 19, 1901, and dismissed the petition, upholding the constitutionality of the statute, and refusing to issue the writ. The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Marshall and the syllabus of the same, showing the points of the decision, reads as follows:
1. Rev. St. 1899, sec. 5037, providing that the members of the board of examiners for barbers shall each receive a compensation of $3 per day for his services and necessary traveling expenses, which shall be paid out of any money in the hands of the treasurer of the board, is not in conflict with Const., art. 4, sec. 43, providing that the general assembly shall have no power to divert any revenue received by the State, or to permit money to be drawn from the treasury, except in pursuance of regular appropriations made by law, since the money authorized to be collected under the act is not State revenue.
2. Rev. Stat., 1899, sec. 5035, creates a board of examiners for barbers, and provides that the governor shall appoint one member each from those recommended by the State Barbers' Protective Association, the Boss Barbers' Protective Association, and the Journeyman Barbers' Union. Held, that a person arrested on a complaint of such board for pursuing the occupation of a barber without license can not object that such method of appointing the board is unconstitutional because it limits the governor's privilege of appointment to persons recommended by the unions specified, since the governor alone can make that objection.
3. Such restriction of the governor's power of selection is authorized by Const., art. 14, sec. 9, providing that the appointment of all officers not otherwise directed by the constitution shall be made in such manner as may be prescribed by law, since the constitution does not prescribe how such board shall be appointed.
4. Acts 1899, p. 44, approved May 5, 1899 (Rev. St. 1899, c. 78), creates a board of examiners for barbers, and makes it unlawful for any barber in a city of 50,000 inhabitants to pursue the occupation of a barber unless he procures a license from such board “within 90 days after the approval of the act.”. Const., art. 4, sec. 36, provides that, except in the case of a declared emergency and appropriations, no law shall take effect until 90 days after the adjournment of the session at which it was enacted. The general assembly adjourned May 22d. lled, that the term "within 90 days after the approval of the act” must be considered a technical term, having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, and understood under the constitution to mean 90 day after the act can and does constitutionally take effect; hence the act is not objectionable as limiting the time for acquiring a license to a period which expired before the act took effect so that a board could be appointed under it.
5. Acts 1899, p. 44 (Rev. St. 1899, c. 78), regulating the occupation of barbers, in section 1, provides that the provisions of the law shall not apply to barbers in any city, town, or village containing less than 50,000 inhabitants. lleld, that the act is not unconstitutional as special legislation, since there are already several cities to which it applies, and it is a continuing act which will apply to all other cities attaining the specified population, and the necessity for regulating the occupation of a barber is greater in a large than in a small city.
6. Where a person is arrested for violating the provisions of Rev. St., 1899, c. 78, which declares it unlawful to follow the occupation of barber without first obtaining a certificate of registration, he may contest the constitutionality of the law by habeas corpus.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-ISSUANCE OF TICKETS DR CHECKS REDEEMABLE ONLY in Goods REGULATED— State v. Ferguson et al., and State v. Atkins et al., 28 Southern Reporter, pages 917 and 919.G. R. Ferguson and others were indicted for unlawfully issuing tickets redeemable in merchandise, and a hearing was had in the judicial district court of the Parish of Vernon, State of Louisiana. J. B. Atkins and others were indicted for the same offense, and the hearing was had in the judicial district court of the Parish of Red River, State of Louisiana. In both cases motions to quash the indictments were made and v'ere sustained by the courts. Appeals were then taken by the State to the supreme court of Louisiana, which rendered decisions 10 both cases on November 19, 1900, and sustained the action of the lower courts. Judge Blanchard delivered the opinions in both cases, and his opinion in the case of State ». Ferguson et al., which was referred to in the opinion in the case of State v. Atkins et al., as authority for the decision therein, the facts in the two cases being practically alike. reads as follows:
Defendants were indicted for unlawfully issuing tickets and checks redeemable only in goods and merchandise at their place of business, and not redeemable in United States currency. They were, respec: tively, general manager and check clerk of the Nona Mills Company, Limited, a corporation organized under the laws of the State. The statute upon which the indictment is predicated is act No. 71 of 1994, the title of which is, “To encourage the freedom of trade and to for bid the issuance by merchants or corporations of tickets regleemable only in goods at their own place of business." The first section of the act declares “that hereafter it shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, or firm in this State to issue tickets or checks redeemable only in goods at their own place of business. But all such tickets shall be redeemable in United States currency, and any contract or agreement to take and receive such tickets redeemable only in goods shall be null as against public policy.” The second section declares " that any person or officers of any corporation or firm issuing such tickets shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by fine not more than one hundred nor less than twenty-five dollars, or imprisonment at not more than six months and not less than one month, one-half of said fine to go to the benefit of the informer.”
The accused appeared by counsel and moved to quash the indietment on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the act. They averred its unconstitutionality in these particulars, to wit: (1) That the title of the act expresses and sets forth two or more separate and distinct objects; that the object of the act is not set forth in its title, and that the subject of the second section of the act is not mentioned or referred to at all in its title. In these respects it is claimed the act violates article 29 of the constitution of 1879 and article 31 of the constitution of 1898. (2) That the act is an attempt to regulate labor and trade, and in this respect violates article 46 of the constitution of 1879 and article 48 of the present constitution. (3) That the act restrains and abridges the freedom of contract, denies the equal protection of the laws to the persons aimed at, and thus deprives the citizen of his liberty and property without due process of law. In these respects, it is asserted, it violates article 2 of the constitution of 1898, and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The judge a quo held the motion to quash good, sustained the plea of unconstitutionality, and set aside the indictment. The State prosecutes this appeal.
Article 29 of the constitution of 1879 and article 31 of the present constitution are identical. The language is: “Every law enacted by the general assembly shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.” The “object” of a law is the aim or purpose of the enactment. (Board v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1367; 24 South., Sog.) The “subject” of a law is the matter to which it relates and with which
it deals. (Id., People 2. Lawrence, 36 Barb., 192.) The general assembly in 1894 took cognizance of the practice which had grown up of merchants and corporations issuing tickets or checks redeemable only in merchandise at their place of business. It was considered to be against public policy to permit this, and so act No. 71 of 1894 was enacted. The subject-matter, then, with which this law deals is tickets redeemable only in goods at the place of business of merchants and corporations making use of same, and the practice of issuing such tickets, indulged in by merchants and corporations. All will agree as to this-State and defense alike. But when it comes to the object of the act a divergence of view appears. The State's position is that its only object is to forbid the issuance of tickets which come under the ban of the act, and that the purpose of this is to encourage freedom of trade. The position of the defense is the act discloses several distinct objects-among them, one to forbid the issuance of tickets and checks such as those described; another, to make such tickets, if issued, redeemable in United States currency; a third, to declare against public policy and void all contracts or agreements to issue and receive tickets or checks redeemable only in goods at the place of business of the persons, corporations, or firms issuing the same.
On this branch of the case the conclusion we have reached is that the title of this act actually indicates, and the act itself actually embraces, two or more distinct objects. Thus, the title declares the law to be an act to encourage the freedom of trade and to forbid the issuance by merchants or corporations of tickets redeemable only in goods at their place of business.” Now, when we examine the body of the act, we find the first part of the first section to forbid issuance of tickets redeemable only in goods by declaring the same to be unlawful; and we find all of the second section to be devoted to making this declaration effective by prescribing penalties against those who issue tickets redeemable only in goods. So here is one complete object of the law mentioned in the title and carried out in the body of the act. Then we find in the concluding part of the first section of the act that which evidently was intended to foster the freedom of trade by declaring that any contract or agreement to take and receive tickets redeemable only in goods shall be null as against public policy, and that all “such” tickets (meaning tickets issued redeemable only in goods) shall be redeemable in United States currency. So here is another complete object of the law indicated in the title and carried out in the body of the act. To forbid the issuance of the tickets described in the law is one purpose and aim of the statute. To make all such tickets that may be issued anyhow-notwithstanding the law-redeemable in United States currency is another purpose and aim of the statute. The title of the act is not “to encourage the freedom of trade,” by forbidding the issuance of tickets, etc., but “to encourage the freedom of trade and to forbid the issuance of tickets,' etc. (See Moon v. Police Jury, 32 La. Ann., 1015.) Therefore the words to encourage the freedom of trade” must relate to something in the body of the act other than that which prohibits the issuing of tickets "redeemable only in goods." The clauses in the body of the act relating to the latter are covered by that portion of the title which follows the words “to encourage the freedom of trade.” Now, that "something” in the body of the act (other than prohibiting the issuance of tickets) to which the words “to encourage the freedom of