At this point the court quotes from a number of cases and then goes on in its opinion as follows:

In the last case cited [Burnes v. Railroad Co., 129 Mo., 41, 56; 31 S. W., 350], the supreme court of Missouri, speaking in relation to the duty of the master, said: "The duty of keeping its road, track, and yards in a reasonably safe condition is a personal duty which the master owes the servant, and it can not delegate this duty to any servant. high or low, nor can it avoid liability by letting out a part of its duties as a common carrier to independent contractors. While, for many purposes, this relation of independent contractor will be recognized, it can not be sustained to shield the master from those positive personal obligations cast upon him by his relation to his servant. (Schaub . Railroad Co., 106 Mo., 74; 16 S. W., 924; Lewis v. Railroad Co., 59 Mo.. 495; Siela v. Railroad Co., 82 Mo., 435.)"

In view of these cases, it must be regarded as established by the weight of authority, supported by reason, that the master is not relieved from the positive personal duty which he is under to the servant by letting work to a contractor, and that he does not avoid liability in case the work is negligently done, and the servant thereby injured in consequence of exposure to a dangerous place or defect against which, in the discharge of the master's duty, he should have been protected. It follows, therefore, that the learned circuit judge rightly ruled the question on which the case turns, and in regard thereto correctly instructed the jury. Judgment affirmed.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-EFFECT OF RELEASE OF CLAIM FOR DAMAGES-Pioneer Cooperage Co. v. Romanowicz, 57 Northeastern Reporter, page 864.—Anton Romanowicz brought suit against the above-named company in an inferior court of the State of Illinois to recover damages for injuries incurred by him while in its employ, and recovered a judgment. The case was appealed by the company to the appellate court, first district, which affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of Romanowicz. The company then appealed the case to the supreme court of the State, which rendered its decision June 21, 1900, and affirmed the judgments of the lower courts. The plaintiff upon the trial proved the fact of injury and that it was due to the negligence of the company, etc., and the only defense offered by the company was the fact that 17 days after the accident occurred the plaintiff signed a paper, in the presence of the foreman of the company and one Frank Domanske, who was a friend of the plaintiff, reciting that the injury was received through his own carelessness and through no fault of the company, and containing the following language: "In consideration that the company pay my doctor's bill, I relinquish all further claim upon said company." In reply to this the plaintiff furnished evidence to the effect that neither he nor his friend, who was with him and who witnessed the signatures to the release, could read English; and that the foreman represented to them that it was only an agreement or authority for the defendant to furnish a physician, of whose attendance the plaintiff was in urgent need.

The opinion of the supreme court was delivered by Judge Phillips and contains the following:

The effect of this release, under the circumstances under which it was executed, was a question of fact to be determined by the jury under proper instructions.

Appellant complains of the giving of the two following instructions for the plaintiff: "The jury are instructed that if you believe from the evidence that the release in this case was procured from the plaintiff by the defendant, or by any one for it, and that at the time the plaintiff signed the said paper he believed from what was told him before signing it that it was for the purpose of securing the services of a physician, and that the parties who induced him to sign said paper led the plaintiff to believe that he was only signing a paper for the purpose of securing the services of a physician, and that the plaintiff did so believe, you are instructed that a release so procured would not be binding upon the plaintiff, and should not be considered by you in arriving at your verdict."

"You are instructed that it is for the jury to determine, from all the evidence and circumstances in the case, whether the plaintiff understood the contents of the release at the time he signed it, and whether he intended to release, and understood that he was releasing, his claim and right of action against the defendant in consideration of the defendant furnishing him with a doctor; and, unless you so find, you are instructed that it would not release the defendant from liability, if you further find from the evidence that the defendant is liable, and such release should be disregarded by you in arriving at your verdict." These two instructions, taken together, are supported by the evidence, ind, while they might have been given in better form, are within the rule announced in Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 47 Ill. App., 178, which case is reported in this court in 155 Ill., 210; 40 N. E., 492. In that case the appellate court said that a release may be regarded as not fairly obtained, and hence as inoperative, where it is taken from one unable to read the language, and is not read over to him, and he is made to believe that it is a paper for some other purpose.

We find no sufficient ground for a reversal of the judgment, and the judgment of the appellate court for the first district is affirmed.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Rhobidas v. City of Concord, 47 Atlantic Reporter, page 82.-In the supreme court of the State of New Hampshire action was brought by Edward Rhobidas against the city of Concord for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence while the plaintiff was employed as a servant in the waterworks department of said city. The defendant entered a special plea, the details of which it is not necessary to mention, to the effect that being a municipal corporation it was not liable under the law in a suit of this nature. The plaintiff then filed a demurrer to this plea and, after a hearing, the supreme court rendered its decision March 16, 1900, and sustained the demurrer, holding that a servant in a city waterworks department who

has received personal injuries by reason of the negligence of the city's officers or agents, may recover therefor against the city, notwithstanding the city was in the performance of a public duty.

From the opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Peaslee, the following is quoted:

The plaintiff's demurrer raises the question whether there is in this State any common-law liability of a municipal corporation, and, if there is, whether it exists in the class to which the present case belongs. While it is the law of this jurisdiction that towns are to a certain extent a part of the State, and therefore not suable at common law, no case has gone so far as to hold that this rule applies to all cases. The mere fact that a town is engaged in the performance of a public duty is not enough to free it from all common-law liability for its acts, if the word "public" is to be taken in the broad sense of including every enterprise which may be supported by taxation. There is no case laying down such a doctrine in this State.

Taking the law as it has been declared in this State, a town is liable for the negligence of its agents which affects the private property right of others. Is it any less liable when the right involved is personal instead of proprietary? The basis of the cause of action is the infringement of a private right-a violation of those rules of conduct. which from being custom became law, and which now govern the conduct of all in their relations to others, be those relations either personal or proprietary. A private right is infringed when a person's health is injured by emptying a sewer wrongfully in the vicinity of his residence, the same as when water is wrongfully turned upon his land.

The rule which governs this case is clearly stated by Perley, C. J., in Eastman . Town of Meredith, 36 N. H., 284, 295, where it is said: The plaintiff in cases of this character does not recover on the ground that he has been denied any public right which the corporation owed to him as a citizen of the town, or because he has suffered an injury in the exercise of a public right, from neglect of the town to perform a public duty. The corporation being authorized by law to execute the work, if in their manner of doing it they cause a private injury they are answerable in the same way and on the same principle as an individual who injures another by the wrongful manner in which he performs an act lawful in itself. It has been sometimes made a question whether in the particular case the corporation were liable as principals for the conduct of those who performed the work on their account; but, where a work is once conceded to be done by the corporation, it would seem to be clear, on authority and general principles, that a corporation, public or private, must be held liable, like an individual, for injuries caused by negligence in the process of executing the work." For more than 40 years this decision has been acted upon as correctly stating the law applicable to this class of cases. It states the law, not only of this jurisdiction, but of every jurisdiction where the common law prevails.

"It is universally considered, even in the absence of a statute giving the action, that" municipal corporations "are liable for acts of misfeasance positively injurious to individuals, done by their authorized agents or officers in the course of the performance of cor10332-No. 33-01——13

porate powers constitutionally conferred, or in the execution of corporate duties." (2 Dill. Munn. Corp., sec. 966.)

The case at bar falls within the rules laid down by these authorities. The complaint is of wrongful acts injurious to an individual.

Except as to those guarantied by the constitution, private rights may be modified or enlarged by legislative action; but until this is done they remain as they were at common law. So in this case the contract of the parties created a situation which gave the plaintiff the common-law right to be furnished a reasonably safe place in which to work. The existence of the right can not be doubted. It was a particular right" concerning the individual only, and not one which "affected the whole community." It was in every sense such a right that a negligent violation of it would be a civil injury or private wrong. It in no way depended upon the performance or nonperformance by the defendants of any public duty. Demurrer sustained.

66

LAWS OF VARIOUS STATES RELATING TO LABOR ENACTED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1896.

[The Second Special Report of the Department contains all laws of the various States and Territories and of the United States relating to labor in force January 1, 1896. Later enactments are reproduced in successive issues of the Bulletin from time to time as published.]

GEORGIA.

ACTS OF 1899.

ACT No. 311.-Forgery, etc., of cards and receipts for dues given by associations of railroad employees and of employers' letters or certificates of recommendation.

(Page 79.)

SECTION 1. From and after the passage of this act, any person who shall make, alter, forge or counterfeit any card or receipt of dues purporting to be given or issued by any association of railway employees, or by any of its officers, to its members, with intent to injure, deceive or defraud, shall be punished as hereinafter provided.

SEC. 2. Any person who shall falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit any letter or certificate purporting to be given by any corporation or person, or officer or agent of such corporation or person to an employee of such corporation or person at the time of such employee's leaving the service of such corporation or person, showing the capacity or capacities in which such employee was employed by such corporation or person, the date of leaving the service or the reason or cause of such leaving, with the intent to injure, deceive or defraud, shall be punished as hereinafter provided. SEC. 3. Any person who shall willfully and knowingly utter, publish, pass or tender as true, or who shall have in his possession with intent to utter, publish, pass or tender as true, any false, altered, forged or counterfeited letter, certificate, card or receipt, the forging, altering or counterfeiting whereof is prohibited by either of the preceding sections of this act, with intent to injure, deceive or defraud, knowing the same to be forged, shall be punished as hereinafter provided; provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal, change or modify any of the existing laws in this State against the crime of forgery.

SEC. 4. Any person violating any of the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as provided in section 1039, Vol. III, of the Penal Code of 1895.

SEC. 5. All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act be, and the same are, hereby repealed.

Approved December 20, 1899.

IOWA.

ACTS OF 1900.

CHAPTER 79.-Compensation of mine inspectors.

SECTION 1. Section twenty-four hundred and eighty-three (2483) of the code [shall] be amended, as follows: Strike out the words "twelve hundred" in the ninth line and insert in lieu thereof the following “fifteen hundred.” Also by striking out the words "five hundred" in the tenth line, and inserting in lieu thereof the words "seven hundred and fifty."

Approved April 7, 1900.