accomplish the following objectives, among others: Protection of the value of the dollar, maintenance and furtherance of collective bargaining, preservation of industrial peace, and fostering of defense production. These objectives are not always consistent. They must be balanced in the consideraiton of general policy and its application to particular cases. The balancing of such considerations requires wisdom, experience, and cooperation which only a tripartite procedure can supply.

Title IV further provides that wage stabilization is to be administered through the adoption of regulations which are fair and equitable and administered in such a way as to avoid hardships and inequities.

The authority of the Board as to its disputes functions is derived from the President and spelled out in Executive Order 10161, as amended by Executive Order 10233, hereafter referred to as E. O. 10233, copy attached. This order follows very closely the approach taken by Congress in title V of the Defense Production Act, as amended, entitled "Settlement of Labor Disputes."

Effectuation of title V presupposes a public-labor-management conference out of which presumably would come an over-all no-strike, no-lockout pledge and the conferring upon some agency the duty and power to make recommendations, or issue directive orders or decisions, for the settlement of labor disputes during the emergency. The President has not called such a conference, presumably because he did not think that the emergency was of such a nature as to invoke an over-all no-strike, no-lock-out pledge at this time with the wide jurisdiction that would have to be conferred on a disputes-settlement agency. At the same time, the President recognized that some additional machinery had to be established to take care of disputes which would threaten the defense effort. A brief review of the normal peacetime machinery available will suffice to show why. (1) The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is primarily concerned with settling questions concerning representation and unfair labor practices. The NLRB does not concern itself with disputes over the terms and conditions of the collective-bargaining agreement.

(2) The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) does concern itself with disputes over the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement, such as rates of pay, fringe benefits, and noneconomic issues, including the union shop. It has been highly successful in that field. It has, for example, settled many disputes in which the employer granted the union shop, or some modification thereof, of a kind permitted by Congress in section 8 (a) (3) of the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947. The Service does not, however, make formal recommendations for the settlement of any dispute. Such a procedure would impair its usefulness as a mediating agency.

When collective bargaining, mediation, and conciliation have failed, there is, generally speaking, no further means of preventing a strike or other interruption of production except through the procedure of a national emergency injunction obtained pursuant to title II of the Taft-Hartley Act. Such injunctions, however, are available only where the dispute or strike would imperil the national health or safety and involves an entire industry or a substantial part thereof. As Senator Taft has pointed out, such an injunction is designed for disputes of a national character and would not be available in most of the disputes with which the Board is dealing. Such disputes, for example, may include a single jet-engine plant which, while vital in terms of the defense effort, may be only a small segment of the industry.

In issuing Executive Order 10233, the President did not by any means attempt to set aside or ignore the injunction provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Moreover, he took full account of the objectives and guideposts contained in title V of the Defense Production Act, as amended.

Where a Taft-Hartley injunction would be available, all that Executive Order 10233 provides is an alternative or supplemental remedy. Either or both may be used. Both were in fact used in a dispute involving various copper companies and the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers Union. When the workers refused to end their strike, the Board returned the case to the President, and he promptly sought and obtained an injunction.

Where a Taft-Hartley injunction would not be available, Executive Order 10233 fills a void in the governmental machinery for maintaining industrial peace and defense production during the emergency. This order, issued April 21, 1951, contains all the safeguards set forth in title V of the Defense Production Act, as amended. The relevant portions of Executive Order 10233 are as follows:

"SECTION 1. Part IV of Executive Order 10161 of September 9, 1950, is hereby amended by revoking sections 403 and 404 thereof and by inserting after section 402 thereof the following new sections:

"SEC. 405. The Board may assume jurisdiction of any labor dispute which is not resolved by collective bargaining or by the prior full use of conciliation and mediation facilities and which threatens an interruption of work affecting the national defense.

"(a) The parties to any such dispute jointly agree to submit such dispute to the Board for recommendation or decision, if the Board agrees to accept such dispute, or

"(b) The President is of the opinion that the dispute is of a character which substantially threatens the progress of national defense and refers such dispute to the Board.

"SEC. 406. In any case referred to the Board by the President under section 405 the Board shall investigate and inquire into the issues in dispute and promptly report to the President thereon with its recommendations to the parties as to fair and equitable terms of settlement.

"SEC. 407. In any case where the parties jointly agree to submit the case to the Board for its recommendations under section 405, the Board shall investigate and inquire into the issues in dispute and shall advise the parties of its recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement.

"SEC. 408. In any case submitted or referred to the Board under section 405 where the parties jointly agree to be bound by the decision of the Board, the Board shall render a decision on the issues in dispute, which decision shall be binding on the parties.

"SEC. 409. Any wage action taken by the Board with respect to any case submitted or referred to it under section 405 shall be consistent with stabilization policies."

"SEC. 4. No action inconsistent with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, other Federal labor standards statutes, the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, or with other applicable laws shall be taken under this Executive Order." [Italics supplied.]

Since the issuance of Executive Order 10233, the President has referred 12 disputes to the Board for recommendations. Employers and unions have voluntarily submitted 21 disputes for recommendations; the Board has accepted jurisdiction in 15 of these cases. Attached is a chart analyzing these cases and their progress thus far.

In most of these cases, as I have pointed out a Taft-Hartley injunction could not have been obtained, because they did not relate to a dispute imperiling the national health or safety and involving an entire industry or a substantial part thereof. Even in cases like the steel dispute, where that test was met, an injunction would necessarily have prevented a strike or other interruption of production for no more than 80 days. The President has been criticized for not using the Taft-Hartley injunction when the negotiations broke down. An injunction is the counterpart of seizure. An injunction seizes the union's most valuable asset; that is, its right to strike. It would be inequitable, to put it mildly, for the Government to use an injunction to obtain 80 days of enforced peace after the union had voluntarily kept the peace for over 100 days. Had the President sought an injunction prior to last Tuesday night, he would have destroyed any chance of a settlement at that time. He actually waited until the last moment, which was sound and right. Had he started injunction proceedings the following day, it would have meant at least several days of lost production. These are facts, and we should not ignore the realities of industrial life. With the execption of the case referred to involving the copper industry, the Board, operating under Executive Order 10233, was successful in keeping production going, in many instances for more than 80 days. No governmental disputes-settling agency in the history of the United States can produce a better record than this. I am proud of this record and proud of every member of my Board, all of whom contributed to that record. I am all the more proud that this record was made without the patriotic stimulus of an all-out war; without a no-strike, no-lock-out pledge; and with the Board being shot at from every conceivable angle.

WHY IS A TRIPARTITE BOARD NECESSARY FOR WAGE STABILIZATION OR DISPUTES

SETTLEMENT?

(a) Wage stabilization.-World War II was the first time that the United States Government attempted to control wages or prices. What does wage stabilization mean? It means that Uncle Sam is saying to the workers, "You can't have a wage increase even if the boss wants to give it to you," at the same time he is saying to the businessman, "You can't raise your prices even though the public is willing to pay them." Neither is a very happy thing for government to say at any time in a democracy. But these are not happy times nor safe times. We are not living in a never-never world-never woryy about a possible war, never mind about the risks of a do-nothing attitude. With the threat of totalitarianism hanging over the world, we must sacrifice convenience, and much more, if we are to save democracy itself.

We are saying to the American worker, in effect: "You have the right to bargain collectively, but, as to wages and fringe benefits, you must bargain only within limits prescribed by the Government. You have the right to strike, but again, you can't exercise it beyond those limits. If you make a collectivebargaining agreement on wages and fringe benefits, with or without a strike, you must still persuade a Government agency before the agreement may be placed into effect. If that agency should rule adversely, you cannot strike because you would be striking against the Government."

Is it not clear that we are, in reality, asking labor and management for a partial no-strike pledge? If that is the case, the Government owes an obligation to provide machinery in which labor, as well as management, will have a voice. Only in that way can we insure acceptance of its rulings. Labor and management must have confidence in the agency which is telling them that they cannot negotiate or put into effect the wage agreement they would like to make or for which labor is willing to strike and management to take a strike. They will not have that confidence unless they feel they are represented in the deliberations of the agency which is deciding their fate. The tripartite nature of the Wage Stabilization Board supplies that need and provides the best method of effectuating the implied no-strike, no-lock-out pledge which I have described. The tripartite system in labor relations means an equal voice for all three sides the public, management, and labor. Any attempt to reduce the management and labor representation to an inferior status, in terms of voting power or otherwise, would destroy the basic values of that system. The strength of the tripartite system lies in the opportunity and need for persuasion through free debate. The elimination of labor and management representation or their reduction to an inferior status would remove the incentive to the public members to persuade one side or the other or both to their view through the democratic process of debate. In my considered opinion, such an attempt would be a fatal mistake.

(b) Disputes.-I have already outlined the nature and source of the Board's disputes jurisdiction. It has been alleged that the Board is exceeding its jurisdiction in handling noneconomic issues, particularly the union shop. Nothing could be further from the truth. When the powers of the Wage Stabilization Board, about to be reconstituted, were first debated within the National Advisory Board on Mobilization Policy, this was the basic question considered. Everybody knew that if the steel case were referred to the Board it would involve the union shop and other noneconomic issues. That body voted, with industry dissenting, to recommend to the President that he confer limited disputes jurisdiction on the Board in a limited type of case. On April 21, 1951, the President issued Executive Order 10233, incorporating the suggestions of the Mobilization Board. The fight, nevertheless, continued. It has never ceased. It is very much alive today, as witness the Allen resolution (H. Res. 532) and the Dirksen amendment to S. 2645. The Dirksen amendment in essence revives the Lucas amendment in the Eighty-second Congress, first session (H. Res. 4552), defeated by a vote of 217 to 113.

Every member of the reconstituted Board who took an oath of office to serve under Executive Order 10233 knew precisely what his duties would be and that such duties would include making recommendations or decisions in dispute cases involving the union shop and other noneconomic issues. In fact, several months prior to the steel case, the industry members of my Board met to consider whether, in view of the likelihood that the steel case would be referred to the Board, they should continue to serve. After due deliberation, they decided they would. When the Board made its recommendation in the steel case, it was

clearly acting within its jurisdiction and authority, and any person taking the trouble to find out would know this to be a fact.

It has also been alleged that the Board, in making its recommendations on wages and fringe adjustments in the steel dispute, exceeded its authority and ignored its own regulations, resolutions, and prior rulings. Again, nothing could be further from the truth.

THE STEEL CASE

On December 22, 1951, the President, acting pursuant to Executive Order 10233, referred the dispute between the various steel-producing companies and the United Steelworkers of America to the Wage Stabilization Board with instructions to "investigate and inquire into the issues in dispute and promptly report to the President thereon with its recommendations to the parties as to fair and equitable terms of settlement."

Why did the President take this step? Steel is a key product in the national economy and doubly important in the defense effort. The steel-producing companies have had collective-bargaining agreements for many years with the United Steelworkers of America as the representative of their employees. The existing contract was due to expire on December 31, 1951. There had been no over-all contract negotiations since 1947. The union had made numerous demands on economic and noneconomic issues, including union shop, for the new contract. Collective bargaining had failed. The Honorable Cyrus Ching had reported to the President that mediation and conciliation had not succeeded in bringing about a settlement. The President had given careful consideration to an application for a Taft-Hartley injunction. That course would have insured against a strike for 80 days. Beyond that, it would have insured only a board of inquiry with power to investigate the dispute but not to make recommendations for settlement. In the unyielding mood of the parties, with over 100 issues to be settled, it is unlikely that the injunction procedure would have accomplished anything besides making the parties even more adamant.

The President unquestionably has the power to appoint a board or commission or other group of persons at any time to advise him as to the means of settling an important labor dispute. He might, therefore, have appointed an ad hoc emergency board, as he did in 1949, to investigate the dispute and make recommendations for its settlement. The wage recommendations of such a board would, however, if accepted by the parties, have had to be submitted to the Wage Stabilization Board for approval. This would have meant delay, uncertainty, and unrest if the Wage Stabilization Board had modified those recommendations. The President might have referred the economic issues to the Wage Stabilization Board for recommendations and the noneconomic issues, including the union shop, to an ad hoc board. This would have meant a wasteful duplication of effort and expense. It would not have made good sense. A labor dispute is "one ball of wax." As a rule, everything is settled together or nothing is settled at all.

The President decided to refer the case to the Wage Stabilization Board which could, in a single proceeding,, dispose of the dispute and any stabilization questions involved.

Events supported the wisdom of the President's course of action. Time and again the union postponed its strike, originally scheduled for midnight, December 31, 1951, in order to give the Board an opportunity to consider the base. An expert panel held hearings for over 10 weeks and worked more than 2 months on the case. The Board met with the panel for days and then discussed the case for days in executive session. No single case has ever received more thorough and conscientious consideration. The Board's recommendations were issued on Thursday, March 20, at approximately 10 p. m. Both sides had previously agreed to give serious consideration to the Board's recommendations. The union, although stating that the recommendations were far from being completely satisfactory to the union members, accepted them in toto.

The parties were supposed to begin negotiations, with the help of the Board's recommendations, on Monday, March 23, 1952. On the evening of March 24, 1952, on his return from Key West, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, then Director of Defense Mobilization, stated to reporters:

"I won't comment on that [whether the Board exceeded its regulations], but I'll say this: If the wage increases contemplated under the WSB recommendations are put into effect it would be a serious threat to our year-old effort to stabilize the economy. Of that I am sure."

On the following day, Mr. Wilson stated:

"In view of the comment caused by my answers to reporters' queries at the airport last evening, I should like further to clarify my position on the Wage Stabilization Board steel recommendations. Without changing the personal views I expressed last evening, I believe, first of all, there is an obligation resting on all of us in the Government-and upon labor and management as well-to prevent a work stoppage in an industry so vital to the national defense.

"Secondly, I know that the Wage Stabilization Board's recommendations were reached after much study by a duly constituted Government agency. "In view of the above, it is therefore appropriate that these recommendations should be used as a basis for trying to work out a settlement that would prevent a strike."

This retraction was too little and too late to avoid the havoc caused by the first statement. Immediately after the first statement, the industry members of the Wage Stabilization Board had issued a statement which ended with the sentence "We * * feel that the Wage Stabilization Board no longer serves a useful purpose." This statement was widely interpreted as indicating an intention on the part of the industry members to resign. On March 27, following Mr. Wilson's second statement, the industry members issued a further statement that they did not intend to leave the Board.

This atmosphere was scarcely conducive to the beginning of negotiations looking toward settlement. Negotiations, in fact, did not commence until Thursday, April 3, in New York City. On that date the parties conducted two sessions at the end of which the negotiations were broken off with not even the beginning of a settlement in sight. The following morning Dr. John R. Steelman, Acting Director of Defense Mobilization, after contacting the parties, asked me to go to New York in an attempt to get the parties back into negotiations and to help them to settle. I advised the labor and industry members of the Board of this request and asked them to remain available for consultation. It had been previously understood by the parties that they were to report to the Board on the progress of their negotiations and that the Board would remain available for assistance. The technical nature of many of the issues in dispute made it desirable and necessary that the Board remain thus available. The recommendations themselves contemplated negotiations on many questions, such as the length of the contract, the form of union security, and the method of distribution of wage increase.

With the assistance of Vice Chairman Frederick H. Bullen, I succeeded in getting the parties back into bargaining. Meanwhile, discussions were taking place on the subject of price relief between representatives of the steel companies and Gov. Ellis G. Arnall, Director of the Office of Price Stabilization.

I met with the parties in numerous sessions, jointly and separately, from Friday afternoon, April 4, through Tuesday evening, April 8. I remained in constant touch with Dr. Steelman. At no time did I concern myself with the question of price or with the question of what steps the Government might take if negotiations were not successful. Quite properly, I was not consulted on the question of seizure. I contined myself entirely to an attempt to bring about a settlement of the dispute on terms which would be mutually acceptable to the parties. That is still my primary objective.

On Tuesday evening, April 8, I advised Dr. Steelman that, while progress had been made, I could not say with any confidence that a settlement was in sight that evening. At 10:30 p. m. the President announced on the radio that he was issuing his seizure order. I was instructed to return to Washington to assist in negotiations which were to be resumed the next day under the auspices of Dr. Steelman. I left New York on the midnight train as per instructions. It should be made clear that while the Secretary of Commerce, who is administering the seizure order, has authority to establish the terms and conditions under which the men are to work for the Government, the final settlement must nevertheless come about as a result of an agreement between the parties. That explains why I am still engaged in efforts to bring about a settlement of the dispute by mutual agreement.

THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS

I shall not concern myself here with the Board's recommendations on the numerous contract issues although they are of vital concern to the parties. It may be noted in passing, however, that as to these issues the Board rejected numerous demands of the union, including the "guaranteed annual wage" and