land would refuse to acknowledge the authenticity of the declaration, or the sincerity of the practice. As to the "antedated decree," a copy of it was furnished Mr. Barlow before the declaration of war against Great Britain was made in this country. If this decree had been known in time, hostilities would probably have been prevented. This could not, therefore, have been the motive of France, in producing, at that very late hour, a copy of so important a document. On the other hand, if France anticipated the war, if war was considered no longer to be avoided, what purpose did it answer to produce the decree in the actual state of hostilities, or on the eve of a declaration. The entire correspondence of the American government with France, from 1806 to the fall of the imperial dynasty in 1814, was of an angry nature-a series of complaints, remonstrances and threats of retaliation. Every year appeared to augment the dissatisfaction felt by this country,-increased the claims for indemnity,-diminished the prospect of an alliance. The American minister at Paris, as our quotations prove, was directed to press a consideration of these grievances with more zeal and vigour. And his instructions forbade him from entering on a treaty, till those representations were satisfied. We finish this portion of the relations of America with France, with the downfall in 1814 of Napoleon Bonaparte. Although no treaty was concluded during the period of which we have attempted a brief sketch in this chapter, the circumstances of the times were too important to have justified us in passing over it in entire silence.*

* In addition to these treaties and conventions with France, a contract was made by Dr. Franklin with M. de Vergennes, in July '82, to regulate the mode of payment, and the rate of interest of the 18,000,000 livres, loaned by his Christian Majesty to the confederation, together with the loan (10,000,000) in Holland. In November '88, a convention was made by Mr. Jefferson, with M. de Montmorin, to define the duties, powers and privileges of consuls. We have not thought it necessary to take any notice of this instrument, as our consuls in Europe, (and, also, French consuls in this country) are only commercial agents; they are not invested, like the consuls on the Barbary coast, with diplomatic functions. In '83, America again contracted a loan of 6,000,000 livres with the French government.

CHAPTER XI.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

Not originally applied to for aid by Congress of '77-Little known at that time in Europe-Relations friendly-Armed neutrality-Dana sent to Russia in '80-Propriety of applying to foreign courtsIzard's, Adams', and Franklin's opinions-Instructed to propose America as a member of the armed neutrality-Not received by the Empress-French ministers abroad kind― Dana in awkward situation at St. Petersburg-Letters to Russian ministers-Singular opinion of Empress-Russia not disposed to acknowledge independ ence-Anecdote of Franklin and Count du Nord-Neutrality awakens great anxiety-Congress, at return of peace, took earliest steps to prevent a connexion with " Armed Neutrality”—Instructions to ministers in Europe not to agree to support neutrality by force of armsAdams, minister to Russia-Pahlen to this country-DaschkoffNo treaty or commercial convention, though great trade.

RUSSIA was originally not one of the European states, to whom an application was made by Congress in 1777 for aid, and for the recognition for the independence, though some circumstances, that will presently be mentioned in a subsequent year, appeared likely to give uncommon importance to the first diplomatic connexions of the two countries. We may account for this omission entirely by local considerations. The weight and power of that nation, since become so formidable, had been confined principally to the north, and to wars with the Turks. Little known to Europe, except by her attacks on the Prussian dominions in the time of the great Frederic, and by sharing in the wicked partition of Poland in 1772, the consequences of the French revolution first brought her armies across the Alps and the Rhine, first developed the resources of that country to full view,

and in most successful action. No European power has, however, conducted itself in a more friendly manner towards America than Russia; the relations of the two countries having all along been of an amicable and satisfactory kind. As early as 1791 we had a direct trade up the Baltic, but till 1809 and 10, it was principally confined to imports. It has since been great, though, as to imports, consisting chiefly of articles that might well be made staples in this country. We have suffered less interruption in our commerce with Russia than with any other continental nation of Europe, the Emperor Alexander not having adopted the French system till after the treaty of Tilsit, in 1807, and having taken the first opportunity to release himself from the obligation of enforcing it, by publishing the celebrated Ukase of December 1810. Indeed, the system was never executed with much severity in Russia; British goods never having been burnt in that country, as on other parts of the continent, and they always enjoyed the privilege of being admitted in neutral

bottoms.

Notwithstanding Catharine II. was the author of the armed neutrality of 1780, Russia was one of the first parties to the maritime coalition, formed, in the year '93, against France. But the declaration of this Empress, in the year just mentioned, concerning the rights and duties of neutrals, immediately attracted the attention of Congress. The principles, announced in that instrument, though far from being complete or embracing the whole ground,* were such as America would at once espouse; they were directly hostile to the system of Great Britain, and in that way were likely to produce a favourable influence on the war then waging between the mother country and the colonies. Congress did not delay to send a minister to Russia, for the armed neutrality presented an admirable occasion of attacking England in a vital organ. Another method of expressing their approbation of the principles of that confederacy was,

* The armed neutrality left contrabands matter of conventional law, nor did it establish any regulations for vessels under convoy.

also, adopted. We copy from the Journal of October '80, the following paragraph :--" Congress, willing to testify their regard to the rights of commerce, and their respect for the sovereign who hath proposed, and the powers who have. approved the said regulations: Resolve, That the Board of Admiralty prepare and report instructions for the commanders of armed vessels commissioned by the United States, conformable to the principles contained in the declaration of the Empress of all the Russias on the rights of neutral vessels."

Francis Dana, of Massachusetts, was elected, in December 1780, minister plenipotentiary to the court of St. Petersburg; he was authorized to "accede to the convention of the said neutral and belligerent powers for protecting the freedom of commerce and the rights of nations," and to propose a treaty of amity and commerce. This is the only in stance in the history of the country, in which the United States volunteered themselves a party to a league of sove. reigns in Europe;-a proceeding that in consequence of the arrangements, that have succeeded the pacification of 1815, would, at this day, have excited an intense and profound interest. Still, the principles, adopted by the northern confederacy, were exceedingly grateful to the American government, and a proposal to join it was considered an effectual mode of hastening the acknowledgment of independence. It was, in reality, a league, both offensive and defensive, what its name purported it to be, an armed coalition, or in the modern phrase, “war in disguise." But even if the United States had been admitted to it, they were not in a condition, at that time, to furnish their quota of armament. England, at war with France, Spain, America, and shortly after Holland, regarded this coalition of the principal states of Europe with sullen silence; she replied to the notes of the different northern powers, notifying to her the formation of the confederacy, with uncommon adroitness, and with all possible diplomatic address and formality. With the exeeption of Portugal, she had not a real friend left in the year 281, in either hemisphere ; and, with less power and wealth

to conduct and sustain the conflict, she was in a more desperate condition than in 1809.

Mr. Dana was neither received by the Russian court, nor was it officially known that he was at St. Petersburg, and as the empress had proposed to act a principal part in the mediation already mentioned, she could not consent to admit a minister from the United States. M. de Vergennes advised Mr. Dana not to appear in an official character, but to keep his commission secret, and to represent himself as a common traveller. This opinion he stated distinctly at a conference in April 1781, at Versailles. He was particularly urgent Mr. Dana should travel as a private citizen. The propriety of applying to foreign courts for aid and acknowledgment, before their views were privately and accurately ascertained, was, at this period, a subject of great discussion. Congress had given broad and indiscriminating directions on this head, and if the result of their applications should govern us, the proceeding must be considered, as by no means, injudicious. From Spain and Prussia we obtained the promise of assistance, in some cases actual aid, and with Holland we succeeded in concluding a treaty at so early an hour, as to compel her to become a party to the general war. We do not intend to intimate that this contest was to be

waged by negotiation alone. As to that matter, the opinion of Mr. Izard, expressed in a letter of December 1777, is undoubtedly correct. "The establishment of our liberties must depend on our own exertions. One successful battle will gain us more friends, and do our business more effectually than all the skill of the ablest negotiators." But in all such great conflicts that, in reality, affect the interests of the civilized world, it is not easy to separate some portion of ncgotiation from the actual fighting. Aid in money or arms will always be needed, and it is desirable to conciliate the favourable opinions of the bystanders, or, at the least, to prevent them from joining with the enemy. Mr. Adams made, as it appears to us, a just remark on this subject, in a letter written in April 1781. "America has been too long silent in Europe. Iler cause is that of all nations and all men, and