INTRODUCTION 66* * * The act which created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961 cites the ultimate goal of the United States as * a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments. ***" The corresponding purpose of the Agency was to provide impetus toward that goal by dealing with the problem of reduction and control of armaments. In large measure ACDA has worked effectively over the years in achieving that lofty goal. With often limited budget, its small but talented staff has done much in bringing about a more peaceful world. Within recent years, however, the feeling has been growing in Congress that the initial effectiveness of the Agency has diminished. As one of our witnesses put it so aptly, ACDA has recently gone into somewhat of an "eclipse" for reasons not always or entirely its own. It was not unexpected, therefore, when a major indepth study and review of the Agency was called for in the Foreign Affairs Committee report on the ACDA authorization for fiscal year 1975. A thorough examination of the Agency was deemed appropriate for several reasons. First, the Agency had not been subjected to a comprehensive oversight review during the 13 years of its existence. Further, there were indications that Agency activities had, in several instances, veered away from original congressional intentions. Finally, there was growing concern that ACDA no longer played the role in the formulation and execution of U.S. arms control policies that it once did. Therefore the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments had ample areas for study and review. As a first stage in its efforts the subcommittee ordered a comprehensive staff review as a basis for planning and conducting its study. That review is included within the appendix of this volume. The subcommittee subsequently held 5 days of extensive hearings through which we drew on the insights and experience of several outstanding witnesses. The hearings were largely concerned with the Agency's past performance and present capabilities. At the same time the subcommittee's main emphasis was on the future-on the prospects and requirements for arms control and what role the Agency might play in that effort. Throughout, our objective was to enhance the future status and effectiveness of ACDA. The study was never intended as a criticism of the Agency; quite to the contrary. As a sponsor of the original legislation creating ACDA, I have only the highest regard for it and its dedicated personnel. Thus, the overriding and constant purpose of the study and hearings was entirely positive. These published hearings are a partial fulfillment of that goal. Within the near future, the subcommittee will forward to the full committee a summary report on its efforts. It is also anticipated that legislative proposals intended to strengthen the Agency will be formu lated soon and introduced early in the new 94th Congress for consideration by the committee and ultimately the House of Representatives. of Representatives. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. DECEMBER 10, 1974. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1974 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will come to order. We have a very important piece of legislation on the floor, a continuing resolution, with certain amendments pending so the other members will be along shortly. Today the subcommittee begins the first in a series of five hearings on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This major indepth review was provided for in the full Foreign Affairs Committee report (No. 93-904) on the ACDA authorization for fiscal 1975. As outlined in that report, a thorough examination of the Agency was deemed appropriate for several reasons. First, the Agency has never been subjected to a comprehensive review during the 13 years of its existence. Further, there are indications that Agency activities have, in several instances, veered away from original congressional intensions. Finally there is growing concern that ACDA no longer plays the role in the formulation and execution of U.S. arms control policies that it once did. Here this afternoon to help us in this important effort are three distinguished witnesses, all deeply experienced in the area of arms control and disarmament. They are: The Honorable John McCloy, former Chairman of the ACDA General Advisory Committee; the Honorable Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of ACDA from 1961 to 1969 and now dean of the Georgetown University Law School; and Dr. Donald Brennan, Director of National Security Studies for the Hudson Institute and periodic consultant to the Agency. Mr. McCloy, proceed. we are very honored to welcome you, if you will STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. MCCLOY, FORMER CHAIRMAN, ACDA GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE John J. McCloy, former Chairman of the ACDA General Advisory Committee, has been a member of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy law firm since 1963. A native of Philadelphia, Dr. McCloy received his LL.D. from Amherst College. He has served as consultant to the Department of Defense and chairman of the board of various organizations. In addition to serving as President of the Ford Foundation from 1953-65. Dr. McCloy was Coordinator of U.S. disarmament activities from 1961-63. Mr. McCLOY. Mr. Chairman, I have had fairly short notice for preparing to appear before this committee. I had a rather busy schedule last week and I have prepared this watement that I have here rather hastily over the weekend. I apologize for its length. It is one of these situations where I didn't have time enough to make it shorter. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I certainly want to apologize for giving you such a short notice, but we know that your testimony, whether short or long, is very important and we welcome you. Mr. McCLOY. Let me perhaps just run through this and summarize it as well as I can rather than perhaps read the whole statement at length, although there might be one or two areas that I ought to expand on a little. I will do that, if that is satisfactory to you. I will dispense with my qualifications and I will start by saying that in regard to arms control and disarmament matters my experience is really just two positions which I have held, one was as adviser to President Kennedy on disarmament and the other was Chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, but that Committee, as you know, was set up and provided for in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. I find I have been the Chairman of that Committee longer than I thought I had been, but it was practically almost all its life, although I had reason to resign some time ago. I have read over the hearings, the reports of the hearings at the time 1961, and they are all, I think, appropriate to review at this stage. According to my best recollection and knowledge of this committee's reports-that is, the Committee on Foreign Affairs reportsand the Committee of Foreign Relations reports as of the 1961 legislation they all give a very good picture. I think, of the origin and the purpose of the Arms Control Act. DIFFICULTIES IN CREATION OF ACDA There is one bit of history I thought I might dwell on for a moment that explains some things I believe in the act. President Kennedy, I think if you will recall, became very much concerned about the general position of the United States in regard to nuclear and thermonuclear power, and he made a number of speeches in the campaign; and then he also referred to the subject in some of his early state pronouncement after he was inaugurated, emphasizing the need of avoidance of an arms race, and emphasizing the need for what he felt was a more adequate type of agency within the Government to deal with the question of arms control and disarmament. He invited me to come to Washington to become, as he put it, his adviser, and then I had that title, but my mandate was really to help organize the thinking and the implementation which would result in an agency that was equipped to cope with new dimensions of the disarmament and arms control problem. |