Dr. Kissinger, and in part because of a weakening of general public attention to the need for strength and energy at this end of the spectrum of consideration of national security policy, the formal presence and the quality of staff work on problems of national security from the arms control point of view has badly deteriorated.

STAFF CHANGES DIMINISH AGENCY'S INFLUENCE

You can get closer witnesses than I to the changes in personnel which occurred in ACDA. The evidence, I think, is clear that while there is personal distinction in the head of the agency there is not the strength or influence there which there was in earlier times.

It is also clear in the very nature of the enormous burdens which he is carrying and in the nature of the structure and organization of the staff machinery, both at the White House and in the Department of State, that you simply do not have available to the Secretary of State, who is really his own principal negotiator at the moment, the kind of staff support at this end of the spectrum which is available to him and to the Secretary of Defense over the remainder of the spectrum, especially from the Department of Defense.

That being so, we are increasingly dependent on a single individual in a situation in which not even that individual with all his skills and experiences and his generation-long concern with this particular set of problems, can be expected to know it all, himself.

SALT II ISSUES DIFFICULT

That situation, I think, is one element in the disappointing condition in which the SALT II talks now find themselves, although a more serious difficulty there is that the issues in SALT II are, themselves, harder than any we have had before in arms control.

That is a long answer to a short question, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Bundy.

Although it was a short question, a short answer would not suffice, I understand.

With the agreement of the members, since Mr. Richardson has arrived, I will call on Mr. Richardson to present his statement.

Do you have a copy of your statement?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am sorry; I don't have a written statement.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Upon the completion of Mr. Richardson's statement, questions will be asked of both witnesses.

Mr. Richardson, we are pleased and honored that you have been able to come before the subcommittee to give your views on the problem we are discussing.

You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOT RICHARDSON, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A native of Boston, Mass., Mr. Richardson has served his home state as Lt. Governor and Attorney General. He received his law degree from Harvard University. Following extensive experience in private practice, Mr. Richardson led a

distinguished career in government. Positions he has held include assistant secretary for legislation, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and Undersecretary of State. He has also served as Secretary of HEW, 1970 to 1972; Secretary of Defense, January to May, 1973; and Attorney General, May to October, 1973. Mr. Richardson is currently with the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, to have this opportunity.

I would like to make a very brief, informal statement and then I will be pleased to respond to or react to any questions the committee may have.

My competence to testify at all derives really just from a year and a half in the Department of State, working closely with the Director of ACDA and his staff, and then a brief period of reexposure to many of the same problems during a short tour as Secretary of Defense.

At the outset, I would like to express my own admiration for the quality of this committee print entitled "Review of Arms Control Legislation and Organization." That seems to me to focus admirably the issues under consideration by this subcommittee and as far as I have any ability to assess the quality of the paper, it does seem to me to be of a very high order.

I would in essence incorporate as the background of anything I say, the exposition and analysis in the paper.

Perhaps it would be useful if I proceeded directly to a brief expression of my reaction to some of the fundamental issues and areas for inquiry that are set forth in part 5.

1961 ACT REMAINS SOUND CHARTER

First of all, I do believe that the 1961 act does remain a sound charter for U.S. Government disarmament activity subject to specific issues with respect to amendment of the act that are set forth in annex E.

I think that ACDA has established itself as an organization performing functions that belong in a separately identifiable agency. On the other hand, I think that the issues with which ACDA deals, particularly in proportion to their importance, are issues that are intrinsically inseparable from the most fundamental problems of foreign policy.

Indeed, to the extent that it seems desirable, if the United States makes the objective of arms control an integral aim of its foreign policy, then obviously the roles of ACDA and that of the Department of State become so closely tied that I would not urge or favor a complete separation of ACDA from the Department of State. Indeed, I think ACDA's opportunity to have an effective impact is more likely to be enhanced by the closeness of that relationship than otherwise. That is a point that also bears on the participation of the Director of ACDA in National Security Council meetings.

It seems to me that it would be desirable if he were to participate as an observer. Of course, you can't both be that close to the formation and development of fundamental policies in the National Security area and also wholly on the outside as a sort of independent critic and commentator, free at any time to diverge as far as the Director may feel like doing from the actual policies being pursued by the United States.

ADVOCATE ROLE FOR ACDA

At the same time, it seems to me that the role of ACDA should be perceived to be essentially that of an advocate for an arms control point of view within the Government and within the framework of the structure dealing with national security and foreign policy issues. That, in turn, I think means that the Director of ACDA should not automatically be assumed to be the appropriate person for the conduct of negotiations.

Indeed, if we were to move forward on a number of the arms control fronts that are identified in annex C, there would clearly be involved a range of responsibility in the arms control area that could not effectively be delegated to the Director of the ACDA as the chief negotiator in all instances.

Indeed, as I have already suggested, to the extent that the role of the agency is perceived to be that of an advocate, then the resultant U.S. negotiating position may in any given instances, while reflecting the views of the ACDA, not necessarily coincide with them.

Finally, it seems to me that if ACDA is to perform effectively both the role of formulator of arms control initiatives and advocate of those initiatives, it does need adequate staff capability, both for policy formulation and research.

My impression is that it would be benefited by stronger support for those aspects of its activities than it has had in recent years. That, Mr. Chairman, at least is enough of a sketch of my overal! point of view to serve at a point of departure for questions. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Richardson.

The Chair realizes that I have had my 5 minutes-nevertheless I would like a question of Mr. Richardson on which Mr. Bundy may want to comment as well.

AGENCY NEEDS "FULL INFORMATION"

In order to be a proper advocate of arms control the Agency has to have full information.

Mr. Bundy, on page 2, alluded to one change he would suggest be made in the authorizing legislation expressing by legislative intent or requirement that the Agency have full access, under the direction of the President, to all information and all plans, especially in the field of weapons development, which relate to its responsibility for informed and timely advice on questions of arms control.

Mr. Bundy's statement implies that ACDA was denied such information. I think that is a very important point.

Mr. Richardson, as Under Secretary of State and as Secretary of Defense, can you comment as to what extent the Director and staff of ACDA were denied information thereby preventing the agency from being the advocate that we hope it would be in the area of arms control and disarmament?

LACK OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't happen, Mr. Chairman, within the range of my experience, to be aware of a situation in which the Director of ACDA complained of a lack of access to information.

I agree in principle with Mr. Bundy's proposition.

All I am saying is that I don't know any instance where that was a problem for Gerard Smith in the period during which I worked with him. I would see him often enough and worked regularly with him and the heads of other associated agencies and with State so that if he had had that complaint I am sure I would have heard it.

In principle, I think the point made by Mr. Bundy is valid.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If it were not during your time, do you have any information as to whether such information was denied after you had left or prior to your appointment?

Perhaps Mr. Bundy can elucidate on this.

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on this, I am sure Mr. Richardson is correct in his recollection whether there were formal complaints, and I have no direct knowledge, of course, of the period of which he does have direct knowledge because our service in office did not overlap.

"GLEAM IN THE EYE"

The kind of thing I am talking about really is the sort of thing that you don't usually get formal complaints up the line about. What you have more usually is a situation in which a new weapons system is a gleam in the eye of an adviser or contractor or of a particular service, in which the service may feel it very important for understandable reasons to protect the privacy of its thinking and planning.

There can be difficulties, as I think Mr. Richardson would agree, even in the Department of Defense in getting a full command and control of emerging concerns of particular services. This is not new. I am not addressing my recommendation to any particular conspicuous failure but rather to the kind of state of mind that it seems to me it would be wise to have in the executive branch with respect to issues which historically we have thought of as military and which now we must think of as both military and related to the control of weapons.

There is in a sense nothing logically difficult about this. Much of the responsibility for the control of weapons, the safety of nuclear systems, for example, rests directly with the Department of Defense and most Secretaries of Defense and most Chiefs of Staff have been deeply concerned with just those issues.

ACDA'S MISSION IN THE FUTURE

But, as Mr. Farley's review makes clear, the mission of ACDA in the future, if it is to be an effective agency, has to go well beyond the primary emphasis on negotiating positions for disarmament agreements which historically had such a great role in the formation of the agency.

I would agree with Secretary Richardson that there is every reason not to suppose that the primary mission of the Director of ACDA is to be the negotiating ambassador wherever the more important arms Legotiations at the moment may be going forward.

So, this expression of opinion has to do not with a particular failure but rather with the balancing of a relationship which, if it is not balanced-this is not a statement of great logical difficulty-if it is not balanced, it tends to be unbalanced.

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Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Do you wish to comment any further, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

I agree essentially with what Mr. Bundy has said although possibly I might want to argue in a given instance in delineating when the gleam in the eye of a service representative is likely enough to reach a level of development that raises genuine concerns from an arms control point of view.

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Chairman, let me try an example, if I may, which follows after both my term and Mr. Richardson's term in service in the national security area.

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

The present Secretary of Defense in the early months of this year made very important statements with respect to United States and Soviet strategic doctrine and military policies. The most important that I at least have encountered is one before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization, your sister Committee in Foreign Relations in the Senate.

The positions expressed and developed there and in the Secretary's own posture statement were, as far as I know, and as far as I have read in any public discussion of the matter, essentially DOD positions. The impact of these statements on the negotiations for SALT II has been serious.

It is very difficult, to be sure, how much of what is reported as a Russian reaction is a real reaction and how much is a propaganda reaction, but that there has been significant reaction, I think, is beyond question.

It does appear to me that while I have the greatest respect for the intelligence and the sensitivity with which from his position the Secretary stated his concerns, I do not think that they would have been stated in quite the same way or with quite the same diplomatic effect if before they had been made the matter had been reviewed with concerns for arms control, for the negotiations and for the whole spectrum of relevant considerations, and not simply from the point of view of the Secretary of Defense understandingly trying to get sensitive control over the commands and control of strategic weapons.

PARTICIPATION OF ACDA DIRECTOR

Mr. RICHARDSON. I agree with that, Mr. Chairman, although I think that is not really an example of a relatively limited weapons system development project constituting only a gleam in the eye of a service chief, for example.

Mr. BUNDY. I will accept the correction.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The example mentioned by Mr. Bundy is in the very highest order of fundamental strategic arms control policy and I think clearly a matter in which the Director of the Arms Control Agency, as well as the appropriate State Department people would need to be involved.

I had assumed, certainly in the period of my own initial exposure to the studies that had been conducted under Dr. John Foster, that