portant, step needed in a reform of our system for arriving at decisions in the national security area. "Somehow we must do better than we have in the analysis of the implications of weapons and foreign policy decisions, and a broadening of ACDA's charter would help in this." Now, would you care to share your views on just how the charter could be broadened? Mr. RATHJENS. Well, it has been my interpretation, without having read the act in many years, that it was exactly as has been suggested here, that the intent was always that the focus be on the negotiation forums and the kind of issues that come up in negotiations. HOW CHARTER COULD BE BROADENED What I would suggest, at least for consideration, is that the charter be changed, that it be given responsibility for commenting on major weapons acquisition decisions very much along the lines of the Harrington amendment, as I understand it. It is the kind of change I would like to see, so that ACDA would have an understood responsibility to comment on all these kinds of major weapons programs. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, Secretary Nitze did say that the Director has been consulted and was at the National Security Council. Professor, would you share your views as to whether it would be advisable to give the ACDA Director NSC membership by statute? Mr. RATHJENS. I would certainly think so, yes. Mr. ZABLOCKI. How about you, Mr. Secretary? Mr. NITZE. I would be leary of that. It would seem to me that the present practice for the Director of ACDA to be present at all meetings of the Security Council which deal with arms control matters, is correct. He isn't necessarily present if they are dealing with defense matters per se. Some of the subjects which Dr. Rathjens has mentioned in his paper are not subjects on which the ACDA Director would necessarily be present in the National Security meeting. PLACE ON NSC FOR ACDA DIRECTOR So, the question is whether or not the role of the ACDA is to be broadened to the role Dr. Rathjens is advocating. If it were broadened to that degree, then I could see reason for the head of ACDA to be a full member of the NSC. Otherwise, it would seem to me that the present practice of having the head of ACDA at those meetings that are pertinent to his responsibilities is preferable. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, the amount of an agency's budget really is not necessarily related to whether the work done by the agency is effective or not. But do you believe the cutback in personnel will tend to improve the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, broaden its scope of activity, and make it more meaningful? Mr. NITZE. I understood you to ask whether I believe that the cutback in the ACDA's budget has broadened its scope? Mr. ZABLOCKI. Will tend to broaden or encourage the broadening of its scope. There is some concern that the cutback in the budget, small as it already was, and the personnel, was an initial step to perhaps do away entirely with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at some future date. The question is to what extent has the budget cut appeared to affect the agency? Mr. NITZE. From reading Mr. Farley's report, I got the impression that it hadn't affected it that much. Certainly I have not been aware that it affected it that much from my personal observation. ACDA PERFORMED WELL DESPITE BUDGET CUT Mr. RATHJENS. I would have to say the same thing, but then I have not been that close to it for many years. It is amazing to me how much influence the agency has been able to have. Considering the size of its budget, and comparing its influence on decisions with that, for example, of the Defense Department with its budget, ACDA does very well. I guess I would agree that if one could double its effectiveness by doubling its budget that would be a very small price to pay, and I would be strongly for it. I am not sure whether more money will buy that. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I prefaced that question with the observation that a larger budget does not necessarily mean a better organization, but we are concerned and are searching for ways and means to bring ACDA up to an agency that will be productive, have the prestige, and will be able to do the job that the enabling basic act expected of that agency. Mr. Biester. Mr. BIESTER. I don't believe I really have anything further, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if either of you gentlemen could spell out or if you feel it is appropriate to think in terms of what the ultimate goal of ACDA would be. Is there some holy grail down the road that we should be reaching for, some goal we should have, or is it a kind of continuous, gradual impact on our policy? GOAL FOR ACDA? Mr. NITZE. The other day a friend of mine was asked whether he couldn't see the light at the end of the tunnel and he replied: "All I can see at the end of the tunnel is another tunnel." I am afraid that this problem of collaboration between states with respect to maximizing their mutual interests in the limitation and regulation of armaments, requires, and will require, continuous work. Mr. RATHJENS. I am a little confused by your question, as to whether you are referring to what we could hope to see in the way of the kind of organization ACDA would evolve into and the way it would influence events. Mr. BIESTER. No; I wasn't thinking in structural terms at all. Mr. RATHJENS. You are thinking in terms of where we are going in international relations and military affairs? Well, there, I think, I have to agree with Mr. Nitze. It is an evolutionary process where one hopes to make small progress. I can't be optimistic about complete disarmament. Mr. BIESTER. I think back on all the various efforts made in those directions and none of them has been very productive over the long span. I am not a student of them, but I seem to recall the Washington conference which set limitations on ships and tonnage and armaments and so forth which didn't seem to accomplish very much. I seem to recall the various points along the way during the thirties that both sides would, when they thought they had a sufficient advantage, publicly proclaim their desire for a limitation on weapons and a disarmament conference. ACDA STAGNATED BY AN EXISTENTIAL PROCESS I just wonder whether there is a real goal or whether we are simply engaged in the kind of existential process by which we limit the falibility of our other judgments. I suspect it is the latter. Mr. RATHJENS. I would agree with that. Mr. BIESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I would like to ask a question, but I want to preface by saying I don't want it to appear that I am antimilitary. But there have been some who have the view that there were too many military officers, or question at least the number of military officers, active or recently retired in senior ACDA slots. I know from personal experience some of the military officers in ACDA did an excellent job, were very knowledgeable, and we needed that type of personnel, but should there be a formula as to the number of military personnel; or is there a danger that there would be too many military officers in senior ACDA slots? DANGER OF IMPROPER MILITARY VIEW Mr. NITZE. My impression was that in the initial organization of ACDA great weight was put upon that segment of ACDA which consisted of military analysis and which was headed by a lieutenant general. Over the years a different portion of ACDA, that portion which included the scientists, the physicists, and the civilian analysts, came to have more influence than did the military section within ACDA. I am unaware of ACDA ever having been in a position where there was danger of an improper military view capturing ACDA or being too influential. The final question is the degree to which ACDA should avail itself of military expertise. I do not believe that ACDA should be limited in that. I don't see that there is any reason, at least there isn't as yet, for there being limitations on ACDA tapping military talent, so again I come up where I started, and that was that I don't yet see a compelling need for amendments to the act. Mr. RATHJENS. I share those views. It does seem to me from my own experience with the Agency that there has never been improper military influence. RELYING MORE ON MILITARY FOR EXPERTISE My only concern would be that the officer assigned there may find himself in a situation of almost conflict of interest on occasion. I am not sure if I were an aspiring colonel in the Air Force that I would necessarily pick an ACDA assignment as the preferred route to getting my star. That would be my only concern. It may be a case, perhaps for, relying more on retired officers for expertise than on serving officers. Mr. ZABLOCKI. If I may ask a final question to round up in summary. There are indeed some who feel that ACDA has not been as effective as it could have been. Some of the accomplishments credited to ACDA would have been accomplished by other governmental agencies if ACDA did not exist. Indeed, some say the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency could very well be abolished. What would be the fate or the result of the lack of input in our better understanding of the problem of arms control, trying to bring disarmament in the world, if ACDA were abolished? Mr. NITZE. In the period prior to 1961 there was no ACDA. There was, however, a fairly substantial division or bureau within the State. Department which handled comparable responsibilities. IF ACDA ABOLISHED, THEN WHAT? It was my view then, both the effectiveness of ACDA and the degree to which its actions would get into the main policy stream and get the attention of the Secretary of State and the President, would be greater if this work were separated out into a separate agency reporting to the Secretary of State, but not being part of the State Department. I think that has happened and I think it was a good thing to separate out this work from the main body of the State Department. If ACDA were abolished, the works would have to go someplace. I think the only alternative would be for it to go back to the State Department to a division or bureau of the State Department. It is always possible to overcome less than optimal organizational arrangements. I am sure if you got the right people in and paid enough attention to it, you could make it work virtually as well as a separate agency, but I would not recommend it. Mr. RATHJENS. I share those views except I would say that the State Department isn't the only place it could happen. ALTERNATIVES TO ACDA If the Agency did not exist, the work could be done perhaps in the NSC staff; some of it might even be done in OMB or in a reactivated President's Science Advisory Committee, as much of the work was done on the nuclear test ban before ACDA was organized; but I would certainly agree if it weren't there you would have to parcel out the work somewhere. A President would need that kind of help, and it seems to me that the present arrangement of having an organization such as ACDA is probably a fairly satisfactory solution as far as the executive branch is concerned. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, we are grateful for your expert testimony. Your recommendations and observations will be most helpful to the subcommittee in its study of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The subcommittee stands adjourned until Tuesday, October 1, when our witnesses will be Hon. McGeorge Bundy, former National Security Adviser to the President, and Hon. Elliot Richardson, former Secretary of Defense. I thank you again, gentlemen. [Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene on Tuesday, October 1, 1974.] |