STATEMENT JOINTLY SUBMITTED BY LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD AND AMELIA C. LEISS, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, MIT DEAR MR. ZABLOCKI: Thank you for your invitation of September 24 to the Center for International Studies to submit a statement for your inquiry into the organization and operation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. There did not appear to be sufficient time to attempt to orchestrate a broad Center response to the questions you raise. In any event, since the Center doesn't take positions as an institution, such a reply could have been a catalog of individual views. I have asked the two members of the Center who have been most deeply involved in research for A.C.D.A. to send you their comments. The attached therefore represent the opinions of Professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Ms. Amelia C. Leiss. This seems particularly appropriate, in any event, because they are the authors of the research on local conflicts which Mr. Farley mentions so favorably in his analysis for your committee. Sincerely yours, STATEMENT EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF, Director. The initiative of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to study in depth the operation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is both timely and urgently needed. In our view ACDA has done a good job under severe and well-known handicaps. The chief cost of these handicaps is a chronic weakness of the voice within the Government that should be continuously making the case for arms restraint, for imaginative efforts to reduce arms internationally, and for national security policies that reflect the urgency of reversing both nuclear and conventional arms races. Instead, the promising arms control steps of the 1960's and early 70's are losing momentum, and on a number of fronts the arms control issue is reaching critical junction-points that will require new policy choices. The review of ACDA's mission and operation comes at a time when it is clearly imperative to make a maximum effort to ensure that the "arms control case" is effectively presented and taken into account in a wide range of portentous governmental decisions. Philip Farley's excellent report emphasizes the substantive problem areas in which ACDA has (or has not) been active or effective. We are in broad agreement with virtually all the points he makes, and at the end of this memorandum we include a listing of those we believe to be particularly vital to act upon. But the Government's problem can, we think, be further illuminated along a different dimension-that of the decision-making process. To stretch one's imagination, it is useful to consider the "impact points" of arms control considerations without being constrained by current government practices or bureaucratic habits. Arms control and disarmament concerns are in fact relevant to virtually all aspects of the military planning process; to all aspects of the process of decisionmaking about making weapons available for use; to all aspects of the foreign policy process where U.S. commitments, or regional or alliance policy, or international security negotiations are involved; and to all aspects of the U.S. diplomatic process which sends signals to other nations on the basis of which they make their decisions about weapons, doctrines, and intentions concerning the use of weapons. In its broadest sense the arms control "concern" is thus a far-ranging aspect and dimension of national security policy, extending well beyond the usually-understood metes and bounds of ACDA. Clearly, the definition suggested of the arms control aspect or dimension is of a far higher order than ACDA's current mandate, and then the present capabilities of ACDA in broadly penetrating the policy-making apparatus. When its (178) scope is broadly conceived, this function obviously impinges on two of the major axes of the government process. One is the planning process as far back as the earliest decisions are made to investigate possible weapons systems or effects. The other is the decision-making process as high up as the final choice about using or threatening the use of specific weapons systems. With this picture in mind-unrealistic though it may seem given current organization-it is possible to speculate as to ways the government might be restructured to deal more purposefully with the towering issues of arms control which current arrangements often seem to trivialize in the overall scheme of national security policy. In our view, the principle that should govern choices about institutional arrangements is that of significantly upgrading the power of the voice of "arms control concern" in all aspects of U.S. government decisional processes where that concern is relevant. The present arrangements are remote from providing this capability. Of course, some of the most important changes in decision-making on arms control are attitudinal. In the case of conventional arms transfers, to take one example, there has been a regrettable shift in the burden of argument from those advocating a grant or sale to those questioning it. ACDA and AID are the only two agencies within the executive branch with a responsibility to look at the broad potential negative arguments against a transfer, yet while they are pro forma part of the decision process, they are institutionally in a weak position to make their arguments felt. It would be a mistake to assume that ACDA can be, or should be, the sole locus for studying arms control problems and ensuring that arms control considerations are taken into account in decision-making. Indeed it can be argued that the decline in attention to arms control issues over the past five or six years is not so much a fault of ACDA as a decline too frequently a deliberate emasculation-of such other executive branch agencies as the Science Advisory Committee in the White House, and International Security Affairs and Systems Analysis in Defense, as well as a less active role in this area for the Office of Management and Budget. It can also be said that the diffusion of attention to arms control issues among the foreign policy and defense policy committees in the Congress and parallel fragmentation of committee staff efforts have helped to obscure the arms control effort. The questions that have to be addressed, therefore, are: how to improve the capacity of the executive branch to ensure that salient arms control issues are brought to bear on defense and foreign policy decisions; how the legislative branch can be strengthened to take better advantage of the arms control-relevant inputs it receives and to elicit the arms control-relevant advice and information it requires; and how to strengthen ACDA to contribute to these two objectives. However, simply moving the arms control function around within the departments of the executive branch will not accomplish the needful purpose. This is not because of ill will, or a lack of general appreciation of the problem-although the latter is endemic. It is because of, first, the well-known phenomenon of organizational behavior in which primacy is invariably given to a department's paramount objectives and programs; and second, the notorious pressures for consensus within agreed bounds of what is currently defined as "realistic", "acceptable", or "sensible". Within the Executive Branch it seems inescapable that the function should be centered somewhere clearly above or alongside the foreign policy and defense bureaucracies, rather than being subordinate to them. Agency parochialism and suspicion of "soft"-seeming policy considerations can be surmounted only if the arms control input is unavoidable and backed directly by the power and authority of the White House. It has not been sufficient to give the ACDA Director the statutory right to report to the President when in fact he is subordinate to the Secretary of State. On the other hand it is not functional to add more staff elements directly to the Presidency. (Indeed, a strong Secretary of State is unlikely to tolerate a Presidential staff assistant who operates independently in the arms control field; cf. Secretary Dulles' victory over Harold Stassen.) One suggestion we advance to meet the goal would be to recreate ACDA as a more independent and potent agency, with statutory seating on the National Security Council; and to appoint its Director concurrently Special Assistant to the President for Arms Control Affairs. 41-421 O-74-13 An even more unorthodox suggestion-which we would not however rule out given the nature of the problem-would be creation of an independent research and "audit" agency whose head is appointed by the President but which, like the General Accounting Office, reports to the Congress. Its functions would be (a) research, (b) planning, and (c) continuous auditing of national security policies including arms control and disarmament policies-(d) generating regular reports to the President and the Congress in the form of both "impact" statements and policy recommendations. This agency would also (e) reestablish the essential contacts with the private "arms control community", and (f) seek to improve the quality of social science research which might contribute to policy. The proposed agency on a modified GAO model would thus (1) ensure inputs that might not be invariably acceptable to the entrenched departments: (2) encourage longer range arms control planning and research efforts, both of which are in short supply in the departments and in the current ACDA; and (3) provide the requisite voice in the highest government councils. Other arms control operational functions would, under this design, be allocated to State and Defense Department for (a) day-to-day policy inputs, (b) backstopping negotiation and, (c) implementation of agreed policies on arms sales and transfers. Short of such drastic changes in organization and approach-which we hope would be considered seriously against probable future developments before being dismissed as "unrealistic"-Mr. Farley's memorandum and our colleague George Rathjens' testimony cover most of the salient issues. We will not repeat them here, but rather stress a few points that seem to us of particular importance. 1. ACDA should be given greater independence from the State Department. Arms control issues of course impinge closely on foreign policy. But as decisions are discussed within the executive branch, ACDA's input and participation should be separate and distinct, and not moderated from the outset by the political concerns that must be State's. 2. ACDA should be an active and full participant in NSC deliberations, as well as in lower level interdepartmental groups. 3. ACDA's professional-level staff should have greater continuity. The practice of short-term assignments for Foreign Service officers or secondment from the military services and intelligence agencies should be greatly reduced. 4. ACDA should retain its capacity for in-house research, particularly on the short-range questions that require quick response. 5. At the same time, ACDA's external research operation should be greatly enlarged and focussed for the most part on long-range issues rather than shortrange highly operational issues. Research that challenges assumptions or that seeks to give structure to complex problems is the natural forte of the academic world; research within an operating agency can never indulge in the luxury of long-range speculative thinking. 6. The Social Science Advisory Committee of ACDA should be revived and exploited by the agency to advise on research. 7. The so-called Goldwater amendment whereby ACDA must apply the most stringent security regulations prevailing anywhere in the U.S. Government should be repealed, and the security-consciousness of ACDA reduced to a more nominal level. This is not to suggest that in some areas, such as specific weapons technology, security does not have to be taken very seriously. But in the social science areas with which we are most familiar the same degree of caution can be stultifying, and quite needless. 8. The Congress should require, from ACDA and from its own staff, "arms control impact statements" to accompany every request for Defense Department appropriations. 9. The Houses of Congress should establish separate or joint committees, together with committee staffs, to deal with arms control matters. 10. The Office of Technology Assessment should be given the necessary staff and budget to provide the Congress with technically competent advice on arms control issues. STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY YUAN-LI WU OF THE HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE DEAR CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: In response to your kind invitation of September 24, I am honored to enclose a statement by Professor Yuan-li Wu, Ph. D., who has prepared his analysis for the hearing record. Thank you for giving us this opportunity to participate in the activities of your subcommittee. Respectfully, STATEMENT RICHARD F. STAAR, In evaluating the past work and future role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency one needs to go back briefly to the role of arms control in U.S. government policy. Only then can one determine whether this role has been best served by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as it is now constituted. The benefits of arms control, real or alleged, can be enumerated on several levels. First, one can probably assume that it is not U.S. policy to conclude arms control treaties or arrangements with other countries that have a detrimental effect on the long-term security of this country, and will, therefore, not be really conducive to the maintenance of peace. Under this assumption one should promote arms control arrangements if they serve to reduce the risk of accidental war, or if they can moderate the adverse incidence of war should it occur, or if they can lower the net cost in human and material resources for maintaining a given degree of security. (Thus, limitations of nuclear arms could under certain circumstances reduce the damage of armed conflict; however, any cost reduction as a result of such limitations must be offset against potential increases in cost in conventional arms and in the "policing" of the nuclear agreement.) Beyond these benefits of arms control, on a lower level of certainty, there are other possible benefits if the conclusion of an arms control agreement could lead to additional agreements either in arms control or in other areas that would promote international peace and cooperation. However, benefits at this level are more elusive because they are predicated upon the response of other nations with whom one negotiates. Hence their importance is determined primarily by the subjective evaluation of policy-makers. Moreover, reaction and initiatives on the part of potential foreign adversaries may change over time. This kind of interaction is a dynamic process in which arms control arrangements can play a part, but only a small part, either positively or negatively. On an even lower level, the claim is sometimes made that arms control agreements are desirable per se because they represent agreements. This argument tends to overlook the content of any agreement and stress the bare fact that an agreement has been reached. In order to make sure that the real advantages of arms control measures are not missed, it is necessary for the U.S. government to have available realistic alternative proposals for arms control that are carefully studied and structured, with advantages versus disadvantages and risks laid out dispassionately and clearly. There is, therefore, a need for objective studies and evaluation of alternatives. Such an objective effort would be vitiated under two circumstances, namely, 1) if there is an active, partisan lobby for a particular set of proposals by a government agency to the extent of submerging, or preventing the full examination of, other alternatives, or 2) if there develops a vested interest within the government structure that desires agreement for agreement's sake in the name of relaxing tension by "generating a momentum." What such a "momentum" really amounts to may turn out to be the stampeding of public, congressional, and executive opinion in a single direction. A crucial requirement of prudence in gov ernment policy-making is the ability to tell that past policy was based on mistaken assumptions about the behavior of foreign countries, should such be the case. Risk-taking for peace is necessary, but how much risk to take and when to know that the risk involved has become too large are qualities that must be safeguarded. A vested interest in arms control would not be conducive to the preservation of these qualities. An arms control lobby could hinder the timely resolution of these problems and the reaching of agreements, that, being consistent with the longterm security interests of the participating nations, are more likely to be kept. In a world of rather rapid technological change, inability to correct mistaken policies in good time could make arms control or, for that matter, other experimental policies in the international sphere, spell the end of future experiments. In view of the above, the Congress, in its present effort to examine ACDA's future role and past performance, may find it worthwhile to address itself to the following questions: First, at least one of the earlier witnesses during the present hearing has suggested that some of ACDA's research projects may not have been fully utilized by their sponsor while other projects may not have been particularly useful. An even more important question would seem to be the determination of the extent to which any past study by ACDA may have been in the nature of advocacy rather than analysis and fact-finding. It would be useful to know how much past ACDA research if any, was of the former category. In the same connection one should ask whether ACDA has sponsored studies that look into the risks of recent arms control agreements and the problems of how to determine (a) whether further risk-taking would be warranted, and (b) whether the U.S. can then still do whatever may be necessary. Second, one earlier witness mentioned the suppression of a study by Dr. Emil Benoit whose findings were in conflict with "the official line." Are there other such alleged instances? Third, a former annual ACDA report on world arms expenditure, suspended during the last two to three years, was criticized by some for employing estimates of Soviet defense expenditure, as well as other estimates, for comparison with U.S. figures, that are misleading and that cast United States foreign policy in an unfavorable light. If resumption of this reporting series is contemplated, it would be most interesting for the Congress to look into its contents. The above points should obviously be weighed when the Congress attempts to determine whether ACDA needs more funding for public information and research. All this is not to say that in a democracy there should not be open advocacy of partisan causes. The point is whether such advocacy, which could lead to adverse effects on U.S. security and even hamper the conclusion of lasting arms control agreements by creating a wrong foreign perception of U.S. policy, should be funded by the federal government. Moreover, in considering the need for government funded research on arms control, one should not overlook the volume of research in this area already funded by some large private foundations. Partisan advocacy of arms control measures should perhaps best be left in private hands. A final point should be made regarding the future role of ACDA in evaluating weapons selection and the defense posture of the United States. Mr. John J. McCloy, an earlier witness, could not be more correct in his statement, “we can't afford two defense departments." During the thirteen years of its existence, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has succeeded in focusing a great deal of attention in other government agencies on arms control issues. This has led to the emergence of considerable expertise in arms control matters both in State and Defense. This indirect contribution of ACDA, as well as some of its positive achievements, must by no means be belittled. The Agency's very success, however, now enables us to reconsider whether in the future arms control studies should not be brought under the purview of a joint State-Defense committee, backstopped by staff within each of the two departments. This would help put the conduct of arms control negotiations primarily in the hands of the Department of State under the overall direction of the President with the advice of the National Security Council. In a time of demands to streamline the federal budget it is important that a clear line, however arbitrary, be drawn between intragovernment coordination of policy and intragovernment advocacy on a disproportionate scale. The latter tends to generate waste, inefficiency, and indeterminateness of policy, which we can even less afford now than before. YUAN-LI Wu. |