The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception
Dimitria Electra Gatzia, Berit Brogaard
Oxford University Press, Jan 3, 2020 - Philosophy - 288 pages
Most of the research on the epistemology of perception has focused on visual perception. This is hardly surprising given that most of our knowledge about the world is largely attributable to our visual experiences. The present volume is the first to instead focus on the epistemology of non-visual perception - hearing, touch, taste, and cross-sensory experiences. Drawing on recent empirical studies of emotion, perception, and decision-making, it breaks new ground on discussions of whether or not perceptual experience can yield justified beliefs and how to characterize those beliefs. The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception explores questions not only related to traditional sensory perception, but also to proprioceptive, interoceptive, multisensory, and event perception, expanding traditional notions of the influence that conscious non-visual experience has on human behavior and rationality. Contributors investigate the role that emotions play in decision-making and agential perception and what this means for justifications of belief and knowledge. They analyze the notion that some sensory experiences, like touch, have epistemic privilege over others, as well as perception's relationship to introspection, and the relationship between action perception and belief. Other essays engage with topics in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, exploring the role that artworks can play in providing us with perceptional knowledge of emotions. The essays collected here, written by top researchers in their respective fields, offer perspectives from a wide range of philosophical disciplines and will appeal to scholars interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophical psychology, among others.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
An Epistemology of Multisensory Perception
2 Sensory Interactions and the Epistemology of Haptic Touch
3 Multimodal Mental Imagery and Perceptual Justification
4 How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs
5 Hearing As
6 Is Tactual Knowledge of Space Grounded in Tactual Sensation?
Other editions - View all
affect appear argues aspect attention auditory awareness beliefs bodily body brain Cambridge cause changes character cognitive penetration concepts Consciousness consider contrast discussion distinct duration effort emotions environment epistemic epistemology event evidence example experienced explain expression external fact feeling figure flavor give hand hear human important indicating influence input instance integration interactions interoception interval involves justified kind knowledge least look matter means mental imagery Mind multisensory nature objects occur olfactory experiences one’s Oxford University Press particular perceive perception perceptual experience perceptual processing person phenomenal Philosophical play possible present problem processing properties Psychology qualities question reason reference relation reliably represent representation resistance response result role Sciences seems sensations sense sense modality sensory smell sound stimulation suggest Suppose sweet tactual sensations taste theory things tion top-down touch traits understanding virtue vision visual