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hancement of the interceptor capabilities through improvements in radars and fire control systems in the interceptors

Senator STENNIS. Intercept what, Mr. Secretary? What kind of weapon are you talking about?

Mr. CHARYK. These would be intercepting air-breathing vehicles, manned or unmanned. They would not be applicable to the problem of defense against ballistic missiles.

In addition we would propose to equip the F-101B and the F-106 with advanced air-to-air missiles, again for interception of primarily manned bombers.

The other major additions are related to the earlier implementation of our ballistic missile early warning system.

We would propose to advance by the better part of a year the initial operation or capability in the second BMÈWS site which is located in Alaska, and also to expedite the operational date for the third BMEWS site in England.

We feel that the earlier implementation of the ballistic missile early warning system is a very important factor insofar as the strategic retaliatory force is concerned, and the advancement of the capability in the fashion that I have indicated, we feel, is a very important addition to the program.

It is also intended to apply some of the dollars to the Samos and Midas program, which are the satellite programs aimed at early warning of ballistic missile attack, and also at reconnaissance.

So these are the major additions that we are proposing to our program as the result of the reorientation of the air defense program.

Senator STENNIS. All right.

I had announced, as you will recall, that we are setting up a special hearing on the whole air defense concept. That will go over, of course, beyond Easter, and we have already notified the Air Force.

You have been in communication, Mr. Clerk, with them I have not had a chance to discuss it, but we will just discuss it a little bit now if it is agreeable.

We are called on for a great change here in the air defense system, and shifting on emphasis and money, and I think we ought to have the Air Force presentation and hear General Kuter, too; he is the commanding officer of this joint command, as I understand it, Norad; and is that your idea about it?

Senator ČASE. I think we should. I am not disposed to quarrel with what I have heard about it, that is, I am not disposed necessarily against it, but I do think we ought to have a record on it.

Senator STENNIS. Correct.

I am not quarreling with it in any way. In fact, my impression is that I approve it so far as I can go in my thoughts on the subject. But I do think it certainly ought to be reviewed.

Mr. CHARYK. We certainly will be happy, Mr. Chairman, to go into this question in as much detail as the committee would like.

Senator STENNIS. I do not know just how soon you can be ready, but we can be ready this next week, can we not, Senator Case, as far as we can see now? We can set this matter up, because we do not want to hold this bill up. I thought the filibuster was holding up everything around here. The newspapers all say it did, but when it was over I found out that there were other matters that were holding it up. So

we do not want to wait any longer than we have to, gentlemen, and you are going to have to set a figure on it at some time, and we are going to have to write a figure in this bill.

So I think you ought to concentrate on that, and we will just tentatively set next Tuesday, is that is agreeable, Senator Case.

Mr. CHARYK. I am sure that will be satisfactory from our point of view, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. All right, then. It is definitely understood and agreed that we will have this special briefing before this subcommittee next Tuesday morning, say, beginning at 10 o'clock, and have the whole defense I want to get the whole picture, not just the Air Force part, but everyone, and we will need General Kuter in certainly.

All right, Senator Case, did you have some questions for the Secretary before we go into the line items!

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, in his shortened statement he referred to this matter of adding some launchers to the last six ATLAS squadrons and then he says, “This can be done within the authorization previously approved for the 1 by 9 configuration.”

How can that be done within the previously approved authorization?

Mr. CHARYK. I think General Minton might comment on that in more detail, but on the basis of the first bids on the enlargement to 1 by 12, it appears that we will be able to proceed with this implementation without additional authorization.

Senator CASE. You mean in terms of dollars?

General MINTON. Dollars and authorization, Senator. We just have the second squadron bid in yesterday afternoon, and we also got favorable bids on that.

Senator Case. Are you relying there on your 5-percent overrun? General MINTON. No, sir; we are not; no overrun at all.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I think you will recall that both of us were a little disturbed by some earlier testimony where it was indicated that by using the 5-percent overrun, and assuming that applied to all of the projects, it could give them a 5-percent total overrun; the Defense Department was expecting to create some authorization beyond the picture that had been presented.

I do not personally think that is a good interpretation of, certainly not of the intent, of the legislation. It may be technically possible, and I am inclined to think in this bill we should put in language which would make it clear that a 5-percent overrun permitted for an individual project is not intended to create a new authorization for items that were not presented to the committee.

Mr. FERRY. Senator, I think we understand that without the necessity of actually writing it in the bill because we are including in this new authorization $50 million to pick up any requirement in order to cover our missile construction.

General MINTON. This $50 million covers our

Senator CASE. The committee print with which the Senator is working proposes some language in section 503, as I think you may have noticed, but it would have a sentence that would make clear this intent.

Section 503 in the committee print says: Any of the amounts named in titles 1, 2, or 3 of this act may, in the discretion of the Secretary concerned, be increased by 5 per centum for projects inside the United States, other than Alaska, and by 10 per centum on projects outside the United States and Alaska. However, the total cost of all projects in each such title may not be more than the total amount authorized to be appropriated for projects in that title.

Personally I shall favor keeping that sentence in the bill, whether there is any understanding or not, because I was certainly surprised to find the other interpretation placed upon past legislation.

The 5-percent overrun was intended to make it possible for you to go ahead with these critical projects, or for the Defense Department to go ahead with critical projects.

I do not think it was ever intended that a 5-percent overrun for an individual project, if not used, could be added to shortfalls in the estimates, and then create an authorization for something the committee never heard about.

Senator STENNIS. Yes, gentlemen; we were rather shocked with those figures you brought in, totaling up those possible overruns. Over in the Appropriations Committee we approved the reprograming of the funds the first of the year but, as I recall, we wrote a letter that in an emergency we were approving it because we assumed you had the authorization, but we did not want to set a precedent thereby, and Senator Case has so well stated here his thought, and I think it would be the committee's thought.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, there is one other thing about this.

Senator STENNIS. We will press for this amendment, that is what I mean, and if you want to say anything to offset it, why we will hear you on it during the course of the hearing.

Senator Case?

Senator CASE. One further thing with regard to the ATLAS. Mr. Chairman, I should like in executive session to hear a presentation on this proposal to add launchers to the last six ATLAS squadrons.

I want to get into asking certain questions, but I will state this personal feeling about this matter at this time, and you may comment on it if you wish.

In view of my understanding of the very definite advantages of TITAN over ATLAS, I was surprised to hear that you are proposing to add additional launchers to the first six ATLAS squadrons.

Now, some of those advantages, as I understand them, are not those that you might want to discuss in an open session this morning. There was a time when doubt might have been raised as to whether or not the progress on TITAN was comparable with that on ATLAS.

But the testimony that I have heard here and also over in the Appropriations Committee would indicate that the progress on TITAN as of today is just as good, if not better, than the progress on ATLAS was at a certain stage in its development; and the number of successful TITAN firings, the score has been notably improved during recent firings of the TITAN. That, coupled with the inherent advantages in TITAN over ATLAS, makes me wonder why you are not putting this money, which you save on ATLAS, upon expediting TITAN or carrying it a step further. Why, if long-range planning can be considered, why you don't use it on MINUTEMAN.

Mr. CHARYK. I might comment to this extent, Senator, and we can go into this in more detail in executive session, if you would like.

The implementation here is to the last six ATLAS squadrons which are the dispersed, hardened to a hundred p.s.i., and all inertial guidance, namely, the most advanced ATLASES in our program.

It is also possible, with the augmentation which is proposed, to bring these missiles into the inventory in a rather early time period.

It would not be possible to bring additional TITAN missiles or MINUTEMAN missiles into the program in the same time period in which we can bring these 18 ATLASES into our inventory.

So the coupling of the desirable characteristics of hardening, dispersal, all-inertial guidance, which represents the latest ATLAS version, and the early time period are the dictating factors in the recommendations we have made.

Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that we can profitably go into the other aspects of it that I would want to discuss. Mr. CHARYK. Yes.

Senator CASE. But when you mentioned hardening, dispersal and inertial guidance, you still have not, of course, treated of two or three factors which make TITAN potentially more useful and desirable, it seems to me, than an ATLAS. As to the other point, the fact that you can get ATLAS in production more rapidly than you can get TITAN or MINUTEMAN, I think that is certainly true. But the capability of the mix of retaliatory weapons that we would still have, I was under the impression, would extend through the period until TITAN would be operational and on more of a production line basis.

Mr. CHARYK. Well, I think it would be appropriate to go into details of this in executive session.

Senator CASE. I understand that. Senator STENNIS. All right; thank you, Senator Case. Gentlemen, there is just one point I want to raise. We spend a great deal of time here on these line items in considering these bills, write up careful reports, take them to the Senate floor, and then we have sometime quite a battle in conference; but at the same time, the Department of Defense has been in for military construction each year on vast projects involving sometimes several hundred million dollars, Senator Case, as you know, on matters that never do come before the Congress at all, just under contract authority and procurement, building factories for aircraft, for missiles, and so forth.

I am going to ask you gentlemen, I understand it is classified, but I am going to ask you—anyway, I want to have the Air Force to make a showing, as to how much you propose to spend in fiscal year 1961 from procurement and research funds in building industrial facilities.

It is something that I think this committee has, to a degree, overlooked, Senator Case.

So far as the figures are not classified, I think we ought to cover it in our report to the Senate with reference to these construction funds. It is not said critically, but it is just a part of the picture.

I know here not too long ago, according to the figures I have before me, we spent over $440 million in one fiscal year, and the next year $435 million for such purposes, brick and mortar, and industrial facilities.

I know it is a necessary part of your program, but without that part of the picture filled out, Congress just does not get a picture of what is really happening in this field.

All right, if you have nothing further, gentlemen, we are ready for the line items. Whom will you have in charge now?

(The following information was subsequently furnished :)

The fiscal year 1961 budget contains the following amounts for industrial facilities:

Million Aircraft procurement_

$20.0 Missile procurement.

60.3 Research, development, test and evaluation

9.6 Other procurement---





------------ 94. 4 These funds are for the procurement of industrial mahinery, equipment and facilities. Included in the above are the following amounts for "brick and mortar” construction and for other additions required for minor expansion : Aircraft procurement

--- $1.0 Missile procurement------Research, development, test and evaluation.---.

Mr. FERRY. General Curtin, assisted by Colonel Parkhill, will introduce and discuss the line item books in any detail you may desire.

Senator STENNIS. All right, gentlemen, get your places. We are glad to have you but you do not have to stay, Mr. Secretary.

Gentlemen, do you have additional general statements?




TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. R. H. CURTIN General CURTIN. No, Mr. Chairman. We are prepared to proceed with the line items, if you so desire.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I did want to ask some questions, following up this general reference to housing that was in the Secretary's statement.

I note you have already asked why they had not been able to take the maximum advantage of the surplus commodity program, and the answer is that because sometimes the funds have been in countries where there was no housing requirement. But is that the only reason?

The Secretary's statement says:

It has been our aim to take maximum advantage of the surplus commodity program to finance the sorely needed housing. Unfortunately, we have not been able to do this.

General CURTIN. Senator Case, we have in every case where we have had a valid requirement overseas and where the surplus commodity program is applicable, made every effort from the Department of Air Force level to secure any funds that were generated and were applicable to the housing construction program. As you are aware, funds are sometimes generated overseas, but are not applicable to this program. I certainly am not any expert on the financial aspects of it, but I do assure you that from where we sit this is the basic reason.

We have had these programs authorized by the Congress in some cases for more than 2 years, and we have made efforts through the appropriate channels to secure funds without success.

Senator Case. I should personally like to know of specific places where you have tried to do that and did not have success.

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