We proceed now to redeem our pledge, given in the last number, on the subject of moral ability. It will be necessary to bear in mind some things which we have said of power, the idea of which is always gained from a connexion between cause and effect. Why do we speak of moral power? Is it not because we attach moral character or qualities, to effects or actions; and from this infer that something moral belongs to its source? Moral faculties, employed in producing moral effects, suggest the idea of what we call moral ability. What is it? Wherein does it differ from any other ability, except in the character of its source, and its effects? A question here occurs which ought to be distinctly understood and answered -What belongs to man of a moral nature; and why is it moral? An answer to this question might be gathered from what we have already said; but to prevent the necessity of turning back, and to present the facts in their proper relation to the topick now under examination, we recapitulate them in this place. Moral has relation to holiness, or sin, right, or wrong. That which is holy or sinful, right or wrong, is properly moral, and nothing else. There may be some things belonging to man, or done by him, which have no moral character. Whatever will not distinguish a good or holy being from a sinful being, has no moral quality; it is common to both. What distinguishes a holy from a sinful man? It must be something which belongs to mind, and not to matter.

Is it intellect? Is it will? Is it heart? If we speak of each faculty in abstract terms, and by itself, neither will distinguish them. Good and bad men have understanding, heart and will; but in one man they are right, and in the other wrong. What is the primary ground of distinction; or, in other words, in which faculty is the foundation of this wide discrimination? To us the heart seems to answer the question. Good and bad men may perceive the same things, and choose the same things, to great extent, but the moment we examine the feelings, we perceive direct opposition. One loves, the other hates, holy things. It may

be necessary to say here, that we admit a distinguishing difference, both in the exercises of intellect, and in volitions: And we hold the doctrine of divine illumination as a guidance. But the difference in the exercises of intellect, is in the degree of clearness in perceiving the truth. Wicked men must perceive something of the holiness and truth of God, else they would not hate them.

We consider the heart, or faculty of feeling, as possessing a moral character in itself; it is the primary spring or principle of action. Let this be right and the man is good, though his knowledge be limited or extensive; but if the heart be wrong, he is bad, however ignorant or informed. We do not say equally good or bad, whatever may be the extent of knowledge. But man is a moral being, because he has a faculty in its nature moral; it loves or hates holy objects. Man is a moral agent, because he has a principle of agency, and it belongs to his moral faculty: consequently man is a moral agent.

Now in order to apprehend clearly, the idea of moral power, take the following synopsis of several things already discussed. The heart is the principle of moral

agency, and is necessary to constitute man a moral agent, because without feeling he could not act, could not be blameable, or praiseworthy; and could not be rewarded with happiness or misery. The understanding is also necessary to moral agency. Not because it is a principle of action, but because unknown objects cannot affect the heart. It is the faculty of intelligence, through which the heart receives all its impressions of pleasure or disgust; and without which medium there could be no action. It is the office of the intellect to devise the means of obtaining the objects which please, and of avoiding those which pain the heart. In its moral relation, it is necessary to discern what is right and what is wrong; to know the reason of praise and blame, and the propriety of rewards and punishments. The will is also essential to moral agency. Obedient to the feelings of the heart, the will, or faculty of volition, directs the understanding and bodily motions to obtain or accomplish the objects agreeable to the heart, or to avoid those things which are disagreeable. The will is necessary to perform many, if not all, the duties involved in moral agency; and to manifest the character of the heart. These are the elements of a free moral agent. What now is his moral power? It is suggested by those moral elements, employed to produce moral results or effects. If man acts right or wrong, he has moral power; if he does both, he has power to do both. As we said before, that the principal idea of natural or physical power is the connexion between volition and the effect, or to have the substitute before mentioned, that which forms or sustains the connexion; so we say here, the leading thought, expressed in moral power, is the connexion between the feelings of the heart and the effects, or actions.

We proceed now with the main object of this article; some inquiries into the uses and applications of human power, together with certain uses made of the distinction between material and moral ability.

One general use of power is obvious from the preceding discussion. Men are by it constituted agents, and may be voluntarily employed to accomplish the purposes of God, and promote the welfare of their fellow men. Man's power may be employed for valuable purposes in his social state, and for his individual benefit. But is it always so employed? Far from it. The inquiry may be pursued; why not? What controls and perverts man's ability from obedience to his Maker, from his own and his fellow creature's happiness? This question deserves careful examination. We say the heart is the spring or source of action. this be right with God, and all will be right; let it be wrong, and all will be wrong. The desires and feelings will always express the character of the heart. Man's ability to do mischief, or accomplish that which is good, will depend upon his opportunities, means, sagacity, and intellectual discipline; but whether actually he do good or evil, depends on the temper of his heart.

Let

We may as well come directly to the use made of the distinction between natural and moral ability, because its discussion will show the most important limits and uses of human power. It is alleged, by a large class of metaphysick theologians, that men have natural power to obey all God's commands. Let us examine this philosophy: and if we can spare a little space, we will also examine its theology. For we hold that the philosophy and theology of this dogma are distinct things, although they may be blended together, and involve each other. But if we examine

the theology of the allegation, we should bring it to the test of what God has said, fairly and philologically interpreted. But we now But we now inquire into its philosophy. How are the facts?

We say the allegation is partly true, or it is utterly false, just as it may be understood. If the meaning be, that men havé natural power to do all those things which appropriately belong to their natural ability, then it is true; but these are not all the things which God commands. So that in the form of its statement, it is only true in part. Again, if it mean that men have this kind of power to perform all the duties in which natural power is employed, it is partly true. It is true, that men have just that natural ability, which God requires them to exercise, or the employment of which is involved in obedience to the command. But this affects not the point in controversy. It is not the employment of physical ability which gives moral character to actions: nor is it the province of natural power to effect moral results. If the meaning be, what seems to be the plain construction of the terms of its statement, that men are naturally able to obey all God's commands, it is utterly false in its philosophy, and worse than false in its theology. It is admitted by all, that God's commands are, many of them at least, moral. We know that many external actions, which God commands, men are naturally able to perform. Such are, labouring with their hands, tilling the ground, sowing and reaping, together with many acts of beneficence. But the whole controversy respects natural power to produce moral results; or in more common style, to do that which is exclusively moral. To bring the examination to a point, let us take love to God, which is indisputably a moral action of the heart, and which God most pe

remptorily commands, and examine the application of this philosophical doctrine of natural ability. Have men natural ability to love God? Our opposing philosophy affirms: we deny. Is there any physical power employed in this simple affection of the heart? We answer no; and this brings out the first reason and ground of our denial. It may be connected with the exercise of physical power, and followed by its employment in many ways, but the affection itself is a moral feeling of a moral faculty, and that is its whole philosophical description. There is no physical power in it: and to think of looking for this moral feeling from the exercise of natural power, is no more rational than the attempt to gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles.

We stand, therefore, on firm ground in this denial. We show that the philosophical pretension does violence to the principle on which the distinction between natural and moral ability is founded. Take any ground, which the advocates of the distinction may choose, and this application of it to the simple affection of love to God violates that ground. This we fearlessly assert. We have seen, it is true, several, and widely different, reasons of this distinction, and several grounds on which it is maintained; and this application of natural power to loving God is inconsistent with all of them. If men loved God with the hand, or foot, or intellect, or with any thing except their hearts, the case would be different. The fact, that all the faculties of mind and body may be under the influence of love to God as a principle of action, is distinctly admitted; but still, it is incontrovertibly true, that love is an affection of the heart, and belongs exclusively to that faculty.

A second reason of our denial is, that natural power never did

govern, and it never can control, the affections of the heart. They are moral exercises of a moral faculty, and it would be degrading man from his high rank in the workmanship of his Creator, to place his moral character under the control of physical power, in any sense which might be implied in the subjugation affirmed in the philosophy which we oppose. To bring this matter to the test, we appeal to known and common facts, so multiplied and familiar, that we need only make one general statement. It often occurs that men's judgments are convinced that they ought to love certain others whom they dislike, or to dislike others whom they love, but after all their conviction and continued efforts, no change of affection takes place. But we will not spend time in illustrations from analogous facts, which must be familiar to all who will think. Let us examine the case as alleged. And here we ask the advocates of the philosophy, if they have ever seen a man convinced that he ought to love God, filled with agonizing distress at the discovery of his crime in hating God, employing all his time and efforts to change his affections, for days and weeks, without success? During all this time, his whole physical ability has been employed to place the affections on God and Christ, and holy objects, without approximating the change attempted. Will it be alleged that it is because he mistakes, or knows not the proper method of employing his power? Where is the defect? He apprehends his danger and his sin; he believes fully that he must perish, if he love not God; he bends all his intellectual efforts to the investigation of God's character and truth; he seeks instruction from those skilled in the direction of sinners to Christ; and, after all, he remains, by the evidence of his own consciousness, unreconciled to God.

the same

He does, externally, things to great extent, which those do, who love God; and he gives evidence that his intellect is employed about the same subjects. Could his volition change the character of his affections, he is sure it would be done without delay. Where is the defect? There is inducement enough present to his mind; but after all, no love springs up in his heart. The truth is, the defect is not in the employment of his natural ability; the difficulty lies in the temper of his heart, which all his physical power can never control.

Again, we ask these philosophers if they are acquainted with the mental exercises called the Christian warfare within. If so, will they explain, on their principles, the facts, over which they lament with an apostle" a law in their members warring against the law of their mind, and bringing them into captivity to the law of sin?" Why are not Christians as holy as they desire to be? If they have natural power to perform all that God commands, why do they not at least love him as much as he requires? The fact is most evident that the hearts of Christians have remaining propensities to evil, and these constitute the controlling "law of sin," to which they are captivated, and by which their natural ability is often directed.

We have many reasons for denying the allegation, which has been so popular with a certain class of theologians: but we have not space to illustrate them. We have stated two, which present the philosophical facts and principles contravened by the dogma. These might be presented in different forms, and lead us to several inferences. We make two or three inferences, from the principle involved in the use made of natural ability in the statement which we oppose. Of course we do not as

cribe our inferences to those who hold and preach the dogma; but they are inferences which we could not avoid, if we admitted the principle. If it were a law of mental operation that the affections obey the volition; or which is the same thing, were under the control of physical ability, there would be no pain or mental suffering in the world. All men would be happy, no matter what objects might be presented, what disappointments might occur, or what calamities might befall them: they would only have to choose to be pleased with what is called calamity, or disappointment,and they would be happy. Again, men might always possess just such characters as they choose; be just as penitent, humble, devout and holy as they choose, without the mission or agency of the Holy Spirit. The whole plan of salvation by Jesus Christ, and the mission of the Holy Comforter, would be unnecessary. In short, we see not how, according to this law of mind, any man could be punished in a future state, though he should be cast into outer darkness; let him choose to delight in what the Scriptures call torment, and his happiness would be complete for ever. To us these seem legitimate inferences from the principle, and may be included in the reasons why we deny the statement.

What then, it may well be asked, is the use of this famous distinction between natural and moral ability? Before we reply to this question, upon our own principles of philosophy, we beg leave to state some of the uses which we think it actually subserves, as employed by those to whom we alluded in the statement above. One purpose which it evidently subserves, whether so intended or not, is to make ignorant and and undiscriminating hearers think the preacher very wise, while they profess not to understand the distinctions. We have seen such hearers gape with Ch. Adv.-VOL. X.

astonishment, while they listened to those metaphysical distinctions; and when they left the place of preaching, we have heard them say, the preacher must be a very learned man, he seems to be familiar with things which we do not understand at all. We leave others to estimate the value of this result. Another effect is produced on many thinking minds, by the manner in which the terms natural ability are used by many preachers; they conclude there is some real contradiction in the revelation of God, to conceal which, the preacher resorts to metaphysical philosophy. But these are comparatively harmless effects, when some others are considered. It misleads multitudes in estimating their character, danger and duty. They perceive, what is true, that they have pow er, which they are told is physical, to perform the common actions of social life; and that they cannot be held responsible for the exertion of power which they do not possess. This becomes a maxim of extensive application; and because it is true in its legitimate application, they think the more confidently that it bears them out, in estimating their natural ability as fully competent to perform all that God requires. An inference from this strain of argument is practically felt and acted on, to a fearful extent, which leads them to think they have little need of a Saviour, and less need of the Holy Spirit's influence. They cannot, therefore, be very criminal, and are in no danger but what it is in their power, at any time, to avoid. Men will think, under the influence of this philosophy, that their intentions are very good: they may have committed some mistakes, which they are abundantly able to correct and avoid in future. They may be told, and told truly, that it is their duty to repent and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ at once: to this they may assent, but U