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VI. An attorney before a department of the Government, differing from an attorney before the courts, of which he is a sworn recognized officer, where his acts are public, can act as and assume only to be "attorney in fact" when he acts with due diligence, and keeps his client informed of the state of his business. (4 Burr., 2061; 1 Barnwell & Alderson, 202; Bac. Abr. "Att'y;" Story, Agency, sec. 25; Russell vs. Palmer, 2 Wilson, 328; Swannel vs. Ellis, 1 Bingham, 347; Chit. Cont., 603, 605.)

From 1872 to 1876 or 1877, no service was rendered by either of the Meguires, and they failed to correspond with Clift after 1872. No notice was given by A. S. Meguire that he had gone to Chicago, or had left the claims with James F. Meguire. The revocation of the power to Meguire was justified, and he had notice of it before he did anything as to the bills in Congress.

DECISION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller:

There is no controversy as to the sufficiency in form of the powers of attorney to Kinney, nor as to their giving him the right he asserts, unless this right was barred by the contract with, and power of attorney given to, Meguire.

There are several grounds upon which the right asserted by Meguire must be denied.

I.--The power of attorney to and contract with Meguire do not extend to the claim allowed under the act of March 3, 1881, passed for the relief of the crews of steamers "Champion, numbers one and two.” That the warrant in this case in favor of Clift was issued under the relief act of March 3, 1881, is not disputed. It was issued under no other act.

The contract of Clift and the other parties with A. S. Meguire is expressly for "services to be rendered by him in the matter of obtaining certain moneys from the United States Government, due them severally for wages during their imprisonment." Money due for wages means money due under existing law. There was a law-the act of July 25, 1866, (14 Stats., 364,) referred to in the able argument of the learned counsel for Meguire-under which it was claimed that money other than for wages was due. The contract was made with reference to that law. The power of attorney to Meguire was given in view of that It might have been given to cover money to become due under an act to be passed; but it was not so given. When a power of attorney relates to a matter provided for by existing laws, it cannot, by implication, bé extended to matters arising under, and rights created by, laws subsequently enacted. The contract with and power to A. S. Meguire pointed to existing law-to money then due; but in contemplation of law, the money authorized to be paid by the relief act

act.

referred to did not become due until the date of its approval, namely, March 3, 1881. The terms of the power must be construed strictly, and hence they exclude any purpose to authorize or require services in securing legislation, or in asserting a claim for money not due. The power does not extend to matters involving future legislation, or to rights accruing therefrom. To extend the contract and power to a claim under the relief act would involve the adoption of a principle and a construction which might inflict gross injustice.

The contract in terms says that there shall be paid to Meguire "fifty per centum of any and all amounts so recovered;" that is, of "certain moneys from the United States Government due them," (Clift and others.)

Meguire presented a claim to the proper executive department of the Government asking for the allowance of the moneys referred to in the power of attorney, and the claim was rejected. This was a final adjudication of the matter, and the rejection was in effect a decision that the claimant had no right to such moneys. The relief act of March 3, 1881, cannot be construed as reversing that decision, but rather as providing for a special case; and it gave a right to receive money, which right, before its approval, did not exist. In strict law, the accounting officers must regard the matter referred to in the last power of attorney to Kinney as a matter entirely different from that referred to in the power of attorney given to Meguire.

The claimants might be willing to give, for the service to be rendered in obtaining an allowance of the claim, fifty per centum of moneys due, as they supposed, by existing law; but if a future law should give a largely increased sum, they might not at all consent to give for the service one half of that sum. Unless the terms of the contract and power taken together manifest at least fairly, if not clearly, an intention to apply to all money which might become due by future legislation, they cannot be construed as extending to such money.

In addition to all this, the relief act expressly requires applications to be "made under this act." It cannot be said that a power of attorney made before the act was passed, and with no terms referring to it, can authorize an application under it. The act gives a right to some compensation not at all alluded to in the contract with or power to Meguire.

It is a well-settled rule of construction that "a statute referring to, or affecting persons, places, or things, is limited in its operations to persons, places, or things as they existed at the time the statute was passed." (U. S. vs. Paul, 6 Pet., 141; Hall vs. State, 20 Ohio, 16.)

So a power of attorney will generally be construed with reference to existing laws and facts.

II. The power of attorney given to Meguire to prosecute the claim referred to therein was clearly and legally revoked. It was revocable at common law, without the statutory provision. (U. S. vs. Robeson, 9 Pet., 325; Rev. Stats., 3477; Di Cesnola's case, ante, 142.)

The right of revocation has already been sufficiently shown in another case, and it is unnecessary to repeat the argument or cite the authorities here. (McAllister's case, ante, 167; Taylor vs. Benham, 5 How., 233.) The Secretary of the Treasury, (B. H. Bristow, distinguished for his great learning as a lawyer,) in a circular of April 16, 1875, stated the rule to be, as to powers of attorney irrevocable because coupled with an interest, that "there must be an interest in the thing itself, and not merely in that which is produced by the exercise of the power." This is the general rule at common law, and seems to be recognized by the legislation of Congress. (U. S. vs. Hall, 98 U. S., 357; 9 Stats., 41; 10 Stats., 170; Rev. Stats., 3477.) This rule of law has not been changed by any "regulation." If this rule may work hardship, Congress alone has authority to change it. Executive officers must obey the law as it is. On this subject there are many instructive lessons. (Numbers, xxii, 15-22.)

III. Meguire is not aided by the "regulations" of the Department. The regulations of October 10, 1876, being circular in relation to powers of attorney, make four provisions as to drafts. These are as follow:

1. "In every case to be finally adjudicated in this Department, the attorney shall present a letter of attorney from the claimant to prosecute the case, and shall be regarded as the attorney in such case, with the right to receive any draft therein. The claimant may change his attorney at any time, with the consent of the proper officers of the Department."

2. "In cases certified for payment by the Court of Claims, or by any commission created by Congress, the persons certified by said court or commission as the attorneys of record shall be regarded as such by this Department, and be entitled to receive the drafts in such cases."

3. "In all cases drafts for claims will be made to the order of the claimant, and will be delivered to the proper attorney, according to this

order."

4. "The Secretary reserves the right in all cases to make such special orders as may be proper."

The circular of July 19, 1880, declares that—

"Hereafter, the accounting officers will decide what persons as attorneys or claimants are entitled to receive drafts under the rules of the Department. This practice will prevent the delay occasioned by sending the papers to the Secretary or Assistant Secretary for such decision."

The second clause of the circular of October 10, 1876, does not reach this case. The fourth clause does not apply, as the Secretary has made

H. Ex. Doc. 219-13

no "special order." The third clause, by a well-known rule of construction, relates to drafts in all cases not covered by the other clauses. (Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. L., 209; N. L. & B. Inst. vs. Com., 14 B. Monroe, 266.) Or, if the third is to be deemed as controlling the preceding clauses, it means that "in all cases" drafts "will be delivered to the proper attorney"-that is, to the attorney who, by law, is entitled to receive them. The first clause does not in fact relate to this case; but, whether it does so or not, it is shown by the decisions in Di Cesnola's case, ante, 142, and McAllister's case, ante, 167, that by every rule of law Kinney is "the proper attorney." It is scarcely to be presumed that any regulation is to be construed as requiring a draft to be delivered to any but the proper attorney. A regulation may, however, be made to determine to a certain extent the persons to whom drafts should be delivered. The first clause does not apply to Meguire, unless it be to exclude him from the right to receive the draft. In one sense the claim of Clift presents a case "finally adjudicated in this Department." It was finally allowed under the relief act. But this clause says "the attorney shall present a letter of attorney from the claimant to prosecute the case, and shall be regarded as the attorney in such case, with the right to receive any draft therein." Now "the case" here "finally adjudicated" is one arising under the relief act. Meguire does not present

a power for "the case." The case [claim] did not exist when the power was given in October, 1872. The case is a claim under the relief act of March 3, 1881. Until that act was passed there was no case-no claim-such as has been allowed. The claim which Meguire prosecuted was under a prior law, and it was rejected. Kinney does present a power "to prosecute the case," and hence, as the regulation says, "shall be regarded as the attorney." But if the power to Meguire had been sufficiently broad in terms to prosecute a claim under the act of July 25, 1866, and also under any future act, still he would not be aided by the first clause of the "regulation," which merely gives a right to receive a draft to the attorney who prosecutes the case under the act which allowed the claim. It looks to services before the Department, and was intended to apply to the attorney for such services.

The right to receive the draft in this case is not asserted by reason solely of services in the Department under the relief act. No contest was made in the Department under this act. The "regulation" is not designed to protect the rights of attorneys for services rendered before committees of Congress. The power of the head of a Department to make regulations is limited to the business done in or by officers or agents of his Department; it does not extend to business transacted elsewhere. (Rev. Stats., 161.)

If the claim of Clift is to be regarded as one "finally adjudicated" under the relief act, then Kinney is the only person who presents any power of attorney given since the act was passed, or which gave authority to prosecute under that act, and he alone is authorized to receive the draft. A power of attorney may be given under which services may be rendered before a committee of Congress, and conferring authority to receive any draft to be issued after a relief act shall have been passed. But the power to Meguire evidently did not point to such services or such acts, but to services and claims under the act of July 25, 1866, (14) Stats., 364,) to which reference is made in the argument of his counsel. In taking this view it must be held that Meguire presents no power of attorney which reaches the claim under the relief act. By its own terms his power is so restricted that it does not contemplate or look to a claim under future legislation. The contract with Meguire was for services "in the matter of obtaining certain moneys from the United States Government due them [Clift and others] severally for wages." Money due means money demandable by existing law.

The regulation does not in terms deny the right existing by law to revoke a power. It declares that "the claimant may change his attorney at any time with the consent of the proper officers of the Department." This manifestly relates to the right to change an attorney in the prosecution of a claim before the Department. (McAllister's case, ante, 167.) It is not dealing with the subject of the revocation of a power, and does not deny the right to revoke it. But if it should be construed as referring to revocation, it recognizes the right in saying that the change. of attorney may be made "with the consent of the proper officers.” It does not indicate who these officers are. The Treasurer and First Comptroller are the only officers charged by statute with a duty in relation to the payment of drafts and the settlement of the accounts for such payment. (Bender's case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 317; Di Cesnola's case, ante, 142.)

The only clause of the "regulations" which can in any way apply in this case is the third, relating to "all cases" which are not otherwise provided for therein. This clause directs that the draft be delivered to the "proper attorney;" which means the attorney who, according to the principles of law, is entitled to receive it; and it is shown that Kinney is the attorney so authorized.

The "Navy Settlement Warrant No. 555," issued in favor of Clift, under the relief act of Congress, contains the words "Pay to William B. Clift, care J. F. Meguire, attorney, 116 D street, northwest, Washington, D. C." This indicates that the draft to be issued on the warwant should be delivered to Meguire. There is no statute specifically

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