Mr. RATHJENS. You are thinking in terms of where we are going in international relations and military affairs? Well, there, I think, I have to agree with Mr. Nitze. It is an evolutionary process where one hopes to make small progress. I can't be optimistic about complete disarmament.

Mr. BIESTER. I think back on all the various efforts made in those directions and none of them has been very productive over the long span.

I am not a student of them, but I seem to recall the Washington conference which set limitations on ships and tonnage and armaments and so forth which didn't seem to accomplish very much.

I seem to recall the various points along the way during the thirties that both sides would, when they thought they had a sufficient advantage, publicly proclaim their desire for a limitation on weapons and a disarmament conference.

ACDA STAGNATED BY AN EXISTENTIAL PROCESS

I just wonder whether there is a real goal or whether we are simply engaged in the kind of existential process by which we limit the falibility of our other judgments. I suspect it is the latter.

Mr. RATHJENS. I would agree with that.

Mr. BIESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I would like to ask a question, but I want to preface by saying I don't want it to appear that I am antimilitary. But there have been some who have the view that there were too many military officers, or question at least the number of military officers, active or recently retired in senior ACDA slots.

I know from personal experience some of the military officers in ACDA did an excellent job, were very knowledgeable, and we needed that type of personnel, but should there be a formula as to the number of military personnel; or is there a danger that there would be too many military officers in senior ACDA slots?

DANGER OF IMPROPER MILITARY VIEW

Mr. NITZE. My impression was that in the initial organization of ACDA great weight was put upon that segment of ACDA which consisted of military analysis and which was headed by a lieutenant general. Over the years a different portion of ACDA, that portion which included the scientists, the physicists, and the civilian analysts, came to have more influence than did the military section within ACDA.

I am unaware of ACDA ever having been in a position where there was danger of an improper military view capturing ACDA or being too influential.

The final question is the degree to which ACDA should avail itself of military expertise. I do not believe that ACDA should be limited in that. I don't see that there is any reason, at least there isn't as yet,

for there being limitations on ACDA tapping military talent, so again I come up where I started, and that was that I don't yet see a compelling need for amendments to the act.

Mr. RATHJENS. I share those views.

It does seem to me from my own experience with the Agency that there has never been improper military influence.

RELYING MORE ON MILITARY FOR EXPERTISE

My only concern would be that the officer assigned there may find himself in a situation of almost conflict of interest on occasion. I am not sure if I were an aspiring colonel in the Air Force that I would necessarily pick an ACDA assignment as the preferred route to getting my star. That would be my only concern. It may be a case, perhaps for, relying more on retired officers for expertise than on serving officers.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If I may ask a final question to round up in summary. There are indeed some who feel that ACDA has not been as effective as it could have been. Some of the accomplishments credited to ACDA would have been accomplished by other governmental agencies if ACDA did not exist.

Indeed, some say the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency could very well be abolished.

What would be the fate or the result of the lack of input in our better understanding of the problem of arms control, trying to bring disarmament in the world, if ACDA were abolished?

Mr. NITZE. In the period prior to 1961 there was no ACDA. There was, however, a fairly substantial division or bureau within the State Department which handled comparable responsibilities.

IF ACDA ABOLISHED, THEN WHAT?

It was my view then, both the effectiveness of ACDA and the degree to which its actions would get into the main policy stream and get the attention of the Secretary of State and the President, would be greater if this work were separated out into a separate agency reporting to the Secretary of State, but not being part of the State Department. I think that has happened and I think it was a good thing to separate out this work from the main body of the State Department. If ACDA were abolished, the works would have to go someplace. I think the only alternative would be for it to go back to the State Department to a division or bureau of the State Department.

It is always possible to overcome less than optimal organizational arrangements. I am sure if you got the right people in and paid enough attention to it, you could make it work virtually as well as a separate agency, but I would not recommend it.

Mr. RATHJENS. I share those views except I would say that the State Department isn't the only place it could happen.

ALTERNATIVES TO ACDA

If the Agency did not exist, the work could be done perhaps in the NSC staff; some of it might even be done in OMB or in a reactivated President's Science Advisory Committee, as much of the work was done on the nuclear test ban before ACDA was organized; but I would certainly agree if it weren't there you would have to parcel out the work somewhere. A President would need that kind of help, and it seems to me that the present arrangement of having an organization such as ACDA is probably a fairly satisfactory solution as far as the executive branch is concerned.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, we are grateful for your expert testimony. Your recommendations and observations will be most helpful to the subcommittee in its study of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The subcommittee stands adjourned until Tuesday, October 1, when our witnesses will be Hon. McGeorge Bundy, former National Security Adviser to the President, and Hon. Elliot Richardson, former Secretary of Defense.

I thank you again, gentlemen.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene on Tuesday, October 1, 1974.]

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order.

The chairman wishes to apologize for the late start. The members had several prior meetings; therefore, the delay in beginning of this hearing.

We resume this morning with the third in our series of hearings on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Our chief interest and concern is whether legislative changes may be necesary to make ACDA more effective.

Here today to help us in fulfilling that objective are two distinguished and respected former Government officials. They are:

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser to the President from 1961 to 1966, and currently president of the Ford Foundation; and

The Honorable Elliot Richardson, former Attorney General and Secretary to the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare and Defense. Mr. Richardson is currently a Fellow with the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution.

We are very honored and privileged to have you with us. Mr. Bundy, if you will, proceed, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. McGEORGE BUNDY, PRESIDENT, FORD FOUNDATION, AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT

A native of Boston, Mass., Mr. Bundy has compiled a distinguished career as educator, government official, and foundation executive. Mr. Bundy served on the faculty of Harvard University prior to his appointment by President Kennedy in 1961 as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. He remained in that position under President Johnson until 1966 when he was named head of the Ford Foundation. He is the author of several books and articles in the area of foreign relations.

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great pleasure to be here at your invitation as a private citizen to comment on the past and future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

As you say, I was Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs when this legislation was passed and in the following 4 years I had a good opportunity to see the new agency at work.

I was then and I am now a strong supporter both of the legislation and of the agency, itself, as essential to the work of the executive branch in national security affairs.

Your committee has heard authoritative testimony from John J. McCloy and Adrian Fisher on the legislative history of the act and, in addition, you have the admirable staff review prepared by Mr. Philip Farley.

Finding myself in broad agreement with what is said in this review and by those witnesses, I will confine my opening statement to a brief set of summary comments which we can explore as you and your colleagues desire.

ARMS CONTROL AS IMPORTANT AS MILITARY SYSTEMS

First, it is in the very nature of the nuclear age that the control and limitation of armaments are just as important for the national security as military systems, themselves. It is, therefore, fundamental to the formulation of policy in this area that the President and his senior advisers should have access to information and advice which cover the full spectrum of the dangers and opportunities we face. I know of no substitute for ACDA in helping to insure that this full spectrum of informed advice is available.

There have, of course, been other important points of input, notably the President's Science Advisory Committee, and sometimes the Bureau of the Budget and often special elements in the Department of Defense, itself. But over a sustained long term period, I think an independent or autonomous agency such as ACDA is the only fully reliable means and indeed the history of efforts through these other channels, I think, demonstrate the point.

Second, the act of 1961 remains a sound and well-conceived statute. It does what legislation can do to give an agency life and force inside the executive branch, and the work ACDA does inside the executive branch is its central mission.

I do agree with other witnesses, that one change which might well be made in the authorizing legislation would be some expression of legislative intent or requirement that the Agency have full access, under the direction of the President, to all information and all plans, especially in the field of weapons development, which relate to its responsibility for informed and timely advice on questions of arms control.

ACDA EFFECTIVENESS DEPENDENT ON PRESIDENT, STAFFING

Third, in any administration the effectiveness of ACDA will depend on two crucial and interconnected elements:

The first is the degree to which the President and his most senior advisers make use of the capabilities of the Agency as they address matters relating to arms control and disarmament, and the second is the strength and quality of the Agency's leadership and staff.