FREQUENCY OF GAC MEETINGS

As I recall, as I am looking back on the meetings of the committee, they met 2 days in succession-say four or five times a year. Their discussions were very lively. They had the benefit of very comprehensive presentations.

There were at no stage any obstacles placed in the way of the committee's getting any amount of information, confidential or otherwise, that it felt that it was entitled to have, particularly referring to a good bit of very sensitive intelligence information and scientific information as well as levels of armament and things of that very confidential nature.

There were meetings with the Secretary of State, very frequent meetings with the Director of the Agency. There were some meetingsthey were less frequent-with the President, and as time went on some of the contacts with the White House became less frequent and less direct. So we began to make written reports sometimes, rather than to look forward to a face-to-face meeting.

Incidentally, Dr. Kissinger, who was then of course in the White House, did make himself available to the committee very frequently, and he was very forthcoming in his appearances before the committee.

DID COMMITTEE SERVE ITS PURPOSE?

I mention the setting up of the committee at some length because it is interesting to me what transpired as a result of it. Rather than being something of a safeguard against far out ideology on the part of pacifists, or passionate disarmament advocates, the committee really did exercise a very, I think, objective point of view-knowledgeable and imaginative point of view.

It turned out that it made recommendations that were perhaps a little further out in the area of constraints on armament than some of its advisees were prepared to accept.

Now I think that the committee served a useful purpose. It had a real effect, I think, on the Agency itself; it tended to keep the Agency up to the bit, so to speak. There was a lot of questioning of Agency officials made by the members of the committee, and the fact that the agency had to prepare for the meetings of the committee from time to time over very wide area subjects did, I think, tend to keep them on their toes, and I think that they also did contribute to the thinking of the decisionmakers, the people that did prepare the terms of reference that were to go to the negotiators.

I would say as a result of my experience with the men on those committees over that period of years, that it was a helpful institution. I was asked this morning whether I thought at this stage in history it was advisable and necessary or helpful to retain it. I think I would have to give a little more thought to that suggestion than I have thus far, but I think I can testify as to the past. I believe that the committee did serve its purpose, and in some ways led the thought in regard to proposals in the manner that I don't believe the Congress itself had contemplated at the time the act was passed.

My feeling now is that the committee perhaps, looking back on it, should address itself in the future, if it is to continue more in longer range aspects of armament, and perhaps less exclusively to the current give-and-take of Soviet-United States disarmament negotiations, as it tended to do more recently.

ARMS FLOW TO THIRD POWERS DISTURBING

I am very much disturbed, as I know a whole lot of other people are by this massive flow of arms, mainly conventional, to third powers; it is assuming very large proportions.

The greatest tank battles in history, I am told, have been fought in Syria and Egypt during the October war, and tanks are pouring into that part of the world from both sides, or at least from the Soviet side and our side. If the committee is charged with advice to safeguard world peace, it seems to me this is a situation which the Agency and the committee should examine into, and on which they ought to be prepared, or might be prepared, to offer advice to their statutory advisees.

NEED TO INTERNATIONALIZE ARMS CONTROL PROCESSES

This danger of confrontation growing out of these areas, the possibility of third party and fourth party confrontation with the backup for the first and second parties, is getting more and more ominous in my judgment. I think that perhaps instead of exclusively as they have in the past been considering both in the Agency and the committee as I say; the give-and-take, and the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear power, it might be well to think of some broader concepts, and even perhaps to place more accent on the internationalization of the disarmament and arms control movement in view of the dangers that we now face.

So I would make that suggestion even though I am aware that it would have to continue to do this so-called backup work in regard to negotiations as they have in the past.

Another thing is the matter of how you use the Agency and how you use the committee. I found that during the negotiations which took place in the course of Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow, some very farreaching decisions were made without recourse to the advice of the committee, and I am told, although I cannot testify of my own knowledge, without notice to some of the members and officials of ACDA. I know it was difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the advice of the committee in view of the time and the space factors, but I think that the result was rather unfortunate.

POLITICAL PRESSURE PRESENT

There was very heavy political pressure on both the President and Dr. Kissinger and Gerry Smith at that time, and I could not escape. the conclusion that the results were unfortunate. I don't know that we would have been able to divert them, even if we had had an opportunity to render our advice, but looking back on it, the results that

did evolve created at least the appearance of ceding nuclear superiority in major categories of launchers to the Soviet Union, and it requires. a good bit of argumentation, to say the least, to dissipate that impression.

I draw some conclusion from that. I have the feeling that of course all democracies are subject perhaps to this handicap of political pressures. You don't get any pressures operating under dictatorships that are not immediately suppressed, but in democracies you are dealing with negotiations with other countries; and political pressures are exerted, particularly if political tensions are high at home at the time. Where possible-I know it is not always possible-I would strongly urge that in the future that disarmament control or arms agreements be well and clearly outlined before any summit meetings are scheduled to deal with them.

REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

I think, as I indicated just a minute ago, that reduction of conventional weaponry may now be becoming such an increasing factor in the preservation of peace, that I believe an agency supposed to be dealing with arms control and disarmament has to look into this aspect of arms. I am aware that this is a difficult problem, and it is not unrelated, of course, to the economic situation that is the shift of the balance of wealth-to the oil-producing countries and their propensity to buy larger and larger quantities of arms together with the equal tendency on the part of the consuming nations to sell them to their oil creditors. This condition at present does not really hold out much hope for conventional reductions.

But I think it is considerations such as this that the Advisory Committee and the Agency should in the future take into account. There have been some suggestions that the activities, attitudes, conclusions, and recommendations of the Agency were not as well known or publicized as they should be, and perhaps this is due to the fact, and quite properly that there are so many security aspects related to their advice that they cannot really billboard their conclusions. But if their studies did produce general advice in regard to reduction of armaments under their world peace mandate, their conclusions might very well be published and weighed, therefore, more effectively by the public and by the Congress than they have been in the past when they have confined themselves to advice that is surrounded with security considerations.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF ACDA

Constantly the question is asked, well, where do we stand? What has been achieved? I have tried to spell out here in my statement what has been done and what has been accomplished by the creation. of the Agency, by the passage of the act of 1961. I was trying to sum these up in my own mind. Thanks to Mr. Berdes I got a copy of the staff review that was prepared by Mr. Farley, and I find he set

1 The text of the staff review appears in appendix on p. 183.

out there to a very large degree on pages 6, 7, 8, and 9 the treaties that were arrived at and what had been achieved in the way of negotiations that had been stimulated largely as a result of the effort of the Agency.

Another thing I think we have got to bear in mind is that the passage of the act itself was a very significant thing. The creation of the Agency with its powers and its authority was a very impressive earnest of our intention. It was an indication of the sincerity and the purpose of this country in its effort to advance the cause of disarmament. I don't know of any other country that went as far, and I am sure it stimulated the thinking and knowledge as to the implications and problems of unconstrained competition and development of arms throughout the world.

I am aware that at the present the SALT negotiations seem to be a bit sluggish and unpromising, but this should not blind us to the fact that a good bit has been accomplished. I think without the Agency and without the passage of that act we probably would not be as far along as we are now. The fact that we are still in negotiation with the Soviet Union in a persistent interchange of thought is very important and this, in such ideological, hostile countries, is itself an important circumstance.

POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT?

If I were asked as to how I would go about improving the organization, as I say I don't know that I would have the answers, and I don't know that I have had the time to weigh all the things that might be done, but in looking back come to the conclusion that the 1961 actand I have reread it over the weekend-was rather well designed to meet the needs that it faced.

I think that the arguments that were then used to subordinate the Agency to the Secretary of State remain quite understandable today. I don't think that we could comfortably say that if the Agency had been more antagonistic-and the word was "adversarial"-to the attitudes of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or the President, it would have advanced the causes of disarmament and arms control.

KEY FACTOR IS HOW AGENCY USED BY PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE

With me it is always a significant thing—and as I look back on it I feel this is my strong conviction-the significant thing is how the President as well as the Secretary of State and the Director used the Agency. My view may be that neither President Johnson nor President Nixon used the Agency and the Advisory Committee to their fullest advantage or excellent Directors of the Agency, such as William Foster and Adrian Fisher, who had the title frequently of Deputy Director, but frequently was the Acting Director and for all practical purposes the Director when Foster was off negotiating or was not available to carry on the affairs of the Agency.

Gerard Smith and Farley are often names that I might mention. It was a really well-equipped Agency, I thought, taking into account the knowledge and experience and industry with which they tackled their job.

Although I think that the President should have communicated or might well have communicated more fully with the committee, I don't think the entire blame for the lack of communication should be placed on the President. The committee has an obligation of its own and if it has something that it really feels that is worthy of getting to the attention of the Presidency it should not wait to have a request made on it for advice but I think it should offer advice.

To some degree I believe that the Advisory Committee was a little too disposed to wait for such a call before proffering advice, and for this I assume some responsibility. We did on occasions have some difficulty in presenting our views personally to the President. I put this down toward the general disposition then existing in the White House to discourage visitation but that did not apply only to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

AGENCY DIRECTOR, GAC HEAD ON NSC

I have said that I thought that the Director of the Agency and the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, in view of the language of the statute, should have a place on the NSC. I did sometimes very frequently appear at the NSC and did state the views of the committee and some degree of the Agency. I am not so sure that that ought to be incorporated in the statute: Perhaps he can be tipped in as it seems advisable, but I do think that the Director of the Agency should have a spot on either the NSC, the Committee of Principals, or the Verification Board or whatever the organization happens to be that is formulating recommendations to the President for the terms of reference.

I have some other comments here. Again as I say they are somewhat off the top of my head. I don't like the idea of setting up within the Agency any sort of a propaganda capacity.

I was not impressed by the handicaps that we operated under, because the Pentagon had more money for public relations than the Agency had. Generals expressed their views, and the admirals quite properly, but I never sensed a situation where the Director could not also do so if he was armed with the facts and had the will to do so.

I doubt very seriously that the Agency was ever seriously handicapped for lack of informational funds. A certain amount of that work I think it can well go on in its way of explaining its position, perhaps with some of the scientific agencies and in some of the educational areas. Maybe some increase in the size of the funds for such purposes would be justifiable, but the idea of having a substantial sum of money to enable it to publicize its concepts around the worldperhaps in opposition to those decisions of the Government-does not really appeal to me.

ARMS CONTROL: PLAGUED BY LEAKS

Another thing in this respect which creates some reluctance on any part is the fact that this whole business of arms control and disarmament somehow or other has been plagued by leaks. I know it is not the only activity in Washington that is, but my general feeling is that the more money you have for publicity the more leaks you are apt to generate.