Mr. ZABLOCKI. The recent administration. Mr. BRENNAN. Why don't we ask Dr. Farley to come over and sit at this table. I am sure he is well informed. Mr. FISHER. I don't ask anyone to ask anyone. I know the difficulties of a fine public servant; I hate to say this in his presence. He is a great man. Mr. ZABLOCKI. That is why we selected Dr. Farley. Mr. FISHER. I would not want to put him on the spot by saying why he didn't want to stay. Mr. ZABLOCKI. If agencies can be purged of good men, such agencies are undermined no matter how well they are constructed and administered. They cannot be under such an ax. What can be done to prevent future purges? Mr. BRENNAN. Nothing. Mr. ZABLOCKI. There must be something.. Mr. FISHER. It seems to me the only way it can be done is the political ramifications of that purge itself was worth. I regret to report that there was so much static on the line that that reaction could not be made here because there was so much more going on. It was a bad period in American political history in my judgment. GOAL OF THOSE WHO CONDUCTED PURGE I say this without any direct personal interest. I mean I am a law school dean happily watching from a distance and worrying about students occupying my office-not so much worried as I used to be. There was a purge in this Agency, there is no question about it. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Am I correct in assuming that the abolition of the Agency and not the purge itself was really the final goal of those who did the purging? Mr. FISHER. I don't think so. I think the purge was an attempt of a group formerly on the White House staff to get a form of personal control over larger areas of the executive branch of the Government that were outside of the normal areas of Presidential and political responsibility. I do not think that Mr. Ikle was any part or parcel of that. I give him the highest grades and he is a great man but I don't know what you could put in the legislation when you have Presidential appointees or, for that matter, scheduled employees that could prevent a purge. I am sorry that the political reactions of 1973 were such that there was not greater attention brought to this purge, but that is in fact what happened. DECLINING TO PURSUE ADMINISTRATION POLICY Mr. BIESTER. If the chairman will yield. Dean Fisher has set this point very sharply. You cannot have a nonpurged system and also a nonpurged system for others, and you may have circumstances in which the policy of an administration which may be very good policy is declined to be pursued. You have got to have the power. Mr. FISHER. Yes, that is true. I agree with that, Congressman. The only problem is in this particular case there was so much static all around the entire Government that there was no attention brought to this. Mr. BIESTER. We cannot make a value judgment based on only those circumstances. Mr. FISHER. I agree with that. Sooner or later you have to have administration responsibility. My problem is you had this rather unhappily in view of a particular political situation. When it was happening here it was happening so many other places, it got lost in the shuffle. Mr. ZABLOCKI. It was really not lost in the shuffle. My staff counsel refreshes my memory. Early in 1973 a deep cut in the budget and personnel was ordered. At this time this subcommittee requested-I wish Mr. McCloy were here to comment-him and others to come before us to testify as to just what happened and why. GAC DECLINES TO TESTIFY Maybe they felt the legislation bound them to advise only the President, Secretary of State, and the Director of ACDA they were "unavailable." That is one reason I think the Advisory Committee should perhaps be done away with. On second thought, we will live with it for a while. Mr. FISHER. Rather than do away with it I would make it the form of responsibility that you prefer, rather than throw the baby out with the bath water. Mr. ZABLOCKI. We could not get a response, we could not get them to come before the committee to justify the action of somebody in the executive. Mr. BRENNAN. If I may add a footnote about what Mr. Fisher said about the purge. He said it was an attempt by some people on the White House staff to gain control. I think I would put a slightly different perspective on it. I was in no way close to that operation so I am speaking somewhat speculatively. "EXCESSIVELY LIBERAL ACTIVISM" My understanding at second- and third-hand was that the people on the White House staff who were responsible for the purge were reacting against what they perceived to be an excessively liberal activism within the Agency's upper reaches in the preceding year or two or three, much more than an attempt to impose future detailed control. This is perhaps only a difference of emphasis from Mr. Fisher's theory of why it was brought about. Mr. FISHER. I would prefer my own emphasis on this, Mr. Chair man. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I believe both of you gentlemen have made a significant contribution on this issue. Mr. Biester. Mr. BIESTER. No questions. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, you have been most generous with your time. I want to again apologize for the unavoidable interruptions because of the legislative program in the House of Representatives. We have had to respond to rollcalls and quorum calls. Thank you for your studied views. I am sure that the absent members will carefully read your testimony and I might say as chairman I am going to give a careful rereading of your prepared testimony. I thank all of you for coming. Mr. FISHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee stands adjourned until tomorrow at 2 p.m. [Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 2 p.m., September 25, 1974.] ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1974 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2:15 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order. We will resume this afternoon the subcommittee's hearings on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Our witnesses today are the Honorable Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and until recently, a member of the U.S. SALT negotiating team; and, Prof. George Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Rathjens' previous Government experience includes terms on the staff of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and 2 years as Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA. Gentlemen, we indeed are very pleased and honored that you were able to get the time to come before this subcommittee to share with us your views on how the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency can be upgraded, so to speak. The biographical data on Secretary Nitze and Professor Rathjens will be made a part of the record prior to their statement. Secretary Nitze, I understand you do not have a prepared statement but you may begin, sir. STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL NITZE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND MEMBER OF THE U.S. SALT NEGOTIATING TEAM Dr. Paul Nitze has led a varied and distinguished career in government and private industry. Born in Massachusetts, he received his LL.D. from Johns Hopkins University. Positions he has held in the State Department are Deputy Director, Office of International Trade Policy; Deputy to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; and Director, Policy Planning Staff. He also served in the Department of Defense as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1961 to 1963; Secretary of the Navy, 1963–67; and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1967–69. Dr. Nitze is a former member of the U.S. delegation to SALT in Geneva. (59) 41-421-74 5 |