Mr. IKLE. There is a great deal more that can be said. I don't know how much time you wish to give to this question. There are people working on the arms control and disarmament issues in all the relevant agencies,1 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department. It is with these people that my staff interact on almost a daily basis, also with the National Security Council staff.

The structure in each department and agency differs slightly at the discretion, of course, of the respective Secretary or agency head. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Arms control matters are handled in the other relevant departments in ways similar to those used in ACDA?

Mr. IKLE. ACDA has the primary function dealing with arms control and disarmament issues. For these other departments this is part of their larger job. Hence they have relatively few people working on these issues. They do not have, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the analytic capability, except for the systems analysis capability in the Defense Department. It is here that our staff with its expertise, its technical knowledge and political knowledge can have a great deal of weight, because knowledge here is an instrument of power and influence, if I may put it that way.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. du Pont.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONGRESS, GOVERNMENT, AND THEIR CONSCIENCES

Dr. Ikle, I think your statement is an excellent one outlining the problems you have.

On page 3 you hit upon two items that I think are perhaps worthy of some comment. You describe yourself at the bottom of page 2, carrying over to page 3, as the conscience of the Nation on the question of long term international arms control issues.

We have all had problems from time to time with our consciences, particularly listening to them. How do you think you can persuade Congress, if you will, the U.S. Government, to listen to its conscience a little bit more?

1 Number of Persons in Agencies and Departments Other Than ACDA Working on Arms Control:

On the basis of the best information available to ACDA through its informal working relationships with other Government agencies, it is estimated that the number of persons indicated below are working on arms control at the agencies listed.

Department of Defense-The Office of the Secretary of Defense has 23 persons full-time and 18 persons part-time on a regular basis, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services have 50 persons full-time and 49 part-time. In DOD, arms control activities permeate the entire department but cluster principally in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In ISA, there is a DOD SALT Task Force with representatives from every major Defense element which has been organized directly under the Secretary of Defense. Additional support and expertise are provided by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering; Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Intelligence, Program Analysis and Evaluation, and Public Affairs; the Office of General Counsel; the Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have assigned responsibility for arms control activities to the Director, J-5, Plans and Policy, who is supported, as appropriate, by the Service staffs. Atomic Energy Commission-The equivalent of seven full-time man-years per year (excludes manpower devoted to domestic safeguards).

At the AEC the work on arms control matters is primarily handled by the Division of Safeguards and Security under the Associate Director for Policy and Standards. Department of State-The equivalent of 20 full-time man-years per year. This work is focused in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, the Policy Planning Staff and the Office of the Counselor of the Department.

National Security Council-A total of approximately 10 persons divided among the NSC Program Analysis Staff, Research Group, and Office of Scientific Affairs.

Mr. IKLE. We try to do this in many ways. We try to do it by presenting a case based on facts in these internal meetings and deliberations, be it the Verificaion Panel chaired by Dr. Kissinger, or the National Security Council chaired by the President. We try to build a persuasive case to accompany our recommendations to the President and to the Secretary of State. We also attempt to interact with Congress in developing our case.

As I said in my opening remarks, this has to be a two-way street. The advice can flow in both directions. In some sense the public at large has to be brought in, with its anxieties about nuclear war and with its concerns about the burden of the Defense budget.

FOCAL POINT ASSIMULATING SOUND IDEAS

I did not want to mean this in a presumptious way, that we have a kind of privileged knowledge of arms control and disarmament, but rather by way of illustrating that we are a focal point trying to pull together sound ideas, whether they are from Congress, from the academic community, from the public at large, from the scientific community, or from our own staff, and try to focus everybody's attention on the long term process in arms control. So that short term considerations do not win out in every decision.

Mr. DU PONT. My question is not so much your role, and I am not trying to put any presumptious role on your Agency, but if you could suggest one or two things that might be done in order that your message, whatever that might be, might get through better across the street in the Capitol, what would you suggest to us?

Mr. IKLE. Let me give you an example. In the area of nuclear proliferation, we are deeply concerned about the development, which really was not military in origin, the question of peaceful nuclear explosives or PNE's.

IMPLICATIONS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

Since the Indian explosion on May 18 of this year, of course, this problem has been highlighted for the world at large. The problem also appears in the unfinished business of the threshold test ban treaty where negotiations are still required to make arrangements for peaceful nuclear explosives.

From an arms control point of view ACDA has always taken a negative position or jaundiced view of PNE's, and this may now be borne out by further evaluations in our own Government. As you know, PNE funding has gone down; indeed, Congress has put in a prohibition against further tests during this fiscal year. Yet the idea of peaceful nuclear explosions is there.

It is an American idea and, if I may put it starkly, from an arms control point of view, it is almost a diabolic invention because it pretends a distinction in the development of nuclear explosives, where there really can't be a distinction, particularly at the beginning of such a peaceful explosive program.

It makes it easier for countries and governments and budgetary efforts to move in the direction of support of a peaceful nuclear explo

sive program, which, in essence, may be tantamount to a nuclear weapons explosive program.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I will have to interrupt. There is a vote in progress on the floor. We will be in recess until 2:45.

[A brief recess was taken.]

CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION ESSENTIAL

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The committee will come to order.
The hearing will resume.

Mr. du Pont.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Ikle, my second question went to the second of your three reasons on page 2 as to why the active participation of Congress is essential. You point out that sound arms control policy requires a long leadtime, that it takes a long time to get the idea ready for negotiations, to present it properly and so forth.

Do

Similarly new weapons development is a very long term operation. you feel that your agency has an input into the mainstream of the Congress thinking early enough in weapon system development to perhaps alter the course of events?

I am thinking particularly of the hearings that this subcommittee held on the new binary gases and binary gas delivery system. That is an expensive project that is going to take a long time to develop.

Do you feel on something like that that you have a chance to get an input into the situation before it is too late, before we are committed to the development of a new system?

Mr. IKLE. We do try to have an input in a timely fashion and I think, as the history of the binary chemicals illustrates, there are many ways of having an input. It is difficult to standardize this. This relates in a way to the question of the impact statement or impact analysis which has been discussed in these very hearings.

DIFFERENT FORMS OF INPUT

Our input can take many different forms. It can be in substantive hearings such as we had on binary chemicals. It can be an informal function, ACDA people in legitimate public affairs activities or in the agency-to-agency process, letting it be known that, from an arms control point of view, a particular program may not be desirable, or that we should emphasize a different direction in weapons development. Let me try to be a bit more specific. Some of the programs, most of the important programs, really, as you just said, Congressman du Pont, take a long time. Hence, there are several opportunities for the arms control impact to be discussed, be it in substantive hearings, in informal discussions with Members of Congress, or within the administration itself.

We now are facing very important questions, looking at the longer term, for new strategic delivery systems that will be survivable for the coming decades.

As you have heard, the Russians have been testing new ICBM's, bigger and heavier than the ones we have and bigger than the ones they had before.

So what should we do? Some people have proposed that we, too, build bigger ICBM's. This would be a relatively inexpensive delivery system, less expensive than bombers or submarines. But from the point of view of arms control this is probably the worst way to go, for fixed ICBM's are bound to become increasingly vulnerable in the future.

The larger the fixed missile the more your deterrent force is concentrated in one target. Thus, in this case, the arms control consideration really moves in the opposite direction of the economic consideration, which is important to the taxpayer.

We are in the awkward position here of leaning possibly toward the more expensive rather than the less expensive system.

I mention this just as an illustration of a process which really can go on over many years, in many different forms, in many different hearings.

MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR INPUT

Mr. DU PONT. Is there sufficient opportunity within the executive branch, for example, for you to make an input, the very point you made-have you an opportunity to make that input early enough in the decisionmaking process in the executive branch?

Mr. IKLE. Yes; there are many opportunities. The reason I stressed the "many" is that mentioning it once in a National Security Council meeting or Verification Panel meeting or once to the President may not necessarily settle the issue.

It has to be presented in many different ways and forms to make it effective.

This also relates, of course, to the question of impact statements which I mentioned in my response to your previous questions.

Mr. DU PONT. Let me ask one more question that is very specific. We have seen over recent months some disclosures and some hypothetical discussion of the physical security of U.S. nuclear weapons. We see in Greece a potential problem. We have seen some newspaper articles suggesting that in this country it would be relatively easy to steal fissionable material and make homemade bombs or whatever.

STATUTE ESTABLISHES NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

Is ACDA doing anything to minimize the danger? Are efforts being made to establish procedures to safeguard nuclear materials, or is that something that is outside your department?

Mr. IKLE. No, Mr. du Pont, this is not outside. Indeed, under the statute establishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it is part of our interest. It happens that in my professional work before I became Director, this very question-security of our nuclear weapons-had been for a long period of vital concern to me.

Thus, you might say I have a personal interest. In addition, I have directed some very talented staff members to focus on this, to move ahead to see if they can contribute ideas.

Let me also add that in this instance obviously the Defense Department has the primary responsibility, and while quite a bit has been said about the proper adversary role of ACDA-which is important— on this issue we are all pulling in the same direction.

Any good idea that my staff can contribute will be made available to the people in Defense and we are pushing on it, too.

Mr. DU PONT. Are you making some progress on it?

QUESTION ON DR. IKLE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, I would like to compliment you on a very fine statement. We all appreciate your willingness to discuss with us from time to time some of the problems that you are faced with. I certainly appreciate the many calls that I have had from you personally. I was just wondering about your relationship with President Ford.

One of the recommendations, of course, in the subcommittee was that there ought to be something in the law that would require you to give your personal views. Do you find President Ford difficult to talk to, and what is his interest in arms control?

Mr. IKLE. I met with Mr. Ford when he was Vice President. I have since met with President Ford on several occasions at National Security Council meetings.

It is my great pleasure to see his keen and well-informed interest in arms control issues from the smallest details to the broad questions, and his desire to make progress in arms control matters, and the ease with which he can be approached on any issue that is of concern to many. I would like to point out that if it were not already in the statute that the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ought to advise the President, I would think it should be put in. However, since it is there, and since the statute includes the Director giving his personal opinion to the President, I think nothing further needs to be done.

DUAL ROLE PREFERRED OVER DIVIDED ONE?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Your predecessor, of course, had a dual role in operation. He was not only the Director of the Agency, but he served as our chief negotiator.

Do you find this a problem in your own work? Do you think that it is better to keep them divided as they are now?

Mr. IKLE. Indeed, I would find it a problem if I had to be in Geneva at the same time I needed to be here in Washington to perform my role as Director.

My predecessor, Gerard Smith, did an admirable job in leading the SALT negotiating team; and with his excellent Deputy, Philip J. Farley, running the Agency at the same time, it was possible during those years.

Now I think it would be almost impossible because we not only have the SALT negotiations going, but we have been preparing for the NPT Review Conference. We have a lot of other issues coming up; we have new issues coming up in multilateral forums.

As you know, the principal decisions are being taken here in Washington rather than in the forum of the delegation.

Thus, I am very pleased that it is no longer necessary for me as Director to be the chief negotiator in one of these negotiations. Indeed, if the change had not been made, I would have recommended it.