confidentiality in the course of some of the discussions that we had. I have no doubt that such a joint committee could meet that problem.

NEED FOR MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION

Further, such a joint committee could respond to another need expressed in this report, and that is a need for more public information on these issues. It is not easy for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to conduct negotiations or to advise the President and the Secretary of State on the one hand and on the other hand go to the public and help them in the debate of alternatives or the debate with regard to points of view different from those which are represented by our negotiators.

I think such a joint committee of the Congress might be able through hearings, through publications, through encouragement of studies, and other institutions such as universities and research institutions, to contribute substantially to public discussion and understanding of some of these issues without committing either the Congress, itself, or the Government of the United States on the details which might be involved in a negotiating position.

Certainly, as a matter of convenience, from the executive branch point of view, if there were a body with whom one could consult with reasonable confidentiality, that would be somewhat more orderly and easier than consulting with four or five different subcommittees of the Congress.

I think there is another point, and I don't say that because I happen to be sitting on this side of Capitol Hill, when we talk about limitation of arms, we are in a field which has a very specific and direct bearing upon the constitutional powers of the Congress to raise armies, provide for the national defense, maintain a Navy, and so forth, and I think the limitation of arms field might be somewhat like the trade field, a field shared between the Senate and the House of Representatives, more than has been done in the past.

ARMS LIMITATIONS: RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES

I think such a joint committee would assist that process, and it may well be, just as trade legislation goes before both Houses and, trade agreements needing approval, tend to go before the Congress for resolution, that arms limitations matters might be a matter of the resolution of both Houses of Congress rather than restricted to the treaty process.

I understand that history has a record of a certain amount of tension within the Congress on that particular point. I just mention that for what it is worth in passing.

I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, that you can solve organizational problems simply by changing organizational charts. At the end of the day an organization in government depends upon the way in which responsibility and confidence are delegated downward, in the executive branch by the President downward through people, actual living human beings, not through organizational charts or delegated by congressional legislation.

Minor adjustments won't make much difference in relation to a commitment of a President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense to try to find the right answers in this field of arms limitation.

NEED FOR "BLANK CHECK" POLICY TOWARD ACDA

Now, on the policy issues involved, your report raises a good many of them. I would think that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ought to be looked upon as an agency almost with a blank check in terms of finance and staffing. If you look at some of the things which have been accomplished thus far, modest as they are, the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 or the important preventive action such as the removal of Antarctica from a superpower arms race and the denial of weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on the seabeds, if we try to think about what our expenditures might have been, had those preventive actions not been taken, any reasonable cost for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would have been literally peanuts compared to the very large sums that might otherwise have been expended.

I think, therefore, that the test might well be how to get the talents which can give deep and imaginative thought to the possibilities of arms limitation rather than what can be done with a millions of dollars, at least in the range in which we are talking about money at the present time.

I don't believe that we ought to put an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the position of having to establish priorities in the use of their manpower and personnel and resources.

APPROACHING SUBJECT ON A BROAD FRONT

I noticed in annex C there is a list of a number of specific arms control possibilities and some options. I would think that we might want to approach this subject like an infantry advance, on a broad front. That is where it is possible to make movement, go ahead and move. But when you come across a hard-core resistance in terms of a specific problem, recognize that we have to take more time.

We should have a staff which could dig into such questions as weather and environmental warfare, regional budget expenditures, regional arms control agreements, along with the SALT talks and some possible limitation in the conventional arms field and not force an establishment of priorities by limitations of staff and funds because sometimes it is well to get agreement on small things even if you can't get agreement on large things.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, because I know you want to hear from Mr. Smith, and there will be questions, I do think that we need to go all out to try to find a broader base of agreement in the nuclear arms

race.

There are now thousands of megatons in the hands of frail human beings. The agreements we have achieved thus far have been useful enough but are very limited in character. When we look at those elements of the nuclear arms race on which there has not yet been an agreement, we can see that the prospect is that the nuclear arms race can well be continued and, indeed, accelerated, if in somewhat different channels than might have been the case had we not had SALT I.

DIFFICULTIES IN CONTINUING SALT TALKS

I do not underestimate the complexity and difficulty of moving further with the talks. Again, one of those passing tragic moments that occurred in August 1968. On a certain Wednesday morning the Soviet Union and the United States were to make a joint announcement that President Johnson was going to the Soviet Union to initiate arms limitation talks in the nuclear field. The trouble is, that had to be canceled because the night before the Soviet Union had moved their troops into Czechoslovakia.

One of the results of that was that the beginnings of the SALT talks were delayed for quite some time, for all practical purposes 11/2 to 2 years. Had we been able to get to those talks in the autumn of 1968, it is possible we might have been able to take hold of this MIRV problem at a sufficiently early stage to make it manageable.

Now that the MIRVing process has gone on in terms of deployment on our side and full research and development on the Soviet side and deployment beginning or certainly imminent, that is a far more difficult problem to deal with today than it might have been in August 1968.

ADDITIONAL SENSE OF URGENCY NEEDED

Well, we can't pause to shed tears over lost opportunities, but I think it might help us to generate an additional sense of urgency in order that we do not lose opportunities either by inattention at the very top of our Government, including the Congress, or because of any inadequacy of staff or funds to pursue these issues just as diligently as possible. Because, if we don't find some way to get an assured control on the shape of the arms race, then our budgets are likely to go out of sight, and the economic problems will be more difficult to deal with than they are now, and they are difficult enough

now.

So, I would express the hope, Mr. Chairman, that your subcommittee will find ways and means to give additional impetus to this effort and will give serious thought to whether the Congress, itself, might be somewhat more efficiently organized to deal with these issues.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Rusk for your excellent and informative testimony. Mr. Smith, if you will proceed please.

STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD SMITH, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 to 1972, is currently with the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering. A native of New York, he received his LL.B. from Yale. As a government official he has served with AEC; with Department of State his positions included Special Assistant for Atomic Affairs, Director of Policy Planning Staff, and Special Adviser to the Secretary. Mr. Smith was chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.

Mr. SMITII. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a short prepared statement but first I would like to endorse what Dean Rusk said about this report. I think this is one of the finest pieces of work of this sort that I have ever seen.

I would hope that at some point in your proceedings it be given wide publicity. I think a number of people, including my friend, Congressman Bingham, are more interested than others in seeing that more publicity is given to the work of the Arms Agency and problems of arms control. I think this would be an excellent document to further

that purpose.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It is the intention of the subcommittee to add to the present committee print a summary and recommendations and to reprint it as part of the hearings.

Mr. SMITH, Good.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In the interim, if necessary, I believe additional copies can be printed but the number would be limited.

FAILURE TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, there seems to be some disenchantment with strategic arms control at present especially in academic circles owing to what is judged by some to be a failure to limit offensive systems after 5 years of effort and owing to continuing modernization of strategic systems on both sides. To some people SALT seems to have become an excuse for the development of new weapon systems under the guise of hedging, insuring, or bargaining.

Now, it seems to me that our critics of SALT tend to pass over the very substantial strategic controls contained in the ABM Treaty. In this criticism the ABM Treaty seems to be taken for granted and all the focus is on the interim freeze and the prospect of converting that treaty. The ABM Treaty eliminated the prospect of a costly and unwinable competition in defensive weapons systems, a competition that could have destabilized the strategic relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

I would like especially to point out the provision in the ABM Treaty which in effect legitimizes intelligence techniques as a means of verifying arms control arrangements. I think that was a very significant breakthrough in international law. That position is bolstered by another one which rules out concealment measures aimed at defeating verification.

I think if someone had asked us in 1969 would the Soviets ever agree to eschew concealment measures of any sort I would have said no, no

way.

EXECUTING STRATEGIC DIALOG WITH U.S.S.R.

There is also the institution of the Standard Consultative Commission which has already proved its usefulness in connection with working out replacement procedures and which to my mind gives a quite good promise for being a useful mechanism for carrying out a strategic dialog with the U.S.S.R.

One other bonus from the ABM Treaty which has not gotten much attention is that it is becoming gradually clearer, at least to the United States, that once a nation has agreed not to defend its cities against missiles it makes little sense to defend them against bombers.

As you know, we have and presently do have a very substantial antiaircraft defense system. If I understand the Secretary of Defense in his recent statements correctly, that is going to be reduced in size as the direct result of the ABM Treaty and therefore I think you will see substantial reductions in defense expenditures as the antiaircraft program is reduced.

As a general proposition I don't think it comes as any surprise to you gentlemen that I believe that the SALT process has increased the U. S. national security and that a continued effort to reach controls over offensive systems is well warranted.

STAFF DEPARTURES PLACE ACDA IN ECLIPSE

Turning for a minute to the question of the agency, after the successful conclusion of SALT I, ACDA, which I believe made a substantial contribution to that outcome, went into something of an eclipse. Highly skilled, knowledgeable and experienced officers were lost to the Government. Now all officials working on arms control realize it is somewhat hazardous duty. To some people, those who worked to limit U.S. armaments are suspect even though the limitation is through a process of verifiable agreements which would limit U.S.S.R. armaments at the same time.

The field of arms control embraces a range of disciplines and to become expert in the field takes years. This means spanning different administrations. To be an expendable member of the bureaucracy as well as an arms controller is indeed to be in double jeopardy.

Yet, the job of recruiting first class people must go on. The key component of success in arms control is people in relatively small numbers. To my mind it matters little how much money is appropriated or whether or not arms control responsibilities are in an independent agency unless first rate people are working on the subject. With a nucleus of experienced, able individuals who are recognized as such by high officials in State, Defense, CIA, JCS, and the White House, there is good prospect that ACDA can be productive.

GENERATING POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON ACDA IN WHITE HOUSE

But in addition there is needed a certain attitude in the White House and at top levels of the State Department that ACDA is needed by the administration. Such an attitude cannot be generated by legislation and it cannot be attained with larger appropriations.

I think the President needs an agency from which he can obtain advice about the likely arms control impact of weapons development and deployment decisions and from which can come well through arms control proposals. The President should depend on the Director of ACDA for forceful presentation of arms control positions to the National Security Council in order to balance the probably somewhat differing views of other departments and agencies. This calls for a semiadversary process in which the parties are on as nearly equal terms as possible.

Such a procedure does not depend so much on what the statute says or on a clear definition of access to the President or how big an office or how large a limousine the Director of ACDA may have. It calls for