...truth of this sentence in the semantic conception is determined by an equivalence of the form (T) : The sentence "snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white. Hence in the new conception we must reject this equivalence, and consequently we must assume its denial:...

...Tarski and is more fundamental. The semantic conception of truth is regularly epitomized in the example: ‘Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. To apply that conception in the comparison of two theories, one must therefore suppose that their proponents...

...say what it means to know it. This of course immediately leads to semantic discoveries of the type 'snow is white is true if and only if snow is white', but it also leads to an S. Stenlund (ed.). Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis, 163-174. All Rights...

...if the definition of truth is to conform to our conception, it must imply the following equivalence: The sentence" 'snow is white' is true if, and only if, snow is white . . . Employing the mediaeval logical terminology we could also say, that on the right side the words...

...English in English, leading us to the seemingly silly T-sentence that Tarski made famous: (2) The English sentence 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. The bite, in our pair of requirements, comes with the constraint that for each sentence s of L, it...

...true if and only if x exists and has the property, f. As Tarski puts it, in his standard example: (¿) ‘Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. At first sight, this example looks singularly unhelpful as the basis upon which to build a formal theory...

...in truthconditional semantics of Tarski's formalization of the notion of truth. The sentence (3) ' Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white is tacitly construed as if it expresses a tenseless, if not timeless, proposition and is being used...

...therefore often opaque to linguists. The reaction of impatient dismissal however is not. The formula Snow is white is true if and only if snow is white is quite misleading if it is taken at face value as a simple pairing of a sequence of strings which...

...truth and tests for it may be slightly softened. First, and of least importance, the familiar dictum " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" must be revised to something like " 'Snow is white' is true in a given world if and only if snow is...

...is available for 'true' in three-valued systems. The obvious reply is that the famous biconditional 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white is perfectly acceptable even if one uses three-valued logic. Tarski's criterion has as a consequence...