It is well to remember that a great many Allied vessels carrying vital cargoes of war equipment, foodstuffs, and other material were sunk during the war. Sinkings reached a high of 1,561 vessels lost by enemy action in 1942 and 586 vessels lost in 1943. As the numbers of vessels and naval aircraft on the seas were increased, sinkings fell to 199 vessels in 1944 and 88 vessels lost by enemy action in 1945. For the period from 1942 through 1945, submarines accounted for 74 percent of the Allied and neutral commercial ship losses that were due to enemy action. We must make sure that in any future war, no attempt to cut us off from our allies by submarine will succeed. Germany tried to do so in the last two World Wars and came perilously close to success. Our antisubmarine warfare program is designed to smash any attempt of underwater raiders to attack our naval vessels, merchant fleet, or our shores in any future war. Our naval vessels and merchant fleet must and will continue to move freely over the waterways of the earth. The fact that billions of tons of cargoes were moved by ship during and since the war, show how unwise it is to doubt the importance of sea power in a world whose surface is 70 percent covered by water. No one can seriously contend that cargoes will cease to be moved over the surface of that water in the foreseeable future, or that they can be more efficiently moved by any other means. In the last war, General Eisenhower and General Spaatz were able to build up their land and air forces in England because the Allied navies stopped the heavy losses en route. General Eisenhower and General Patch reached the continent of Europe across a bridge of naval craft and under naval guns. General MacArthur and General Kenney maneuvered their land and air forces to and through the Philippines because the fleet took them there, because naval planes covered their landings, and because the fleet destroyed the Japanese Navy. General MacArthur could start the final pincer on Japan because his amphibious advance to the Philippines coincided with a 6,000mile march of Navy sea-air power from Midway to Okinawa. However, sea power alone did not win the war. Neither did air power alone, nor the ground forces alone. The war was won through the combined striking power of all three, plus the tremendous effort on the home front where the production army of American industry and agriculture forged the tools of victory. Because the same combination will be needed to meet or to stamp out any future threat of war. we must preserve all the components in that combination. My remarks on the Navy budget will be an introduction to the statements that the professional leaders of the Navy will make to you. Admiral Sherman, who will follow me, will discuss naval requirements and plans for the operating forces. General Cates will discuss the Marine Corps requirements. Admiral Hopwood and other Navy witnesses will explain the details of manpower, equipment, and money necessary to support these requirements. I shall discuss some general matters affecting the naval budget. President Truman's budget for the Department of the Navy, which I fully support, is the result of a rigid screening process within the executive branch of the Government. In addition to very careful planning of forces and programs within the Department of the Navy, this budget has been reviewed in the Department of Defense and the Executive Office of the President. The Navy budget was finally established after careful consideration by the President of all those factors which must be balanced and weighed in formulating the Federal budget. The requested naval budget represents what we consider to be the minimum essential for effective Navy participation in an adequate security program. The budget estimates of the Navy for the fiscal year 1951 represent the best balance of programs we could achieve under the dollar ceiling. The operating forces and programs that this naval budget will support are, in the opinion of our professional military personnel, below those essential to meet mobilization requirements without a degree of risk. A comparison of the dollar estimates in the budget for fiscal year 1951 with prior year budgets reflects sharp reductions in over-all obligating authority. The comparison of the dollars alone in this budget with that of prior years understates the size of this reduction, since increased costs for military and civilian personnel resulting from recent legislation are reflected in these 1951 estimates. The total obligating authority in Navy estimates for 1951 is $3,881,000,000 of which $125,000,000 is carried over from 1950. This is a reduction of about 11 percent below the amount appropriated for the current fiscal year. This reduction in funds is paralleled by a reduction in all phases of operating forces and major programs, except those of the Naval and Marine Corps Organized Reserve. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL The estimate before you provides for an average of 386,000 activeduty personnel of the Navy including officer candidates and 74,000 active personnel of the Marine Corps. This represents a reduction of 31,000 active personnel of the Navy and of 8,000 active personnel of the Marine Corps from current average strength. NAVAL AND MARINE CORPS RESERVE The number of regular personnel in the budget estimates for fiscal 1951 is properly much less than war requirements. It is therefore essential that for real preparedness we have a large and well-trained Naval and Marine Corps Reserve that immediately can be drawn upon to meet initial mobilization requirements. Plans for fiscal 1951 call for a total Naval Reserve of 923,000, of whom an average of 204,850 will be in organized-drill pay status. This is an increase of 22,544 in the average number in organized-drill pay status. For the Marine. Corps, plans contemplate a total of 149,386 during 1951, of whom an average of 50,772 will be in organized-drill pay status. This is an increase of 2,320 in drill-pay status over current fiscal year plans. There will be 317 training centers in use by the Naval Reserve. Sixty-eight training centers will be in use by the Marine Corps Reserve, who, in addition, will share 66 Naval Reserve training centers. The Navy has reorganized its seagoing reserve training program to eliminate 60 smaller vessels because their size and light construction made it uneconomical to continue their operation. The 111 larger ships remaining will be placed in year-round operating status by augmenting their crews with personnel transferred from inactivated vessels, thus increasing the yearly number of cruises and providing 10,000 additional training billets. The air components of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve will operate 1,844 aircraft of all types from 27 air stations-a reduction of 339 aircraft below 1950. SHIPS AND SHIPBUILDING There will be 653 vessels in the active fleet in fiscal 1951, a decrease of 78 from the 731 vessels appropriated for in 1950. There will be 239 major combatants in 1951, compared to the 288 major combatants in 1950. Ten shipyards will be operated in fiscal 1951. The Long Beach Naval Shipyard, which will be inactivated in 1950, will be kept in a maintenance status. Shipbuilding work under prior authority will continue at about a $300,000,000 expenditure rate during fiscal year 1951. No new obligating authority is requested to initiate new shipbuilding or conversion for fiscal 1951. As the Secretary of Defense pointed out, this action is not to be interpreted as meaning that a reasonably adequate shipbuilding program, including new starts, will not be provided for in future budgets. New types of ships must be built and existing ships converted in order that the Navy may keep pace with progress in scientific warfare. In addition to providing the replacements required to maintain a balance fleet, it is through new construction that new ship types, new instruments, new systems, improvements, innovations and the use of new weapons are developed. Developments in carrier planes, for example, demand basic changes in deck strength, deck height, launching catapults, fuel and ammunition supplies, and handling equipment. AIRCRAFT The Navy and Marine aviation programs for 1951 comprise a total of 4,389 operating aircraft for the Regular Establishment and 1,844 for the reserve components. This is a reduction which affects both the regular and reserve programs, the regular by 21 percent and the reserve by 16 percent below 1950. However, by greater utilization per aircraft, we shall be able to continue at approximately the 1950 level of flight operations. Very significant reductions in the aviation combat units are indicated at the beginning of 1951. Attack carrier air groups are to be reduced from 14 to 9. Antisubmarine squadrons, which operate from the small carriers, will be reduced from 8 to 7. Patrol squadrons will be reduced from 30 to 20. The Marines will operate 12 squadrons in 1951, compared with 23 provided for in 1950 estimates. The aviation shore establishment is being reduced by five stations in 1951. The proposed procurement of 817 aircraft included in this budget, will offset attrition and improve, somewhat, our aircraft inventory position, but it does not represent actual requirements. Other witnesses will present our aircraft program in greater detail, but I should like to point out that the rate of modernization of our aircraft con tinues below the standard required to maintain this force in first-line condition. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION Our industrial mobilization program under this budget will continue at the 1950 level of a little less than $14,000,000. The vital importance of industrial mobilization planning must not be overlooked. În any future war, no matter how well trained our personnel may be, or how modern our fighting equipment may be at the onset, our staying power will be directly dependent upon the ability of industry to mobilize and achieve peak production more quickly than ever before. Our plans and budget for industrial mobilization have been correlated with those of the other two services. As stated earlier in testimony of the Chairman of the Munitions Board, our proposed program in the 1951 estimates represents the best balance possible under the over-all budget. ORDNANCE Procurement of ordnance is being primarily restricted to ordnance material required to improve the effectiveness of antisubmarine warfare and antiaircraft defense systems in the active fleet. The number of ordnance shore stations will be decreased from 60 in fiscal 1950 to 56 in fiscal 1951. Of these stations, 33 will be actively operated, while the balance will be kept in a maintenance status. This continues the policy of disestablishing, leasing, or inactivating stations not required for peacetime missions. At the end of fiscal 1947, for example, there were 82 active ordnance stations. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT The research and development program presented in the Navy budget has been integrated with the programs of the Army and the Air Force and approved by the Research and Development Board. Naval ships, aircraft, weapons, and tactics must keep pace with the rapid advances being made in scientific warfare. PERFORMANCE BUDGET The Navy budget which includes the Marine Corps, is submitted in a structure materially different from previous years, and is termed a performance-type budget. It high lights the general character of programs to be accomplished and services to be rendered, rather than upon abstract objects such as personal services, supplies, et cetera. These items are, after all, only a means to an end. The all-important aim in budgeting is the purpose to be achieved (what the Navy and Marine Corps do)-the operation, maintenance, and repair of ships and aircraft, together with the personnel required to man them and their costs. Management responsibility parallels fiscal responsibility. The performance budget is not new for the Navy. For fiscal 1948 the President's budget was printed in two forms the conventional and an "alternate" on a performance basis. This alternate form wast suggested by the Navy Appropriations Subcommittee of the House in 1947. High priority legislation precluded consideration in the 1948 act. Mr. MAHON. I think it might be pointed out for the record that at that time Mr. Sheppard was Chairman of the House Subcommittee for Naval Appropriations, for 1947, and, of course, he now is vice chairman of this subcommittee. Secretary MATTHEWS. Yes, sir. The Department of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House recommended the new form in its report on the 1950 bill. The Hoover Commission endorsed the performance budget. Instead of 48 appropriations the new basis provides 21. Appropriation titles are meaningful instead of "Maintenance, Bureau of Ships" we have "Ships and facilities." Meaningless titles as "Miscellaneous expenses" are eliminated. In view of its long-standing and well-known desire to push forward with improvements in its budget structure, the Navy welcomes this opportunity to submit for your consideration its 1951 budget estimates on a revised basis. MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT The Department of the Navy has under way several additional programs to improve the efficiency and economy of our operations. An on-site survey program was initiated in June of 1949 to determine the minimum essential shore establishments necessary to the support of the peacetime Naval Establishment. A collateral objective is to make such recommendations regarding organization, staffing and physical plant and improvement needs for all naval activities in a given naval district as will permit the maximum amount of monetary savings without serious impairment of operating efficiency. Certain of the general provisions in the bill are now under study as to their possible implications affecting naval personnel. It is understood that the general provisions will be the subject of later hearings. In conclusion, the funds which the Navy requests are essential to support the international policy and commitments of the United States. Our Navy today is stationed at many distant places in support of these commitments. The funds which we seek are necessary to maintain the reduced operating forces in readiness to meet any emergency that may arise. Admiral Sherman will tell you about the operating forces and how they will be used. General Čates will discuss Marine Corps requirements. Admiral Hopwood will tell you about the financial aspects of the estimates. I want to assure you that the Bureau Chiefs, and any other Navy personnel whom you may wish to question, will appear before you to discuss any aspect of the estimates in which you may be interested. LIMITATION ON TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES BEFORE THE COMMITTEE Mr. PLUMLEY, Mr. Chairman, might I interrupt right there to ask this: Will they answer any questions we may ask? Secretary MATTHEWS. They will try to. I am quite sure they will be capable of doing it. Mr. PLUMLEY. Are there any restrictions now imposed by anybody as against an opportunity for this committee to ascertain what it wants to know? Secretary MATTHEWS. Not the slightest, Mr. Plumley. |