Subjectivity And Reduction: An Introduction To The Mind-body Problem
Contemporary philosophy has seen a proliferation of complex theories and intricate arguments brought to bear on the mind-body problem, perhaps the most intractable of perennial philosophical problems. In this concise and accessible text, Barbara Hannan provides an elegant introduction to this contemporary debate. Her emphasis is upon the clear and even-handed presentation and evaluation of the major theories of the mind, but she does not shrink from contributing to the advancement of the argument, including the presentation of an original account, the theory of "content internalism." Along the way to the formulation of this account, Hannan puts into context and discusses the views of all the major contemporary philosophers writing on the mind, including Lewis, Putnam, Searle, Davidson, Dennett, and Fodor. Combining a deep respect for the depth of the issues with clarity of thought and lucidity of expression, Subjectivity and Reduction is the ideal introduction to the central problem of today's philosophy of mind.
Reductive Materialist MindBody Theories
Reductive Physicalism Type Identity
Functionalist MindBody Theories
Does the Chinese Room Argument Work?
Arguments for Eliminative Materialism
Arguments Against Eliminative Materialism
Two Versions of NonReductive Materialism
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argues attitude psychology attributed beliefs and desires body brain called Cambridge causal explanations causal interaction causal powers causally relevant Chapter chickory Chinese room Chinese room argument Churchland cognitive science commonsense propositional attitude commonsense psychology computational concepts consciousness Dagmar Dennett Descartes eliminative materialism eliminativist essentially subjective example existence explain false Fodor folk physics functionalist Hilary Putnam homuncular functionalism human intelligent Intentional Stance introspective intuition logical behaviorism materialist mean mental causation mental descriptions mental events mental properties mentalistic mind-body problem multiple realization non-physical non-reductive materialism notion objection pain particular person philosophical Philosophy of Mind physical events physical properties predicted Press propositional attitude psychology propositional attitudes qualitative rational reduction representation scientific Searle sense sentence SIMPLICIO Socrates sort Stich substance dualism substance dualist view supervene on physical supervenience Suppose Swampman that-clauses things thoughts Turing machine Twin Earth type identity theory understand Chinese version of functionalism vocabulary words