quarrel with success. But I do not think the record of the last 20 or 30 years is precisely a record of unbroken triumph. I do not know whether the decisions would have been any better had they been debated in public, but I doubt whether they could have been much worse. And I think that our people would be more willing to withstand the impact of defeat, be more willing to withstand the impact of mistakes, if they felt they had a voice in it in the first place.

I have also discovered another rather peculiar thing that happens with this whole question of secrecy. In recent months, for various reasons, I have had a number of conversations with members of what is known as the New Left, the young college students who even find Karl Marx far too conservative and reactionary for their tastes. I do not mean any actual bomb-tossers; I do not think I have met any Weathermen or anything like that, but the young philosophical radicals of the modern era. What I find among them are some appalling arguments that offend all of my commen sense and I think would offend the common sense of almost any experienced man, but which in a sense cannot be refuted, because they always fall back on the vast areas of secrecy which lie within our government, and say these things are true if only they were not held secret by the Government.

Now, it is a peculiar argument, it is an old philosophical fallacy. I know the chairman and Senator Fulbright will know what is meant by the double negative; but nevertheless it is there.

I have had them argue with me heatedly that the only reason we are in Vietnam is in order to enhance the fortunes of some oil companies. Well, that thing is ridiculous. I do not believe that the people in charge of American foreign policy in the last few years have been venal and corrupt. But I think in their obsession for secrecy, they have laid the basis for this thing.

Now, you are confronted with a very difficult problem. Even though I am not a lawyer and cannot analyze the bill from that standpoint, I doubt very much whether any legislation can be devised that will compel the disclosure of all information within the executive branch. I think this is a practical matter; I think there will always be some things about which Presidents will not speak. I think there will always be some areas where the information really is difficult to gather. But those are rather practical matters which can be worked out on an ad hoc basis at the time.

But the one thing that I think Congress can do and should do is insist that this type of invocation of privilege be restricted to the President himself and that if there does arise a question of whether a man is his personal adviser, the President himself can be required to make that decision. I have heard some arguments that to give the President this sort of task is also conceding to him the doctrine of executive privilege. I do not mind conceding it too much, simply because I do not think there is anything that can be done about it. I think he can exercise it merely by the fact of his position. I do not think it even requires an argument on inherent powers or whether the founding fathers intended this.

From my reading of the Federalist papers, I doubt that they did, but this is irrelevant. This he can do and this he will do. But I

seriously doubt whether the practice of withholding information would be quite as widespread if the President really knew that he himself was going to have to make the decision and sign a piece of paper saying, this will be withheld for this reason.

I have heard other arguments to the effect that this is what the executive is already doing anyway. Well, again, I am a little skeptical. If that is what he is already doing anyway, why is he so resistant to this type of approach from Congress? That is an argument that can work both ways. If this bill is in accord with what they are doing, then what is wrong with passing it?

I think the practicalities of the matter are that it is highly essential that Congress start taking some tentative steps to exercise control over this new branch of Government. And, this I definitely find within Senator Fulbright's bill.

I do not think that we can any longer go on the assumption that the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is a personal adviser who is not subject to questioning by Congress, because if we do go on that assumption when the reality is quite to the contrary, the only people Congress will be able to question are men who have been reduced to the status of rather high-powered messenger boys.

I also think, incidentally, that another very good result of Senator Fulbright's bill would be to upgrade the Cabinet agencies themselves. I, myself, think that the kind of work, the sort of staff work that is vital to the successful functioning of our government is far better performed in the executive agencies than it is in the White House.

I am well aware of the fact that the executive agencies are not as imaginative, they are less likely to adopt new approaches when new approaches are called for. But at the same time, those agencies have an institutional memory. They are aware of what has been done in the past. They have certain reasonable rules by which to guide themselves.

I think that out of this comes a much more solid product. I think that out of it comes much wiser decisions to the extent that any decision can be wise. And I also think that out of it comes something into which Congress can get its teeth, whereas in the White House, while it is true there is more likely to be an imaginative approach, and quite possibly even a bit more brilliance-I do not know-it is also quite likely that decisions will be made with no knowledge of the past or very little, with very little practical experience in the Government, and with very little practical experience of what is necessary to keep a nation operating and keep it in a successful degree of unity.

Now, Mr. Chairman, those are my general views. I am certainly only too happy to respond to all questions and to see what I can do to be helpful to this committee.

Senator ERVIN. I think you have made a very significant philosophical contribution to the study of this subject.

Mr. REEDY. Thank you, sir.

Senator ERVIN. If I analyze your remarks properly, you think that if government is to operate in a democratic society in a manner which commands the respect and confidence of the people, it is essen

tial that the maximum amount of information dealing with crucial issues be divulged and debated?

Mr. REEDY. Right.

And I might add, Mr. Chairman, that I know of no other way to hold a public debate unless Congress considers the whole point. You know, the nation is not one huge arena in which 200 million citizens meet and debate under a chairman. The debate has to be focused somewhere and Congress is the place for that focus.

Senator ERVIN. I think you have lifted the study to a higher philosophical plane. You do not view this question as a petty contest between executive agencies and legislators?

Mr. REEDY. No.

Senator ERVIN. You believe that while such contests exist, they are of comparative insignificance in the whole picture?

Mr. REEDY. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. The real importance of the disclosure of information lies in the need for a full debate on the crucial issues which affect the life of the nation. Such debate is essential to make a democratic system, if not work efficiently, work in a manner satisfactory to the people, which, after all, is what Government has to do if it is going to endure.

Mr. REEDY. Right.

Possibly, I could give one example that just occurred to me, Mr. Chairman that might illustrate the point. One of my first duties on Capitol Hill happened to involve the period when General MacArthur came back from Japan. As you may recall, Senator Russell formed this joint committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, and very exhaustive hearings were held at that time.

I was privileged to serve as a staff member during those hearings. To me, the transformation in the country within a few short weeks was little short of fantastic.

When General MacArthur returned to the United States, the mood could only be described as explosive-in fact, that is an understatement. There were deep suspicions in the country that there had been some tremendous sellout at the very highest levels of the Government and that General MacArthur had been prevented from carrying out his duties as a soldier. And I still can recall the crowds lining the street and the vividness in their faces and the absolute electric feeling that was in the air. It would have taken very, very little to have touched off some significant explosions.

Now, one of the most amazing things about that hearing is that this was one instance that I know of in which information was given very fully, very freely, and very frankly. I think for once, the executive agencies were really penetrated by the absolute need for candor. And we had some rather elaborate arrangements so security information could be censored out. But it was censored out right on the spot in such a way that anybody reading the transcript realized that this was legitimate security information that no one could question. And inside of 4 or 5 weeks, the country once again was calm, there was once again unity; simply because you had an instance in which Congress was being given very fully, very frankly, and very freely, information.

And the public in turn became aware of this, which they did because all of the attention was focused upon it. And I think that frankness and candor saved the country quite a bit of turmoil.

On the other hand, I can recall what I think was one of the most divisive debates and one that did a tremendous amount to erode confidence in our Government. It revolved around the Wedemeyer report. The Wedemeyer report was one for which there probably were legitimate reasons for keeping secrets, I do not know but I imagine it had something to do with saving face for Chiang Kai Shek.

Nevertheless, even if there were reasons for keeping it secret, the mere existence of this secret report which was not being surrendered to Congress or anybody else, served as a corrosive basis for undermining the confidence of the people in their Government and leaving them with a feeling that there was some dark and secret Communist plot simply because this report was not released.

The report was released a few years later and the wonder was why they had not just published it in the newspapers the first day they got hold of it. But the secrecy of it-that was the only dramatic thing in the Wedemeyer report, the fact that it was secret. And even if there may have been good reasons for not publishing it, I think the damage of not publishing it was so great that our country to a certain extent is still suffering from it.

Senator ERVIN. If I may make an observation just before I have to go over to the Senate floor and vote, it seems to me that the philosophy which you have expressed as the result of your experience and observation of the Federal Government is in complete harmony with the Biblical statement, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." In other words, you emphasized that if the people know the truth in respect to the matters that affect their lives or in which they have a particular interest and debate that truth, they are freed from many fears they otherwise would have, they are freed from a lack of confidence in the Government, and they are freed from any misapprehensions and misunderstandings which tend to lead them astray.

Mr. REEDY. Right, very much so, sir.

Senator ERVIN. I expect I will have to go over and vote.
The subcommittee will stand in recess.

(Recess.)

Senator ERVIN. Since Senator Fulbright is the author of the proposed legislation under consideration by the committee, I am going to extend to him the privilege of asking the witness any questions he may desire to ask in connection with the matters being investigated.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the opportunity. It is a rather unique opportunity and I normally would not wish to infringe upon the time of the committee. But I think Mr. Reedy is, in a sense, a unique witness. I do not know whether the record shows it or not-I do not believe it does. If I might ask just as a background to show what I mean by unique, how long did you serve either in connection with the legislative or the executive branch? Just very briefly, because I think your experience gives great credibility to your testimony.

Mr. REEDY. Well, my service in the legislative branch, Senator, began in 1951, when I went with the Senate Preparedness Committee as a staff consultant. Then in 1953, I became the staff director of what was then the Senate Minority Policy Committee. In 1955, after quite a display of intelligence by the voters, I became staff director of the Senate Majority Policy Committee.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Who was chairman of that Policy Committee? Mr. REEDY. Senator Lyndon Johnson was chairman of the Policy Committee.

Then in 1961, when he became Vice President, I became his Special Assistant for the Equal Employment Opportunities Program and for the Space Act.

Then in 1961, I became Special Assistant to the President. In 1964 and 1965, I was the Press Secretary of the White House. Senator FULBRIGHT. Under President Johnson?

Mr. REEDY. Yes; under President Johnson. Then I had to have some rather extensive surgery which kept me out of activities that involved walking for a year and I spent that year in the White House as Special Assistant, largely in labor matters. Then I was in the White House for 1 year in 1968.

Before 1951, I had been a newspaperman, spending most of my time in covering the Senate and some period in covering of the House of Representatives.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think, Mr. Chairman, this is important because I dare say you will have few witnesses who have had such intimate experience on both sides and observed the problems and virtues and faults, if there are any, of both the legislative and of the executive. I think it is worthwhile noting this, because some of the witnesses necessarily have had experience only in the executive or only in the legislative. I myself can say I have only had experience in the legislative branch.

So I think Mr. Reedy has a balance and understanding that we will find in very few people.

I want to join with the chairman and say in regard to the book you have written about the Presidency that it is the best book in modern days about this office and I do strongly recommend it to anybody interested in how our Government operates.

Senator ERVIN. If I may add my observation to yours, prior to having this connection with the Government, the witness had the benefit of a newspaper experience which gave him, I think, to a very marked degree. the capacity to detach himself from things and to observe them with objectivity.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes; he had testified to that, and I certainly agree with that. This is the third experience-that is, as a member of what we call the fourth estate, he has this rather, I think, unique experience. And to me, it lends great weight to what he has to say. Coming back to some of the questions you raised. I know most of the limitations of what we can make any executive do, and I was certainly conscious of that in drawing this bill.

I tried to go as far as I thought it was feasible to go and no further. There was no point in going beyond it. I do not know; if we can get the Congress to accept this, it will be almost a miracle.