What specific programs was the system designed to support? Who authorized this system, and when? Who had access to the information in the system? How many print-outs were made? To whom were they distributed? Who is the highest ranking civilian in authority who approved or had actual knowledge of the data bank? When was the system discovered? What justification was made for maintaining the system and for seeking an exception to the discontinuance order of Secretary Resor? Were periodic teletype messages, estimates or summaries produced and, if so, to whom were they distributed? Please also answer the questions above relating to the master and other tapes for this computer system as well. Reference has been made to a third data bank system at Fort Hood. The Subcommittee has even less information about this system. I would appreciate a full report on this, including information on the matters raised with respect to the other two computers. A print-out of this data system was not included in the materials transferred from the Department of Justice. Does a print-out or any other similar document exist which contains the information on that computer? If so, I would appreciate access to it as well. During the hearings, references were made to a set of records called the "Van Deman" files. Have these files ever existed, and were they compiled by Army personnel in whole or part? Please describe the history, content and nature of the files. Were they ever in the custody or possession of the Army? If so, please give the dates, and the particulars of how they came into Army control. Are they still in Army control? If not, on what date did they leave Army control? Please give the particulars of how they left Army control. Did the Army have possession or control of them on the date Mr. Froehlke testified, or could they have regained control at that time? Why was no mention made of these files at the time of his testimony? The Subcommittee is informed that reviews of files in the possession of the Department during the period of the Subcommittee's inquiries revealed a number which were specially segregated and destroyed because of their content or because the existence of files on these persons would have been particularly embarrassing to the Department. Were any special reviews made of files, indexes, or the like to determine whether files on persons of prominence existed? If so, when was the review made? Were any such files discovered? Were the files destroyed? If so, when, by whom, and on whose authority or direction? Please describe the nature and contents of the files and list the names of the persons involved. Why was no mention made of this to the Subcommittee? With kindest wishes, SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., Chairman. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, JR., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary of Defense has requested me to respond to your letter of March 12 and to thank you for your complimentary remarks on the cooperation of the Department of Defense, and on Mr. Froehlke's testimony in connection with the recent hearings of your Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. I recall that you told me in one of our earlier meetings that the purpose of your investigation was to assist in bringing about a correction of whatever excesses or inappropriate activities existed or had existed in connection with gathering by military organizations of information on individuals and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense and the Department concurred wholeheartedly in that objective and is intent on continuing cooperation with you toward that end. In this connection, the transcript of the hearing at which Mr. Froehlke testified has been carefully reviewed to insure that all information requested by you and the other Senators who participated has been supplied in full. In addition, supplemental material has been provided in a number of areas which appear to be useful to your Committee in fully evaluating the subjects of your interest. Among the materials requested by you during the hearings was data on the organization and mannning of the Army's investigative and counterintelligence units within the United States. This material is being provided with respect both to the United States Army Intelligence Command and the military intelligence detachments and units which are assigned to combatant forces. Appropriate maps are also being provided to show the location of these units and, where applicable, their geograhic areas of responsibility. Also in response to a request by Senator Kennedy, we are furnishing the number of agents involved in direct observation and the types of utilization made of them in connection with major disturbances. To the best of our knowledge, these are the only two questions asked during the full day's testimony by Mr. Froehlke in which answers to the Committee's inquiries could not be fully provided at that time. In your letter, you noted that you had not yet received an assessment of the effectiveness of the intelligence operations and their usefulness in helping the Army, the Department of Justice, and state and local offices in meeting their responsibilities when they were called upon to put down civil disorders. We cannot, of course, respond for the Department of Justice, but we have noted that officials of that Department have appeared before your Committee on two occasions. Neither could we presume to evaluate any assistance which might have incidentally been provided to state and local officials from the civil disturbance information collection activities. The Department of the Army and the Department of Defense, however, have assessed the effectiveness and usefulness of the types of civil disturbance information collected in past years. This evaluation has been made by senior civilian officials of the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. As I am sure you know, those charged with the responsibility of collecting information are not in the best position to evaluate its usefulness to the decision makers, and respond to requirements for information, which, when collected, is considered, together with information from other sources, by those they support. The civil disturbance information collection by the military (primarily the Army) was broadly expanded in 1967 in the hope and expectation that on the basis of a wide range of information collected it might be possible to predict with a creditable degree of accuracy the occurrence of civil disturbances which might be sufficiently severe to require the assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies by military forces. However, as Secretary of the Army Resor stated in his letter to Congressman Ogden Reid on 13 February 1971, "we also concluded from our experience in collecting civil disturbance information for over two years that we could not predict, with any degree of assurance, which disturbances would be sufficiently severe to require the Army to assist state and local law enforcement agencies." This conclusion contributed to the decision by the Department of the Army on June 9, 1970, and to that of the Secretary of Defense in March of this year, to severely constrain the collection of civil disturbance information by military organizations and personnel. As you know, the Department of Defense now relies on the Department of Justice to provide adequate alert to the Department of Defense on situations which might require prepositioning or deployment of military units to assist state and local law enforcement agencies in civil disturbance situations. As you noted, Mr. Froehlke did testify on the extent to which civil disturbance information collection by the military was ordered or approved by higher civilian authorities. Please be assured that Mr. Froehlke was in a position to know the facts since he had at his disposal all of the records of the Department. His familiarity, as I am sure you will agree, is indicated by his extensive recital on the types of civilian knowledge and involvement indicated by the records. As Mr. Froehlke testified, internal memoranda of interagency group meetings at the White House and elsewhere demonstrated that senior civilian officials fully participated in the civil disturbance planning. Further, the Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan of May 1968 was, as you know, widely distributed to the appropriate civilian levels of authority in the Government. Additionally, Congressional committees were notified of the military's participation in the collection of civil disturbance information. This ability to provide a broad overview of events is contrasted with the more restricted knowledge of subordinate commanders or staff officers. Such officers receive their direction through formal channels, and in the normal course of business, do not have direct knowledge of the acts of civilian officials either at the Departmental level, at higher echelons of Government, or in other departments of Government. The formal investigations to which I referred in my letter to you of March 9 were initiated with respect to allegations that military personnel from Fort Carson units and from undetermined units in Texas had engaged in information collection activities on individuals not affiliated with the Department of Defense. The allegations were directed at personnel of other than the United States Army Intelligence Command. The initial purposes of the investigation are to determine which, if any, of the allegations are factually based, who participated and who directed the activities, if any, to be performed. Once these questions are answered, it will be necessary to determine, if such occurred, under what authority they were conducted, and whether any of the activities exceeded the authority vested in the commander who initiated them. These activities are being subjected to formal investigation because there is no present evidence that civilian authorities specifically authorized such activities or were aware of them. At this stage of the investigation, it is not possible to anticipate what might be the nature of the judicial or administrative actions, if any, that result. It is hoped that this additional information will be of assistance to your Committee. Sincerely yours, J. FRED BUZHARDT. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, JR., Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received a copy of Mr. Rehnquist's letter to you dated March 18, 1971 concerning access to the material in the print-outs from the Army's civil disturbance intelligence data banks which are now in the custody of the Department of Justice. Mr. Rehnquist indicates in his letter that he has no objection to making these documents available for inspection by members of your staff. The Department of Defense also has no objection to your staff's reviewing these documents in order to ascertain their general character and in order to get a general understanding of their intended purpose. However, the print-outs contain references to various individuals and organizations which we are precluded, by consistent Executive Branch policy, from releasing to the public. The kinds of characterizations and unsubstantiated information contained in these print-outs, like other information contained in intelligence files, could be misleading if taken out of context and could be detrimental to the individuals and organizations which are mentioned. Accordingly, we concur in the print-outs being made available to you for. examination with the expressed understanding that none of the specific information contained in these print-outs will be made public. Sincerely, J. FRED BUZHARDT. SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, March 12, 1971. Hon. MELVIN R. LAIRD, DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your response, through General Counsel Buzhardt, in reply to my letter of March 4 repeating my request that Generals McChristian, Yarborough and Blakefield appear before the Subcommittee to testify. As I have often expressed both publicly and privately, the Subcommittee appreciates the fine spirit of cooperation which the Department has demonstrated during the course of our inquiry. There is no question but that you and the Department have rendered a fine public service by the way in which this matter has been approached. Mr. Froehlke's statement was extremely helpful and served to clear up many questions the Subcommittee and the public had with respect to the events of the past few years. Although I have not yet had an opportunity to study in detail the new rules promulgated by the Department for future domestic intelligence, it is apparent that you and the other members of the Department have made a commendable effort to rectify the abuses of the past and to prevent their reoccurrence. Despite the great progress which has been made thus far, there still remain some important matters which must be cleared up. Chief among the issues is the question of the extent to which the intelligence-gathering was ordered or approved by higher civilian authority. It is also necessary to determine the extent and level of civilian knowledge of these activities during various times throughout the period in question. Mr. Froehlke's testimony was very helpful in these matters. However, the Subcommittee has had no direct, positive evidence from those in a position to know the facts. As Mr. Froehlke pointed out so well, the evidence on this difficult point must be reconstructed from the memories of those who participated. He, of course, like yourself, was not in office at the time and he was given formal and direct responsibility for these matters only recently. The Subcommittee has not thus far been given access to the memoranda, notes, chronologies and other documents upon which Mr. Froehlke's statements were based or to which he referred. These are matters which can only be clarified by the appearance of those in the military service who were direct participants in these operations or who were immediately responsible for the implementation of the programs. One very serious question, which only such individuals can assist in answering, concerns the effectiveness of the intelligence operations and their usefulness in helping the Army, the Department of Justice, and state and local officers in meeting their responsibilities when they were called upon to put down civil disorders. We have not as yet received an assessment of this activity from the experts who are in position to inform the Subcommittee and the American people. Only direct, positive testimony from officers whose business it is to provide useful intelligence can give us this evaluation. There are other points upon which their testimony will be helpful. We wish to learn, for instance, how many agents were employed in domestic intelligence work, what their geographic areas of responsibility were, how many meetings, speeches, campuses, and other activities were covered, and other such information. I am very mindful of the sensitivity of testimony which might conceivably be presented by these generals. As a former judge and as one who has long been striving for the finest possible systems of military and civilian justice, I am most cautious lest any public testimony prejudice prosecutions which may develop out of this inquiry. However, it is difficult to determine from the current state of Subcommittee knowledge how any testimony we might desire from these gentlemen could in any way be involved in a future trial. For this reason, I believe it would be helpful if you would inform me, in detail, of the nature of the possible prosecutions, the persons involved, the substance of the allegations and the particulars of the statutes and regulations that may have been violated. I realize that you are in an early stage of determining whether there occurred any violations subject to court-martial proceedings. However, as is evident from the testimony and Mr. Buzhardt's letter, this is more than a hypothetical possibility. The Subcommittee wishes to avoid any possibility of prejudicing in any way the future rights of any person who may be subject to court-martial. I will certainly inform other members of the Subcommittee of the possible difficulty and encourage each of them to exercise great care during the conduct of the hearing. Since each member of this Subcommittee is a lawyer and each has been involved in the Subcommittee's prior efforts to ensure that every soldier is protected by the finest system of justice possible, I have every confidence that the fears expressed in Mr. Buzhardt's letter can easily be avoided. I believe that if these gentlemen are permitted to testify, we can demonstrate to the American citizen beyond question that any lingering doubts he might have about the issues under investigation are without foundation. I am certain you agree with me that it is important that the Congress and the Defense Department not give any citizen any reason to believe that the full story about surveillance of civilians has not yet been told. I firmly believe that the appearance of these gentlemen at a full public hearing will go far towards achieving this important goal. Once again, I want you to know of my appreciation for the fine cooperation which you have shown thus far in our inquiry. With kindest wishes, Sincerely yours, SAM J. ERVIN, JR., Chairman. MARCH 11, 1971. Hon. STANLEY R. RESOR, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In order to assist the Subcommittee in its current inquiry into domestic intelligence operations, I would appreciate your supplying the following information: 1. What is the total number of persons, enlisted and officer, in the U.S. Army Intelligence Command stationed in the United States? Please give answers for each year from 1964 to present. 2. How is the Command organized geographically? Please give the location, designation, and geographic responsibility for each military intelligence office in the United States and the number of persons, officers and enlisted in each office. Please give answers for each year from 1965 to present. 3. What is the organizational structure of the Command, and who have been the officers in charge of the principle divisions of the Command from 1965 to present? Please give the dates in which these officers have been in command, and a brief description of the functions of each of these divisions. It would be helpful if you would also submit a map or chart containing the information requested in questions 2 and 3. 4. During the testimony of Assistant Secretary Froehlke, he discussed the tactical intelligence units attached to units of the Continental Army. Please give the same information for these units. Mr. Froehlke mentioned at his appearance on March 3 plans to staff military intelligence positions with career personnel, and not to assign draftees or other personnel with limited Army experience either officer or enlisted to these responsibilities. I would appreciate being informed whether such plans have been suggested, studied or approved, and whether such a plan is now or will soon be in effect. If such a plan is not yet approved, I would appreciate learning its status, and the reasons for its being considered. Mr. Froehlke also offered to the Subcommittee a list of inspections conducted by the Department of Army into its domestic intelligence operations during the period from January, 1970, to present. I would appreciate your sending a copy to the Subcommittee. I should like to express once again my appreciation for the cooperation you have given the Subcommittee in its current inquiry. With kindest regards, DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: The Secretary asked that I reply to your letter of March 4 with reference to additional witnesses from the Army for your Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. It comes as a surprise that you feel that Secretary Froehlke left some of your questions unanswered in his appearance on March 2 before your Subcommittee. A review of the transcript revealed but one request by your Subcommittee for information to be submitted for the record. The material |