Files have been and will continue to be screened in accordance with this policy for the purpose of removing and destroying material not authorized for retention under current policy. Generally speaking, there has been no special effort to segregate files to be screened. However, upon discovering that files on certain prominent individuals contained information which is no longer authorized to be retained, the Army has specifically screened out this material.

I trust that this information will assist you in your inquiry.

Sincerely,

J. FRED BUZHARDT.

SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
Washington, D.C., June 10, 1971.

Hon. MELVIN R. LAIRD,

Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Over the course of the weeks since the conclusion of the Subcommittee's recent hearings I have from time to time addressed inquiries to you on various points which have needed clarification. I have now had an opportunity to review in more detail the Department's testimony and other information and materials at my disposal. As a result I am submitting additional queries which I would like answered.

In order to facilitate the Subcommittee's understanding of the issues raised in these inquiries, I would like to receive copies of the documents which pertain to them rather than merely a narrative response. You may, of course, include any additional material which would aid the Subcommittee in its understanding of the materials you submit, but my primary interest is in the documents themselves. These materials are indispensable if the Congress and the American people are to understand fully the operations and implications of the Army's surveillance program.

A. During the course of Mr. Froehlke's testimony, he made a number of generalized references to the manner in which this program was initiated and controlled, and the extent of knowledge and approval by senior military and civilian authority.

1. Following World War II, when did the Army first begin to conduct surveillance of any type and to any degree on domestic activities of United States citizens? Trace Army intelligence activities from this date to the Pentagon March on October 23, 1967.

2. Beginning in 1967 and 1968, if appropriate, when were the first meetings to discuss preparations for civil disturbances held between senior Administration officials at which Defense Department officers were present? Where were they held, who was present, and what transpired with regard to the collection of intelligence and the roles, respectively, of the Army, the Justice Department, and other agencies?

3. When did direct discussions between the Army, Justice and other agencies begin respecting the allocation of responsibility for intelligence collecting? Please trace the course of these discussions to Jan. 1, 1971.

4. What was the result of the disturbances following Martin Luther King's death on disturbance planning and intelligence? When was the Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations Directorate established and what intelligence responsibilities were created at this time? Describe the structure and organization of the DCDPO from its creation to present. Describe all intelligence production of DCDPO, including any data banks, computer programs, research materials, studies or finished intelligence it produced.

5. Describe the chain of command in Defense for the Department's responsibilities in this area.

6. When were the first descriptions made of the intelligence needed for civil disturbance? Please trace the development of these "essential elements of intelligence" from this point to March 2, 1971, and include copies of each. 7. State the organizational, personnel, and financial charges made or requested from the initiation of Army civil disturbance intelligence responsibilities to present. What effect did these new responsibilities have on the other functions of military intelligence?

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8. Please describe all reports, studies, evaluations and analyses made respecting the Department's civil disturbance and intelligence programs from Little Rock, September, 1957, to present.

B. There has been considerable confusion about the extent of the knowledge of civilian officials in the Army of the scope of the Army program and, in particular, the employment of computers.

1. Please list all inquiries from civilian officers of the Department of Defense prior to and including the 1970 period concerning the Army's data bank and computer capability in civil disturbance intelligence. Please specify to and by whom each inquiry was made, what the response was, and the exact data and circumstance when the existence and contents of each computer data bank was made known to the Army General Counsel.

2. Please describe the plans, programs, authorizations, and approvals for each computer operation as it was conceived and initiated. Include also each research and evaluation study involved in the creation and operation of these programs, as well as all information pertaining to the "predictive" or other uses of these operations.

C. Secretary Froehlke mentioned the efforts of the Department to have the Department of Justice assume responsibility for intelligence collection. 1. Please describe the course of discussions between the Departments regarding the assumption of responsibility by the Department of Justice. In particular, describe the position of the Army on the adequacy of the Justice Department intelligence program to the Army's perceived need for intelligence. 2. Please describe the information given to the Justice Department on the Army's intelligence program and, to the extent made known to the Army, the usefulness of the Army's program, as seen by the Justice Department, for its own responsibilities.

3. Please describe each instance in which intelligence gathered by the Department was used or sought to be used by the Department of Justice in prosecutions undertaken or contemplated.

4. Please describe in detail the discussions leading up to the Justice/Defense memorandum to the President on civil disturbance responsibilities (April, 1969), and the allocation of responsibilities that resulted from that agreement. 5. Describe the Army intelligence responsibility prior to and following this agreement and the extent to which those operations prior to April 1969, and from April, 1969 to June, 1970, were consistent or exceeded these requirements. Describe how, if at all, the June, 1970 redefinition of intelligence responsibilities related to the April, 1969 agreement. To the extent known, describe any new responsibilities undertaken by the Justice Department on or after June, 1970, as a result of the reduction in Army intelligence collection.

6. Please describe the response of the various Army and Defense Department offices concerned with intelligence to the April, 1969 agreement.

7. Please describe the reassessment and redefinition of Army intelligence reponsibilities, if any, that may have resulted from the reviews following the McGiffert memorandum and the Defense/Justice agreement, including, but not limited to the following points:

Limitations on direct observation

Limitations on covert observation

Extent of surveillance of campus and church activities

Restrictions on publication and distribution of intelligence products, such as studies, resource materials, spot reports, summaries, etc.

Intelligence Command responsibilities

Revisions in "EEIs" and the Civil Disturbance Information Collection

Plan.

D. Secretary Froehlke testified that the reassessment of the Army intelligence role began with the McGiffert memorandum of February 5, 1969 and that this reassessment led to the reduction of Army activities through the balance of 1969.

1. Please describe the origins of the McGiffert memorandum and Beal memorandum which followed. Describe all the recommendations submitted in response to the memoranda by the responsible officials of OACSI, the Vice Chief of Staff, the DCDPO, the CIAD, USAINTC, and other Army and Defense offices through and until January 1, 1970. Describe in detail the changes made and not made in the collection program as a result of the issues raised in the McGiffert and Beal memoranda.

2. Describe the efforts to redefine the Army's intelligence mission from January 1, 1970, to January 1, 1971. Specify the requests for information from the General Counsel or the Secretary of the Army, the policies announced by him, and the responses and reactions from all interested offices. 3. Please describe all manpower and resource utilization surveys conducted into the intelligence operation including their results, recommendations, and the follow-up action taken.

E. Throughout the course of this inquiry I have endeavored to discover the magnitude of the military surveillance program. Mr. Froehlke's testimony gave few if any details on this point.

Please describe all efforts made since January, 1970 to determine the magnitude and scope of the Army collection program. Describe all requests from the Pentagon to the various intelligence offices for such information, and the responses. Please describe the magnitude of the operation for each such office, giving the dates as of which this information was furnished to you. Include, of course, all Intelligence Command and Continental Army Intelligence offices, as well as those of higher headquarters, OACSI, and DCDPO.

F. References have been made to various operations, projects, or activities which used code names such as Garden Plot, Royal Queen, Cafe Zipper, Grand Silo, Grain Metric, Rook Tower, Gracious Manor, Rook Castle, etc. Please describe each of these plans or operations, including the written orders and other pertinent documents. Please list and describe all other codename activities, whether national, regional, or local, relating to Army surveillance activities and civil disturbance operations. Was there a plan, contingency or otherwise, for the imposition of martial law should that become necessary? If so, please give the code name, if any, and describe the plan.

G. I have received information that following the orders to destroy or purge information collected under the program in the months following January, 1970, some materials were given to local, state, or other federal agencies.

Please describe any efforts undertaken to determine whether such transfers occurred. Describe and specify each instance in which it was discovered that such transfers were made, including the materials, the offices and personnel involved, and whether such transfer was or was not authorized by higher authority.

H. Electronic Surveillance. Secretary Froehlke said in his testimony that on only one occasion was electronic surveillance employed, and that was an interception of citizens band radio transmissions.

1. Please explain his use of the term "electronic surveillance" and whether it includes interception of radio communications of any kind as well as wire communications.

2. Describe how many times such interceptions or monitoring either of wire or radio-by Army personnel took place, whether directly for Army use or for other agencies, giving the agency involved, the persons under surveillance, who authorized the surveillance, and other details.

3. Please give the pertinent law and regulation on such interceptions at the time each took place.

4. Describe whether such electronic surveillance was approved or known by senior military officers, or civilian officials in the Department when done, whether it was ever discussed with the Department of Justice, the FBI, the FCC, or other non-Department of Defense Agencies, and who was aware or approved of this activity.

5. Set forth any opinion, formal or informal, sought or received by the Army as to the legality of such interceptions.

6. Describe the nature of the information obtained from such surveillance. Was the usefulness for intelligence purposes of such interceptions ever evaluated and if so, when? Please describe the effect of these evaluations on the continued use of electronic surveillance.

7. Please describe the authorization and approval procedures that were in effect at the time of each of these interceptions. To what extent were they followed in each case. Please include a copy of the operations manuals for these operations.

It is clear from my continuing study of this problem that there is a great deal of information which has not yet been made available to the Subcommittee. These queries of mine should go far towards disclosing the full picture

for the benefit of Congress and the American people. While I will not at this time reiterate my views on the differences which have arisen with respect to my earlier requests, I do wish to stress as emphatically as I can my belief that the entire story must be told that only the most persuasive arguments for national security-assuming that "national security" is pertinent at all in the context of this activity-should restrict the information and the documents from being disclosed to the American people.

With kindest wishes,
Sincerely yours,

SAM J. ERVIN, JR., Chairman.

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., June 9, 1971.

Mr. LAWRENCE M. BASKIR,

Chief Counsel and Staff Director,

Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. BASKIR: Please accept my apologies for not responding earlier to your draft analysis of the various Army documents delivered to the Subcommittee by the Justice Department. In order to give you a responsible reaction, it was necessary to establish a coordinated review of the documents from all appropriate elements of the Department.

Our comments are as follows:

1. The publication of the statement would be prejudicial to the Government's interests in the Tatum v. Laird litigation, particularly since the case has been remanded for trial. Certain of the information in the staff report, and the exhibits accompanying it, would not be available in discovery proceedings. As the documents are needed by the Government in preparation for pending litigation, the documents temporarily in the possession of the Subcommittee staff should be returned to the Justice Department.

2. The publication of the statement with references to certain public figures would certainly run counter to the Subcommittee's announced intention to safeguard the privacy of individuals. With the report itself there are descriptions of individuals and their activities of a personal nature. It is one thing to put it in an investigative file, but quite another thing to publish it in a Committee report available to the public-at-large.

3. The publication of the statement would be in contradiction to the conditions under which the Subcommittee staff was permitted to review these documents. As was noted in the Department's letter to you of March 19, 1971, Defense agreed to this review "with the expressed understanding that none of the specific information contained in these print-outs will be made public." 4. The draft statement is overtaken by events. Since the preparation of the staff report, the Defense Department has furnished additional materials to the Committee. These explain certain of the code designations reflected in the computer print-outs. They also refute the contention expressed in the report that the Army has failed to provide an adequate explanation of the computer printouts.

5. No useful purpose would be served by a public report on the materials examined, particularly where these materials relate to long-rescinded intelligence collection programs. Many hundreds of manhours have already been devoted to explaining these computer operations in considerable detail. Since these computer operations were disbanded, and since Defense policies now specifically restrict such collections of information, further efforts in this area would serve no valid legislative purpose.

6. The report contains a number of statements which are factually incorrect, which omit pertinent facts or which draw erroneous conclusions as indicated below.

The report states that there is an absence of "any definite assessment" as to the "value of this intelligence." On November 27, 1970, the Army notified the Committee that it did not substantially aid the Army in predicting civil disturbances. On March 2, 1971, Secretary Froehlke testified that the Army's Under Secretary had questioned the worth of the intelligence collection effort as early as December 1968.

The report strongly implies that the Army has failed to cooperate by providing a complete accounting. Contrary to these assertions, the Army has provided both documents and personnel to explain the computer system in a series of exchanges with the Subcommittee staff. On April 12, 1971, a computer expert familiar with the computer operations at Fort Monroe and Fort Hood, together with an Army General Counsel representative, met with the Chief Counsel to discuss these computer systems. Instead, the major attention of this meeting was directed to the Fort Holabird computer system with which the computer expert was not immediately familiar. As this computer system was dismantled sometime ago, it is difficult to reconstruct computer decisions of three years ago.

The report is deficient in that it omits any reference as to the date these documents were compiled and any reference to the date these documents were destroyed. At the very least it should note that so-called "Mug" books were published in May and October 1968. It should further note that the two volumes of the Compendium were compiled in 1968 with the last change dated October 1969. The report should also indicate that these documents were ordered destroyed in June 1970, and that the only known copies are those retained for litigation purposes.

Finally, the report states that despite the analysis of these documents the Subcommittee staff still does not have a complete picture of civil disturbance intelligence activities. It further asserts that it is impossible to determine whether civilian authorities had ordered or had knowledge of the intelligence program. These assertions are difficult to accept because the extent of the surveillance program has been covered in great depth, both by the Subcommittee's own witnesses and through the testimony and documents supplied by the Defense Department. As to civilian participation and knowledge of such activities, the record is replete with testimony as to involvement of the White House, the Justice Department and senior civilian officials in the Department of Defense.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Secretary Resor has asked me to reply to your letter of March 11, 1971 requesting certain information on the Army intelligence program.

I regret the delay in responding to your requests. Much of the information requested in questions number two and three of your letter was simply not available in any central location and had to be obtained from various sources at subordinate field units.

The information requested in your first question is enclosed at Tabs A and B.

I believe that your second question of how USAINTC is organized geographically has already been answered by Mr. Robert Froehlke in his March 29, 1971 letter to you. The additional specific information you requested on the location, designation, and geographic responsibility of the various military intelligence offices is enclosed at Tab C. On March 29, 1971, Mr. Froehlke also provided you a map depicting the geographic organization of USAINTC. This may also be used in conjunction with the information supplied at Tab C. As for the first question of number 3 of your letter, I have enclosed an organizational chart of USAINTC, which outlines its various command and staff relationships. I have also included organizational charts for each of the eight Military Intelligence Groups at Tab D. In addition, the regulations at Tabs E and F describe the responsibilities and duties of various positions in USAINTC and the overall mission of USAINTC. This information fully explains the organization and duties of the various elements of USAINTC.